Palo Verde Nuclear
Generating Station

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102-04567-SAB/TNW/GAM
May 10, 2001

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-37
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Sirs:

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Units 1, 2, and 3
Docket Nos. STN 50-528/529/530
Technical Specifications Bases Revisions 9 and 10 Updates

Pursuant to PVNGS Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.14, "Technical Specifications Bases Control Program," Arizona Public Service Company (APS) is submitting changes to the TS Bases incorporated into Revision 9, implemented on April 19, 2001, and Revision 10, implemented on May 4, 2001. The Revision 9 changed pages are provided in Enclosure 1, and the Revision 10 changed pages are provided in Enclosure 2.

No commitments are being made to the NRC by this letter.

Should you have any questions, please contact Scott A. Bauer at (623) 393-5978.

Sincerely,

SAB/TNW/GAM/kg

Enclosure 1: PVNGS Technical Specification Bases Revision 9 Insertion Instructions and Replacement Pages
Enclosure 2: PVNGS Technical Specification Bases Revision 10 Insertion Instructions and Replacement Pages

cc: E. W. Merschoff (all w/o enclosure)
L. R. Wharton
J. H. Moorman

A001

ENCLOSURE 1

PVNGS
Technical Specification Bases
Revision 9

Insertion Instructions and
Replacement Pages

PVNGS Technical Specifications Bases
Revision 9
Insertion Instructions

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B 3.7.5-9/B 3.7.5-10	B 3.7.5-9/B 3.7.5-10
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PVNGS

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
Units 1, 2, and 3

Technical Specification Bases

Revision 9
April 19, 2001

PALO VERDE

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BASES

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the AFW System is required to be OPERABLE and to function in the event that the MFW System is lost. In addition, the AFW System is required to supply enough makeup water to replace steam generator secondary inventory, lost as the unit cools to MODE 4 conditions.

In MODE 4, the AFW System may be used for heat removal via the steam generator.

In MODES 5 and 6, the steam generators are not normally used for decay heat removal, and the AFW System is not required.

ACTIONS

A.1

If one of the two steam supplies to the turbine driven AFW pumps is inoperable, or if a turbine driven pump is inoperable while in MODE 3 immediately following refueling (prior to MODE 2), action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable based on the following reasons:

a. For the inoperability of a steam supply to the turbine-driven AFW pump, the 7 day Completion time is reasonable since there is a redundant steam supply line for the turbine driven pump.

b. For the inoperability of a turbine-driven AFW pump while in MODE 3 immediately subsequent to a refueling outage, the 7 day Completion time is reasonable due to the minimal decay heat levels in this situation.

c. For both the inoperability of a steam supply line to the turbine-driven pump and an inoperable turbine-driven AFW pump while in MODE 3 immediately following a refueling outage, the 7 day Completion time is reasonable due to the availability of redundant OPERABLE motor driven AFW pumps.

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be inoperable during any continuous failure to meet this LCO.

The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The AND connector between 7 days and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

Condition A is modified by a Note which limits the applicability of the Condition to when the unit has not entered MODE 2 following a refueling. Condition A allows the turbine-driven AFW pump to be inoperable for 7 days vice the 72 hour Completion Time in Condition B. This longer Completion Time is based on the reduced decay heat following refueling and prior to the reactor being critical.

It should be noted that when in this Condition with one steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump inoperable, that the AFA train of AFW is considered to be inoperable.

B.1

With one of the required AFW trains (pump or flow path) inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 72 hours. This Condition includes the loss of two steam supply lines to the turbine driven AFW pump. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on the redundant capabilities afforded by the AFW System, the time needed for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA event occurring during this period. Two AFW pumps and flow paths remain to supply feedwater to the steam generators. The second Completion Time for Required Action B.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of Conditions to be inoperable during any continuous failure to meet this LCO.

The 10 day Completion Time provides a limitation time allowed in this specified Condition after discovery of failure to meet the LCO. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The AND connector between 72 hours and 10 days dictates that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

C.1 and C.2

When either Required Action A.1 or B.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, or if two AFW trains are inoperable in MODES 1, 2, and 3, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply.

To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 4 within 12 hours.

This Condition includes the loss of 2 AFW pumps. This Condition also includes the situation where one steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump is inoperable, coincident with another ("B" or "N") AFW train inoperable.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

In MODE 4, with two AFW trains inoperable, operation is allowed to continue because only one motor driven AFW pump (either the essential or the non-essential pump) is required in accordance with the Note that modifies the LCO. Although it is not required, the unit may continue to cool down and start the SDC.

D.1

Required Action D.1 is modified by a Note indicating that all required MODE changes or power reductions are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status. Completion Times are also suspended at the time the conditions is entered. The Completion Time is resumed with the time remaining when the Condition was entered upon restoration of one AFW train to OPERABLE status.

