April 24, 1989

Docket No. 50-271

Mr. R. W. Capstick
Licensing Engineer
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corporation
580 Main Street
Bolton, Massachusetts 01740-1398

Dear Mr. Capstick:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO.111 TO DPR-28 - VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION (TAC NO. 51693)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.111 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated November 18, 1988.

This amendment modifies the Technical Specifications to add limiting conditions of operation and surveillance requirements for the RCIC System and the HPCI System resulting from improvements required by NUREG-0737, Items II.K.3.13 and II.K.3.22. These changes to the Technical Specifications complete changes called for by NRC Generic Letter 83-02 dated January 10, 1983.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

This completes action under TAC 51693.

Sincerely,

/S/

Morton B. Fairtile, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-3
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

8905020409 890424
PDR ADOCK 05000271
P PNU

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No.111 to License No. DPR-28
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

DF01
1/1

CP-1
cc

OFC:	PDI-3	:PDI-3	:OGC	:DIR/PDI-3:	:	:
NAME:	MRushbrook	:MFairtile	:RBachmann	:RWessman	:	:
DATE:	3/21/89	: 3/21/89	: 3/27/89	: 4/12/89	:	:

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

April 24, 1989

Docket No. 50-271

Mr. R. W. Capstick
Licensing Engineer
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corporation
580 Main Street
Bolton, Massachusetts 01740-1398

Dear Mr. Capstick:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO.111 TO DPR-28 - VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION (TAC NO. 51693)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.111 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) in response to your application dated November 18, 1988.

This amendment modifies the Technical Specifications to add limiting conditions of operation and surveillance requirements for the RCIC System and the HPCI System resulting from improvements required by NUREG-0737, Items II.K.3.13 and II.K.3.22. These changes to the Technical Specifications complete changes called for by NRC Generic Letter 83-02 dated January 10, 1983.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

This completes action under TAC 51693.

Sincerely,

Morton B. Fairtile

Morton B. Fairtile, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-3
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No.111 to License No. DPR-28
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

Mr. R. W. Capstick
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station

cc:

Mr. J. Gary Weigand
President & Chief Executive Officer
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
R.D. 5, Box 169
Ferry Road
Brattleboro, Vermont 05301

W. P. Murphy, Vice President
and Manager of Operations
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
R.D. 5, Box 169
Ferry Road
Brattleboro, Vermont 05301

Mr. John DeVincentis, Vice President
Yankee Atomic Electric Company
580 Main Street
Bolton, Massachusetts 01740-1398

Mr. George Sterzinger, Commissioner
Vermont Department of Public Service
120 State Street, 3rd Floor
Montpelier, Vermont 05602

New England Coalition on Nuclear
Pollution
Hill and Dale Farm
R.D. 2, Box 223
Putney, Vermont 05346

Public Service Board
State of Vermont
120 State Street
Montpelier, Vermont 05602

Vermont Public Interest Research
Group, Inc.
43 State Street
Montpelier, Vermont 05602

G. Dean Weyman
Chairman, Board of Selectman
Post Office Box 116
Vernon, Vermont 05354

William Russell, Regional Administrator
Region I Office
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Raymond N. McCandless
Vermont Division of Occupational
and Radiological Health
Administration Building
Montpelier, Vermont 05602

Mr. R. W. Capstick
Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corporation
580 Main St.
Bolton, Massachusetts 01740-1398

Honorable John J. Easton
Attorney General
State of Vermont
109 State Street
Montpelier, Vermont 05602

R. K. Gad III
Ropes & Gray
225 Franklin Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02110

Conner & Wetterhahn, P.C.
Suite 1050
1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

cc:

Diane Curran, Esq.
Harmon, Curran & Tousley
2001 S Street, N.W., Suite 430
Washington, D.C. 20009

David J. Mullett, Esq.
Special Assistant Attorney General
Vermont Depart. of Public Service
120 State Street
Montpelier, VT 05602

Jay Gutierrez
Regional Counsel
USNRC, Region I
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

G. Dana Bisbee, Esq.
Office of the Attorney General
Environmental Protection Bureau
State House Annex
25 Capitol Street
Concord, NH 03301-6397

