DCR 016

August 11, 1986

Docket No. 50-271

See correction letter of 12/19/86

Mr. R. W. Capstick
Licensing Engineer
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
1671 Worcester Road
Framingham, Massachusetts 01701

Dear Mr. Capstick:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 96 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated December 14, 1984, with clarifying information provided on November 26, 1985.

By letter dated November 1, 1983 (Generic Letter (GL) 83-36) we provided guidance to all BWR licensees on Technical Specification requirements for NUREG-0737 items scheduled for implementation after December 31, 1981. This amendment revises the Technical Specifications to address the items described in GL 83-36. The Technical Specifications revised in this amendment complete the Technical Specification requirements for the following NUREG-0737 activities:

III.D.3.4	Control Room Habitability Requirements
II.F.1.3	Containment High Range Monitors
II.F.1.4	Containment Pressure Monitors
II.F.1.5	Containment Water Level Monitors
II.F.1.6	Containment Hydrogen Monitors

We have concluded that this amendment satisfactorily completes the Technical Specification requirements described in GL 83-36.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's Biweekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,

/s /

Vernon L. Rooney, Project Manager
BWR Project Directorate #2
Division of BWR Licensing

Enclosures and cc:
See next page

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 96 to License No. DPR-28
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

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Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station

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Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 96 to
   License No. DPR-28
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-271

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 96
License No. DPR-28

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (the licensee) dated December 14, 1984, as supplemented November 26, 1985, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 96 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Daniel R. Muller, Director
BWR Project Directorate #2
Division of BWR Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 11, 1986

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 96

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-28

DOCKET NO. 50-271

Replace the following pages of the Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.

34a

49

49a

49b*

49c*

60

60a*

60b*

66

67

*Page added

3.2 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS	4.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS
Specification (cont'd)	Specification (cont'd)
I. Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation	I. Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation
During reactor power operation, the Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation shall be operative in accordance with Table 3.2.1.	The Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation shall be functionally tested and calibrated in accordance with Table 4.2.1.
J. Control Room Toxic Gas Monitoring	J. Control Room Toxic Gas Monitoring
Whenever the Control Room is required to be manned, the Toxic Gas Monitoring System shall be operable in accordance with Table 3.2.7.	The Toxic Gas Monitoring System Instrumentation shall be calibrated in accordance with Table 4.2.7.

TABLE 3.2.6

Post-Accident Instrumentation

Minimum Number of Operable Instrument Channels	Parameter	Type of Indication	Instrument Range
2	Drywell Atmospheric Temperature (Note 1)	Recorder #16-19-45 Recorder #TR-1-149	0-300°F 0-300°F
2	Containment Pressure (Note 1)	Meter #16-19-29A Meter #16-19-29B	0-275 psia 0-275 psia
1	Torus Pressure (Note 1)	Recorder #16-19-44	0-80 psia
2	Torus Water Level (Note 3)	Meter #16-19-10A Meter #16-19-10B	0-20 ft. 0-20 ft.
2	Torus Water Temperature (Note 1)	Meter #16-19-48	60-180°F
2	Reactor Pressure (Note 1)	Meter #PI-2-3-56A Meter #PI-2-3-56B	0-1500 psig 0-1500 psig
2	Reactor Vessel Water Level (Note 1)	Meter #2-3-91A Meter #2-3-91B	(-150)-0-(+150)"H_2O (-150)-0-(+150)"H_2O
1	Control Rod Position (Notes 1, 2)	Meter	0-48" RPIS
1	Neutron Monitor (Notes 1,2)	Meter	0-125% Rated flux
1	Torus Air Temperature (Note 1)	Recorder #TR-16-19-45	0-300°F
2/valve	Safety/Relief Valve Position From Pressure Switches (Note 4)	Lights (SRV 2-71-A through D)	Closed - Open

TABLE 3.2.6

Post-Accident Instrumentation
(continued)

