MAR 12 1976

Docket No. 50-271

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Yankee Atomic Electric Company
ATTN: Mr. Robert H. Groce
Licensing Engineer
20 Turnpike Road
Westboro, Massachusetts 01581

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 21 to Facility License No. DPR-28 for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. This amendment includes changes to the Technical Specifications in response to Vermont Yankee's request dated July 31, 1975, as supplemented August 28, 1975.

This amendment reflects incorporation of the average Power Range Monitor (APRM) setdown into the Reactor Protection System. This amendment also makes minor editorial corrections to Technical Specification Table 3.2.1, Note 6.

Copies of our Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice relating to this action are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 21
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Federal Register Notice

cc: See next page

ri 3/12/76

OFFICE ➤	ORB4 PDB	OELD	ORB4:C			
SURNAME ➤	PDiBenedetto:mmt	Tourtellotte	RWReid			
DATE ➤	3/12/76	3/ /76	3/12/76			

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

March 12, 1976

Docket No. 50-271

Yankee Atomic Electric Company
ATTN: Mr. Robert H. Groce
Licensing Engineer
20 Turnpike Road
Westboro, Massachusetts 01581

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 21 to Facility License No. DPR-28 for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. This amendment includes changes to the Technical Specifications in response to Vermont Yankee's request dated July 31, 1975, as supplemented August 28, 1975.

This amendment reflects incorporation of the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) setdown into the Reactor Protection System. This amendment also makes minor editorial corrections to Technical Specification Table 3.2.1, Note 6.

Copies of our Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice relating to this action are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Robert W. Reid

Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 21
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Federal Register Notice

cc: See next page

cc:
Mr. James E. Griffin, President
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
77 Grove Street
Rutland, Vermont 05701

Mr. Donald E. Vandenburgh, Vice President
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
Turnpike Road, Route 9
Westboro, Massachusetts 01581

John A. Ritsher, Esquire
Ropes & Gray
225 Franklin Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02110

Gregor I. McGregor, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General
Department of the Attorney General
State House, Room 370
Boston, Massachusetts 02133

Richard E. Ayres, Esquire
Natural Resources Defense
917 - 15th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20005

Honorable M. Jerome Diamond
Attorney General
State of Vermont
109 State Street
Pavilion Office Building
Montpelier, Vermont 05602

John A. Calhoun
Assistant Attorney General
State of Vermont
109 State Street
Pavilion Office Building
Montpelier, Vermont 05602

Anthony Z. Roisman, Esquire
Berlin, Roisman and Kessler
1712 N Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Brooks Memorial Library
224 Main Street
Brattleboro, Vermont 05301

Mr. John R. Stanton, Director
Radiation Control Agency
Hazen Drive
Concord, New Hampshire 03301

Mr. John W. Stevens
Conservation Society of
Southern Vermont
P. O. Box 256
Townshend, Vermont 05353

Mr. David M. Scott
Radiation Health Engineer
Agency of Human Services
Division of Occupational Health
P. O. Box 607
Barre, Vermont 05641

New England Coalition on
Nuclear Pollution
Hill and Dale Farm
West Hill - Faraway Road
Putney, Vermont 05346

Mr. Raymond H. Puffer
Chairman
Board of Selectman
Vernon, Vermont 05354

cc w/enclosures and copy of
VY's filing dtd.
7/31/75 and 8/28/75

Mr. Martin K. Miller, Chairman
State of Vermont
Public Service Board
120 State Street
Montpelier, Vermont 05602

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-271

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 21
License No. DPR-28

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (the licensee) dated July 31, 1975, as supplemented August 28, 1975, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and,

   E. An environmental statement or negative declaration need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by a change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the
Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance:
March 12, 1976

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 21

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-28

DOCKET NO. 50-271

Remove pages 5a, 14a, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, and 40 from Appendix A Technical Specifications and insert the attached replacement pages. The changed areas on the revised pages are shown by a marginal line.

1.1 Safety Limit

2.1 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTING

In the event of operation with a maximum total peaking factor (MTPF) greater than the design value of A, the setting shall be modified as follows:

$$S \leq (0.66\ W + 54\%) \frac{A}{MTPF}$$

where:

A = 2.62 for 7 x 7 fuel
= 2.44 for 8 x 8 fuel

MTPF = The value of the existing maximum total peaking factor.

