



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-8064**

June 7, 2001

S. K. Gambhir, Division Manager
Nuclear Operations
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.
P.O. Box 399
Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun
Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023-0399

SUBJECT: CORRECTION TO NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-285/00-11

The subject inspection report incorrectly documented the lack of an evaluation for use of safety-related electrical buses to supply nonsafety-related electrical loads as a cited Severity Level IV violation and included a Notice of Violation. Upon further review, the NRC has concluded that this violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, should be characterized as a noncited violation in accordance with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy. The enclosure to this letter contains replacement pages for the subject inspection report to correct this error. Please replace the original pages with the enclosed replacement pages and remove the Notice of Violation (Enclosure 1). We regret any inconvenience this may have caused.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Charles S. Marschall, Chief
Project Branch C
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket: 50-285
License: DPR-40

cc w/enclosure:

Mark T. Frans, Manager
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- Branch Chief, DRP/TSS **(PHH)**
- RITS Coordinator **(NBH)**
- Jim Isom, Pilot Plant Program **(JAI)**
- Sampath Malur, Pilot Plant Program **(SKM)**

Only inspection reports to the following:

- Scott Morris **(SAM1)**
- NRR Event Tracking System **(IPAS)**
- FCS Site Secretary **(NJC)**
- Dale Thatcher **(DFT)**

R:_FCS\FC2000-11RP-WCW Correction.wpd

RIV:C:DRP/C	D:ACES	Signature		
CSMarschall;df	GFSanborn	CSMarschall		
<i>/RA/</i>	<i>/RA/</i>	<i>/RA/</i>		
5/31/01	6/1/01	6/7/01		

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Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023-0399

SUBJECT: FORT CALHOUN STATION NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-285/00-11

Dear Mr. Gambhir:

This refers to the inspection conducted on December 31, 2000, through March 31, 2001, at the Fort Calhoun Station facility. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection. The resident inspectors discussed their inspection findings on April 2, 2001, with Mr. Clemens and other members of your staff. The inspection also included input in specific areas by regional specialists.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified two issues of very low safety significance (Green). These issues were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However, because of their very low safety significance and because they have been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these issues as noncited violations, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny these noncited violations, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Fort Calhoun facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

Charles S. Marschall, Chief
Project Branch C
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket: 50-285
License: DPR-40

Enclosures:

1. Notice of Violation
2. NRC Inspection Report
50-285/00-11

cc w/enclosures:

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000285-00-11; 12/31/2000, through 03/31/2001, Omaha Public Power District, Fort Calhoun Station, Integrated Resident & Regional Report. Operability Evaluations.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors and regional specialists. The inspection identified two findings. The significance is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," (SDP) or via IMC 0610*, "Threshold for Documentation," process for no color findings.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

- Green. The inspectors identified a noncited violation for failure to take adequate corrective actions to prevent the use of nonload shed welding receptacles without a proper evaluation (10 CFR Part 50, Criterion XVI).

The finding was of very low safety significance because the diesel generator load limit margins were not exceeded, the welding receptacles had adequate fault protection, and the diesel generators remained operable (Section 1R15.).

- Green. The inspectors identified a noncited violation for failure to take adequate action to correct a valve actuator deficiency. The corrective action did not ensure that component cooling water inlet isolation valves would fully open on demand for all plant conditions (10 CFR Part 50, Criterion XVI).

The finding was of very low safety significance because the deficiencies were corrected prior to significant system degradation and the system was only vulnerable to the deficiency for very brief periods of time during the operating cycle (Section 1R15.2).

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following operability evaluations for technical adequacy, applicable compensatory measures, and impact on continued operations:

- Operability for shutdown cooling heat exchangers (Condition Report 200100310)
- Operability for postaccident containment sump level transmitter (Condition Report 200100359)
- Operability for 13.8 kV emergency power supply (Condition Report 200100514)
- Operability for chemical volume control system piping (Condition Report 200100589)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.1 Diesel Loading and Weld Receptacles

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the diesel generator loading calculations to determine the impact of having nonload shed heating elements connected to a safety-related motor control center.

b. Findings

The inspectors determined that plant personnel did not implement adequate corrective actions for control of nonload shed welding receptacles in response to a noncited violation identified on December 10, 1999. This constitutes a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," but was of very low safety significance and is being characterized as a green noncited violation in accordance with Section VI.A of the NRC enforcement policy.

