Technical Requirements Manual

Appendix J

(Amendment 46)

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9

Core Operating Limits Report

and

Reload Transient Analysis Results

May 2001

Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix J

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## Section **1**

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9

Core Operating Limits Report

May 2001

## Issuance of Changes Summary



## **Table of Contents**



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## **1.** Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR) **(3.2.1)**

Tech Spec Reference: Tech Spec 3.2.1

#### 1.2 Description:

For operation without a full TIP set from BOC to 500 MWd/MT a penalty of 11.01% must be applied to all APLHGR limits.

#### 1.2.1 GE Fuel

The MAPLHGR Limit is determined using the applicable Lattice-Type MAPLHGR limits from Tables 1.2-1 and 1.2-2. For Single Reactor Recirculation Loop Operation, the MAPLHGR limits in Tables 1.2-1 and 1.2-2 are multiplied by the MAPFAC multipliers provided in Figures 1.2-1 and 1.2-2.

#### 1.2.2 SPC Fuel

The MAPLHGR Limit is the Lattice-Type MAPLHGR Limit. The Lattice-Type MAPLHGR limits are determined from the table given below:



For single loop operation, the MAPLHGR limits from the table above are multiplied by the MAPLHGR multiplier. The MAPLHGR multiplier for **SPC** fuel is 0.90. (References 3, 5 and 6)

## Table 1.2-1

Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (MAPLHGR)

vs.

### Average Planar Exposure for Fuel Type GE9B-P8CWB322-11GZ-100M-150-CECO (Reference 9 and 19)

Exposure Exposure<br>(MWD/ST) (MWD/MT)

#### Lattice-Type MAPLHGR (kW/ft)



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Table 1.2-2

Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (MAPLHGR)

vs.

### Average Planar Exposure for Fuel Type GE9B-P8CWB320-9GZ3-100M-150-CECO (Reference 9 and 19)

Exposure Exposure<br>(MWD/ST) (MWD/MT)

Lattice-Type MAPLHGR (kW/ft)



#### **1**  0.95. 0.9 0.85 ų. 0.8 0.75 C.  $For 25 > P:$ **I\_ .)**  No Thermal Limits Monitoring Required; If Official 0.7 **0**  Monitoring is Desired, the Equations for ≥ 25% Power 0.65 May Be Extrapolated for 25 > P, provided the Official monitoring is only performed with the TCV/TSV closure 0.6 **0~ C,**  scrams and RPT enabled. 0.55 **"l 0 .5.** . . . ... . For  $25 \le P \le 100$  $\overline{\phantom{a}}$ 0.45 MAPFACp = 1.0+0.005224 (P-100) 0.4 **(J .J a)**  For  $100 < P$ , MAPFACp =  $1.00$ 0.35 **0~ "0**  0.3  $P = %$  Rated Core Thermal Power 0.25 a) 0.2 **0. 0.** 0.15 0.1 0.05 **0 25 30 35** <sup>40</sup> 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100

## Figure 1.2-1 Power-Dependent **SLO** MAPLHGR Multipliers for **GE** Fuel **(MAPFAq)**  (References **8** and **19)**

Core Thermal Power **(%** Rated)

Figure 1.2-2 Flow-Dependent SLO MAPLHGR Multiplier (MAPFAC <sub>F</sub>) for GE Fuel (References 8, 18, and 19)



LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle **9**

#### 2. Minimum Critical Power Ratio **(3.2.2)**

2.1 Tech Spec Reference:

Tech Spec 3.2.2.

2.2 Description:

Prior to initial scram time testing for an operating cycle, the MCPR operating limit is based on the Technical Specification Scram Times. For Technical Specification requirements refer to Technical Specification table 3.1.4-1.

TIP Symmetry Chi-squared testing shall be performed prior to reaching 500 MWd/MTU to validate the MCPR calculation.