For no combination of loop recirculation flow rate and core thermal power shall the APRM flux scram trip setting be allowed to exceed 120% of rated thermal power.

b. Flux Scram Trip Setting (Refuel or Startup and Hot Standby Mode)

When the reactor mode switch is in the REFUEL or STARTUP position, average power range monitor (APRM) scram shall be set down to less than or equal to 15% of rated neutron flux. The IRM flux scram setting shall be set at less than or equal to 120//25 of full scale.

B. Core Thermal Power Limit (Reactor Pressure ≤800 psia or Core Flow ≤10% of Rated)

When the reactor pressure is ≤800 psia or core flow ≤10% of rated, the core thermal power shall not exceed 25% of rated thermal power.

B. APRM Rod Block Trip Setting

The APRM rod block trip setting shall be as shown in Figure 2.1.1 and shall be:

$$S_{RB} \leq 0.66\ W + 42\%$$

APRM Flux Scram Trip Setting (Run Mode)

The scram trip setting must be adjusted to ensure that the LHGR transient peak is not increased for any combination of MTPF and reactor core thermal power. The scram setting is adjusted in accordance with the formula in Specification 2.1.A.1.a, when the maximum total peaking factor is greater than 2.62 for 7x7 fuel and 2.44 for 8x8 fuel.

Analyses of the limiting transients show that no scram adjustment is required to assure MCPR >1.05 when the transient is initiated from MCPR $\geq$ 1.28.

b. Flux Scram Trip Setting (Refuel or Startup & Hot Standby Mode)

For operation in the startup mode while the reactor is at low pressure, the reduced APRM scram setting to 15 percent of rated power provides adequate thermal margin between the setpoint and the safety limit, 25 percent of rated. The margin is adequate to accommodate anticipated maneuvers associated with station startup. Effects of increasing pressure at zero or low void content are minor, cold water from sources available during startup is not much colder than that already in the system, temperature coefficients are small, and control rod patterns are constrained to be uniform by operating procedures backed up by the rod worth minimizer. Worth of individual rods is very low in a uniform rod pattern. Thus, of all possible sources of reactivity input, uniform control rod withdrawal is the most probable cause of significant power rise. Because the flux distribution associated with uniform rod withdrawals does not involve high local peaks, and because several rods must be moved to change power by a significant percentage of rated power, the rate of power rise is very slow. Generally, the heat flux is in near equilibrium with the fission rate. In an assumed uniform rod withdrawal approach to the scram level, the rate of power rise is no more than 5 percent of rated power per minute, and the APRM system would be more than adequate to assure a scram before the power could exceed the safety limit. The reduced APRM scram remains active until the mode switch is placed in the RUN position. This switch can occur when reactor pressure is greater than 850 psig.

The IRM system consists of 6 chambers, 3 in each of the reactor protection system logic channels. The IRM is a 5-decade instrument which covers the range of power level between that covered by the SRM and the APRM. The 5 decades are covered by the IRM by means of a range switch and the 5 decades are broken down into 10 ranges, each being one-half of a decade in size. The IRM scram trip setting of 120/125 of full scale is active in each range of the IRM. For example, if the instrument were on range 1, the scram setting would be a 120/125 of full scale for that range; likewise, if the instrument were on range 5, the scram would be 120/125 of full scale on that range. Thus, as the IRM is ranged up to accommodate the increase in power level, the scram trip setting is also ranged up. The most significant sources of reactivity change during the power increase are due to control rod withdrawal. For insequence control rod withdrawal, the rate of change of power is slow enough due to the physical limitation of withdrawing control rods, that heat flux is in equilibrium with the neutron flux and an IRM scram would result in a reactor shutdown well before any Safety Limit is exceeded.

