

July 1, 1985

Docket No. 50-271

Mr. R. W. Capstick  
Licensing Engineer  
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation  
1671 Worcester Road  
Framingham, Massachusetts 01701

Dear Mr. Capstick:

SUBJECT: MARK I CONTAINMENT PROPOSED TECHNICAL  
SPECIFICATION CHANGE

Re: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station

Your November 2, 1984 letter provided a proposed amendment to incorporate the results of the plant unique analysis, performed as part of the Mark I Containment long-term program, into the primary containment Bases, Specification 3.7.A. Since the changes only affect the Bases section of the Technical Specifications, an amendment to the license is not required.

We have completed our review of the information you provided and have determined that the changes are administrative in nature. We, therefore, find the proposed Technical Specification Bases changes acceptable. Enclosed are Technical Specification Bases pages 138, 139 and 139a.

Sincerely,

Original signed by MGrotenhuis for/

Domenic B. Vassallo, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #2  
Division of Licensing

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As stated

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Mr. R. W. Capstick  
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation  
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station

cc:

Mr. W. F. Conway  
President & Chief Executive Officer  
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.  
R. D. 5, Box 169  
Ferry Road  
Brattleboro, Vermont 05301

Mr. Donald Hunter, Vice President  
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.  
1671 Worcester Road  
Framingham, Massachusetts 01701

New England Coalition on  
Nuclear Pollution  
Hill and Dale Farm  
R. D. 2, Box 223  
Putney, Vermont 05346

Mr. Walter Zaluzny  
Chairman, Board of Selectman  
Post Office Box 116  
Vernon, Vermont 05345

J. P. Pelletier, Plant Manager  
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.  
Post Office Box 157  
Vernon, Vermont 05354

Raymond N. McCandless  
Vermont Division of Occupational  
& Radiological Health  
Administration Building  
10 Baldwin Street  
Montpelier, Vermont 05602

Honorable John J. Easton  
Attorney General  
State of Vermont  
109 State Street  
Montpelier, Vermont 05602

John A. Ritscher, Esquire  
Ropes & Gray  
225 Franklin Street  
Boston, Massachusetts 02110

W. P. Murphy, Vice President &  
Manager of Operations  
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.  
R. D. 5, Box 169  
Ferry Road  
Brattleboro, Vermont 05301

Mr. Gerald Tarrant, Commissioner  
Vermont Department of Public Service  
120 State Street  
Montpelier, Vermont 05602

Public Service Board  
State of Vermont  
120 State Street  
Montpelier, Vermont 05602

Vermont Yankee Decommissioning  
Alliance  
Box 53  
Montpelier, Vermont 05602-0053

Resident Inspector  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Post Office Box 176  
Vernon, Vermont 05354

Vermont Public Interest  
Research Group, Inc.  
43 State Street  
Montpelier, Vermont 05602

Thomas A. Murley  
Regional Administrator  
Region I Office  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Bases:

### 3.7 STATION CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

#### A. Primary Containment

The integrity of the primary containment and operation of the core standby cooling systems in combination limit the off-site doses to values less than to those suggested in 10 CFR 100 in the event of a break in the primary system piping. Thus, containment integrity is specified whenever the potential for violation of the primary reactor system integrity exists. Concern about such a violation exists whenever the reactor is critical, above atmospheric pressure and temperature above 212°F. An exception is made to this requirement during initial core loading and while a low power test program is being conducted and ready access to the reactor vessel is required. The reactor may be taken critical during the period; however, restrictive operating procedures will be in effect again to minimize the probability of an accident occurring. Procedures and the Rod Worth Minimizer would limit control worth to less than 1.30% delta k.

The pressure suppression pool water provides the heat sink for the reactor primary system energy release following posulated rupture of the system. The pressure suppression chamber water volume must absorb the associated decay and structural sensible heat released during primary system blowdown from 1000 psig.

Since all the gases in the drywell are purged into the pressure suppression chamber air space during a loss-of-coolant accident, the pressure resulting from isothermal compression plus the vapor pressure of the liquid must not exceed 62 psig, the allowable pressure suppression chamber pressure. The design volume of the suppression chamber (water and air) was obtained by considering that the total volume of reactor coolant to be condensed is discharged to the suppression chamber and that the drywell volume is purged to the suppression chamber (Reference Section 5.2 FSAR).

Using the minimum or maximum water volumes given in the specification, containment pressure during the design basis accident is approximately 44 psig, which is below the design of 56 psig.<sup>(3)</sup> The minimum volume of 68,000 ft<sup>3</sup> results in a submergency of approximately four feet. The majority of the Bodega tests <sup>(2)</sup> were run with a submerged length of four feet and with complete condensation. Thus, with respect to downcomer submergency, this specification is adequate.