MCPR limits from BOC to Coastdown are applicable up to a core average exposure of 30,266.2 MWd/MTU (which is the licensing basis exposure used by SPC). (Reference 3)

2.2.1 Manual Flow Control MCPR Limits

The Governing MCPR Operating Limit while in Manual Flow Control is either determined from 2.2.1.1 or 2.2.1.2, whichever is greater at any given power, flow condition.

- 2.2.1.1 Power-Dependent MCPR (MCPRp)\*
	- 2.2.1.1.1 GE Fuel

Table 2-1 gives the MCPRp limit as a function of core thermal power for Tech Spec Scram Times.

2.2.1.1.2 Siemens Fuel

Table 2-2 gives the MCPRp limit as a function of core thermal power for Tech Spec Scram Times.

2.2.1.2 Flow-Dependent MCPR (MCPRF)

Table 2-3 gives the MCPR $_F$  limit as a function of flow.

2.2.2 Automatic Flow Control MCPR Limits

Automatic Flow Control MCPR Limits are not provided for L2C9.

\* For thermal limit monitoring at greater than 100%P, the 100% power MCPRp limits should be applied.

## Table 2-1 MCPR<sub>p</sub> for GE Fuel (References 2, 3, and 51)

#### Operation from **BOC** to Coastdown\*\*

#### Percent Core Thermal Power\*



\* Values are interpolated between relevant power levels. For operation at exactly 25% or 80% CTP, the more limiting value is used. 3489 MWt is rated power

- \*\* Coastdown thermal limits are not provided in this COLR
- \*\*\* Allowable EOOS conditions are listed in Section 5.

## Table 2-2 MCPRp for Siemens Fuel (References 2, 3, 21, and 51)

#### For all Siemens fuel EXCEPT Fuel Type **18** in 10B cell locations from BOC to Coastdown\*\*.



Percent Core Thermal Power\*

#### For ONLY Siemens Fuel Type **18** in 10B cell locations for operation with rod pattern targeted from BOC to Coastdown\*\*



\* Values are interpolated between relevant power levels. For operation at exactly 25% or 80% CTP, the more limiting value is used. 3489 MWt is rated power.

\*\* Coastdown thermal limits are not provided in this COLR

\*\*\* Allowable EOOS conditions are listed in Section 5.

### Table 2-3 MCPR<sub>F</sub> for GE and Siemens Fuel (Reference 3)

#### $MCPR<sub>F</sub>$  limits for 105% Maximum Attainable Core Flow



The  $MCPR<sub>F</sub>$  limits are applicable from BOC through coastdown and in all EOOS scenarios.

#### **3.** Linear Heat Generation Rate **(3.2.3)**

3.1 Tech Spec Reference:

Tech Spec 3.2.3.

3.2 Description:

For operation without a full TIP set from BOC to 500 MWd/MT a penalty of 11.01% must be applied to all LHGR limits.

3.2.1 GE Fuel

The LHGR Limit is the product of the LHGR Limit in the following tables and the minimum of either the power dependent LHGR Factor\*, LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub>, or the flow dependent LHGR Factor, LHGRFAC<sub>F</sub>. The LHGR Factors (LHGRFAC<sub>P</sub> and LHGRFAC<sub>F</sub>) for the GE fuel are determined from Figures 3.2-1 through 3.2-3. The following GE LHGR limits apply for the entire cycle exposure range: (References 2, 8, 10 and 19)

1. GE9B-P8CWB322-11GZ-100M-150-CECO (bundle 3861 in Reference 2)





2. GE9B-P8CWB320-9GZ-1OOM-150-CECO (bundle 3860 in Reference 2)

#### 3.2.2 Siemens Fuel

The LHGR Limit is the product of the Steady-State LHGR Limit (given below from Reference 3) and the minimum of either the power dependent LHGR Factor\*, LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub>, or the flow dependent LHGR Factor, LHGRFAC<sub>F</sub>. LHGRFAC<sub>P</sub> is determined from Table 3-1. LHGRFAC<sub>F</sub> is determined from Table 3-2. SPC LHGRFAC multipliers from BOC to Coastdown are applicable up to a core average exposure of 30,266.2 MWd/MTU (which is the licensing basis exposure used by SPC). (Reference 3)



\* For thermal limit monitoring at greater than 100%P, the 100% power LHGRFACp limits should be applied.