With all three AFW trains inoperable in MODES 1, 2, and 3, the unit is in a seriously degraded condition with no TS related means for conducting a cooldown, and only limited means for conducting a cooldown with nonsafety grade equipment. In such a condition, the unit should not be perturbed by any action, including a power change, that might result in a trip. The seriousness of this condition requires that action be started immediately to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable, as it could force the unit into a less safe condition.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

E.1

Required Action E.1 is modified by a Note indicating that all required MODE changes or power reductions are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status. Completion Times are also suspended at the time the Condition is entered. The Completion Time is resumed with the time remaining when the Condition was entered upon restoration of one AFW train to OPERABLE status.

With one AFW train inoperable, action must be taken to immediately restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status or to immediately verify, by administrative means, the OPERABILITY of a second train. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable, as it could force the unit into a less safe condition.

In MODE 4, either the reactor coolant pumps or the SDC loops can be used to provide forced circulation as discussed in LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4."

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.5.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the AFW water and steam supply flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths exist for AFW operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulations; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position.

The 31 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

SR 3.7.5.2

Verifying that each AFW pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures that AFW pump performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow and differential head are

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.5.2 (continued)

normal tests of pump performance required by Section XI of the ASME Code (Ref. 2). Because it is undesirable to introduce cold AFW into the steam generators while they are operating, this testing may be performed on recirculation flow. This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and can be indicative of overall performance. Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. Performance of inservice testing, discussed in the ASME Code, Section XI (Ref. 2), at 3 month intervals satisfies this requirement.

This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR should be deferred until suitable test conditions are established. Normal operating pressure is established in the steam generators when RCS temperature reaches 532°F, this corresponds to a P_{sat} of 900 psia. This deferral is required because there is an insufficient steam pressure to perform the test.

SR 3.7.5.3

This SR ensures that AFW can be delivered to the appropriate steam generator, in the event of any accident or transient that generates an AFAS signal, by demonstrating that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal. This Surveillance is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the required position under administrative controls. This SR is not required for the non-essential train since there are no automatic valves which receive an AFAS. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 18 month Frequency is acceptable, based on the design reliability and operating experience of the equipment.

This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR should be deferred until suitable test conditions have been established. Normal operating pressure is established in the steam generators when RCS temperature reaches 532°F, this corresponds to a P_{sat} of 900 psia. This deferral is required because there is an insufficient steam pressure to perform the test.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.5.3 (continued)

Also, this SR is modified by a Note that states the SR is not required in MODE 4. In MODE 4, the required AFW train is already aligned and operating.

SR 3.7.5.4

This SR ensures that the essential AFW pumps will start in the event of any accident or transient that generates an AFAS signal by demonstrating that each essential AFW pump starts automatically on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. The 18 month Frequency is acceptable, based on the design reliability and operating experience of the equipment.

The non-essential AFW pump does not automatically activate and is not subject to this SR.

This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 indicates that the SR be deferred until suitable test conditions are established. Normal operating pressure is established in the steam generators when RCS temperature reaches 532°F, this corresponds to a P_{sat} of 900 psia. This deferral is required because there is insufficient steam pressure to perform the test. Note 2 states that the SR is not required in MODE 4. In MODE 4, the required pump is already operating and the autostart function is not required.

SR 3.7.5.5

This SR ensures that the AFW System is properly aligned by verifying the flow path from each essential AFW pump to each steam generator prior to entering MODE 2 operation, after 30 days in MODE 5 or 6. OPERABILITY of essential AFW flow paths must be verified before sufficient core heat is generated that would require the operation of the AFW System during a subsequent shutdown. The Frequency is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, and administrative controls to ensure that flow paths remain OPERABLE.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.5.5 (continued)

To further ensure AFW System alignment, the OPERABILITY of the essential AFW flow paths is verified following extended outages to determine that no misalignment of valves has occurred. This SR ensures that the flow path from the CST to the steam generators is properly aligned by requiring a verification of minimum flow capacity of 650 gpm at pressures corresponding to 1270 psia at the entrance to the steam generators. (This SR is not required for the non-essential AFW pump since it is normally used for startup and shutdown.)

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 10.4.9.

2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, Subsection IWP.

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ENCLOSURE 2

PVNGS
Technical Specification Bases
Revision 10

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PVNGS

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station
Units 1, 2, and 3

Technical Specification Bases

Revision 10
May 4, 2001

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BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

h. Log Power Level – High trip;

i. Reactor Coolant Flow – Low trip; and

j. Steam Generator Safety Valves.

The limitation that the average enthalpy in the hot leg be less than or equal to the enthalpy of saturated liquid also ensures that the ΔT measured by instrumentation used in the protection system design as a measure of the core power is proportional to core power.

The SL represents a design requirement for establishing the protection system trip setpoints identified previously. LCO 3.2.1, "Linear Heat Rate (LHR)," and LCO 3.2.4, "Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR)," or the assumed initial conditions of the safety analyses (as indicated in the UFSAR, Ref. 2) provide more restrictive limits to ensure that the SLs are not exceeded.