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr.
Administrative Judge
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.O. Box 176
Vernon, Vermont 05354

John Traficonte, Esq.
Chief Safety Unit
Office of the Attorney General
One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor
Boston, MA 02108

Geoffrey M. Huntington, Esquire
Office of the Attorney General
Environmental Protection Bureau
State House Annex
25 Capitol Street
Concord, NH 03301-6397

Charles Bechhoefer, Esq.
Administrative Judge
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Dr. James H. Carpenter
Administrative Judge
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Adjudicatory File (2)
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel Docket
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-271

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 111
License No. DPR-28

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (the licensee), dated November 18, 1988, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

8905020417 890424
PDR ADOCK 05000271
P PNU

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B of Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (b) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 111 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective immediately.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Richard H. Wessman, Director
Project Directorate I-3
Division of Reactor Projects I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 24, 1989

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 111

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-28

DOCKET NO. 50-271

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove	Insert
34a	34a
42	42
43	43
44	44
--	49e*
--	49f*
52	52
55	55
56	56
--	60d*
63	63
--	66a*

*Denotes new page

3.2 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.2 Protective Instrument Systems Specification (cont'd)

I. Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation

During reactor power operation, the Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation shall be operative in accordance with Table 3.2.1.

J. Control Room Toxic Gas Monitoring

Whenever the Control Room is required to be manned, the Toxic Gas Monitoring System shall be operable in accordance with Table 3.2.7.

K. Degraded Grid Protective System

During reactor power operation, the emergency bus undervoltage instrumentation shall be operative in accordance with Table 3.2.8

L. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Actuation

When the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System is required in accordance with Specification 3.5.G, the instrumentation which initiates actuation of this system shall be operable in accordance with Table 3.2.9.

4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS

Specification (cont'd)

I. Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation

The Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation shall be functionally tested and calibrated in accordance with Table 4.2.1.

J. Control Room Toxic Gas Monitoring

The toxic Gas Monitoring System Instrumentation shall be calibrated in accordance with Table 4.2.7.

K. Degraded Grid Protective System

The emergency bus undervoltage instrumentation shall be functionally tested and calibrated in accordance with Table 4.2.8.

L. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Actuation

Instrumentation and Logic Systems shall be functionally tested and calibrated as indicated in Table 4.2.9.

TABLE 3.2.2 (Cont.)

High Pressure Coolant Injection System Isolation Instrumentation

Minimum Number of Operable Instrument Channels per Trip System	Trip Function	Trip Level Setting	Required Action When Minimum Conditions for Operation are not Satisfied
2 per set of 4	High Steam Line Space Temperature	≤212°F	Note 3
1	High Steam Line d/p (Steam Line Break)	≤195 inches of water	Note 3
4 (Note 5)	Low HPCI Steam Supply Pressure	≥70 psig	Note 3
2	Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature	≤212°F	Note 3
1	Time Delay (23A-K48, 23A-K49)	≤35 minutes	Note 3
1	Bus Power Monitor	—	—
1	Trip System Logic	—	—

TABLE 3.2.2 (Cont.)

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Isolation Instrumentation

Minimum Number of Operable Instrument Channels per Trip System	Trip Function	Trip Level Setting	Required Action When Minimum Conditions for Operation are not Satisfied (Note 2)
2	Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature	$\leq 212^{o}F$	Note 3
1	Time Delay (13A-K41) (13A-K42)	$\leq$35 minutes	Note 3
2 per set of 4	High Steam Line Space Temperature	$\leq 212^{o}F$	Note 3
1	High Steam Line d/p (Steam Line Break)	$\leq$195 inches of water	Note 3
4 (Note 5)	Low Steam Supply Pressure	$\geq$50 psig	Note 3
1	Bus Power Monitor	—	Note 3
1	Trip System Logic	—	Note 3
1	Time Delay (13A-K7) (13A-K31)	$3 \leq t \leq 7$ seconds	Note 3

Table 3.2.2 Notes

1. The main steam line low pressure need be available only in the "Run" mode.

2. If the minimum number of operable instrument channels are not available for one trip system, that trip system shall be tripped. If the minimum number of operable instrument channels are not available for both trip systems, the appropriate actions listed below shall be taken:

   A. Initiate an orderly shutdown and have reactor in the cold shutdown condition in 24 hours.

   B. Initiate an orderly load reduction and have reactor in "Hot Standby" within 8 hours.

3. Close isolation valves in system and comply with Specification 3.5.

4. Deleted.

5. One trip system arranged in a one-out-of-two twice logic.

6. The main steam line high flow is available only in the "Refuel," "Shutdown," and "Startup" modes.

7. This signal also automatically closes the mechanical vacuum pump suction line isolation valves.

8. Channel shared by the Reactor Protection and Primary Containment Isolation Systems.

9. An alarm setting of 1.5 times normal background at rated power shall be established to alert the operator to abnormal radiation levels in the primary coolant.

10. A key lock switch is provided to permit the bypass of this trip function to enable plant startup and shutdown when the condenser vacuum is greater than 12 inches Hg absolute provided that both turbine stop and bypass valves are closed.

TABLE 3.2.9

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation

Minimum Number of Operable Instrument Channels per Trip System	Trip Function	Trip Level Setting	Required Action When Minimum Conditions for Operation are not Satisfied
2 (Note 1)	Low-Low Reactor Vessel Water Level	≥82.5" Above Top of Enriched Fuel	Note 4
2 (Note 2)	Low Condensate Storage Tank Water Level	≥3%	Note 4
2 (Note 3)	High Reactor Vessel Water Level	≤177" Above Top of Enriched Fuel	Note 4
1	Bus Power Monitor	—	Note 4
1	Trip System Logic	—	Note 4

Table 3.2.9 Notes

1. One trip system with initiating instrumentation arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic.

2. One trip system with initiating instrumentation arranged in a one-out-of-two logic.

3. One trip system arranged in a two-out-of-two logic.

4. If the minimum number of operable channels are not available, the system is considered inoperable and the requirements of Specification 3.5 apply.

TABLE 4.2.1 (Cont)

High Pressure Coolant Injection System			
Trip Function	Functional Test(8)	Calibration(8)	Instrument Check
Low-Low Reactor Vessel Water Level	(Note 1)	Once/operating cycle	Once each day
Low Condensate Storage Tank Water Level	(Note 1)	Every three months	---
High Drywell Pressure	(Note 1)	Once/operating cycle	Once each day
Bus Power Monitor	(Note 1)	None	Once each day
Trip System Logic	Once/operating cycle	Once/Operating cycle (Note 3)	---
High Reactor Vessel Water Level	(Note 1)	Once/operating cycle	---

TABLE 4.2.2 (Cont.)

Minimum Test and Calibration Frequencies
High Pressure Coolant Injection System Isolation Instrumentation

Trip Function	Functional Test(8)	Calibration(8)	Instrument Check
High Steam Line Space Temperature	(Note 1)	Each refueling outage	--
High Steam Line D/P (Steam Line Break)	(Note 1)	Every three months	--
Low HPCI Steam Supply Pressure	(Note 1)	Every three months	--
Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature	(Note 1)	Each refueling outage	--
Bus Power Monitor	(Note 1)	None	Once each day
Trip System Logic	Once/operating cycle	Once/operating cycle (Note 3)	--

TABLE 4.2.2 (Cont.)

Minimum Test and Calibration Frequencies
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Isolation Instrumentation

Trip Function	Functional Test(8)	Calibration(8)	Instrument Check
Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature	(Note 1)	Each refueling outage	--
High Steam Line Space Temperature	(Note 1)	Each refueling outage	--
High Steam Line d/p including time delay relays (Steam Line Break)	(Note 1)	Every three months	--
Low RCIC Steam Supply Pressure	(Note 1)	Every three months	--
Bus Power Monitor	(Note 1)	None	Once each day
Trip System Logic	Once/operating cycle	Once/operating cycle (Note 3)	--

TABLE 4.2.9

Minimum Test and Calibration Frequencies
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation

Trip Function	Functional Test(8)	Calibration(8)	Instrument Check
Low-Low Reactor Vessel Water Level	(Note 1)	Once/Operating Cycle	Once each day
Low Condensate Storage Tank Water Level	(Note 1)	Once/Operating Cycle	--
High Reactor Vessel Water Level	(Note 1)	Once/Operating Cycle	--
Bus Power Monitor	(Note 1)	None	Once each day
Trip System Logic	Once/Operating Cycle	Once/Operating Cycle (Note 3)	--

3.2 (Cont'd)

The low-low reactor water level instrumentation is set to trip when reactor water level is 82.5" H_2O indicated on the reactor water level instrumentation above the top of the enriched fuel. This trip initiates closure of the Group 1 primary containment isolation valves and also activates the ECCS and RCIC System and starts the standby diesel generator system. This trip setting level was chosen to be low enough to prevent spurious operation, but high enough to initiate ECCS operation and primary system isolation so that no melting of the fuel cladding will occur, and so that post-accident cooling can be accomplished and the limits of 10CFR100 will not be violated. For the complete circumferential break of a 28-inch recirculation line and with the trip setting given above, ECCS initiation and primary system isolation are initiated in time to meet the above criteria. The instrumentation also covers the full range of spectrum breaks and meets the above criteria.

The high drywell pressure instrumentation is a backup to the water level instrumentation, and in addition to initiating ECCS, it causes isolation of Group 2, 3, and 4 isolation valves. For the complete circumferential break discussed above, this instrumentation will initiate ECCS operation at about the same time as the low-low water level instrumentation, thus, the results given above are applicable here also. Group 2 isolation valves include the drywell vent, purge, and sump isolation valves. High drywell pressure activates only these valves because high drywell pressure could occur as the result of nonsafety-related causes such as not purging the drywell air during startup. Total system isolation is not desirable for these conditions and only the valves in Group 2 are required to close. The water level instrumentation initiates protection for the full spectrum of loss-of-coolant accidents and causes a trip of all primary system isolation valves.

Venturis are provided in the main steam lines as a means of measuring steam flow and also limiting the loss of mass inventory from the vessel during a steam line break accident. In addition to monitoring steam flow, instrumentation is provided which causes a trip of Group 1 isolation valves. The primary function of the instrumentation is to detect a break in the main steam line, thus only Group 1 valves are closed. For the worst case accident, main steam line break outside the drywell, this trip setting of 140 percent of rated steam flow in conjunction with the flow limiters and main steam line valve closure limit the mass inventory loss such that fuel is not uncovered, cladding temperatures remain less than 1295°F and release of radioactivity to the environs is well below 10CFR100.

Temperature monitoring instrumentation is provided in the main steam line tunnel to detect leaks in this area. Trips are provided on this instrumentation and when exceeded cause closure of Group 1 isolation valves. Its setting of ambient plus 95°F is low enough to detect leaks of the order of 5 to 10 gpm; thus, it is capable of covering the entire spectrum of breaks. For large breaks, it is a backup to high steam flow instrumentation discussed above, and for small breaks, with the resultant small release of radioactivity, gives isolation before the limits of 10CFR100 are exceeded.

3.2 (Cont'd)

The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System provides makeup water to the reactor vessel during shutdown and isolation to supplement or replace the normal makeup sources without the use of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems. The RCIC System is initiated automatically upon receipt of a reactor vessel low-low water level signal. Reactor vessel high water level signal results in shutdown of the RCIC System. However, the system will restart on a subsequent reactor vessel low-low water level signal. The RCIC System is normally lined up to take suction from the condensate storage tank. Suction will automatically switch over from the condensate storage tank to the suppression pool on low condensate storage tank level.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 111

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-28

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-271

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated November 18, 1988, the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (Vermont Yankee, the licensee) requested changes to the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications (TS) as incorporated in Facility Operating License DPR-28. The proposed changes consist of change A and change B.

Change A modifies the Technical Specifications to add limiting conditions of operation and surveillance requirements for the RCIC System resulting from improvements required by NUREG-0737, Items II.K.3.13 and II.K.3.22. NUREG-0737, Items II.K.3.13 and II.K.3.22, required that the design of the RCIC System should be modified such that:

1. The system will restart on subsequent low water level after it has been terminated by a high water level signal; and

2. RCIC System suction will automatically switchover from the condensate storage tank to the suppression pool when the condensate storage tank level is low.