## Figure 3.2-1 Power-Dependent LHGR Multipliers for GE Fuel ( Formerly MAPFACp) (References 8 and 19)



Figure 3.2-2 Power-Dependent LHGR Multiplier for GE Fuel (TCV(s) Slow Closure) (formerly MAPFACp)

(References 11 and 19)







Figure 3.2-3 Flow-Dependent LHGR Multiplier for GE Fuel (formerly MAPFACF)

### Table 3-1 LHGRFAC<sub>p</sub> for Siemens Fuel (References 3 and 51)

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Operation from BOC to Coastdown\*\*



\* Values are interpolated between relevant power levels. For operation at exactly 25% or 80% CTP, the more limiting value is used. 3489 MWt is rated power.

\*\* Coastdown thermal limits are not provided in this COLR

\*\*\* Allowable EOOS conditions are listed in Section 5.

## Table 3-2 LHGRFAC<sub>F</sub> for Siemens Fuel (Reference 3)

Values Applicable for up to 105% Maximum Attainable Core Flow



These LHGRFAC<sub>f</sub> multipliers apply from BOC through coastdown and in all EOOS scenarios.

#### 4. Control Rod Withdrawal Block Instrumentation **(3.3.2.1)**

4.1 Tech Spec Reference:

Tech Spec Table 3.3.2.1-1.

4.2 Description:

The Rod Block Monitor Upscale Instrumentation Setpoints are determined from the relationships shown below:

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- This setpoint may be lower/higher and will still comply with the RWE Analysis, because RWE is  $\star$ analyzed unblocked. **<sup>I</sup>**
- Clamped, with an allowable value not to exceed the allowable value for recirculation loop flow (W) of  $\star\star$ 100%.

#### **5.** Allowed Modes of Operation **(B 3.2.2,** B **3.2.3)**



The Allowed Modes of Operation with combinations of Equipment Out-of-Service are as described below: --------. OPERATING REGION **--------**

- 1. Each EOOS condition may be combined with one SRV **OOS,** up to two TIP Machines **OOS** or the equivalent number of TIP channels (100% available at startup from a refuel outage), a 20°F reduction in feedwater temperature (without Feedwater Heaters considered **OOS),** cycle startup with uncalibrated LPRMs (BOC to 500 MWd/MTU), and/or up to 50% of the LPRMs out of service.
- 2. Up to 100°F Reduction in Feedwater Temperature Allowed with Feedwater Heaters Out-of-Service. Feedwater Heaters **OOS** may be an actual **OOS** condition, or an intentionally entered mode of operation to extend the cycle energy.
- 3. If operating with Feedwater Heaters Out-of-Service, operation in MELLLA is supported by current transient analyses, but administratively prohibited due to core stability concerns.
- 4. EOC Recirculation Pump Trip OOS/Feedwater Heaters **OOS** is allowed during non-coastdown operation using the TCV Slow Closure/EOC Recirculation Pump Trip OOSIFeedwater Heaters **OOS** operating limits.
- 5. Only when operating in coastdown, otherwise this combination is not allowed.
- 6. Operation is only allowed when less than 10.5 million Ibm/hr steam flow and when average position of 3 open TCVs is less than 50% open, with FCL <103%, and the MCFL setpoint  $\geq$  120%. TCV Stuck Closed may be in combination with any EOOS except TBVOOS or TCV Slow Closure. If in combination with other EOOS(s), thermal limits may require adjustment for the other EOOS(s) as designated in Sections 1, 2, and 3.
- 7. ICF is analyzed for up to 105% core flow.
- 8. The SLO boundary was not moved up with the incorporation of MELLLA. The flow boundary for SLO at uprated conditions remains the ELLLA boundary for pre-uprate conditions. (Reference 20)
- 9. Coastdown is defined to begin at a core average exposure of 30,266.2 MWd/MTU (which is the licensing basis exposure used by SPC). (Reference 3)
- 10. Single loop operation is allowed with any of the EOOS options listed in this table.

