

EXHIBIT 8

Case No. 2-1998-023

EXHIBIT 8

K/3

Information is being provided to you
under the provisions of the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. 552
FOIA 2001-0012

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

- - - - - X
In the Matter of: :
INTERVIEW OF :
LANDY McCORMICK :
(CLOSED) :
- - - - - X

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
Training Center
1260 Nuclear Plant Road
Spring City, TN
Monday, March 22, 1999

The above-entitled matter came on for interview,
pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m.

BEFORE:

GARY CLAXTON, Investigator
DARRELL B. WHITE, Investigator

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Interviewee and TVA:

THOMAS F. FINE, Esquire
Tennessee Valley Authority
400 West Summit Hill Drive
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902

EXHIBIT 8
PAGE 1 OF 35 PAGE(S)

ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
Court Reporters
1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 1014
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 842-0034

C O N T E N T S

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

WITNESS

EXAMINATION

LANDY McCORMICK

BY MR. CLAXTON, MR. WHITE AND MR. FINE

4

E X H I B I T S

NUMBER

IDENTIFIED

[NONE.]

P R O C E E D I N G S

[2:00 p.m.]

1
2
3 MR. CLAXTON: For the record, today is March
4 22nd, 1999. This is an interview of Landy McCormick. This
5 interview is being conducted at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
6 in Spring City, Tennessee. Also present at the interview is
7 Darrell White, who is a Special Agent with the Office of
8 Investigations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and
9 myself. I'm Gary Claxton. I'm also a Special Agent with
10 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Investigations.

11 Also present is Mr. Tom Fine, and I'll allow him
12 to introduce himself and give his purpose for being here.

13 MR. FINE: My name is Thomas Fine. I'm an
14 assistant general counsel in the Office of the General
15 Counsel of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and I'm here to
16 represent Mr. McCormick and the Tennessee Valley Authority.

17 MR. CLAXTON: Mr. McCormick, have you been
18 introduced -- do you know Mr. Fine as a counsel for TVA?

19 THE INTERVIEWEE: Yes, I do.

20 MR. CLAXTON: Okay. And do you have any
21 objections to him being here, with the understanding that he
22 can share any information with your employer?

23 THE INTERVIEWEE: No, I don't.

24 MR. CLAXTON: Do you understand that you can
25 provide information to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at

1 any time in confidence without anyone else being present?

2 THE INTERVIEWEE: Yes, I do.

3 MR. CLAXTON: And with that, I would also ask you
4 if you have any objections to providing this information
5 under oath?

6 THE INTERVIEWEE: No, I do not.

7 MR. CLAXTON: Would you raise your right hand,
8 please?

9 Whereupon,

10 LANDY McCORMICK,
11 the Interviewee, was called for examination and, having been
12 first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

13 DIRECT EXAMINATION

14 BY MR. CLAXTON:

15 Q If you would, give us your full name.

16 A My name is Landy Leon McCormick.

17 Q And if you would spell McCormick for us?

18 A M-c-C=o-r-m-i-c-k.

19 Q Thank you. What's your address?

20 A Home address?

21 Q Home address, yes.

22 *XC* ~~_____~~
23 ~~_____~~

24 Q And your telephone number at home?

25 *XC* A (~~_____~~)

XC

1 Q And are you presently employed here at Watts Bar?

2 A Yes, I'm employed at Watts Bar.

3 Q How long have you been employed here?

4 A At Watts Bar?

5 Q Mm-hmm.

6 A Since December of 1989.

7 Q If you would just go backwards through your
8 professional career, starting with your present occupation
9 and brief me a little bit on what you've done.

10 A Okay. Since about September of '96 I've been in
11 my present position, which is a component engineering
12 supervisor, and that is in the system engineering
13 organization here at Watts Bar, which is now over in the
14 engineering side of the house. It's not under the plant
15 manager. It's under the site engineering and support
16 manager, who reports to Rick Purcell, the site vice
17 president.

18 Prior to that I was in -- about four months
19 prior, so somewhere like January to April of '96 I was in a
20 senior racker operator equivalent training, and then prior
21 to that I was the nuclear steam supply system section
22 supervisor. At that time that section reported to Dennis
23 Koehl, who was in the tech -- manager of the tech support
24 organization, who reported directly to the plant manager.
25 So there was an organizational change there while I was in

1 SRO training, or just before or just after, I don't recall
2 exactly when.

3 And then I held that position from December of --
4 from about March of '90 to I think September -- September or
5 January, somewhere -- January of '96. And then that's when
6 I came to Watts Bar in December of '89, so that's all the
7 positions I held here, except for the first three months I
8 was the balance of plant supervisor, and then they switched
9 me over to NSSS, so I was the first three months from
10 December to March time frame, balance of plant system
11 engineering supervisor.