Minimum Number of Operable Instrument Channels	Parameter	Type of Indication	Instrument Range
1/valve	Safety Valve Position From Acoustic Monitor (Note 5)	Meter #Z1-2-1A/B	Closed - Open
2	Containment Hydrogen/Oxygen Monitor (Note 1)	Meter #SR-VG-6A Meter #SR-VG-6B	0-30% hydrogen 0-25% oxygen
2	Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor (Note 6)	Meter #RM-16-19-1A/B	1 R/hr-10^7 R/hr

TABLE 3.2.6

POST-ACCIDENT INSTRUMENTATION
(continued)

TABLE 3.2.6 NOTES

Note 1 - From and after the date that a parameter is reduced to one indication, operation is permissible for 30 days. If a parameter is not indicated in the Control Room, continued operation is permissible during the next seven days. If indication cannot be restored within the next six hours, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a hot shutdown condition in six hours and a cold shutdown condition in the following 18 hours.

Note 2 - Control rod position and neutron monitor instruments are considered to be redundant to each other.

Note 3 - From and after the date that this parameter is reduced to one indication in the Control Room, continued reactor operation is permissible during the next 30 days. If both channels are inoperable and indication cannot be restored in six hours, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a hot shutdown condition in six hours and a cold shutdown condition in the following 18 hours.

Note 4 - From and after the date that safety/relief valve position from pressure switches is unavailable, reactor operation may continue provided safety/relief valve position can be determined from Recorder #2-166 (thermocouple, 0-600°F) and Meter #16-19-48 (torus water temperature, 60-180°F). If both indications are not available, the reactor shall be in a hot shutdown condition in six hours and a cold shutdown condition in the following 18 hours.

Note 5 - From and after the date that safety valve position from the acoustic monitor is unavailable, reactor operation may continue provided safety valve position can be determined from Recorder #2-166 (thermocouple, 0-600°F) and Meter #16-19-29A or B (containment pressure 0-275 psia). If both indications are not available, the reactor shall be in a hot shutdown condition in six hours and in a cold shutdown condition in the following 18 hours.

Note 6 - Within 30 days following the loss of one indication, or seven days following the loss of both indications, restore the inoperable channel(s) to an operable status or a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.7 must be prepared and submitted within the subsequent 14 days, outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status.

TABLE 3.2.7

TOXIC GAS MONITORING SYSTEM

Minimum Number of Operable Instrument Channels	Function	Trip Setting		Required Action When Minimum Conditions of Operations Are Not Satisfied
2	Initiate emergency Control Room breathing air	Chlorine	≤ 5 ppm	Note 1
		Ammonia	≤ 75 ppm	
		Vinyl Chloride	≤ 800 ppm	
		Carbon Dioxide	≤ 800 ppm	
		Methanol	≤ 300 ppm	

Note 1 – Within 30 days following the loss of one indication, or 7 days following the loss of both indications, restore the inoperable channel(s) to an operable status or a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.7 must be prepared and submitted within the subsequent 14 days, outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status.

VYNPS

TABLE 4.2.6

CALIBRATION REQUIREMENTS

POST-ACCIDENT INSTRUMENTATION

Parameter	Calibration	Instrument Check
Drywell Atmosphere Temperature	Every 6 months	Once each day
Containment Pressure	Once/Operating Cycle	Once each day
Torus Pressure	Every 6 months	Once each day
Torus Water Level	Once/Operating Cycle	Once each day
Torus Water Temperature	Every 6 months	Once each day
Reactor Pressure	Once/Operating Cycle	Once each day
Reactor Vessel Water Level	Once/Operating Cycle	Once each day
Control Rod Position	(Note 5)	Once each day
Neutron Monitor	Same as Reactor Protection Systems	Once each day
Torus Air Temperature	Every 6 months	Once each day
Safety/Relief Valve Position	Every refueling outage (Note 9) (a Functional Test to be performed quarterly)	Once each day
Safety Valve Position	Every refueling outage (Note 9) (a Functional Test to be performed quarterly)	Once each day

VYNPS

TABLE 4.2.6

CALIBRATION REQUIREMENTS

POST-ACCIDENT INSTRUMENTATION (Cont)