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 **5-1** May 2001

#### 6. Traversing In-Core Probe System (3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3)

#### 6.1 Tech Spec Reference:

Tech Spec Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3 for thermal limits require the TIP system for recalibration of the LPRM detectors and monitoring thermal limits.

#### 6.2 Description:

When the traversing in-core probe (TIP) system (for the required measurement locations) is used for recalibration of the LPRM detectors and monitoring thermal limits, the TIP system shall be operable with the following:

- 1. movable detectors, drives and readout equipment to map the core in the required measurement locations, and
- 2. indexing equipment to allow all required detectors to be calibrated in a common location.

For BOC to BOC + 500 MWD/MT, cycle analyses support thermal limit monitoring without the use of the TIPs.

Following the first TIP set (required prior to BOC + 500 MWD/MT), the following applies for use of the SUBTIP methodology:

With one or more TIP measurement locations inoperable, the TIP data for an inoperable measurement location may be replaced by data obtained from a 3-dimensional BWR core monitoring software system adjusted using the previously calculated uncertainties, provided the following conditions are met:

- 1. All TIP traces have previously been obtained at least once in the current operating cycle when the reactor core was operating above 20% power, (References 14, 15 and 23) and
- 2. The total number of simulated channels (measurement locations) does not exceed 42% (18 channels).

Otherwise, with the TIP system inoperable, suspend use of the system for the above applicable monitoring or calibration functions.

#### 6.3 Bases:

The operability of the TIP system with the above specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this equipment accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core. The normalization of the required detectors is performed internal to the core monitoring software system.

Substitute TIP data, if needed, is 3-dimensional BWR core monitoring software calculated data which is adjusted based on axial and radial factors calculated from previous TIP sets. Since uncertainty could be introduced by the simulation and adjustment process, a maximum of 18 channels may be simulated to ensure that the uncertainties assumed in the substitution process methodology remain valid.

Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix J

## Section 2

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9

Reload Transient Analysis Results

May 2001

## Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix J L2C9 Reload Transient Analysis Results

## Table of Contents



Technical Requirements Manual - Appendix J L2C9 Reload Transient Analysis Results

Attachment 1

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9

Neutronics Licensing Report

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#### NEUTRONICS LICENSING REPORT

for

LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9



#### Licensing Basis

This document, in conjunction with the references 1, 2 and 4 in Section VIII provide the licensing basis for LaSalle Unit 2 Reload 8, Cycle 9.

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- II. Control Rod Withdrawal Error

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- V. Loss of Feedwater Heating
- VI. Maximum Exposure Limit Compliance
- VII. Spent Fuel Pool and Fresh Fuel Vault Criticality Compliance

VII.1 Fresh Fuel Vault Criticality Compliance

VII.2 LI Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Compliance

VII.3 L2 Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Compliance

VIII. References

preparer:  $\gamma$ <sup>1</sup>/<sup>3</sup> ,  $\gamma$  =  $\gamma$  *-oo* reviewer  $\gamma$  and  $\gamma$  31.6<sup>7</sup>



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#### 1.2 Core Nuclear Design Analysis

### 1.2.1 Core Configuration and Licensing Exposure Limits



### Licensing Exposure Limits



### Core UO<sub>2</sub> Weights



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#### 1.2.2 Core Reactivity Characteristics

All values reported below are with zero xenon and are for 68'F moderator temperature. The MICROBURN-B cold BOC best estimate K-effective bias is 1.004 at BOC. The shutdown margin calculations are based on the short EOC8 energy given in Section 1.2.1.



LaSalle station has upgraded its Standby Liquid Control System so that the B-10 enrichment has been increased from 18.9% to 45%. The above SBLC analysis assumes 660 ppm with the boron enriched to 45% B-10.

preparer:  $m$ ytt, 9-15-00

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reviewer  $\rho$ Aw 9.15.00



#### **II.** Control Rod Withdrawal Error

The control rod withdrawal error event is analyzed at 100% of rated power, 100% of rated flow and unblocked conditions only.



