

August 2, 1976

Docket No.: 50-271

Yankee Atomic Electric Company  
ATTN: Mr. Robert H. Groce  
Licensing Engineer  
20 Turnpike Road  
Westboro, Massachusetts 01581

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.27 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated July 15, 1976.

This amendment relates to the replacement of valve position limiters with inline orifices.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by

Robert W. Reid, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #4  
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 27
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Federal Register Notice

cc w/enclosures: See next page

OFFICE →	ORB#4:DOR	ORB#4:DOR	C-RSB-OT:DOR	OELD	C-ORB#4:DOR
SURNAME →	RIngram	PDiBenedetto:rm	RBaer	lowell	RReid
DATE →	7/29/76	7/28/76	7/30/76	7/30/76	8/2/76

DOCK FILE



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

August 2, 1976

Docket No.: 50-271

Yankee Atomic Electric Company  
ATTN: Mr. Robert H. Groce  
Licensing Engineer  
20 Turnpike Road  
Westboro, Massachusetts 01581

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 27 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated July 15, 1976.

This amendment relates to the replacement of valve position limiters with inline orifices.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Robert W. Reid".

Robert W. Reid, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #4  
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 27
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Federal Register Notice

cc w/enclosures: See next page

Yankee Atomic Electric Company

cc: w/enclosure

Mr. James E. Griffin, President  
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation  
77 Grove Street  
Rutland, Vermont 05701

Mr. Donald E. Vandenberg, Vice President  
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation  
Turnpike Road, Route 9  
Westboro, Massachusetts 01581

John A. Ritsher, Esquire  
Ropes & Gray  
225 Franklin Street  
Boston, Massachusetts 02110

Gregor I. McGregor, Esquire  
Assistant Attorney General  
Department of the Attorney General  
State House, Room 370  
Boston, Massachusetts 02133

Richard E. Ayres, Esquire  
Natural Resources Defense  
917 - 15th Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20005

Honorable M. Jerome Diamond  
Attorney General  
State of Vermont  
109 State Street  
Pavilion Office Building  
Montpelier, Vermont 05602

John A. Calhoun  
Assistant Attorney General  
State of Vermont  
109 State Street  
Pavilion Office Building  
Montpelier, Vermont 05602

Anthony Z. Roisman, Esquire  
Berlin, Roisman and Kessler  
1712 N Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20036

Brooks Memorial Library  
224 Main Street  
Brattleboro, Vermont 05301

Mr. John R. Stanton, Director  
Radiation Control Agency  
Hazen Drive  
Concord, New Hampshire 03301

Mr. John W. Stevens  
Conservation Society of  
Southern Vermont  
P. O. Box 256  
Townshend, Vermont 05353

Mr. David M. Scott  
Radiation Health Engineer  
Agency of Human Services  
Division of Occupational Health  
P. O. Box 607  
Barre, Vermont 05641

New England Coalition on  
Nuclear Pollution  
Hill and Dale Farm  
West Hill - Faraway Road  
Putney, Vermont 05346

Mr. Raymond H. Puffer  
Chairman  
Board of Selectman  
Vernon, Vermont 05354

cc w/enclosures and copy of  
VY's filing dtd. 7/15/76

Mr. Martin K. Miller, Chairman  
State of Vermont  
Public Service Board  
120 State Street  
Montpelier, Vermont 05602



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-271

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 27  
License No. DPR-28

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (the licensee) dated July 15, 1976, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment.
3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Robert W. Reid, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #4  
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 2, 1976

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 27

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-28

DOCKET NO. 50-271

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications as follows:

<u>Remove Pages</u>	<u>Insert Pages</u>
85 - 88	85 - 88
91	91
93 & 94	93 & 94
100	100
103 & 104	103 & 104

The changed areas on the revised pages are shown by marginal lines.

3.5 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS

Applicability:

Applies to the operational status of the emergency cooling subsystems.

Objective:

To assure adequate cooling capability for heat removal in the event of a loss of coolant accident or isolation from the normal reactor heat sink.