SAFETY LIMITS

SL 2.1.1.1 and SL 2.1.1.2 ensure that the minimum DNBR is not less than the safety analyses limit and that fuel centerline temperature remains below melting.

The minimum value of the DNBR during normal operation and design basis AOOs is limited to 1.3 (this value will be 1.34 for operating cycles 11 and later), based on a statistical combination of CE-1 CHF correlation and engineering factor uncertainties, and is established as an SL. Additional factors such as rod bow and spacer grid size and placement will determine the limiting safety system settings required to ensure that the SL is maintained. Maintaining the dynamically adjusted peak LHR to ≤ 21 kW/ft ensures that fuel centerline melt will not occur during normal operating conditions or design AOOs.

APPLICABILITY

SL 2.1.1.1 and SL 2.1.1.2 only apply in MODES 1 and 2 because these are the only MODES in which the reactor is critical. Automatic protection functions are required to be OPERABLE during MODES 1 and 2 to ensure operation within the reactor core SLs. The steam generator safety valves or automatic protection actions serve to prevent RCS heatup to the reactor core SL conditions or to initiate a reactor trip

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued)

function, which forces the unit into MODE 3. Setpoints for the reactor trip functions are specified in LCO 3.3.1.

In MODES 3, 4, 5, and 6, Applicability is not required, since the reactor is not generating significant THERMAL POWER.

SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATIONS

The following violation responses are applicable to the reactor core SLs.

2.2.1

If SL 2.1.1.1 or SL 2.1.1.2 is violated, the requirement to go to MODE 3 places the unit in a MODE in which this SL is not applicable.

The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour recognizes the importance of bringing the unit to a MODE where this SL is not applicable and reduces the probability of fuel damage.

2.2.3

If SL 2.1.1.1 or SL 2.1.1.2 is violated, the NRC Operations Center must be notified within 1 hour, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (Ref. 3).

2.2.4

If SL 2.1.1.1 or SL 2.1.1.2 is violated, the appropriate senior management of the nuclear plant and the utility shall be notified within 24 hours. This 24 hour period provides time for the plant operators and staff to take the appropriate immediate action and assess the condition of the unit before reporting to the senior management.

2.2.5

If SL 2.1.1.1 or SL 2.1.1.2 is violated, a Licensee Event Report shall be prepared and submitted within 30 days to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (Ref. 4). A copy of the

(continued)

B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

B 3.2.1 Linear Heat Rate (LHR)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this LCO is to limit the core power distribution to the initial values assumed in the accident analyses. Operation within the limits imposed by this LCO limits or prevents potential fuel cladding failures that could breach the primary fission product barrier and release fission products to the reactor coolant in the event of a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA), ejected Control Element Assembly (CEA) accident, or other postulated accident requiring termination by a Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip function. This LCO limits the damage to the fuel cladding during an accident by ensuring that the plant is operating within acceptable bounding conditions at the onset of a transient.

Methods of controlling the power distribution include:

a. Using full or part length CEAs to alter the axial power distribution;

b. Decreasing CEA insertion by boration, thereby improving the radial power distribution; and

c. Correcting off optimum conditions (e.g., a CEA drop or misoperation of the unit) that cause margin degradations.

The core power distribution is controlled so that, in conjunction with other core operating parameters (e.g., CEA insertion and alignment limits), the power distribution does not result in violation of this LCO. The limiting safety system settings and this LCO are based on the accident analyses (Refs. 1 and 2), so that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOOs), and the limits of acceptable consequences are not exceeded for other postulated accidents.

Limiting power distribution skewing over time also minimizes xenon distribution skewing, which is a significant factor in controlling the axial power distribution.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

Power distribution is a product of multiple parameters, various combinations of which may produce acceptable power distributions. Operation within the design limits of power distribution is accomplished by generating operating limits on the LHR and Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB).

Proximity to the DNB condition is expressed by the Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR), defined as the ratio of the cladding surface heat flux required to cause DNB to the actual cladding surface heat flux. The minimum DNBR value during both normal operation and AOOs is the DNBR Safety Limit as calculated by the CE-1 Correlation (Ref. 3) and corrected for such factors as rod bow and grid spacers. It is accepted as an appropriate margin to DNB for all operating conditions.

There are two systems that monitor core power distribution online: the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs). The COLSS and CPCs that monitor the core power distribution are capable of verifying that the LHR and the DNBR do not exceed their limits. The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating core power operating limits corresponding to the allowable peak LHR and DNBR. The CPCs perform this function by continuously calculating an actual value of DNBR and Local Power Density (LPD) for comparison with the respective trip setpoints.