The design complies with the SPC 1% plastic strain and centerline melt criteria via conformance to the PAPT (Protection Against Power Transient) LHGR limits. The design complies with the GE centerline melt criteria via conformance to the GE thermal overpower protection (TOP) criteria. The design complies with the GE 1% plastic strain criteria via conformance to the GE mechanical overpower protection (MOP) criteria..

#### **IIl.** Fuel Loading Error

The Fuel Loading Error, including fuel mislocation and misorientation, is classified as an accident. By demonstrating that the Fuel Loading Error meets the more stringent Anticipated Operational Occurrence (AOO) requirements, the offsite dose requirement is assured to be met. Because the events listed below result in a  $\triangle$ CPR value that is less than that of the limiting transient, the AOO requirements and hence off-site dose requirements are met for the Fuel Loading Error.

#### **111.1 Fuel** Mislocation Error

The following value bounds both the SPC and the co-resident GE fuel types.



#### **111.2** Fuel Misrotation Error

The following value bounds both the SPC and the co-resident GE fuel types.



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#### IV. Control Rod Drop Accident

LaSalle is a banked position withdrawal sequence plant. In order to allow the site the option of inserting control rods using the simplified control rod sequence shown in Table 1, a control rod drop accident analysis was performed for the simplified sequence. The results from this simplified sequence analysis bound those where BPWS guidelines are followed. The results demonstrate that the simplified shutdown sequence meets the Technical Specification limit of 280 cal/g for a control rod drop accident. Therefore, the simplified sequence is valid for for control rod insertion for shutdown.

An adder of 0.32 %AK is incorporated in this analysis (for other than 00 to 48 control rod drops) to account for possible rod mispositioning errors as well as clumping effects.



Note that the limit on maximum deposited fuel rod enthalpy is 280 cal/g and the limit on the number of rods greater than 170 cal/g (failed rods) is 770 for the GE 8x8 fuel and 850 for the SPC ATRIUM-9B fuel (in LaSalle UFSAR).

#### V. Loss of Feedwater Heating

The loss of feedwater heating event is analyzed at 100% of rated power for 81%, 100% and 105% of rated flow and an assumed inlet temperature decrease of 145°F. The event was analyzed from BOC to EOC. The  $\triangle$ CPR value reported below is bounding for both the SPC and the co-resident GE fuel types and all the analyzed flows.



The design complies with the SPC 1% plastic strain and centerline melt criteria via conformance to the PAPT (Protection Against Power Transient) LHGR limits. The design complies with the GE

*9ftbJ* **jOA-oo01**



1% plastic strain criteria via conformance to the mechanical overpower protection (MOP) limit. The design does not meet the GE thermal overpower protection (TOP) criteria during a loss of feedwater heating event; hence, the LHGR values in the COLR for the affected lattice are adjusted accordingly (References 9, 13 and 14) as follows:

#### **GE9B-P8CWB322-11GZ-100M-150-CECO** Bundle (Fuel Type **1)**  LHGR Limits for **L2C9**



#### **GE9B-P8CWB320-9GZ-100M-150-CECO** Bundle (Fuel Type 2) LHGR Limits for **L2C9**



#### VI. Maximum Exposure Limit Compliance

Note that the following exposures are based on a nominal Cycle 8 EOC exposure of 13750 MWD/MT and a nominal Cycle 9 exposure of 17800 MWD/MT. If Cycle 9 reaches it's long window (approximately 500 MWD/MTU beyond the nominal Cycle 9 energy), the exposure limits will still be met.