Specification:

A. Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection

1. Except as specified in Specifications 3.5.A.2 through 3.5.A.4 below and 3.5.H.3 and 3.5.H.4, both Core Spray and the LPCI subsystems shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and prior to a reactor startup from the cold shutdown condition.

4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

4.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS

Applicability:

Applied to periodic testing of the emergency cooling subsystems.

Objective:

To verify the operability of the core containment cooling subsystems.

Specification:

A. Core Spray and Low Pressure Cooling Injection

Surveillance of the core spray and LPCI subsystems shall be performed as follows:

1. General Testing

<u>Item</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
a. Simulated Automatic Actuation Test	Each refueling outage
b. Flow Rate Test - Core spray pumps shall deliver at least 3000 gpm (torus to torus) against a system head of 120 psig. Each LPCI pump shall deliver 7450 ± 150 gpm (vessel to vessel).	Each refueling outage

## 3.5 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

## 4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

<u>Item</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
c. Pump and Motor Operated Valve Operability except Recirculation Pump discharge valves	once/month
d. Recirculation Pump discharge valves shall be tested to verify full open to full closed in $27 \leq t \leq 33$ sec	each refueling outage
2. From and after the date that one of the Core Spray subsystems is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days unless such subsystem is sooner made operable, provided that during such seven days all active components of the other Core Spray subsystem, the LPCI subsystems and the diesel generators required for operation of such components if no external source of power were available shall be operable.	2. When it is determined that one Core Spray subsystem is inoperable the operable Core Spray subsystem, both LPCI subsystems (Except the Recirculation System discharge valves) and the diesel generators required for operation of such components if no external source of power were available shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately. The operable Core Spray subsystem shall be demonstrated to be operable daily thereafter.
3. From and after the date that one of the LPCI pumps is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven	3. When it is determined that one of the LPCI pumps is inoperable, the remaining active components of the LPCI (except the Recirculation System discharge valves) and the Containment Cooling subsystems, both Core Spray subsystems,

## 3.5 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

days unless such pump is sooner made operable, provided that during such seven days the remaining active components of the LPCI and Containment Cooling subsystem and all active components of both Core Spray subsystems and the diesel generators required for operation of such components if no external source of power were available shall be operable.

4. From and after the date that a LPCI subsystem is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days unless it is sooner made operable, provided that during such seven days all active components of the other LPCI and the Containment Cooling subsystem, the Core Spray subsystems and the diesel generators required for operation of such components if no external source of power were available shall be operable.
5. If the requirements of Specification 3.5.A cannot be met, an orderly shutdown of the reactor shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.

B. Containment Spray Cooling Capability

1. Both containment cooling spray loops are required to be operable when the reactor water temperature is greater than 212°F except that a Containment

## 4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

and the diesel generators required for operation of such components if no external source of power were available shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and the operable LPCI pumps daily thereafter.

4. When it is determined that a LPCI subsystem is inoperable, both Core Spray subsystems, the remaining LPCI (except the recirculation discharge valve) and Containment Cooling subsystems and the diesel generators required for operation of such components if no external source of power were available shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

B. Containment Spray Cooling Capability

1. Surveillance of the drywell spray loops shall be performed as follows, during each five year period, an air test shall be performed on the drywell spray headers and nozzles.

## 3.5 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

## 4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

Cooling subsystem may be inoperable for thirty days.

2. If this requirement cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.
- C. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water System
1. Except as specified in Specifications 3.5.C.2, and 3.5.C.3 below, both RHR service water subsystem loops shall be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and prior to reactor startup from a cold condition.
  2. From and after the date that one of the RHR service water pumps is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding thirty days unless such pump is sooner made operable, provided that during such thirty days all other active components of the RHR service water subsystem are operable.