12 Prior to that time I was in the corporate office
13 and I was in a staff position, working for -- I hired in
14 working for Mr. Kingsley at the time, assisting staff
15 position. Then I -- actually it was Mr. White, when I first
16 got down there, and then he left and Mr. Kingsley came in,
17 and then I switched from Mr. Kingsley over to Joe Bynum, who
18 was vice president of operations, nuclear operations.

19 And I was -- I think I went down there in mid --
20 I can't remember the exact month, somewhere in 1988, and was
21 there for maybe almost a year and a half. Prior to that I
22 was working at Sequoyah. I had gone out to Sequoyah in
23 April of '85, and these are rough now. I can't remember
24 exactly, April '85 and I worked out there until sometime in
25 '88, when I went downtown.

ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
Court Reporters
1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 1014
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 842-0034

1 I was at Sequoyah. I went into -- I was planning
2 and scheduling to begin with -- it may have been before '85
3 I went out there, but I was planning scheduling to begin
4 with, and I went over to the plant operation review staff
5 for some time, and then ended up in licensing and was there
6 for a while before I went downtown on Mr. White's staff. So
7 I was roughly three years out there at Sequoyah.

8 And then prior to that I was down in central
9 office, and that's where I initially hired in in June of
10 1980. And then I was in planning and scheduling in central
11 office for four or five years there, and assisting with
12 outages at Sequoyah and Browns Ferry.

13 Q So since 1980 has all of your experience been in
14 the nuclear field?

15 A Yes, it has.

16 Q Are you engineer -- are you a degreed engineer?

17 A I am mathematics is my major.

18 Q And what type degree did you receive in math?

19 A BS in mathematics.

20 Q From?

21 A From United States Naval Academy.

22 Q Okay. Prior to the beginning of the interview we
23 talked a little bit about the purpose of our being here and
24 what we were going to talk about. Did you bring any copies
25 of reports or --

1 A No, I did not.

2 Q I think Mr. Fine probably has everything we'll be
3 talking about today, but we talked about the two
4 metallurgical reports from Central Labs Services that were
5 produced in June of '95. Do you recall that instant or
6 those examinations just in general?

7 A Yes, I'm aware that there were two reports.

8 Q You recall the instance that I'm talking about?

9 A Yes.

10 Q If we talk about the ice screw examinations?

11 A Yes.

12 Q Can you tell me briefly how you became involved?

13 A Sure.

14 Q With the ice screw issue?

15 A Sure.

16 Q Okay.

17 A I don't remember the exact date, but somewhere
18 after we loaded ice, we had melted out the ice condenser and
19 then we reloaded ice into the ice condenser, back in
20 December-January of '95 -- '94 to '95. And several months
21 later Curtis Overall had come into my office and Curtis
22 worked for me, and he had brought in these one or two bags
23 of screws that he said that they found in the melt tank,
24 which was a tank that we had built to -- as ice went down
25 lower ice condenser, they could bag this ice, bring it out

1 and put it in this melt tank and melt the ice out and save
2 the water basically or discharge -- I'm not sure where the
3 water went.

4 Well, they had I guess were cleaning up that tank
5 several months after we were using it, and noted these
6 screws in that tank. So he and I talked about it and we
7 ended up writing a PER, plant evaluation report on the
8 issue, because they really need to determine where the
9 screws -- we knew that they were ice basket screws, but why
10 were they down in the melt tank was the question.

11 So we wrote that PER and we were in the process of
12 developing the corrective action plan and Curtis had done a
13 preliminary corrective action plan, and we didn't really
14 have any -- well, let me back up a little bit. We then -- I
15 had told Curtis we need to get these screws evaluated to
16 find out why they were failing. Some had the heads that had
17 fallen off, and I think some were still whole in tact.

18 But the ones where the head was coming off of it,
19 you know, I wanted him to try and find out why -- what the
20 cause of it was, and so we sent those down to the lab to
21 have a metallurgical analysis done on it.

22 Q So if you don't mind me interjecting, was this
23 your initiative that these screws be evaluated?

24 A Yeah, it was Curtis and I talking together, yes.
25 With the PER, you've got to have a cause -- the way a PER

1 works is you have a problem out in the plant. Well, in
2 order to really fix it, you need to know what caused it, so
3 I needed some type of cause, and the cause does two things.
4 One is once I know the cause, then I can -- it helps me on
5 my extent of condition. I mean, how many screws may be
6 affected, are there other screws in the plant, or other
7 things that may be affected, okay.