Parameter	Calibration	Instrument Check
Containment Hydrogen/Oxygen Monitor	Once/Operating Cycle	Once each day
Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor	Once/Operating Cycle	Once each day

VYNPS

TABLE 4.2.7

TOXIC GAS MONITORING SYSTEM - CALIBRATION REQUIREMENTS

Parameter	Calibration	Instrument Check
Toxic Gas Monitoring System	Once/Operating Cycle	Once each day

606

611b

3.2 (Continued)

standby gas treatment system operation so that none of the activity released during the refueling accident leave the Reactor Building via the normal ventilation stack but that all activity is processed by the standby gas treatment system. Trip settings for the monitors in the ventilation duct are based upon initiation of the normal ventilation isolation and standby gas treatment system operation at a radiation level equivalent to the maximum release rate of 0.08/E Ci/sec given in Specification 3.8.C.1.a. The monitoring system in the plant stack represents a backup to this system to limit gross radioactivity releases to the environs.

The purpose of isolating the mechanical vacuum pump line is to limit release of radioactivity from the main condenser. During an accident, fission products would be transported from the reactor through the main steam line to the main condenser. The fission product radioactivity would be sensed by the main steam line radiation monitors which initiate isolation.

Post-accident instrumentation parameters for Containment Pressure, Torus Water Level, Containment Hydrogen/Oxygen Monitor, and Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor, are redundant, environmentally and seismically qualified instruments provided to enhance the operators' ability to follow the course of an event. The purpose of each of these instruments is to provide detection and measurement capability during and following an accident as required by NUREG-0737 by ensuring continuous on-scale indication of the following: containment pressure in the 0 to 275 psia range; torus water level in the 0 to 20 foot range (i.e., the bottom to 5 feet above the normal water level of the torus pool); containment hydrogen/oxygen concentrations (0 to 30% hydrogen and 0 to 25% oxygen); and containment radiation in the 1 R/hr to 10^7 R/hr gamma. The Control Room Toxic Gas Monitor assures that the Control Room operators, wherever required to be in the Control Room, will be adequately protected against the effects of an accidental release of toxic gases and that the plant can be safely operated or shut down under design basis accident conditions.

4.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION

The protective instrumentation systems covered by this Specification are listed in Table 4.2. Most of these protective systems are composed of two or more independent and redundant subsystems which are combined in a dual-channel arrangement. Each of these subsystems contains an arrangement of electrical relays which operate to initiate the required system protective action.

The relays in a subsystem are actuated by a number of means, including manually-operated switches, process-operated switches (sensors), bistable devices operated by analog sensor signals, timers, limit switches, and other relays. In most cases, final subsystem relay actuation is obtained by satisfying the logic conditions established by a number of these relay contacts in a logic array. When a subsystem is actuated, the final subsystem relay(s) can operate protective equipment, such as valves and pumps, and can perform other protective actions, such as tripping the main turbine generator unit.

4.2 (Continued)

With the dual-channel arrangement of these subsystems, the single failure of a ready circuit can be tolerated because the redundant subsystem or system (in the case of high pressure coolant injection) will then initiate the necessary protective action. If a failure in one of these circuits occurs in such a way that an action is taken, the operator is immediately alerted to the failure. If the failure occurs and causes no action, it could then remain undetected, causing a loss of the redundancy in the dual-channel arrangement. Losses in redundancy of this nature are found by periodically testing the relay circuits in the subsystems to assure that they are operating properly.

It has been the practice in boiling water reactor plants to functionally test protective instrumentation sensors and sensor relays on-line on a monthly frequency. Since logic circuit tests result in the actuation of plant equipment, testing of this nature was done while the plant was shutdown for refueling. In this way, the testing of equipment would not jeopardize plant operation. However, a refueling interval could be as long as eighteen months, which is too long a period to allow an undetected failure to exist.