2. When it is determined that a containment cooling subsystem is inoperable, the remaining subsystem shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.
- C. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water System
- Surveillance of the RHR service water system shall be performed as follows:
1. RHR service water subsystem testing:
    - a. Pump and motor operated valve operability shall be tested every three months.
    - b. Each RHR service water pump shall be tested after pump maintenance and every three months. Each pump shall deliver at least 2700 gpm and a pressure of at least 70 psia shall be maintained at the RHR heat exchanger service water outlet when the corresponding pairs of RHR service water pumps and station service water pumps are operating.
  2. When it is determined that one RHR service water pump is inoperable, the remaining components of that subsystem and the other RHR service water subsystem shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

3.5 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

E. High Pressure Cooling Injection (HPCI) System

E. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System

1. Except as specified in Specification 3.5.E.2, whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and reactor pressure is greater than 150 psig and prior to reactor startup from a cold condition:

Surveillance of HPCI systems shall be performed as follows:

1. Testing:

- a. The HPCI system shall be operable.
- b. The condensate storage tank shall contain at least 75,000 gallons of condensate water.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
Simulated Automatic Actuation Test	Each refueling outage
Pump operability	once/month
Motor operated valve operability	once/month
Flow rate test (recirculate to Condensate Storage Tank). The HPCI system shall deliver at least 4250 gpm at normal reactor operating pressure.	once/operating cycle

- 2. From and after the date that the HPCI subsystem is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days unless such subsystem is sooner made operable, provided that during such seven days all active components of the Automatic Depressurization subsystems, the Core Spray subsystems, the LPCI subsystems, and the RCIC system are operable.
- 3. If the requirements of Specification 3.5.E cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor pressure shall be reduced to 120 psig within 24 hours.

- 2. When it is determined that the HPCI subsystem is inoperable, the LPCI subsystems, the Core Spray subsystems, the Automatic Depressurization system, and the RCIC system shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately. The Automatic Depressurization system and the RCIC system shall be demonstrated to be operable daily thereafter.

NOTE: Automatic Depressurization system operability shall be demonstrated by performing a functional test of the trip system logic.

3.5 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

3. If the requirements of Specification 3.5.F cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor pressure shall be reduced to 100 psig within 24 hours.

G. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)

1. Except as specified in Specification 3.5.G.2 below, the RCIC system shall be operable whenever the reactor pressure is greater than 150 psig and irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.
2. From and after the date that the RCIC system is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days unless such system is sooner made operable, provided that during such 7 days all active components of the HPCI system are operable.

G. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)

Surveillance of the RCIC system shall be performed as follows:

1. Testing

<u>Item</u>	<u>Frequency</u>
Pump operability	once/month
Motor operated valve operability	once/month
Flow rate test (Recirculate to Condensate Storage Tank) The RCIC shall deliver at least 400 gpm at normal operating pressure.	After major pump maintenance and every three months
Simulated automatic actuation test (testing valve operability)	Each refueling outage

2. When it is determined that the RCIC system is inoperable, the HPCI system shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

## 3.5 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

## 4.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3. If the requirements of Specification 3.5.G cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor pressure shall be reduced to 120 psig within 24 hours.

H. Minimum Core and Containment Cooling System Availability

1. During any period when one of the standby diesel generators is inoperable, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding seven days, provided that all of the Low Pressure Core Cooling and Containment Cooling subsystems connecting to the operable diesel generator shall be operable. If this requirement cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.
2. Any combination of inoperable components in the Core and Containment Cooling systems shall not defeat the capability of the remaining operable components to fulfill the core and containment cooling functions.
3. When irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor is in the cold shutdown condition, all Core and Containment Cooling subsystems may be inoperable provided no work is permitted which has the potential for draining the reactor vessel.

H. Minimum Core and Containment Cooling System Availability

1. During reactor operation, when it is determined that one of the standby diesel generators is inoperable, all Low Pressure Core Cooling and Containment Cooling subsystems shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter. In addition, the operable diesel generator shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.
2. During a refueling outage, when applicable Core and Containment Cooling Systems are required to be operable, the surveillance requirements of Specification 4.5.H.1 shall be performed immediately and monthly except that the operable diesel shall be tested immediately and weekly.

## 3.5 (cont'd)

## B. and C. Containment Spray Cooling Capability and RHR Service Water System

The containment heat removal portion of the RHR system is provided to remove heat energy from the containment in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. For the flow specified, the containment long-term pressure is limited to less than 5 psig and, therefore, the flow is more than ample to provide the required heat removal capability. Reference Section 14.6.3.3.2 FSAR.