\*The ATRIUM-9B exposure limits identified are not applicable until document EMF-85-74 is added to the Technical Specifications (Tech Specs). Until this document is added to the Tech Specs, the ATRIUM-9B exposure limits are 48.0 GWD/MT for Peak Fuel Assembly (no change), 50.0 GWD/MT for Peak Fuel Rod and 60.0 GWD/MT for Peak Fuel Pellet.

preparer:  $m \times H$ ,  $9-1-o$ 



#### **VII.** Spent Fuel Pool and Fresh Fuel Vault Criticality Compliance

For the L2C9 reload, there are four new SPC ATRIUM-9B assembly types consisting of seven unique enriched lattices, as identified in **1.1** Fuel Bundle Nuclear Design Analysis.

#### VII.1 Fresh Fuel Vault Criticality Compliance

The fuel storage vault criticality analysis that is detailed in Reference 5 remains valid for the above lattices. All the new (ATRIUM-9B) assemblies comply with the fresh fuel vault criticality limits, i.e., all lattices have an enrichment of less than 5.00 wt % U-235 and a gadolinia content that is greater than 6 rods at 3.0 wt%  $Gd_2O_3$ .

Note that the new fuel vault is a moderation-controlled area which implies that hydrogenous materials will be limited within the new fuel storage array. Administrative controls as generally defined in GE **SIL** No. 152 (dated March 31,1976) must be incorporated for the area.

#### VH.2 **LI** Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Compliance

The LaSalle Unit 1 spent fuel pool criticality analysis that is detailed in Reference 6 remains valid for the above lattices. All the new (ATRIUM-9B) assemblies comply with the spent fuel pool criticality limits, i.e., all lattices have an enrichment of less than 4.60 wt % U-235 and a gadolinia content that is greater than 8 rods at 3.0 wt%  $Gd<sub>2</sub>O<sub>3</sub>$ .

#### VH.3 L2 Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Compliance

The LaSalle Unit 2 spent fuel pool criticality analysis that is detailed in Reference 7 remains valid for the above lattices. As shown below, all the new (ATRIUM-9B) assemblies comply with the LaSalle Unit 2 spent fuel pool criticality limit of  $k$ -eff  $< 0.95$ .



\* From 68 \*F, uncontrolled CASMO-3G results.

\*\* From Figure 6.1 of Reference 7.



#### VIII. References

- 1. "LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Reload Analysis", Siemens Power Corporation, EMF-2437, Latest Revision.
- 2. "LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Plant Transient Analysis", Siemens Power Corporation, EMF-2440, Latest Revision.
- 3. "LaSalle 2 cycle 9 Core Design," NDIT NFM0000056 Seq. 1, April 7, 2000 and "L2C9 FLLP," BNDL:00-005, Revision 0, 4/7/2000.
- 4. Commonwealth Edison, Nuclear Fuel Services, NFSR-0091, "Benchmark of CASMO/MICROBURN BWR Nuclear Design Methods", as supplemented and approved.
- *5.* "Criticality Safety Analysis for ATRIUM-9B Fuel, LaSalle Units 1 and 2 New Fuel Storage Vault," Siemens Power Corporation, EMF-95-134(P), December 1995. [NDIT 960089, Rev. 0]
- 6. "Criticality Safety Analysis for ATRIUM-9B Fuel, LaSalle Unit 1 Spent Fuel Storage Pool (BORAL Rack)," Siemens Power Corporation, EMF-96-117(P), April 1996. [NDIT 960087, Rev. 0]
- 7. "Criticality Safety Analysis for ATRIUM-9B Fuel, LaSalle Unit 2 Spent Fuel Storage Pool (Boraflex Rack)," Siemens Power Corporation, EMF-95-088(P), February 1996. [NDIT 960088, Rev. 0]
- 8. "L2C9 Standby Liquid Control System Worth Calculations," BNDL:00-028, Revision 0, July 14, 2000.
- 9. "L2C9 Loss of Feedwater Heating Licensing Analysis," BNDL:00-024, Revision 0, July 13, 2000.
- 10. "LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 RWE delta CPR," BNDL:00-026, Revision 0, August 23, 2000.
- 11. "L2C9 Rod Withdrawal Error MOP/TOP Analysis," BNDL:00-023, Revision 0, August 17, 2000.
- 12. "LaSalle Unit 2 Cycle 9 Neutronic Licensing Shutdown Margin Calculation," BNDL:00-032, Revision 0, August 17, 2000.
- 13. "LaSalle 2 Cycle 9 LFWH TOP Violation and LHGR Limit Calculation," Letter NFM:BND:00-050, July 13, 2000.
- 14. "LaSalle 2 Cycle 9 GE9 Curve Adjustment for LFWH TOP Violation," GE Letter KF-00-063, August 24, 2000.
- 15. "LaSalle 2 Cycle 9 LFWH TOP Violation and LHGR Limit Calculation," Letter NFM:BND:00-050, July 13, 2000.
- 16. "L2C9 Mislocation Licensing Analysis," BNDL:00-025, September 2000.
- 17. "L2C9 Bundle Misorientation Analysis," BNDL:00-030, September 2000.