The COLSS indicates continuously to the operator how far the core is from the operating limits and provides an audible alarm if an operating limit is exceeded. Such a condition signifies a reduction in the capability of the plant to withstand an anticipated transient, but does not necessarily imply an immediate violation of fuel design limits. If the margin to fuel design limits continues to decrease, the RPS ensures that the specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded by initiating a reactor trip.

The COLSS continually generates an assessment of the calculated margin for specified LHR and DNBR limits. The data required for these assessments include measured incore neutron flux, CEA positions, and Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inlet temperature, pressure, and flow.

(continued)

B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

B 3.2.2 Planar Radial Peaking Factors (F_{xy})

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this LCO is to limit the core power distribution to the initial values assumed in the accident analyses. Operation within the limits imposed by this LCO either limits or prevents potential fuel cladding failures that could breach the primary fission product barrier and release fission products to the reactor coolant in the event of a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA), loss of flow accident, ejected Control Element Assembly (CEA) accident, or other postulated accident requiring termination by a Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip function. This LCO limits damage to the fuel cladding during an accident by ensuring that the plant is operating within acceptable conditions at the onset of a transient.

Methods of controlling the power distribution include:

a. Using full or part length CEAs to alter the axial power distribution;

b. Decreasing CEA insertion by boration, thereby improving the radial power distribution; and

c. Correcting off optimum conditions (e.g., a CEA drop or misoperation of the unit) that cause margin degradations.

The core power distribution is controlled so that, in conjunction with other core operating parameters (CEA insertion and alignment limits), the power distribution does not result in violation of this LCO. Limiting safety system settings and this LCO are based on the accident analyses (Refs. 1 and 2), so that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOOs), and the limits of acceptable consequences are not exceeded for other postulated accidents.

Limiting power distribution skewing over time also minimizes xenon distribution skewing, which is a significant factor in controlling axial power distribution. Power distribution is a product of multiple parameters, various combinations of

(continued)

BACKGROUND (continued)

which may produce acceptable power distributions. Operation within the design limits of power distribution is accomplished by generating operating limits on Linear Heat Rate (LHR) and Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB).

Proximity to the DNB condition is expressed by the Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR), defined as the ratio of the cladding surface heat flux required to cause DNB to the actual cladding surface heat flux. The minimum DNBR value during both normal operation and AOOs is the DNBR Safety Limit as calculated by the CE-1 Correlation (Ref. 3) and corrected for such factors as rod bow and grid spacers, and it is accepted as an appropriate margin to DNB for all operating conditions.

There are two systems that monitor core power distribution online: the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs). The COLSS and CPCs that monitor the core power distribution are capable of verifying that the LHR and the DNBR do not exceed their limits. The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating core power operating limits corresponding to the allowable peak LHR and DNBR values. The CPCs perform this function by continuously calculating actual values of DNBR and Local Power Density (LPD) for comparison with the respective trip setpoints.

DNBR penalty factors are included in both the COLSS and CPC DNBR calculations to accommodate the effects of rod bow. The amount of rod bow in each assembly is dependent upon the average burnup experienced by that assembly. Fuel assemblies that incur higher than average burnup experience greater rod bow. Conversely, fuel assemblies that receive lower than average burnup experience less rod bow. In design calculations for a reload core, each batch of fuel is assigned a penalty applied to the maximum integrated planar radial power peak of the batch. This penalty is correlated with the amount of rod bow determined from the maximum average assembly burnup of the batch. A single net penalty for the COLSS and CPCs is then determined from the penalties associated with each batch that comprises a core reload, accounting for the offsetting margins due to the lower radial power peaks in the higher burnup batches.

The COLSS indicates continuously to the operator how far the core is to the operating limits and provides an audible

(continued)

B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

B 3.2.3 AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT (T_q)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this LCO is to limit the core power distribution to the initial values assumed in the accident analyses. Operation within the limits imposed by this LCO either limits or prevents potential fuel cladding failures that could breach the primary fission product barrier and release fission products to the reactor coolant in the event of a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA), loss of flow accident, ejected Control Element Assembly (CEA) accident, or other postulated accident requiring termination by a Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip function. This LCO limits the amount of damage to the fuel cladding during an accident by ensuring that the plant is operating within acceptable conditions at the onset of a transient.

Methods of controlling the power distribution include:

a. Using full or part length CEAs to alter the axial power distribution;

b. Decreasing CEA insertion by boration, thereby improving the radial power distribution; and

c. Correcting off optimum conditions, (e.g., a CEA drop or misoperation of the unit) that cause margin degradations.

The core power distribution is controlled so that, in conjunction with other core operating parameters (e.g., CEA insertion and alignment limits), the power distribution does not result in violation of this LCO. The limiting safety system settings and this LCO are based on the accident analyses (Refs. 1 and 2), so that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOOs) and the limits of acceptable consequences are not exceeded for other postulated accidents.

Limiting power distribution skewing over time also minimizes xenon distribution skewing, which is a significant factor in controlling axial power distribution.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

Power distribution is a product of multiple parameters, various combinations of which may produce acceptable power distributions. Operation within the design limits of power distribution is accomplished by generating operating limits on the Linear Heat Rate (LHR) and the Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB).