TABLE 3.1.1

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (SCRAM) INSTRUMENT REQUIREMENTS

Trip Function	Trip Settings	Modes in Which Functions Must be Operating Refuel(1)	Startup	Run	Min. No. Operating Instrument Channels Per Trip System (2)	Required Conditions When Minimum Conditions For Operation Are Not Satisfied(3)
1. Mode switch in shutdown		X	X	X	1	A
2. Manual scram		X	X	X	1	A
3. IRM						
High Flux	≤120/125	X	X	X(11)	2	A
Inop		X	X	X(11)	2	A
4. APRM						
High Flux (flow bias)	≤0.66W + 54% (4)			X	2	A or B
High Flux (reduced)	≤15%	X	X		2	A
INOP				X	2(5)	A or B
Downscale	≥2/125			X	2	A or B
5. High Reactor Pressure	≤1055 psig	X	X	X	2	A
6. High Drywell Pressure	≤2 psig	X	X	X	2	A
7. Reactor Low water level	≥1.0 inch(6)	X	X	X	2	A
8. Scram discharge volume high level	≤24 gallons	X	X	X	2	A

TABLE 3.1.1 NOTES

1. When the reactor is subcritical and the reactor water temperature is less than 212°F, only the following trip functions need to be operable:

   a) mode switch in shutdown
   b) manual scram
   c) high flux IRM or high flux SRM in coincidence
   d) scram discharge volume high water level.

2. There shall be two operable or tripped trip systems for each function.

3. When the requirements in the column "Minimum Number of Operating Instrument Channels Per Trip System" cannot be met for one system, that system shall be tripped. If the requirements cannot be met for both trip systems, the appropriate actions listed below shall be taken:

   A. Initiate insertion of operable rods and complete insertion of all operable rods within four hours.
   B. Reduce power level to IRM range and place mode switch in the "Startup/Hot Standby" position within eight hours.
   C. Reduce turbine load and close main steamline isolation valves within eight hours.
   D. Reduce reactor power to less than 30% of rated within eight hours.

4. "W" is percent rated drive flow where 100% rated drive flow is that flow equivalent to $48x10^6$ lbs/hr core flow

5. To be considered operable an APRM must have at least 2 LPRM inputs per level and at least a total of 13 LPRM inputs, except that channels A, C, D, and F may lose all LPRM inputs from the companion APRM Cabinet plus one additional LPRM input and still be considered operable.

6. 1 inch on the water level instrumentation is 127 above the top of the active fuel.

7. Channel shared by the Reactor Protection and Primary Containment Isolation Systems.

8. An alarm setting of 1.5 times normal background at rated power shall be established to alert the operator to abnormal radiation levels in primary coolant. Fast closure system equipment includes acceleration-relay pressure switches and associated relays.

9. Channel signals for the turbine control valve fast closure trip shall be derived from the same event or events which cause the control valve fast closure.

10. A turbine stop valve closure and generator load rejection bypass is permitted when the first stage turbine pressure is less than 30 percent of normal (220 psia).

11. The IRM scram is bypassed when the APRMs are on scale and the mode switch is in the run position.

TABLE 4.1.1

SCRAM INSTRUMENTATION AND LOGIC SYSTEMS FUNCTIONAL TESTS

MINIMUM FUNCTIONAL TEST FREQUENCIES FOR SAFETY INSTRUMENTATION, LOGIC SYSTEMS AND CONTROL CIRCUITS

Instrument Channel	Group (3)	Functional Test (7)	Minimum Frequency (4)
Mode Switch in Shutdown	A	Place Mode Switch in Shutdown	Each Refueling Outage
Manual Scram	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Every 3 Months
IRM			
High Flux	C	Trip Channel and Alarm (5)	Before Each Startup & Weekly during refueling (6)
Inoperative	C	Trip Channel and Alarm	Before Each Startup & Weekly during refueling (6)
APRM			
High Flux	B	Trip Output Relays (5)	Once Each Week
High Flux (Reduced)	B	Trip Output Relays (5)	Before Each Startup & Weekly during refueling (6)
Inoperative	B	Trip Output Relays	Once Each Week
Downscale	B	Trip Output Relays (5)	Once Each Week
Flow Bias	B	Trip Output Relays (5)	(1)
High Reactor Pressure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)
High Drywell Pressure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)
Low Reactor Water Level (2) (8)	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)
High Water Level in Scram Discharge Volume	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	Every 3 Months
High Main Streamline Radiation (2)	B	Trip Channel and Alarm (5)	Once Each Week
Main Steamline Iso. Valve Closure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)
Turbine Con. Valve Fast Closure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)
Turbine Stop Valve Closure	A	Trip Channel and Alarm	(1)

TABLE 4.1.1 NOTES

1. Initially once per month; thereafter, with an interval not less than one month nor more than three months. The compilation of instrument failure rate data may include data obtained from other Boiling Water Reactors for which the same design instrument operates in an environment similar to that of Vermont Yankee.