8 So and I tried to focus in on let's try and get
9 the cause on this, and then it also helps you in your
10 reoccurrence control actions. When I put together an action
11 plan, you know, to make sure that this doesn't happen again,
12 I've got to do something to take care so that cause doesn't
13 happen again, so those are the two issues that I felt like
14 we need to address.

15 So yeah, these corrective actions within those
16 corrective actions you have reoccurrence control. Also the
17 corrective actions cover your extent of condition, to make
18 sure that everything that may be appropriate is addressed in
19 that action plan.

20 So we sent those off and I don't remember the
21 exact date. I think the PER was written in April time
22 frame. I'm not positive on that, but it was taking much
23 longer than our really allotted time to get together a
24 corrective action plan.

25 Normally you have 20 working today.

1 Q Do you recall whether it was April of '95?

2 A I'm not positive. We'd have to look at the PER
3 and see when it was initiated. We could look at that and
4 verify that. Typically you have 30 calendar days or 20
5 working days to put together a corrective action plan, okay.

6 And by the time we sent these screws off and we
7 still hadn't gotten any reports back to help us with the
8 cause, we ended up extending that corrective action plan.
9 You know, the dates for it, and I believe that happened
10 twice, and again, I'd have to refer to the PER again, but I
11 think it happened twice, and we were just about to extend it
12 a third time before we transferred it.

13 Q Surely because the delay in the examination
14 results that you recall?

15 A As far as I recall. It was primarily due to
16 that. Now, the -- Curtis had put together a corrective
17 action plan fairly early, might have even met the first
18 date, but his action plan involved going out and inspecting
19 baskets. I don't recall what else was in it. It probably
20 had the waiting for the lab report also. I don't know. I
21 don't remember.

22 But I would not approve that corrective action
23 plan because I didn't want us to expend a lot of man hours
24 in that ice condenser pulling baskets, and I would never get
25 probably the maintenance manager to agree to do that with

1 his people either, unless I knew exactly what I was looking
2 for, why I needed to do it, you know, what the cause of
3 these screws breaking, what was I supposed to look at when I
4 went in there as far as individual screws. We pulled some
5 out. You know, what do we do?

6 So I told Curtis, I said we need to get this
7 cause first and then we'll determine what the action plan
8 is. Well, we had extended it once. We had extended it I
9 believe another time, and we were coming close to the third
10 extension when that PER ended up getting transferred.

11 Well, just before it was transferred the first
12 report came in. And I think it was dated June 2nd and I
13 couldn't have told you other than I saw it here recently,
14 and at that time I still owned the PER and I was pretty
15 happy because it had causes in it.

16 And that's really what we were looking for. And
17 I told Curtis to talk to the lab, you know, to make sure
18 that they knew we needed some causes of why these screws
19 broke. And I guess I found out in the trial later that
20 Curtis actually gave them the causes that were in this
21 report. I didn't realize that until the trial, but it did
22 have five or six causes.

23 Now, they were, I believe, potential causes.
24 They weren't necessarily actually why the screws broke, but
25 at least it was something that we could go back and then

1 maybe research further to see is this a possible cause or
2 not.

3 Q You're referring to the conclusions in the
4 metallurgical lab report?

5 A Yes. It had some causes, potential causes, for
6 why these screws would break, and then they had their
7 metallurgical cause as to what the breakage mechanism was.
8 I don't remember -- intergranular stress corrosion or
9 something. I'm not a metallurgist.

10 But when we got that report, our next step would
11 have been to start working on those possible causes and see
12 what we could do corrective action wise to validate those
13 causes and what we needed to do.

14 Well, shortly thereafter -- I don't know how long
15 after, Curtis came in my office and said Landy, they're
16 pulling this first report, and they want us to get all the
17 copies of this first report back, and I said, you know, we
18 had a short discussion on you mean that it doesn't exist and
19 you know -- and he said the next report, they're going to
20 change it and the next report is going to be the same
21 number, but Terry Woods didn't agree with this first report
22 going out.

23 So I was a little bit deflated then, because here
24 we were again without any cause for a PER to put together an
25 action plan.

1 So they pulled all that back and then the second
2 one, I believe came out on -- I don't know, two to three
3 weeks later. And by that time the PER -- and this is hazy
4 now. I don't know for sure, but I know that engineering had
5 picked up the ball significantly. At some point in time
6 there I started talking with Dennis Koehl to transfer that
7 PER over to engineering.