Proximity to the DNB condition is expressed by the Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR), defined as the ratio of the cladding surface heat flux required to cause DNB to the actual cladding surface heat flux. The minimum DNBR value during both normal operation and AOOs is the DNBR Safety Limit as calculated by the CE-1 Correlation (Ref. 3) and corrected for such factors as rod bow and grid spacers, and it is accepted as an appropriate margin to DNB for all operating conditions.

There are two systems that monitor core power distribution online: the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) and the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs). The COLSS and CPCs that monitor the core power distribution are capable of verifying that the LHR and the DNBR do not exceed their limits. The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating core power operating limits corresponding to the allowable peak LHR and DNBR. The CPCs perform this function by continuously calculating actual values of DNBR and Local Power Density (LPD) for comparison with the respective trip setpoints.

A DNBR penalty factor is included in the COLSS and CPC DNBR calculation to accommodate the effects of rod bow. The amount of rod bow in each assembly is dependent upon the average burnup experienced by the assembly. Fuel assemblies that incur higher than average burnup experience greater magnitude of rod bow. Conversely, fuel assemblies that receive lower than average burnup experience less rod bow. In design calculations for a reload core, each batch of fuel is assigned a penalty applied to the maximum integrated planar radial power peak of the batch. This penalty is correlated with the amount of rod bow that is determined from the maximum average assembly burnup of the batch. A single net penalty for the COLSS and CPCs is then determined from the penalties associated with each batch that comprises a core reload, accounting for the offsetting margins caused by the lower radial power peaks in the higher burnup batches.

(continued)

B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

B 3.2.4 Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this LCO is to limit the core power distribution to the initial value assumed in the accident analyses. Specifically, operation within the limits imposed by this LCO either limits or prevents potential fuel cladding failures that could breach the primary fission product barrier and release fission products to the reactor coolant in the event of a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA), loss of flow accident, ejected Control Element Assembly (CEA) accident, or other postulated accident requiring termination by a Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip function. This LCO limits the amount of damage to the fuel cladding during an accident by ensuring that the plant is operating within acceptable conditions at the onset of a transient.

Methods of controlling the power distribution include:

a. Using full or part length CEAs to alter the axial power distribution;

b. Decreasing CEA insertion by boration, thereby improving the radial power distribution; and

c. Correcting off optimum conditions (e.g., a CEA drop or misoperation of the unit) that cause margin degradations.

The core power distribution is controlled so that, in conjunction with other core operating parameters (e.g., CEA insertion and alignment limits), the power distribution does not result in violation of this LCO. The limiting safety system settings and this LCO are based on the accident analysis (Refs. 1 and 2), so that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOOs) and the limits of acceptable consequences are not exceeded for other postulated accidents.

Limiting power distribution skewing over time also minimizes the xenon distribution skewing, which is a significant factor in controlling axial power distribution.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

Power distribution is a product of multiple parameters, various combinations of which may produce acceptable power distributions. Operation within the design limits of power distribution is accomplished by generating operating limits on the Linear Heat Rate (LHR) and the Departure from nucleate boiling (DNB).

Proximity to the DNB condition is expressed by the DNBR, defined as the ratio of the cladding surface heat flux required to cause DNB to the actual cladding surface heat flux. The minimum DNBR value during both normal operation and AOOs is the DNBR Safety Limit as calculated by the CE-1 Correlation (Ref. 3) and corrected for such factors as rod bows and grid spacers and it is accepted as an appropriate margin to DNB for all operating conditions.

There are two systems that monitor core power distribution online: the Core Operating Limits Supervisory System (COLSS) and the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs). The COLSS and CPCs that monitor the core power distribution are capable of verifying that the LHR and DNBR do not exceed their limits. The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating core power operating limits corresponding to the allowable peak LHR and DNBR. The CPCs perform this function by continuously calculating an actual value of DNBR and LPD for comparison with the respective trip setpoints.

A DNBR penalty factor is included in both the COLSS and CPC DNBR calculation to accommodate the effects of rod bow. The amount of rod bow in each assembly is dependent upon the average burnup experienced by that assembly. Fuel assemblies that incur higher than average burnup experience a greater magnitude of rod bow. Conversely, fuel assemblies that receive lower than average burnup experience less rod bow. In design calculations for a reload core, each batch of fuel is assigned a penalty that is applied to the maximum integrated planar radial power peak of the batch. This penalty is correlated with the amount of rod bow that is determined from the maximum average assembly burnup of the batch. A single net penalty for the COLSS and CPCs is then determined from the penalties associated with each batch that comprises a core reload, accounting for the offsetting margins due to the lower radial power peaks in the higher burnup batches.