During a tour of the turbine building on January 24, 2001, the inspectors identified that power welding machines and heating elements were connected to nonload shed welding receptacles without being properly evaluated as a temporary modification. The licensee had previously received a noncited violation for using nonload shed welding receptacles in December 1999, (see NRC Inspection Report 50-285/00-02). The licensee's corrective actions for the 1999 noncited violation were to require a temporary modification evaluation prior to using nonload shed receptacles to evaluate the effect on diesel generator loading. There was no immediate explanation as to why the temporary

modification evaluation was not performed, and the licensee subsequently performed a separate evaluation to demonstrate that diesel generator limit margins had not been exceeded and that the diesel generators had remained operable.

This finding was determined to have a credible impact on safety because uncontrolled loading of nonload shed welding receptacles has the potential to overload the diesel generators and impact their ability to successfully mitigate a design basis accident. However, because no diesel generator load limit margins were actually exceeded, the welding receptacles had adequate fault protection and the diesel generators remained operable. The licensee's failure to effectively preclude repetition of use of the welding receptacles without a proper evaluation constituted a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions" (50-285/0011-01). This violation is associated with an inspection finding that is characterized by the Significance Determination Process as having very low risk significance (i.e., Green) and is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section V1.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 200100155, dated January 25, 2001.

.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 2000-003-01: Failure of CCW System Valves by a Potential Common Mode

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed an operability evaluation for CCW inlet and Outlet Isolation Valves HCV-489A/B through HCV-492A/B (Condition Report 199901951) and LER 2000-003-01. This review was performed to better understand why AC-1C CCW Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve HCV-491A did not fully open when placing the heat exchanger in operation and AC-1B CCW Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve HCV-490A failed to open on demand on October 23, 2000.

b. Findings

The inspectors determined that the failure of HCV-491A to fully open constituted a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," but was of very low safety significance and is being characterized as a green noncited violation in accordance with the NRC enforcement policy.

Following the failures of HCV-491A and HCV-490A, the licensee performed a failure investigation that was documented in LER 2000-003-01. The investigation concluded that the failure of HCV-490A was due to internal mechanical binding and was an isolated failure. The investigation also concluded that HCV-491A failed to fully open due to a combination of packing torque and marginally sized 80-pound actuator springs.

The failure of CCW inlet valves to fully open due to marginally sized actuators have previously occurred, but only with two CCW pumps running. In a two pump alignment, higher flow and pressure are present in the vicinity of the valves, causing a greater torque demand on the valve actuator to fully open them. All eight CCW heat exchanger inlet and outlet isolation valves have the same actuator configuration, but the licensee

concluded that the inlet valves require more actuator opening torque because of the system hydraulic flow characteristics. In 1982, the spring actuators for the inlet isolation valves were increased from 60 to 80 pounds. The same modification was performed on the outlet valves in 1991.

ATTACHMENT

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

D. Bannister, Manager, Operations
G. Cavanaugh, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
J. Chase, Division Manager, Nuclear Assessment
R. Clemens, Plant Manager
M. Core, Manager, System Engineering
D. Dryden, Licensing Specialist, Nuclear Licensing
M. Frans, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
S. Gambhir, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations
W. Gates, Vice President Nuclear
R. Haug, Manager, Chemistry
R. Jaworski, Acting Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
R. Lentz, Licensing Specialist, Nuclear Licensing
J. McManis, Manager, Design Engineering
D. Montgomery, Quality Control Supervisor
R. Phelps, Division Manager, Nuclear Engineering
M. Puckett, Manager, Radiation Protection
C. Simmons, Supervisor, Emergency Planning
J. Spilker, Manager, Corrective Action Group
M. Tesar, Division Manager, Nuclear Support Services
R. Westcott, Manager, Training

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-285/00-011-01 NCV Diesel Loading and Weld Receptacles Corrective Actions
50-285/00-011-02 NCV Component Cooling Water Valve Corrective Actions

Closed

50-285/98-027-02 IFI Flooding Induced Door Failure
50-285/00-011-01 NCV Diesel Loading and Weld Receptacles Corrective Actions
50-285/00-011-02 NCV Component Cooling Water Valve Corrective Actions
50-285/00-003-00 LER Failure of Component Cooling Water System Valves by a
Potential Common Mode, Revision 0