8 And I did that, I believe, because one, I still
9 -- I had all these extensions going on and I wasn't getting
10 anywhere, and I'm the one that's feeling the heat and the
11 pressure to get an action plan put together, and over in
12 engineering they're doing all this talking and discussing
13 and discussion and they don't feel the dates. You know,
14 they don't have that pressure of the dates trying -- and I'm
15 trying to justify every extension and explain why, and so I
16 felt like since Curtis and I -- it really wasn't our area of
17 expertise, that that PER should go over to engineering.

18 So I talked to Dennis Koehl, who is my
19 supervisor. I said Dennis, I don't feel like we should own
20 this. Really all that's being done is over in engineering,
21 with respect to this PER. The metallurgical side is
22 engineering people, and I had learned since that the civil
23 -- and I didn't direct the civils to do it. They all of a
24 sudden picked up and started moving on it also, the civil
25 people from a structural standpoint.

1 Q So who would that be, for instance?

2 A James Adair.

3 Q Okay.

4 A But I wasn't really working with James. I talked
5 through Frank Koontz. I don't recall even ever talking to
6 James on it. I may have on that PER, but I don't recall
7 ever talking to James. I do recall talking with Frank
8 Koontz.

9 Q Yeah. Let me make sure I understand something.
10 You're saying Mr. Adair just on his own started working on
11 the --

12 A No, let me -- I'll fill that in for you. At some
13 point in I believe early June I started talking with Dennis.
14 Now, I don't know if this is when they pulled this report
15 back and I got frustrated, you know, because I couldn't make
16 any progress on it. Maybe then I started talking with
17 Dennis, and I also started talking I believe with Frank
18 Koontz about engineering taking this PER.

19 Now, Dennis may have directed me to talk to
20 Frank, I don't recall, okay. But I found out later Dennis
21 ended up talking with Walt Elliott, who was Frank's boss,
22 okay, about taking this PER.

23 And so then Walt Elliott started the ball rolling
24 over there. He agreed and wanted to take the PER from what
25 Frank Koontz has told me since. Okay. And so once they

1 knew it was coming over there and that they needed to deal
2 with it, somehow I knew the metallurgical side was going,
3 because Curtis initiated that, you know. We initiated
4 getting the screws down to the lab and they owned the
5 metallurgical people over in engineering, so it's our
6 engineering metallurgical people talking with the lab, okay,
7 and then I'm over here in tech support under the plant, with
8 holding the PER.

9 So I'm asking Curtis all the time to get a
10 status, try and get it speeded up, let's get a report, but
11 make sure it gets causes in it, so he's talking to Vonda
12 over here in engineering metallurgical, who is talking with
13 the lab, okay. So I don't know if Curtis talked directly
14 with lab. That usually doesn't happen. It's usually we'll
15 talk with the metallurgical people and they'll talk with the
16 lab on getting the report.

17 Once I knew that they were dealing with that
18 issue, and then I found out primarily in the phone call that
19 happened on whatever date it was, mid-June sometime, that
20 here's all this structural side that's happening, talking in
21 the phone conversation that there was analysis being done by
22 -- and I couldn't tell you who was on the phone, but I know
23 we were over in Westinghouse's office. I'm assuming it was
24 Westinghouse-Pittsburgh, and I know Terry Woods was on the
25 phone.

1 And they were talking about all the structural
2 side of this basket, if the screws didn't work, you know,
3 how high would the basket go, and that sort of thing. And
4 so I was a little bit surprised that here's all this civil
5 side getting into this involved with it also, and then they
6 held the metallurgical, and that's when I started saying,
7 you know, that and before I think, saying this needs to go
8 over there to them.

9 So I ended up transferring it over and it came
10 out in the trial, and I looked at the PER, Larry Ketchum
11 over in engineering had actually signed off on the
12 reportability in like June 20th, which really was still my
13 PER then, but here he was taking hold of the PER and the
14 issue, and so I know that we had had discussions and they
15 had agreed sometime in June, but the actual transfer didn't
16 happen -- the actual sheet that I signed and James Adair
17 signed didn't happen until mid-July.

18 That could be an after-the-fact type signature,
19 which happened quite a bit, but you know, they take it but
20 then someone says oops, you need to get that transfer sheet
21 signed to make it official.

22 But anyway, that's the best of my recollection.
23 I did see the second report come in. I don't recall ever
24 reading the second report. I think Curtis briefed me on the
25 second that the causes weren't there, and anything else that

1 was changed in that second report, I don't recall if -- you
2 know, what it was.

3 In fact, I couldn't have the foggiest idea
4 telling you until, you know, Tom was talking to me last
5 Friday and he was mentioning about these screws from the
6 power stores, and I have no idea that that was the issue of
7 the change.