2. An instrument check shall be performed on low reactor water level once per day and on high steamline radiation once per shift.

3. A description of the three groups is included in the basis of this Specification.

4. Functional tests are not required when the systems are not required to be operable or are tripped. If tests are missed, they shall be performed prior to returning the systems to an operable status.

5. This instrumentation is exempted from the Instrument Functional Test Definition (1.G.). This Instrument Functional Test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the measurement channels.

6. Frequency need not exceed weekly.

7. A functional test of the logic of each channel is performed as indicated. This coupled with placing the mode switch in shutdown each refueling outage constitutes a logic system functional test of the scram system.

8. The water level in the reactor vessel will be perturbed and the corresponding level indicator changes will be monitored. This test will be performed every month after the completion of the monthly tests program.

TABLE 4.1.2

SCRAM INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION

MINIMUM CALIBRATION FREQUENCIES FOR REACTOR PROTECTION INSTRUMENT CHANNELS

Instrument Channel	Group (1)	Calibration Standard (4)	Minimum Frequency (2)
High Flux APRM			
Output Signal	B	Heat Balance	Once Every 7 Days
Output Signal (Reduced)	B	Heat Balance	Once Every 7 Days
Flow Bias	B	Standard Pressure and Voltage Source	Refueling Outage
APRM	B (5)	Using TIP System	Every 1000 equiv. full pwr. hr.
High Reactor Pressure	A	Standard Pressure Source	Every 3 months
Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure	A	Standard Pressure Source	Every 3 months
High Drywell Pressure	A	Standard Pressure Source	Every 3 months
High Water Level in Scram Discharge Volume	A	Water Level	Refueling Outage
Low Reactor Water Level	A	Water Level	Every 3 months
Turbine Stop Valve Closure	A	(6)	Refueling Outage
High Main Steamline Radiation	B	Appropriate Radiation Source (3)	Refueling Outage
First Stage Turbine Pressure - Permissive	A	Pressure Source	Every 6 months and after refueling
Maine Steamline Isolation Valve Closure	A	(6)	Refueling Outage

TABLE 4.1.2 NOTES

1. A description of the three groups is included in the bases of this Specification.

2. Calibration tests are not required when the systems are not required to be operable or are tripped. If tests are missed, they shall be performed prior to returning the systems to an operable status.

3. A current source provides an instrument channel alignment every 3 months.

4. Response time is not part of the routine instrument check and calibration, but will be checked every operating cycle.

5. Does not provide scram function.

6. Physical inspection and actuation.

3.1 (cont'd)

The bases for the scram settings for the IRM, APRM, high reactor pressure, reactor low water level, turbine control valve fast closure, and turbine stop valve closure are discussed in Specification 2.1.

Instrumentation (pressure switches) is provided to detect a loss of coolant accident and initiate the core standby cooling equipment. This instrumentation is a backup to the water level instrumentation which is discussed in Specification 3.2.

The control rod drive scram system is designed so that all of the water which is discharged from the reactor by the scram can be accommodated in the discharge piping. A part of this piping is an instrument volume which accommodates in excess of 24 gallons of water and is the low point in the piping. No credit was taken for this volume in the design of the discharge piping as concerns the amount of water which must be accommodated during a scram. During normal operation the discharge volume is empty; however, should it fill with water, the water discharged to the piping from the reactor could not be accommodated which would result in slow scram times or partial or no control rod insertion. To preclude this occurrence, level switches have been provided in the instrument volume which scram the reactor when the volume of water reaches 24 gallons. As indicated above, there is sufficient volume in the piping to accommodate the scram without impairment of the scram times or amount of insertion of the control rods. This function shuts the reactor down while sufficient volume remains to accommodate the discharged water and precludes the situation in which a scram would be required but not be able to perform its function adequately.