This specification is a periodic testing program which is based upon the overall on-line testing of protective instrumentation systems, including logic circuits as well as sensor circuits. Table 4.2 outlined the test, calibration, and logic system functional test schedule for the protective instrumentation systems. The testing of a subsystem includes a functional test of each relay wherever practicable. The testing of each relay includes all circuitry necessary to make the relay operate, and also the proper functioning of the relay contacts. Functional testing of the inaccessible temperature switches associated with the isolation systems is accomplished remotely by application of a heat source to individual switches.

All subsystems are functionally tested, calibrated, and operated in their entirety if practicable. Certain exceptions are necessary because the actuation of certain relays would jeopardize plant operation or present an operational hardship.

For example, certain relays trip recirculation system discharge valves, and the actuation of these relays would cause a severe plant transient. In cases of this nature, the devices in the relay circuit will be tested, but the relay will only be actuated during a refueling outage. The number of relays in this category is very small compared to the total number of identical relays being tested on-line.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 96 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-28

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-271

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By Generic Letter (GL) 83-36, the NRC staff provided to all boiling water reactor licensees Technical Specification (TS) guidance for NUREG-0737 items scheduled for implementation after December 31, 1981. The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (the licensee/VYNPC) responded by letter dated February 22, 1984 and proposed TS by letter dated December 14, 1984. Following staff review and discussions with the licensee, the licensee clarified the proposed TS changes by letter dated November 26, 1985. This Safety Evaluation relates to the following NUREG-0737 items: II.B.1, II.B.3, III.D.3.4, II.F.1.1, II.F.1.3, II.F.1.4, II.F.1.5 and II.F.1.6.

2.0 EVALUATION

2.1 Reactor Coolant System Vents (TMI II.B.1)

The generic letter stated:

> "The staff has determined that no changes in Technical Specifications are required by this Action Plan item for Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) which do not have isolation condenser."

The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant does not have an isolation condenser, therefore this item is considered to be closed.

2.2 Post-Accident Sampling (TMI II.B.3)

The generic letter stated:

> "Licensees should ensure that their plant has the capability to obtain and analyze reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples under accident conditions. An administrative program should be established, implemented and maintained to ensure this capability. The program should include:
>
> a. training of personnel
> b. procedures of sampling and analysis, and
> c. provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.

> It is acceptable to the staff, if the licensee elects to reference this program in the administrative controls section of the Technical Specifications and include a detailed description of the program in the plant operation manuals. A copy of the program should be easily available to the operating staff during accident and transient conditions."

The licensee responded in its February 22, 1984 letter stating:

> "We concur with the staff's guidelines insofar as the details of our post-accident sampling program need not be incorporated into the Technical Specifications. However, we respectfully disagree with the need to reference this program in the administrative controls section of Technical Specifications. Because our sampling program (training, sampling and analysis procedures, and equipment maintenance) is subject to Region I inspection and enforcement, we cannot perceive of any value in referencing the existence of this program in our Technical Specifications. Further, such a reference does nothing to enhance the safe operation of the plant which we believe is the fundamental purpose of Technical Specifications."

The staff has evaluated the licensee's response with respect to the existing Technical Specifications. As a result of our review, we have determined that Sections 6.1.D.4 and 6.1.D.5 provide an acceptable minimum specification for training. Section 6.5.A requires that detailed written procedures, including check-off lists and instructions, be prepared and approved for all emergency conditions involving potential or actual release of radioactivity, as well as for the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual in-plant implementation. Post accident sampling procedures are therefore required to be prepared and approved. Section 6.5.B requires procedures that meet acceptable radiation control standards be prepared and approved. This requirement assures that appropriate radiation control procedures are applied to the task of post accident sampling. Taken together, Sections 6.5.A and 6.5.B provide an acceptable minimum specification for the procedures used to manage radioactive sampling.