8 I did know as a result of the trial that there
9 was another section of that report changed, but I didn't
10 even understand coming out of the trial what that was and
11 the topic.

12 Q Okay. So in your position as the supervisor in
13 SSS --

14 A Right.

15 Q You were charged with following though on the
16 corrective action program?

17 A Yes, that's correct. I was responsible for the
18 PER and developing its CAP, C-A-P.

19 Q And then I think from what I understood you to
20 say that over a period of time this became so involved with
21 engineering that it was even taken over by -- I think you
22 mentioned Mr. Adair, who started work on the PER?

23 A He's the one that I transferred it to, and they
24 had been involved with it for quite some time before that
25 transfer date, as evidenced by some of the signatures of his

1 people in that PER that I owned, which I didn't authorize
2 them to sign that. They just started signing it, because I
3 guess they knew the PER was coming over to them. They may
4 have physically even had the PER, you know, I don't know.
5 That could have happened and we just didn't get the transfer
6 sheets.

7 Q If you can, explain to me briefly how a PER is
8 transferred, who is responsible for that and who -- do
9 departments agree on it or is there someone up above you?

10 A There's a sheet in the PER where the requirements
11 at that time, so that there wasn't any misunderstanding of
12 who owned it, and right here -- I actually owned the PER
13 until James signed off here on 7-12. I signed it on 7-10,
14 and then he signed it on 7-12. So that's when it was
15 officially transferred.

16 They may have physically had it. Curtis may have
17 brought it over there. I don't know. I may have still had
18 it that date, but all I know is that his people were
19 starting to sign off on some of the reportability
20 determinations in the back. Larry Ketchum did on the 20th,
21 which if you need to see that I can get it here. Would you
22 like to see that?

23 Q No, that's okay.

24 A But this is the actual official transfer. You
25 have to have that signed in order to transfer it.

1 Q Okay. Now, procedurally how do you go about a
2 transfer of a PER? Is this an agreement between two
3 departments?

4 A Yes, yes.

5 Q What if they don't want it?

6 A Well, if they don't want it, it doesn't get
7 transferred.

8 Q Okay. So it's got to be agreed on both sides?

9 A Yes, that's correct.

10 Q I understand.

11 A And that's why a lot of times at my level, they
12 won't agree to it, okay, and like I said, I don't recall
13 ever talking to James directly on this PER. I don't -- I
14 didn't take the PER over to him. It must have been Curtis
15 or someone that took it over, okay. Typically the engineer
16 handles the PER, okay, and everything that's in it. The
17 supervisor gets involved when he's reviewing the CAP or
18 reviewing it for closure, primarily that's when he gets
19 involved. Otherwise the engineer physically has this in his
20 hands and I couldn't tell you who brought it over to James
21 for him to sign.

22 But the only thing I recall is working with Frank
23 Koontz and Dennis Koehl to transfer -- to get engineering to
24 agree to take the PER, and you know, then it happened.

25 Q Did you become involved in any discussions

1 regarding the revision of the first report?

2 A No. I don't recall --

3 Q Do you understand the question?

4 A Yeah, did I talk with anyone as far as the
5 revisions that were made from the first report.

6 Q Or were you involved in any meetings where there
7 were discussions about the possibility of revising or what
8 should be revised or anything along those lines?

9 A Not that I recall.

10 Q Okay.

11 A I don't recall ever talking to Terry or Vonda or
12 any of the metallurgical people about either one of those
13 reports.

14 Q There was a meeting on June 14th apparently, the
15 best if I have here at the site, and there was a sign-in
16 sheet and I see that your name is not on there, but there is
17 also stated that there may have been some people there at
18 that meeting who did not sign in. Do you recall a meeting
19 on June 14th or thereabouts where --

20 A I was aware that one happened. I don't know
21 where I was that day. I did not attend that meeting. I did
22 not attend that meeting. I did attend a phone conversation,
23 a phone call conversation either the next day or shortly
24 thereafter that meeting.

25 Q Do you recall what that conversation entailed or

1 what it involved?

2 A I had a bunch of notes in my Franklin Planner and
3 that's the only thing I could tell you for sure what was
4 involved, but the only thing that comes to my mind is the
5 baskets and the structural integrity of them, and would they
6 fly up very high, and the answer I believe from that was no,
7 that they wouldn't go very high.