(continued)

B 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

B 3.2.5 AXIAL SHAPE INDEX (ASI)

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this LCO is to limit the core power distribution to the initial values assumed in the accident analysis. Operation within the limits imposed by this LCO either limits or prevents potential fuel cladding failures that could breach the primary fission product barrier and release fission products to the reactor coolant in the event of a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA), loss of flow accident, ejected Control Element Assembly (CEA) accident, or other postulated accident requiring termination by a Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip function. This LCO limits the amount of damage to the fuel cladding during an accident by ensuring that the plant is operating within acceptable conditions at the onset of a transient.

Methods of controlling the axial power distribution include:

a. Using full or part length CEAs to alter the axial power distribution;

b. Decreasing CEA insertion by boration, thereby improving the axial power distribution; and

c. Correcting off optimum conditions (e.g., a CEA drop or misoperation of the unit) that cause margin degradations.

The core power distribution is controlled so that, in conjunction with other core operating parameters (CEA insertion and alignment limits), the power distribution does not result in violation of this LCO. The limiting safety system settings are based on the accident analyses (Refs. 1 and 2), so that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOOs) and the limits of acceptable consequences are not exceeded for other postulated accidents.

Limiting power distribution skewing over time also minimizes xenon distribution skewing, which is a significant factor in controlling axial power distribution.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

Power distribution is a product of multiple parameters, various combinations of which may produce acceptable power distributions. Operation within the design limits of power distribution is accomplished by generating operating limits on the Linear Heat Rate (LHR) and the Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB).

Proximity to the DNB condition is expressed by the Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR), defined as the ratio of the cladding surface heat flux required to cause DNB to the actual cladding surface heat flux. The minimum DNBR value during both normal operation and AOOs is the DNBR Safety Limit as calculated by the CE-1 Correlation (Ref. 3), and corrected for such factors as rod bow and grid spacers, and it is accepted as an appropriate margin to DNB for all operating conditions.

There are two systems that monitor core power distribution online: the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) or the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs). The COLSS and CPCs monitor the core power distribution and are capable of verifying that the LHR and DNBR do not exceed their limits. The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating core power operating limits corresponding to the allowable peak LHR and DNBR. The CPCs perform this function by continuously calculating actual values of DNBR and local power density (LPD) for comparison with the respective trip setpoints.

A DNBR penalty factor is included in both the COLSS and CPC DNBR calculations to accommodate the effects of rod bow. The amount of rod bow in each assembly is dependent upon the average burnup experienced by that assembly. Fuel assemblies that incur higher than average burnup experience greater rod bow. Conversely, fuel assemblies that receive lower than average burnup experience less rod bow. In design calculations for a reload core, each batch of fuel is assigned a penalty that is applied to the maximum integrated planar radial power peak of the batch. This penalty is correlated with the amount of rod bow that is determined from the maximum average assembly burnup of the batch. A single net penalty for the COLSS and CPC is then determined from the penalties associated with each batch that comprises a core reload, accounting for the offsetting margins due to the lower radial power peaks in the higher burnup batches.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.1.12

SR 3.3.1.12 is a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST similar to SR 3.3.1.7, except SR 3.3.1.12 is applicable only to operating bypass functions and is performed once within 92 days prior to each startup. Proper operation of operating bypass permissives is critical during plant startup because the operating bypasses must be in place to allow startup operation and must be automatically removed at the appropriate points during power ascent to enable certain reactor trips. Consequently, the appropriate time to verify operating bypass removal function OPERABILITY is just prior to startup. The allowance to conduct this Surveillance within 92 days of startup is based on the reliability analysis presented in topical report CEN-327, "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation" (Ref. 9). Once the operating bypasses are removed, the bypasses must not fail in such a way that the associated trip Function gets inadvertently bypassed. This feature is verified by the trip Function CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.1.7. Therefore, further testing of the operating bypass function after startup is unnecessary.

SR 3.3.1.13

This SR ensures that the RPS RESPONSE TIMES are verified to be less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the safety analysis. Individual component response times are not modeled in the analyses. The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the trip setpoint value at the sensor to the point at which the RTCBs open. Response times are conducted on an 18 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. This results in the interval between successive surveillances of a given channel of n x 18 months, where n is the number of channels in the function. The Frequency of 18 months is based upon operating experience, which has shown that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences. Response time testing may be performed at power on a single channel or during plant outages when the equipment is not required to be operable. Testing may be performed in one measurement or in overlapping segments, with verification that all components are tested.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.1.13 (continued)

Response time may be verified by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, including allocated sensor response time, such that the response time is verified. Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from the records of test results, vendor test data, or vendor engineering specifications. Topical Report CE NPSD-1167-A, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements." (Ref. 12) provides the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the channel response time for specific sensors identified in the Topical Report. Response time verification for other sensor types must be demonstrated by test. The allocation of sensor response times must be verified prior to placing a new component in operation and reverified after maintenance that may adversely affect the sensor response time.