Each containment cooling subsystem consists of 2 RHR service water pumps, 1 heat exchanger and 2 RHR (LPCI) pumps. Either set of equipment is capable of performing the containment cooling function. In fact, an analysis in Section 14.6 of the FSAR shows that one subsystem consisting of 1 RHR service water pump, 1 heat exchanger and 1 RHR pump has sufficient capacity to perform the cooling function. Whenever one containment cooling subsystem becomes inoperable, the remaining subsystem is tested daily to assure containment cooling capability.

## D. Station Service Water and Alternate Cooling Tower Systems

The station service water subsystems and the alternate cooling tower system provide alternate heat sinks to dissipate residual heat after a shutdown or accident. Each station service water subsystem and the alternate cooling tower system provides sufficient heat sink capacity to perform the required heat dissipation. The alternate cooling tower system will provide the necessary heat sink in the event both station service water subsystems become incapacitated due to a loss of the Vernon Dam with subsequent loss of the Vernon Pond.

## E. High Pressure Coolant Injection System

The high pressure coolant injection system (HPCIS) is provided to adequately cool the core for all pipe breaks smaller than those for which the LPCI or core spray cooling subsystems can protect the core.

The HPCIS meets this requirement without the use of outside power. For the pipe breaks for which the HPCIS is intended to function the core never uncovers and is continuously cooled; thus, no clad damage occurs and clad temperatures remain near normal throughout the transient. Reference Subsection 6.5.2.2 of the FSAR.

## F. Automatic Depressurization System

The relief valves of the automatic depressurization system are a backup to the HPCIS. They enable the core spray cooling system or LPCIS to provide protection against the small pipe break in the event of HPCI failure by depressurizing the reactor vessel rapidly enough to actuate the core sprays or LPCIS. Either of the two core spray cooling systems or LPCIS provide sufficient flow of coolant to prevent clad melting. All four relief valves are included in the automatic pressure relief system. (See VYNPS, FSAR Vol. 4 Appendix B.)

#### 4.5 CORE AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEMS

##### A. Core Spray and LPCI

During normal plant operation, manual tests of operable pumps and valves shall be conducted monthly to demonstrate operability with the exception of the Recirculation Pump Discharge valves. The Recirculation System discharge valves are not tested during plant operation since to do so would create a severe plant transient.

During each refueling shutdown, tests (as summarized below) shall be conducted to demonstrate proper automatic operation and system performance.

Periodic testing at the intervals specified above will demonstrate that all components which do not operate during normal conditions will operate properly if required.

The automatic actuation test will be performed by simulation of high drywell pressure or low-low water level. The starting of the pump and actuation of valves will be checked. The normal power supply will be used during the test. Testing of the sequencing of the pumps when the diesel generator is the source of power will be checked during the testing of the diesel. Following the automatic actuation test, the flow rate will be checked by recirculation to the suppression chamber. The pump and valve operability checks will be performed by manually starting the pump or activating the valve. For the pumps, the pump motors will be run long enough for them to reach operating temperatures.

##### B. and C. Containment Spray Cooling Capability and RHR Service Water Systems

The periodic testing intervals specified in Specifications 4.5.B. and C. will demonstrate that all components will operate properly if required. Since this is a manually actuated system, no automatic actuation test is required. The system will be activated manually and the flow checked by an indicator in the control room.

Once every five years air tests will be performed to assure that the containment spray header nozzles are operable.

##### D., E. and F. Station Service Water and Alternate Cooling Tower Systems and High Pressure Coolant Injection and Automatic Depressurization System

The testing intervals for the HPCI system will demonstrate that the system will operate if required. The automatic depressurization system is tested during refueling outages to avoid an undesirable blowdown of the reactor coolant system.

The HPCI Automatic Actuation Test will be performed by simulation of the accident signal. This test is normally performed in conjunction with the Automatic Actuation of all core standby cooling systems.

