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May 17, 2001

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247
NL-01-062

Dr. William Travers
Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. Voluntary Response Regarding Issues Identified in the Citizens Awareness Network Petition Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 (TAC No. MB0736)

Reference: 1) Citizens Awareness Network Letter from Deborah Katz to William Travers, "Petition for Emergency Enforcement Action (10 CFR 2.206) With Regard to Systemic Mismanagement and Lack of Compliance with Nuclear Regulatory Regulation at Indian Point 2," dated December 4, 2000

2) NRC Letter from Christopher Gratton to Con Edison, "Citizens Awareness Network Petition Dated December 20, 2000, Request For Voluntary Response," dated May 3, 2001

Dear Dr. Travers:

On December 29, 2000 Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Con Edison), the owner and operator of the Indian Point Unit No. 2 (IP-2) nuclear plant, received a copy of a petition (Reference 1) submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) by the Citizens Awareness Network (CAN) pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations. The petition asserts conditions of systemic mismanagement and apparent disregard of NRC regulations at IP-2. The petitioners go on to allege these conditions are a deliberate management policy, and, on that basis, requests that Con Edison's license to operate IP-2 be revoked. Subsequent to the receipt of this information, the NRC informed Con Edison of its right to submit a voluntary response to the issues identified by the petitioners.

*Att: William Travers
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The purpose of this letter is to provide Con Edison's overall assessment of the issues raised in the subject petition. Specifically, this assessment will focus on the adequacy and availability of design bases information, problem identification and resolution, and the Reactor Protection System (RPS) drawing configuration discrepancies.

Adequacy and Availability of Design Bases Information

The petition discusses a number of examples of what it characterizes as past problems associated with the representation of information contained in the UFSAR. On a number of past occasions, Con Edison has committed to design basis documentation and configuration control program enhancements at Indian Point 2. The following are the commitments and/or areas of enhanced management attention, which Con Edison previously agreed to initiate and complete.

Complete Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) review program to include:

1. Verification of the accuracy of UFSAR design basis information.
2. Review to confirm that the UFSAR design basis information is properly reflected in plant operation, maintenance, and test procedures.
3. Review the UFSAR to identify and resolve any internal disagreements or inconsistencies, which could impact the design basis.
4. Development of a process to enhance overall UFSAR accessibility.

Continuation of the Design Basis Document (DBD) Initiative to include:

1. Supplementation of existing DBDs with a combination of additional DBDs and added information on interfacing systems to existing DBDs.
2. Verification of the compatibility of the design basis requirements in the UFSAR with new and existing DBDs.
3. Development of a process to enhance overall accessibility and retrievability of DBD information, and keep DBD information current.

Con Edison has reasonable assurance that design bases requirements are currently translated into operations, maintenance and test procedures for the following reasons. First, IP-2 operating, maintenance, and testing procedures are governed and controlled by Station Administrative Orders (SAOs) and departmental administrative procedures. Second, an earlier FSAR review was performed in conjunction with a review of licensing commitments. This resulted in an update of the operating procedures to assure consistency with the FSAR. In addition, the Westinghouse Owners Group developed Emergency Response Guidelines that became the bases for plant-specific Emergency Operating Procedures that were simulator verified. The implementation of this integrated set of procedures enhanced station work processes and better enabled plant personnel to control design, operations, maintenance, and testing activities consistent with the design bases. Moreover, results of many reviews and audits conducted of operations, maintenance and test activities confirm that there is reasonable assurance for concluding that the IP-2 design bases have been appropriately translated into operations, maintenance and testing procedures.

The extensive use of procedures, multiple internal and external assessments, evaluations, audits and inspections, successful operations and testing programs, and many improvements and upgrade programs provide reasonable assurance that the IP-2 systems, structures and components (SSCs), configuration and performance are consistent with the design bases.

Multiple levels of management processes provide reasonable assurance IP-2 SSCs are consistent with the design bases. These processes include control of engineering, operations, maintenance, and test processes, including both the use of procedures and training in the use of procedures, which are intended to assure that the design bases are properly considered. Identified discrepancies are added to the Condition Reporting System (CRS), the plant's corrective action program. Processes that support operations such as operability determinations, walkdowns and testing programs are intended to provide additional assurance that the IP-2 SSCs are consistent with the design bases. Additional specific initiatives and programs enhance and contribute to the accuracy of the information that comprises the design bases and the consistency of the SSCs with the design bases by reviewing and upgrading existing design information or generating new information as required.

Updating the UFSAR to provide accurate information relative to system design configuration is a continuous process at a nuclear facility. At IP-2 design bases/license bases information is available on the IP-2 web. Information such as that contained in licensing correspondence between Con Edison and the NRC, design basis documents (DBDs) developed as part of the 50.54(f) efforts, plant safety evaluations, and the current UFSAR which contains all approved UFSAR changes, are easily accessible to the plant staff. An electronically controlled version of the UFSAR helps to ensure that the most current information is available. During earlier 50.54(f) review efforts, an UFSAR validation was also performed. This process involved the identification of the document(s) that validated the specific segment of the UFSAR being reviewed. During this process condition reports were written for UFSAR deficiencies. As the UFSAR is used during daily activities, any additional deficiencies identified are addressed in condition reports to help assure that the UFSAR is as accurate as possible.

Problem Identification

Corrective action processes provide reasonable assurance that deficiencies are identified and corrected. Active employee identification of conditions potentially adverse to quality includes procedural discrepancies, and equipment and documentation deficiencies. The identified problems are recorded, evaluated, tracked, and dispositioned by the corrective action process. Internal and external assessments, evaluations, audits and inspections identified high Condition Report (CR) item backlog as an issue. Although the backlog is still there, the average age of the condition reports in the backlog continues to decrease. In October 2000, the Corrective Action Group initiated a formal review of closed condition reports to independently assess the adequacy of the closure for condition reports that were closed between December 1, 1998 and June 30, 2000. This effort focused on determining whether the:

1. proper classification was identified for the condition report (i.e., significance level),

2. description of condition reports provided a proper problem statement,
3. corrective action(s) identified for addressing problems were effective and,
4. implementation of the corrective action(s) and closure of the condition report was effective.

Based on the results of this review, there is reasonable confidence that appropriate corrective actions were identified and completed for conditions adverse to quality that were identified in the sampled Condition Reports (CRs) during the time frame of this project.

Reactor Protection System Drawing Configuration Discrepancies


During the NRC's pre-petition review board meeting on January 24, 2001 with representatives from the Citizens Awareness Network, the petitioners identified Condition Reports wherein discrepancies with reactor protection system as-built wiring drawings were identified. Following appropriate verification of system operability, the resolution of discrepancies associated with as-found plant configuration and design drawings resulted in revisions to the specific drawing to conform to the as-found plant conditions. A particular condition report, 200100327, raised the question as to whether certain design changes may have been performed with insufficiently formal safety evaluations. To address this concern each of the identified discrepancies were evaluated in detail. Based upon our reviews, none of the identified discrepancies resulted in the Reactor Protection System being inoperable or incapable of performing its safety function.

Based upon the foregoing, Con Edison has reasonable assurance that: its current processes and programs are sufficient to maintain the plant configuration consistent with the design bases; design bases requirements are properly translated into design specifications and operating, maintenance and testing procedures; the configuration of structures, systems and components are consistent with design bases; and that deviations are reconciled as they are identified.

No new regulatory commitments are being made by Con Edison in this correspondence.

Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact either the undersigned or Mr. John F. McCann, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing, at (914) 734-5074.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Alan Blum". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "A".

CC: Mr. Hubert J. Miller
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