preparer:  $2/4$ ,  $8-31-00$  reviewer  $\rho$ AW  $8.31-00$ 



#### Table **1**

#### **L2C9** Simplified Shutdown Sequence

### Shutdown From an **Al** Sequence



#### Shutdown from an A2 Sequence



\*Group definitions are trom LAP-IUU-i10 1 evision **2i.** 

\*\* The standard BPWS rules concerning out-of-service rods apply to the shutdown sequences.

reviewer  $\rho$ AW<br>9.1.00







**SPCA9-391B-14G8.0-100M SPCA9-410B-19G8.0-100M**

Figure **1. L2C9** Bundle Design (Fuel Types **16** and **17)** 

preparer:  $2wH,8-31-00$  reviewer  $94w$   $8.31.00$ 





## Figure 2. L2C9 Bundle Design (Fuel Types 18 and 19)

preparer: reviewer Ofi .**-931-0o**

#### NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT<br>
NEMITTAL OF DESIGN INFORMATION<br>
Seq. No. 0 TRANSMITTAL OF DESIGN INFORMATION

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## Figure **3. SPCA9-4.53L-11G8.0-100M** Lattice Enrichment Distribution

preparer:  $m$ 1*H*,  $8-31=00$ <br>reviewer **fft**  $8.3$  /-00







Figure 4. **SPCA9-4.56L-12G8.0-100M** Lattice Enrichment Distribution

preparer:  $m \gamma H$ ,  $8 - 31 - 60$  *8<sub>3</sub>. 00 8<sub>3</sub>. 00* 

#### NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT<br>
NSMITTAL OF DESIGN INFORMATION<br>
Seq. No. 0 TRANSMITTAL OF DESIGN INFORMATION

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## Figure 5. **SPCA9-4.21L-13G8.0-100M** Lattice Enrichment Distribution

preparer:  $m$  $\neg$ *H*,  $8-31$ -00 **reviewer**  $\rho$ A $\omega$   $831.00$ 

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## Figure 6. SPCA9-4.27L-12G8.0-100M Lattice Enrichment Distribution

**0.00**

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preparer:  $m \gamma H$ ,  $\beta$ -3*j-00* reviewer  $\rho A \omega g$ . 7/-00

9

**0**







## Figure 7. SPCA9-3.96L-8G5.0-100M Lattice Enrichment Distribution

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preparer:  $W/\mu$ ,  $8-31-00$ <br>reviewer  $\mu$ <sub>x</sub>,  $31-00$ 

#### **NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT** NFM ID# **NFM0000115** TRANSMITTAL OF DESIGN INFORMATION Seq. No. 0

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## Figure **8. SPCA9-4.58L-8G6.0-100M** Lattice Enrichment Distribution

preparer:  $m \gamma H$ ,  $8 - 3$  - 00

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**reviewer**  $\rho A \omega$  8.31.00







Figure **9. SPCA9-4.58L-8G6.0/4G3.0-100M** Lattice Enrichment Distribution

preparer:  $m \gamma H$ ,  $8\gamma$ -3/-00<br>
8<sup>-3</sup>/-00<br>
8<sup>-3</sup>/-00