A Note is added to indicate that the neutron detectors are excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because they are passive devices with minimal drift and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal. Slow changes in detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the daily calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.4)

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 21
2. 10 CFR 100.
3. NRC Safety Evaluation Report, July 15, 1994.
4. IEEE Standard 279-1971, April 5, 1972.
5. UFSAR, Chapters 6 and 15.
6. 10 CFR 50.49.
7. "Calculation of Trip Setpoint Values, Plant Protection System". CEN-286(v), or Calculation 13-JC-SG-203 for the Low Steam Generator Pressure Trip function.
8. UFSAR, Section 7.2.

(continued)

BASES

REFERENCES (continued)

9. CEN-327, June 2, 1986, including Supplement 1, March3, 1989, and Calculation 13-JC-SB-200.

10. CEN-PSD-335-P, "Functional Design Requirements for a Core Protection Calculator."

11. CEN-PSD-336-P, "Functional Design Requirements for a Control Element Assembly Calculator."

12. CEOG Topical Report CE NPSD-1167-A, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements."

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.2.4 (continued)

because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal. Slow changes in detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the daily calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.4).

SR 3.3.2.5

This SR ensures that the RPS RESPONSE TIMES are verified to be less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the safety analysis. Individual component response times are not modeled in the analyses. The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the trip setpoint value at the sensor to the point at which the RTCBs open. Response times are conducted on an 18 month STAGGERED TEST BASIS. This results in the interval between successive tests of a given channel of n x 18 months, where n is the number of channels in the Function. The 18 month Frequency is based upon operating experience, which has shown that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences. Response time testing may be performed at power on a single channel or during plant outages when the equipment is not required to be operable. Testing may be performed in one measurement or in overlapping segments, with verification that all components are tested.

Response time may be verified by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, including allocated sensor response time, such that the response time is verified. Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from records of test results, vendor test data, or vendor engineering specifications. Topical Report CE NPSD-1167-A, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements," (Ref. 7) provides the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the channel response time for specific sensors identified in the Topical Report. Response time verification for other sensor types must be demonstrated by test. The allocation of sensor response times must be verified prior to placing a new component in operation and reverified after maintenance that may adversely affect the sensor response time.

(continued)

BASES

A Note is added to indicate that the neutron detectors are excluded from RPS RESPONSE TIME testing because they are passive devices with minimal drift and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal. Slow changes in detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the daily calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.4).

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50.
2. 10 CFR 100.
3. UFSAR, Section 7.2.
4. "Calculation of Trip Setpoint Values Plant Protection System, CEN-286(v)", or Calculation 13-JC-SG-203 for the Low Steam Generator Pressure Trip Function.
5. NRC Safety Evaluation Report, July 15, 1994.
6. CEN-327, June 2, 1986, including Supplement 1, March 3, 1989, and Calculation 13-JC-SB-200.
7. CEOG Topical Report CE NPSD-1167-A, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements."

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.5.2 (continued)

The as found and as left values must also be recorded and reviewed for consistency with the assumptions of the surveillance interval extension analysis. The requirements for this review are outlined in Reference 9.

SR 3.3.5.3

CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument channel including the detector and the bypass removal functions. The Surveillance verifies that the channel responds to a measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drift between successive calibrations to ensure that the channel remains operational between successive surveillances. CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS must be performed consistent with the plant specific setpoint analysis.

The as found and as left values must also be recorded and reviewed for consistency with the assumptions of the surveillance interval extension analysis. The requirements for this review are outlined in Reference 9.

The 18 month frequency is based on operating experience which has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed on the 18 month Frequency. With proper precautions the channel calibration can be performed with the reactor at power.

SR 3.3.5.4

This Surveillance ensures that the train actuation response times are within the maximum values assumed in the safety analyses.

Response time testing acceptance criteria are included in Reference 8.

Response time may be verified by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, including allocated sensor response time, such that the response time is verified. Allocations for sensor response times may be obtained from records of test results, vendor test data, or vendor engineering specifications. Topical Report CE NPSD-1167-A, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.3.5.4 (continued)

Testing Requirements," (Ref. 10) provides the basis and methodology for using allocated sensor response times in the overall verification of the channel response time for specific sensors identified in the Topical Report. Response time verification for other sensor types must be demonstrated by test. The allocation of sensor response times must be verified prior to placing a new component in operation and re-verified after maintenance that may adversely affect the sensor response time.

ESF RESPONSE TIME tests are conducted on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS of once every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.

SR 3.3.5.5

SR 3.3.5.5 is a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST similar to SR 3.3.5.2, except SR 3.3.5.5 is performed within 92 days prior to startup and is only applicable to operating bypass functions. Since the Pressurizer Pressure – Low operating bypass is identical for both the RPS and ESFAS, this is the same Surveillance performed for the RPS in SR 3.3.1.13.