8 Outside of that I couldn't tell you what that
9 meeting was about. I do know that Terry was on that phone
10 conversation. Curtis and I -- he was on the other side of
11 the phone, okay. Curtis and I were I believe in
12 Westinghouse area, and there was probably a Westinghouse
13 person there, but I couldn't tell you who was there with us.
14 And then there was probably Westinghouse people on the
15 phone.

16 But I know that the issue dealt with -- there
17 were two things that I recall. One was the structural side
18 of it, about the baskets not flying up very high, ten feet
19 or so, and then the other was the possibility of going with
20 a probablistic analysis on these screws rather than a
21 physical inspection of the screws.

22 Q Did Mr. Overall ever discuss with you the
23 revision of those metallurgical reports or the Central Labs
24 reports?

25 A He may have. I don't recall him doing that. But

1 I think I was aware that the root causes weren't in the
2 second report. Okay. As far as the other change that you
3 mentioned with the screws out of the stores and the picture
4 changing and all, I really didn't know what was happening
5 there. I might have been aware that a change was made but
6 what the change content, I don't recall if I was told that
7 or not.

8 Q Did you have any problems with that telephone
9 conversation, that conference telephone call with
10 Westinghouse? I mean, did that cause you any professional
11 problems or problems with judgment that might not be the
12 right thing to do?

13 A I remember Curtis and I both being a little
14 frustrated in that phone call, not so much I don't think at
15 Westinghouse, as wet Terry. Terry seemed to dominate the
16 phone call a fair amount, not totally, but --

17 Q Terry Woods?

18 A Terry Woods, and I don't remember the questions.
19 I just remember one time Curtis kind of coming back, you
20 know, like when we asked a question and Terry's answer, and
21 he was like -- I don't recall the subject. I just know that
22 there was some frustration coming out of that meeting, and
23 it may have been that they were heading in a different
24 direction, you know, with this probability study. I don't
25 think there was anything -- I just don't know -- where there

1 was anything on the structural side. There was nothing
2 there that I recall that was an issue with us. It was just
3 we didn't know how -- it's the first time I had heard
4 anything about a probability study on these screws and I was
5 curious as to how they were going to do that. And I wasn't
6 sure coming out of the phone conversation how that was going
7 to be done.

8 Q And when you say they, was that something
9 Westinghouse was going to do?

10 A I don't know who was saying it. I don't know if
11 it was Terry or Westinghouse. I just know that issue came
12 up on the phone and that's about it. I don't know
13 --remember enough.

14 Q Do you recall the purpose of the telephone call?

15 A No. Curtis just came over to me and said Landy,
16 there's a telephone call, you know, we had this meeting the
17 day before, I think you need to come over and listen in on
18 this telephone call. As far as what we were trying to prove
19 in that telephone call, I can't remember at all. I don't
20 know. I don't know if it was kind of a status meeting. I
21 do remember being surprised, like I said, from the civil
22 side of how much people in Westinghouse was involved,
23 because I didn't turn that on. That was engineering turned
24 all that on to have them look at that.

25 Q To have Westinghouse look at the screw issue?

1 A No, have Westinghouse look at the structural
2 civil side of it. Now, the screws -- I don't know when they
3 got turned on for the screws. I don't know if our -- Terry
4 Woods talked to them or if that came from our civils. I
5 don't know. I didn't know Westinghouse was even involved
6 with it. I don't recall until that telephone call.

7 See, I was not that involved with that PER as far
8 as the actions. Curtis was more talking with those people
9 over there, so he knew probably what was going on more and
10 he could probably tell you more, but --

11 Q When you say those people over there --

12 A Those people meaning the metallurgical and the
13 civil people, whoever he was dealing with over there on the
14 PER.

15 Q Do you have any knowledge as to whether or not
16 Westinghouse had a copy of the Central Labs report?

17 A I think that came up in the trial, so I don't
18 know if I could tell you I had knowledge or not. I don't
19 know. I don't know at that time if they had it or not. I
20 think that came out in the trial that issue, that they had a
21 report, but I don't know for sure.

22 Q And when you refer to the trial, you're referring
23 to which trial?

24 A The --

25 Q The DOL hearing for Mr. Overall?

1 A Yes. The Administrative Law Judge.

2 Q Let me show you a memo that's undated and this is
3 from Mr. Koontz to you.

4 A Mm-hmm.

5 Q Have you seen that?

6 A I think I saw it last Friday for the first time
7 that I remember. I don't recall seeing it before then.
8 What happened was I was talking with Mr. Fine and Mr.
9 Viglucci and right after I left the meeting here -- I think
10 it was Friday, wasn't it? That I got paged by NRC, Bill
11 Bearden, who is I guess -- I believe he's out of region two.
12 He was up here and he showed me this letter and he asked me
13 if I knew -- his concern was is this part of a bigger
14 document, because it didn't have a date or a RIMS number.