Change B moves the "High Reactor Vessel Water Level" trip function from the tables which specify limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for HPCI System and RCIC System isolation instrumentation because it is not directly applicable to these system functions. The change proposes to include these limiting conditions of operation requirements for the "High Reactor Vessel Water Level" trip function with the RCIC System actuation instrumentation and to include surveillance requirements with the RCIC and HPCI actuation instrumentation.

2.0 EVALUATION

Change A

The changes incorporate existing procedural controls for RCIC within the Technical Specifications in accordance with guidance specified in Generic Letter 83-02 pertaining to NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications. Existing designs which have already been determined to be acceptable by the NRC by letters dated May 5, 1983 and May 20, 1983 are unaffected by these changes.

8905020424 890424
PDR ADOCK 05000271
P PNU

Incorporation of RCIC restart and suction transfer instrumentation into the Technical Specifications provides additional assurance that RCIC operation is maintained within the limits determined to be acceptable. This change is therefore acceptable.

Change B

During the process of producing proposed Technical Specifications for RCIC restart and suction (Change A as described in this letter), it became apparent to the licensee that the "High Reactor Vessel Water Level" trip function was directly applicable to RCIC shutdown and restart and HPCI shutdown only, and as such is more appropriately included with limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for RCIC and HPCI Systems actuation instrumentation. The "High Reactor Vessel Water Level" trip function does not perform a HPCI and RCIC isolation function and does not need to be included with the listing of the isolation instrumentation. This change moves the "High Reactor Vessel Water Level" trip function from the HPCI and RCIC Systems isolation instrumentation tables to the table which specifies minimum test and calibration frequencies for HPCI System actuation instrumentation.

This change represents an administrative change to the Technical Specifications. The sections of the Technical Specifications which specify the requirements for the "High Reactor Vessel Water Level" trip function are to change, but the requirements themselves remain unchanged. The change enhances the clarity of the Technical Specifications without detracting from safety, and is therefore acceptable.

Generic Letter 83-02: NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications

The staff has reviewed the licensees proposed resolution of open items from Generic Letter 83-02, as reflected in the licensee's letter dated November 3, 1987. Change A and Change B above resolve two of the four open items (II.K.3.13 and II.K.3.22).

In response to Item I.A.1.3, which requires overtime limits, the licensee provided a copy of Vermont Yankee's procedure AP-0036, "Shift Staffing." Based on comparison of AP-0036 with GL 83-02 guidance we find that the licensee's requirements limiting overtime are equivalent. Therefore, the licensees response to GL 83-02 for Item I.A.1.3 is acceptable.

In response to Item II.K.3.3 which requires reporting safety valve and relief valve failures and challenges, the licensee noted that 10 CFR 70.73 (effective January 1, 1984) requires reporting challenges and failures. License Amendment No. 95 issued August 11, 1986, by the staff reflects the rule change to 10 CFR 50.73. We find that the licensee's response to GL 83-02 Item II.K.3.3 is acceptable.

The above resolution of these four items (I.A.1.3, II.K.3.3, II.K.3.13, and II.K.3.32) completes requirements of Generic Letter 83-02: NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously published a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR §51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR §51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

4.0 CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: V. Rooney

Dated: April 24, 1989

DATE April 24, 1989

AMENDMENT NO. 111 TO DPR-28 - VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

DISTRIBUTION:
Docket File
NRC PDR
Local PDR
PRC System
PD#I-3 Reading
M. Rushbrook
M. Fairtile
S. Varga
G. Lainas
B. Boger
W. Jones - P-522
D. Hagan
Terry Meek (4)
E. Jordan
B. Grimes
J. Kopeck, GPA - 2G-5
ARM/LFMB - 9112 MNBB
OGC 15B18
ACRS (10)
J. Wiggins, Region I
R. Wessman
M. Davis -MS13E16
cc: Plant Service List

DF01
1/1