Section 6.2.A identifies the Maintenance Superintendent as Vice Chairman and the Maintenance Supervisor as member of the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) and assigns PORC the responsibility for reviewing all operating and maintenance procedures (including emergency procedures). Section 6.2.B requires that the Nuclear Safety Audit and Review Committee (NSAR), as a group, employ broad expertise, and assigns NSAR responsibility for reviewing PORC meeting minutes, evaluating actions taken by PORC, and periodically auditing implementing procedures and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Taken together, Sections 6.2.A and 6.2.B provide an acceptable minimum specification for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment. Therefore the staff considers this matter closed.

2.3 Control Room Habitability Requirements (TMI III.D.3.4)

The generic letter stated:

"Licensees should assure that control room operators will be adequately protected against the effects of the accidental release of toxic and/or radioactive gases and that the nuclear power plant can be safely operated or shut down under design basis accident conditions. If the results of the analyses of postulated accidental release of toxic gases (at or near the plant) indicated a need for installing the toxic gas detection system, it should be included in the Technical Specifications. Typical acceptable LCO and surveillance requirements for such a detection system (e.g. chlorine detection system) are provided in Enclosure 3. All detection systems should be included in the Technical Specifications.

In addition to the above requirements, other aspects of the control room habitability requirements should be included i the Technical Specifications for control room emergency air filtration system. Two independent control room emergency air filtration system should be operable continuously during all modes of plant operation and capable of meeting design requirements. Sample Technical Specifications are provided in Enclosure 3."

The licensee responded by letter dated February 22, 1984 proposing Technical Specifications for control room habitability which were generally in agreement with staff guidance. At the staff's request, by letter dated November 26, 1985, the licensee provided additional support concerning operability time limit requirements. The staff has reviewed the information presented and considers that the proposed changes satisfy the requirements of II.D.3.4.

2.4 Noble Gas Effluent Monitors (TMI II.F.1.1)

The generic letter stated:

"Noble gas effluent monitors provide information, during and following an accident, which are considered helpful to the operator in assessing the plant condition. It is desired that these monitors be operable at all times during plant operation, but they are not required for safe shutdown of the plant. In case of failure of the monitor, appropriate actions should be taken to restore its operational capability in a reasonable period of time. Considering the importance of the availability of the equipment and possible delays involved in administrative controls, seven days is considered to be the appropriate time period to restore the operability of the monitor. An alternate method for monitoring the effluent should be initiated as soon as practical, but no later than 72 hours after the identification of the failure of the monitor. If the monitor is not restored to operable condition within seven days after the failure, a special report should be submitted to the NRC within 14 days following the event, outlining the cause of the inoperability, actions taken and the planned schedule for restoring the system to operable status."

The licensee responded in its February 22, 1984 letter stating:

> "By Reference (1), we submitted an application for a license amendment for the NUREG-0737 item which is currently being reviewed by the NRC. We believe our amendment application meets the intent of the staff's guidance criteria."

The Commission approved the licensee's referenced application and issued Amendment No. 83 on October 9, 1984, thereby satisfying the requirements of II.F.1.1.

2.5 Sampling and Analysis of Plant Effluents (TMI II.F.1.2)

The generic letter stated:

> "Each operating nuclear power reactor should have the capability to collect and analyze or measure representative samples of radioactive iodines and particulates in plant gaseous effluents during and following an accident. An administrative program should be established, implemented and maintained to ensure this capability. The program should include:
>
> a. training of personnel
> b. procedures for sampling and analysis, and
> c. provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.
>
> It is acceptable to the staff, if the licensee elects to reference this program in the administrative controls section of the Technical Specifications and include a detailed description of the program in the plant operation manuals. A copy of the program should be readily available to the operating staff during accident and transient conditions."

The licensee responded by referencing his position on TMI Item II.B.3. The staff considers this issue to be resolved acceptably for the reasons stated in our evaluation of Item II.B.3.

2.6 Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor (TMI II.F.1.3)

The generic letter required that:

> "A minimum of two in-containment radiation-level monitors with a maximum range of 10^8 rad/hr (10^7 R/hr for photons only) should be operable at all times except for cold shutdown and refueling outages. In case of failure of the monitor, appropriate actions should be taken to restore its operational capability as soon as possible. If the monitor is not restored to operable condition within seven days after the failure, a special report should be submitted to the NRC within 14 days following the event, outlining the cause of inoperability, actions taken and the planned schedule for restoring the equipment to operable status.