15 Q Mm-hmm.

16 A And I started reading it and I said well, I don't
17 recall this, Bill, and -- but in reading the first paragraph
18 it looks like it had transmitted one of those report, screw
19 reports that we were just talking about from the lab, and I
20 said let me find out if it is attached -- what all it was
21 maybe attached to. I said it could also, since it
22 references the PER, be in the PER package.

23 So I had came back that afternoon and I talked to
24 Frank Koontz on it. He didn't recollect it, and then I
25 talked to Dave Briggs, whose initials are on here. He

1 didn't recollect it, but he thought that Vonda probably
2 wrote it, Vonda Sisson.

3 So I called Vonda Sisson and Vonda said well, it
4 sounds like it was something that maybe I would have
5 written, but I don't recall. And I said well, do you want
6 me to fax it to you, but I said we've got to get back with
7 Bill Bearden the next morning, because he was leaving at
8 noon, and she said okay, fax it to me, and I said well, get
9 back with Phil Smith, who is my counterpart. We're in the
10 rotation, and then he can get back to Bill.

11 So that she did, and I don't think she
12 recollected this letter, but -- what else was I going to
13 say? I lost my train of thought. I didn't recollect seeing
14 this before Bill Bearden showed it to me. Oh, yeah, I
15 talked with James Adair on it also, and we looked -- he had
16 a copy of the PER, and it wasn't in the PER package, so --
17 but we did also look and see would that have been attached
18 to the first or second letter, and based on those causes
19 down there, I think where you got -- it looked like it would
20 probably have been attached to the first report if it was
21 attached to it. And because the cause is a little different
22 in the second than the first one there.

23 So the conclusion we had is if it was issued, it
24 was probably the first report was attached to it, and either
25 Curtis picked it up from Vonda over there, or it was never

1 released, or it came over to me and I gave it to Curtis,
2 because it would have gone into the PER package. So --

3 Q Would a cover memo on a report normally have a
4 RIMS number or --

5 A Yes. According to Vonda, those would normally
6 have a RIMS number with them.

7 Q Would it be a separate RIMS number from the
8 report?

9 A From the PER report? Yes. Oh, yes. And that's
10 why she was thinking that maybe it didn't even get issued.
11 She could have maybe been getting this letter ready to go,
12 and then they pulled the first report back before she even
13 got it attached to this letter. But I don't recall seeing
14 it.

15 Q I probably asked you earlier and if you don't
16 mind, I'll have to ask you again. Did you receive a copy of
17 the first report? Did you actually read the first report?

18 A I believe I got a copy of it. I don't know if I
19 read it all. Curtis came in and he and I probably discussed
20 it as a minimum. I couldn't tell you if I read the whole
21 report or not. My main focus is to look at possible causes,
22 so I know I looked at that section. Whether I read the
23 whole thing in detail, I may have. I don't know. I just
24 don't recall.

25 Q Do you recall in reading the possible causes

1 whether or not manufacturing defects jumped out at you as
2 one of the possible causes?

3 A I don't recollect that.

4 Q And I'll have to ask you maybe to conjecture. If
5 you had seen something like that, that there was indications
6 of manufacturing defects in the screws, would that have
7 jumped out at you or caused you concern in the position you
8 were at?

9 A Like a Part 21 or something?

10 Q Right.

11 A Yeah. Yeah --

12 Q You think it would have?

13 A To my recollection on those causes, that was
14 coming from the lab and those were possible causes. Nothing
15 was definite in those causes. And that's why I said we
16 would need to take it further and then start determining if
17 those are actual causes or eliminated, and I don't know how
18 much root cause analysis you've had but you know, you've got
19 possible causes and then you can do testing or whatever else
20 to see if it's actually a true cause, and --

21 Q If this trigger had occurred, if you had seen
22 this about a possible Part 21 issue, what would have been
23 the route that information should have taken in order to
24 resolve it?

25 A If I would have determined that this was a

1 potential Part 21, I would have, one, talked to my
2 supervisor, and two, talked with licensing and figure out
3 where to go from there.

4 Q Your supervisor was Dennis Koehl at the time?

5 A Yes. Yes. And then talked with licensing on,
6 you know, is this a Part 21 or not, and what all kind of
7 information do we need to gather to determine if it is or
8 not.

9 Q Let me just follow through with some obvious
10 questions. Did you discuss this with Dennis? Did you
11 discuss the possible Part 21 implications?