The maximum temperature at the end of blowdown tested during the Humbolt Bay <sup>(1)</sup> and Bodega Bay tests was 170°F and this is conservatively taken to be the limit for complete condensation of the reactor coolant, although condensation would occur for temperature above 170°F.

## VYNPS

### 3.7.A (Cont'd)

In conjunction with the Mark I Containment Long-Term program, a plant unique analysis was performed (see Vermont Yankee letter, dated April 27, 1984, transmitting Teledyne Engineering Services Company Reports TR-5319-1, Revision 2, dated November 30, 1983 and TR-5319-2, Revision 0) which demonstrated that all stresses in the suppression chamber structure including shell, external supports, vent system, internal structures, and attached piping meet the structural acceptance criteria of NUREG-0661. The maintenance of a drywell-suppression chamber differential pressure of 1.7 psid and a suppression chamber water level corresponding to a downcomer submergence range of 4.29 to 4.54 feet will assure the integrity of the suppression chamber when subjected to post-LOCA suppression pool hydrodynamic forces.

Using a 50°F rise (Section 5.2.4 FSAR) in the suppression chamber water temperature and a minimum water volume of 68,000 ft<sup>3</sup>, the 170°F temperature which is used for complete condensation would be approached only if the suppression pool temperature is 210°F prior to the DBA-LOCA. Maintaining a pool temperature of 90°F will assure that the 170°F limit is not approached.

Experimental data indicate that excessive steam condensing loads can be avoided if the peak temperature of the suppression pool is maintained below 160°F during any period of relief valve operation with sonic conditions at the discharge exit. Specifications have been placed on the envelope of reactor operating conditions so that the reactor can be depressurized in a timely manner to avoid the regime of potentially high suppression chamber loadings.

In addition to the limits on temperature of the suppression chamber pool water, operating procedures define the action to be taken in the event a relief valve inadvertently opens or sticks open. This action would include: (1) use of all available means to close the valve, (2) initiate suppression pool water cooling heat exchangers, (3) initiate reactor shutdown, and (4) if other relief valves are used to depressurize the reactor, their discharge shall be separated from that of the stuck-open relief valve to assure mixing and uniformity of energy insertion to the pool.

Double isolation valves are provided on lines which penetrate the primary containment and open to the free space of the containment. Closure of one of the valves in each line would be sufficient to maintain the integrity of the pressure suppression system. Automatic initiation is required to minimize the potential leakage paths from the containment in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident. Details of the isolation valves are discussed in Section 5.2 of the FSAR.

## VYNPS

### 3.7.A (Cont'd)

The purpose of the vacuum relief valves is to equalize the pressure between the drywell and suppression chamber and suppression chamber and reactor building so that the structural integrity of the containment is maintained.

Technical Specification 3.7.A.9.c is based on the assumption that the operability testing of the pressure suppression chamber-reactor building vacuum breaker, when required, will normally be performed during the same four hour testing interval as the pressure suppression chamber-drywell vacuum breakers in order to minimize operation with  $\leq 1.7$  psi, differential pressure.

The vacuum relief system from the pressure suppression chamber to Reactor Building consists of two 100% vacuum relief breakers (2 parallel sets of 2 valves in series). Operation of either system will maintain the pressure differential less than 2 psig; the external design pressure is 2 psig.

The capacity of the ten (10) drywell vacuum relief valves is sized to limit the pressure differential between the suppression chamber and drywell during post-accident drywell cooling operations to the design limit of 2 psig. They are sized on the basis of the Bodega Bay pressure suppression tests. The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Subsection B, for this vessel allows eight (8) operable valves, therefore, with two (2) valves secured, containment integrity is not impaired.

Each drywell-suppression chamber vacuum breaker is fitted with a redundant pair of limit switches to provide fail-safe signals to panel mounted indicators in the Reactor Building and alarms in the Control Room when the disks are open more than 0.050" at all points along the seal surface of the disk. These switches are capable of transmitting the disk closed to open signal with 0.01" movement of the switch plunger. Continued reactor operation with failed components is justified because of the redundancy of components and circuits and, most importantly, the accessibility of the valve lever arm and position reference external to the valve. The fail safe feature of the alarm circuits assures operator attention if a line fault occurs.

- (1) Robbins, C.H., "Tests on a Full Scale 1/48 Segment of the Humbolt Bay Pressure Suppression Containment", GEAP-3596, November 17, 1960.
- (2) Bodega Bay Preliminary Hazards Summary Report, Appendix 1, Docket 50-205, December 28, 1962.
- (3) Code Allowable peak accident pressure is 62 psig.