## 4.5 (Continued)

A flow rate test of HPCIS is performed once/operating cycle during normal station operation by pumping water at rated conditions from the condensate storage tank and back through the full flow test return line to the tank.

The pump operability check will be performed by starting the turbine manually, valves will also be stroked by manual actuation of the operators.

## G. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System

Frequency of testing of the RCIC system is the same as the HPCIS except the flow rate test is performed after major pump maintenance and every three months, and demonstrates that the system is operable if needed.

## H. Minimum Core and Containment Cooling System Availability

Immediate testing followed by daily tests of all low pressure core cooling subsystems and containment cooling subsystems including the operable standby diesel generator upon determination of one inoperable diesel generator adequately demonstrates the availability of core and containment cooling subsystems. This testing frequency is reduced to monthly during a refueling outage to permit various surveillance inspections on equipment. However, at least one diesel is maintained fully operable and tested weekly.

## I. Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe

Observation of water flowing from the discharge line high point vent monthly assures that the core cooling subsystems will not experience water hammer damage when any of the pumps are started. Core spray subsystems and LPCI subsystems will also be vented through the discharge line high point vent following a return from an inoperable status to assure that the system is "solid" and ready for operation.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 27 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-28  
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION  
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION  
DOCKET NO. 50-271

INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 15, 1976, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (VYNPC) requested a change to the VYNPS Technical Specifications. The changes result from a facility modification to replace the valve position limiters with inline orifices. The orifices are designed to accomplish the same intent. The proposed changes serve to further restrict and clarify the limiting conditions for operation of the core and containment cooling systems for those cases where certain components are out of service.

BACKGROUND

By letter dated May 19, 1976, we requested VYNPC to analyze and determine if long term heat removal capabilities for VYNPS could be impaired due to RHR (LPCI) Pump runout following a postulated LOCA, to provide a schedule for making system modifications, and to describe the testing program that will be used to verify that the required design modifications: (1) adequately protect the RHR (LPCI) Pumps from potential runout conditions; and (2) assure that LPCI system core reflood performance is in accordance with the current ECCS analysis for VYNPS.

VYNPS responded to our request by letters dated June 23, July 15, and supplemented by letter dated July 27, 1976.

EVALUATION

VYNPC has installed orifices in the RHR pump discharge lines to limit the maximum pump flow when the RHR pumps discharge to a postulated broken recirculation loop. These orifices assure that the ratings of the pump motors and emergency diesel generators are not exceeded. VYNPC conducted tests on these RHR pumps with the orifices installed to confirm that the pumps did not suffer a loss of flow that impacts the ECCS Appendix K analysis. VYNPC has calculated that the pumps have a net positive suction head (NPSH) greater than the manufacturer's recommended design value. We find that VYNPC has demonstrated that the orifices installed at VYNPS provide adequate protection to assure RHR pump availability for long term

containment cooling under the postulated accident conditions. Thus, we conclude that operation of VYNPS with the orifices installed will not significantly reduce the short or long term cooling capabilities of the RHR (LPCI) system and is therefore acceptable.

We also conclude that the changes to the Technical Specifications and bases are consistent with current practice and reflect a surveillance and test frequency that will provide assurance of system reliability, and are therefore considered acceptable.

Technical Specification changes were proposed to clarify and change the limiting conditions for operation for the core and containment cooling systems to reduce the period of time certain components are permitted to be out of service. We conclude that these changes are consistent with our position on inoperable equipment at other similar reactors and are acceptable.

#### ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental statement, negative declaration, or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

#### CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: August 2, 1976

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 50-271

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY  
OPERATING LICENSE

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 27 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-28, issued to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (the licensee), which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, (the facility) located near Vernon, Vermont. The amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

The amendment relates to the replacement of valve position limiters with inline orifices.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.


The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement, negative declaration or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated July 15, 1976, (2) Amendment No. 27 to License No. DPR-28, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. and at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., and at the Brooks Memorial Library, 224 Main Street, Brattleboro, Vermont.

A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 2nd day of August 1976.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Robert W. Reid, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #4  
Division of Operating Reactors