Loss of condenser vacuum occurs when the condenser can no longer handle the heat input. Loss of condenser vacuum initiates a closure of the turbine stop valves and turbine bypass valves which eliminates the heat input to the condenser. Closure of the turbine stop and bypass valves causes a pressure transient, neutron flux rise, and an increase in surface heat flux. To prevent the clad safety limit from being exceeded if this occurs, a reactor scram occurs on turbine stop valve closure. The turbine stop valve closure scram function alone is adequate to prevent the clad safety limit from being exceeded in the event of a turbine trip transient without bypass.

3.1 (cont'd)

High radiation levels in the main steam line tunnel above that due to the normal nitrogen and oxygen radio-activity is an indication of leaking fuel. A scram is initiated whenever such radiation level exceeds three times normal background. The purpose of this scram is to reduce the source of such radiation to the extent necessary to prevent release of radioactive material to the turbine. An alarm is initiated whenever the radiation level exceeds 1.5 times normal background to alert the operator to possible serious radioactivity spikes due to abnormal core behavior. The air ejector off-gas monitors serve to back up the main steam line monitors to provide further assurance against release of radioactive material to site environs by isolating the main condenser off-gas line to the main stack.

The main steam line isolation valve closure scram is set to scram when the isolation valves are 10 percent closed from full open in 3 out of 4 lines. This scram anticipates the pressure and flux transient, which would occur when the valves close. By scramming at this setting, the resultant transient is insignificant.

A reactor mode switch is provided which actuates or bypasses the various scram functions appropriate to the particular plant operating status.

The manual scram function is active in all modes, thus providing for a manual means of rapidly inserting control rods during all modes of reactor operation.

The IRM system provides protection against short reactor periods and, in conjunction with the reduced APRM system, provides protection against excessive power levels in the startup and intermediate power ranges. A source range monitor (SRM) system is also provided to supply additional neutron level information during startup and can provide scram function with selected shorting links removed during refueling. Thus, the IRM and the reduced APRM are required in the startup mode and may be required in the refuel mode. In the power range, the normal APRM system provides required protection. Thus, the IRM system and 15% APRM scram are not required in the run mode. The requirement that the IRM's be inserted in the core until the APRM's read at least 2/125 of full scale assures that there is proper overlap in the neutron monitoring systems.

If an unsafe failure is detected during surveillance testing, it is desirable to determine as soon as possible if other failures of a similar type have occurred and whether the particular function involved is still operable or capable of meeting the single failure criteria. To meet the requirements of Table 3.1.1, it is necessary that all instrument channels in one trip system be operable to permit testing in the other trip system. Thus, when failures are detected in the first trip system tested, they would have to be repaired before testing of the other system could begin. In the majority of cases, repairs or

TABLE 3.2.1 NOTES

1. Each of the two Core Spray and LPCI subsystems are initiated and controlled by a trip system. The subsystem "B" is identical to the subsystem "A".

2. If the minimum number of operable instrument channels are not available, the inoperable channel shall be tripped using test jacks or other permanently installed circuits. If the channel cannot be tripped by the means stated above, that channel shall be made operable within 24 hours or an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.

3. One trip system with initiating instrumentation arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic.

4. One trip system with initiating instrumentation arranged in a one-out-of two logic.

5. If the minimum number of operable channels are not available, the system is considered inoperable and the requirements of Specification 3.5 apply.

6. Any one of the two trip systems will initiated ADS. If the minimum number of operable channels in one trip system is not available, the requirements of Specification 3.5.F.2 and 3.5.F.3 shall apply. If the minimum number of operable channels is not available in both trip systems, Specifications 3.5.F.3 shall apply.

7. One trip system arranged in a two-out-of-two logic.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 21 TO LICENSE DPR-28

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-271

INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 31, 1975, and supplemental letter dated August 28, 1975, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (VYNPC) requested a change to the Appendix A Technical Specifications appended to Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The proposed change reflects incorporation of the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) setdown into the Reactor Protection System.

DISCUSSION

By letter dated May 30, 1973, VYNPC proposed changes to the Technical Specifications that would correct errors and improve safety features. Concurrent with this request, meetings were held between the VYNPC staff and the NRC staff regarding installation of systems that were necessary to improve safety. Modifications were to be made to the APRM system, which is a common feature in similar boiling water reactors, so that the rated neutron flux would be indicated and a scram set point of less than or equal to 15 percent in the startup and refuel modes would be required. This modification was performed during the 1974 refueling outage and Technical Specifications were to be issued at the completion of the installation.