Typical surveillance requirements are shown in Enclosure 3. The setpoint for the high radiation level alarm should be determined such that spurious alarms will be precluded. Note that the acceptable calibration techniques for these monitors are discussed in NUREG-0737."

In response, the licensee proposed limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) for the containment high-range effluent monitor. The LCOs satisfy the staff guidance, therefore, the staff finds the proposed changes acceptable.

2.7 Containment Pressure Monitor (TMI II.F.1.4)

The generic letter stated that:

"Containment pressure should be continuously indicated in the control room of each operating reactor during Power Operation Startup Modes. Two channels should be operable at all times when the reactor is operating in any of the above mentioned modes. Technical Specifications for these monitors should be included with other accident monitoring instrumentation in the present Technical Specifications. Limiting conditions for operation (including the required Actions) for the containment pressure monitor should be similar to other accident monitoring instrumentation included in the present Technical Specifications."

The licensee responded by providing proposed Technical Specification changes that are similar to other accident monitoring instrumentation requirements included in the present Technical Specifications. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed changes acceptable.

2.8 Containment Water Level Monitor (TMI II.F.1.5)

The generic letter stated that:

"A continuous indication of suppression pool water level should be provided in the control room of each reactor during Power Operation and Startup Modes. Two channels should be operable at all times when the reactor is operating in any of the above mentioned modes. Technical Specifications for these monitors should be included with other accident monitoring instrumentation in the present Technical Specifications. Limiting conditions for operation (LCO) for these monitors should be similar to other accident monitoring instrumentation included in the present Technical Specifications. Typical acceptable LCO and surveillance requirements for accident monitoring instrumentation are included in Enclosure 3.

The BWRs with dry containment should have at least two channels for wide range instruments and one channel of narrow range instrument operable at all times during above mentioned modes. LCOs for wide range monitors should be similar to that discussed above. LCOs for

narrow range should include the requirement that the inoperable channel will be restored to operable status within 30 days or the reactor will be brought to hot shutdown condition as required by other accident monitoring instrumentation."

The licensee responded by providing a proposed Technical Specification change that is similar to other accident monitoring instrumentation requirements included in the present Technical Specifications. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed changes acceptable.

2.9 Containment Hydrogen Monitor (TMI II.F.1.6)

The generic letter stated:

> Two independent containment hydrogen monitors should be operable (should be capable of performing the required function) at all times when the reactor is operating in Power Operation and Startup Modes. Technical Specifications for hydrogen monitors should be included with other accident monitoring instrumentation in the present Technical Specifications. Typical acceptable LCO and surveillance requirements are included in Enclosure 3."

The licensee responded by letter dated February 22, 1984 proposing Technical Specifications for the containment hydrogen monitors which were generally acceptable, except for the need to specify a time to achieve hot shutdown after the operability LCO had expired. By letter dated November 26, 1985 the licensee satisfactorily corrected the above deficiency, and the proposed changes satisfy the requirements of II.F.1.6, and are acceptable.

3.0 SUMMARY

The licensee has provided sufficient justification for not providing Technical Specifications for the following GL 83-06 items:

1. Reactor Coolant System Vents (II.B.1)
2. Post-Accident Sampling (II.B.3)
3. Noble Gas Effluent Monitors (II.F.1.1)
4. Sample and Analysis of Plant Effluents (II.F.1.2)

The licensee has provided acceptable Technical Specifications for the following GL 83-36 items:

1. Containment High-Range Monitors (II.F.1.3)
2. Containment Pressure Monitors (II.F.1.4)
3. Containment Water Level Monitors (II.F.1.5)
4. Containment Hydrogen Monitor (II.F.1.6)
5. Control Room Habitability Requirements (III.D.3.4)

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

This amendment changes a requirement with respect to in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

4.0 CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Dated: August 11, 1986