12 A No, not that I recall, no.

13 Q Did you discuss the possible implications with
14 licensing?

15 A No, not that I know of.

16 Q And I think I recall you saying that it just
17 didn't jump out at you as an issue; is that --

18 A No, until you just mentioned it, I never even
19 thought about Part 21 issue on this that I recall.

20 Q As far as the possible manufacturing defects on a
21 new screw?

22 A Yeah. I don't remember that issue being
23 discussed at all when those reports are during that time
24 frame.

25 Q But you definitely read the first report? Or I'm

1 sorry, you said you discussed it with --

2 A I know that I discussed the causes with Curtis.
3 Now, I don't think we really acted on any of the causes
4 because I don't think it was very long after that the report
5 got pulled. We didn't have time to really go and start
6 doing anything with those causes.

7 Q Now, did you personally have a copy of the
8 report?

9 A I don't know, probably. All I can say is
10 probably. I don't know for sure.

11 Q Let me just follow that up with a question of do
12 you recall whether or not Mr. Overall came to you and asked
13 you for a copy of the report or your copy or a file copy?

14 A He probably, if anything, he would have given me
15 a copy probably. I know that he came in with the report.
16 Whether he got it ahead of what I got -- sometimes that
17 happens, because he would be over talking with engineering
18 and he would get a copy of it. Well, by the time -- before
19 it was transmitted over, okay, I would have gotten a copy
20 from him. But again, I don't know if that was the sequence
21 or not. I may have gotten it first. Okay, and passed it on
22 to him. He may have brought it to me. I don't know recall.
23 I do know that Curtis talked with me on that first report,
24 okay. Whether he talked to me on the second report, I don't
25 recall. I don't recall. I know that they had changed it.

1 You know, they pulled it back, but by the time that came
2 out, there was a lot of engineering involvement then and I
3 can only guess, but I think that I knew this thing was going
4 over to engineering now and that they needed to deal with
5 those reports, so I went on and worked on many other things
6 that were happening at that time.

7 Q Do you recall that Mr. Overall was upset or saw
8 this as a significant issue that some information had been
9 changed from one report to another?

10 A I don't recall if he was upset. I know that he
11 said that they're pulling the report, and I guess that
12 probably bothered him at the time. It bothered me, because
13 I didn't have anything to go on then. I think that it did
14 bother him that they pulled the report. Now, as far as the
15 contents in it and the difference between the first and the
16 second, I don't know. I don't know how much that bothered
17 him. I just don't remember. If I had to guess, I would say
18 we probably talked about it. I just don't remember the
19 discussions and to the detail and how upset, if at all, he
20 was.

21 Q Let me ask the question this way. Did he come to
22 you and ask for some type of a resolution regarding a
23 concern he had over these two reports?

24 A Not that I recall.

25 Q In other words, did he come to you and say oh,

1 I'm really angry, I'm really upset because they changed this
2 report, and we need to do something about this, anything
3 along those lines, which -- in other words, did he ever put
4 the ball in your court as a supervisor --

5 A To do something about the difference in reports?

6 Q Yes.

7 A I don't recall him doing that. I don't recall
8 that.

9 MR. CLAXTON: Darrell, do you have anything?

10 MR. CLAXTON: Mr. Fine, do you have anything now
11 or would you like to take a few minutes break?

12 MR. FINE: If we could just have a moment or two.

13 MR. CLAXTON: Why don't we take a break at 2:50
14 p.m.

15 [Recess.]

16 MR. CLAXTON: We're back on the record at 2:56
17 p.m. And since there are no further questions from anyone,
18 Mr. McCormick, I'd like to ask you if the information that
19 you've provided has been provided freely and voluntarily?

20 THE INTERVIEWEE: Yes, it has.

21 MR. CLAXTON: Have you received any threats or
22 promises either from myself or any other employee of the
23 Nuclear Regulatory Commission?

24 THE INTERVIEWEE: No.

25 MR. CLAXTON: If there are no other questions --

1 well, I'd like to ask you, do you have any other statements
2 or would you like to clarify or add to anything you've said?

3 THE INTERVIEWEE: No. I know there's a lot of
4 don't recall -- we're talking four years ago, but that's the
5 best of my recollection. I don't have anything else to add.

6 MR. CLAXTON: Okay. I appreciate it. Thank you
7 for your time and with that, we'll conclude the interview at
8 2:57.

9 [Whereupon, at 2:57 p.m., the interview was
10 concluded.]

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

35


This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: INTERVIEW OF
LANDY McCORMICK

CASE NUMBER:

PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Spring City, TN

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.



Ralph Ledford

Official Reporter

Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.