However, testing of the APRM setdown showed it to be inoperable and the features had to be removed. It was scheduled to be reinstalled during the 1975 outage. During the August 1975 outage for core support plate plugging the APRM setdown was installed; testing of this feature proved it to be operable.

The proposed Technical Specifications reflect incorporation of the APRM system so that rated neutron flux will be indicated and a scram set point of less than or equal to 15 percent of rated power is provided in startup and refuel modes.

EVALUATION

For operating in the startup mode while the reactor is at low pressure, the APRM scram setting of 15 percent of rated power provides adequate thermal margin between the setpoint and the safety limit, 25 percent of rated power. 1/ This margin is adequate to accommodate anticipated maneuvers associated with power plant startup and is therefore acceptable.

Effects of increasing pressure at zero or low void content are minor, cold water from sources available during startup is not much colder than that already in the system, temperature coefficients are small, and control rod patterns are constrained to be uniform by operating procedures backed up by the rod worth minimizer. Worth of individual rods is very low in a uniform rod pattern. Thus, of all possible sources of reactivity input, uniform control rod withdrawal is the most probable cause of significant power rise. Because the flux distribution associated with uniform rod withdrawals does not involve high local peaks, and because several rods must be moved to change power by a significant precentage of rated power, the rate of power rise is very slow. Generally the heat flux is in near equilibruim with the fission rate. In an assumed uniform rod withdrawal approach to the scram level, the rate of power rise is no more than five percent of rated power per minute, and the APRM would be more than adequate to assure a scram before the power could exceed the safety limit. We conclude that this is acceptable.

The 15 percent APRM scram remains active until the mode switch is placed in the run position. This switching to the run position is performed when the reactor pressure is greater than 850 psig. We conclude that this manner of operation is acceptable.

This amendment also makes minor editorial corrections to Technical Specification Table 3.2.1, Note 6.

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant evnironmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR § 51.5(d)(4), that an environmental statement, negative declaration, or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

1/ Appendix A Technical Specification Safety Limits 1.1 B, Page 5-2, and Bases 1.1.B, Page 11

CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above that: (1) because the change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated:
March 12, 1976

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 50-271

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Notice is hereby given that the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 21 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 issued to Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, located near Vernon, Vermont. The amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

The amendment reflects incorporation of the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) setdown into the Reactor Protection System. The amendment also makes minor editorial corrections to Technical Specification Table 3.2.1, Note 6.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment is not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental statement, negative declaration or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated July 31, 1975, as supplemented August 28, 1975, (2) Amendment No. 21 to License No. DPR-28, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., and at the Brooks Memorial Library, 224 Main Street, Brattleboro, Vermont 05301. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 12th day of March, 1976.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Operating Reactors

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

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Docket No. 50-271

MAR 17 1976

Docketing and Service Section
Office of the Secretary of the Commission

SUBJECT: **VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION**

Two signed originals of the Federal Register Notice identified below are enclosed for your transmittal to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. Additional conformed copies (12) of the Notice are enclosed for your use.

- ☐ Notice of Receipt of Application for Construction Permit(s) and Operating License(s).
- ☐ Notice of Receipt of Partial Application for Construction Permit(s) and Facility License(s): Time for Submission of Views on Antitrust Matters.
- ☐ Notice of Availability of Applicant's Environmental Report.
- ☐ Notice of Proposed Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License.
- ☐ Notice of Receipt of Application for Facility License(s); Notice of Availability of Applicant's Environmental Report; and Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Facility License(s) and Notice of Opportunity for Hearing.
- ☐ Notice of Availability of NRC Draft/Final Environmental Statement.
- ☐ Notice of Limited Work Authorization.
- ☐ Notice of Availability of Safety Evaluation Report.
- ☐ Notice of Issuance of Construction Permit(s).
- ☒ Notice of Issuance of Facility Operating License(s) or Amendment(s).
- ☐ Other: ______________________

Original signed by
Roberta R. Ingram
Division of Operating Reactors
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:
As Stated

OFFICE→	ORB4					
SURNAME→	RIngram:mmt					
DATE→	3/17/76					

NRC FORM 102 (1-76)