The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for proper operation of the operating bypass permissives is critical during plant heatups because the bypasses may be in place prior to entering MODE 3 but must be removed at the appropriate points during plant startup to enable the ESFAS Function. Consequently, just prior to startup is the appropriate time to verify operating bypass function OPERABILITY. Once the operating bypasses are removed, the bypasses must not fail in such a way that the associated ESFAS Function is inappropriately bypassed. This feature is verified by SR 3.3.5.2.

The allowance to conduct this test with 92 days of startup is based on the reliability analysis presented in topical report CEN-327, "RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation" (Ref. 9).

(continued)

BASES

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 7.3.
2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.
3. NRC Safety Evaluation Report, July 15, 1994
4. IEEE Standard 279-1971.
5. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
6. 10 CFR 50.49.
7. "Calculation of Trip Setpoint Valves Plant Protection System", CEN-286(v), or Calculation 13-JC-SG-203 for the Low Steam Generator Pressure Trip Function.
8. UFSAR, Section 7.2.
9. CEN-327, May 1986, including Supplement 1, March 1989, and Calculation 13-JC-SB-200.
10. CEOG Topical Report CE NPSD-1167-A, "Elimination of Pressure Sensor Response Time Testing Requirements."

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BASES

LCO (continued)

a. Manual Trip

The LCO on Manual Trip backs up the automatic trips and ensures operators have the capability to rapidly initiate the CREFAS Function if any parameter is trending toward its setpoint. One channel must be OPERABLE. This considers that the Manual Trip capability is a backup and that other means are available to actuate the redundant train if required, including manual SIAS, FBEVAS, or CPIAS.

b. Radiation Monitors

One channel of radiation monitor is required to be OPERABLE to ensure the control room filtration actuates on high gaseous activity.

c. Actuation Logic

One train of Actuation Logic must be OPERABLE, since there are alternate means available to actuate the redundant train, including SIAS.

APPLICABILITY

The CREFAS Functions must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in either the fuel building or the containment building, to ensure a habitable environment for the control room operators.

The CREFAS must be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 to provide protection for a Waste Gas Decay Tank rupture accident.

ACTIONS

A CREFAS channel is inoperable when it does not satisfy the OPERABILITY criteria for the channel's function. The most common cause of channel inoperability is outright failure.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS (continued)

A.1, B.1, B.2, C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, and C.2.3

Conditions A, B, and C are applicable to manual and automatic actuation of the CREFAS. Condition A applies to the failure of two channels of the CREFAS Manual Trip, Actuation Logic, and radiation monitor channel in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. Entry into this Condition requires action to either restore the failed channel or manually perform the CREFS safety function (Required Action A.1). The Completion Time of 1 hour is sufficient to complete the Required Actions and accounts for the fact that CREFAS supplements control room filtration by other Functions (e.g., SIAS) in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. If Required Action A.1 and the associated completion time are not met, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours (Required Action B.1) and to MODE 5 within 36 hours (Required Action B.2). The Completion Times of 6 hours and 36 hours for reaching MODES 3 and 5 from MODE 1 are reasonable, based on operating experience and normal cooldown rates, for reaching the required MODE from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant safety systems or operators.

Condition C applies to the failure of two channels of CREFAS Manual Trip, Actuation Logic, and radiation monitor channel in MODE 5 or 6, or when moving irradiated fuel assemblies. The Required Actions are immediately taken to place one OPERABLE CREFS train in the emergency mode of operation (i.e., fan running, valves/dampers aligned to the post - CREFAS mode, etc.) or to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity additions, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The Completion Time recognizes the fact that FBEVAS, or CPIAS are available to initiate control room filtration in the event of a fuel handling accident.

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits

BASES

BACKGROUND

These Bases address requirements for maintaining RCS pressure, temperature, and flow rate within limits assumed in the safety analyses. The safety analyses (Ref. 1) of normal operating conditions and anticipated operational occurrences assume initial conditions within the normal steady state envelope. The limits placed on DNB related parameters ensure that these parameters will not be less conservative than were assumed in the analyses and thereby provide assurance that the minimum Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) will meet the required criteria for each of the transients analyzed.

The LCO limits for minimum and maximum RCS pressures as measured at the pressurizer are consistent with operation within the nominal operating envelope and are bounded by those used as the initial pressures in the analyses.

The LCO limit for minimum and maximum RCS cold leg temperatures are in accordance with the area of acceptable operation shown in Figure 3.4.1-1, are consistent with operation at the indicated power level, and are bounded by those used as the initial temperatures in the analyses.

The LCO limit for minimum RCS flow rate is bounded by those used as the initial flow rates in the analyses. The RCS flow rate is not expected to vary during plant operation with all pumps running.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The requirements of LCO 3.4.1 represent the initial conditions for DNB limited transients analyzed in the safety analyses (Ref. 1). The safety analyses have shown that transients initiated from the limits of this LCO will meet the DNBR criterion of greater than or equal to the DNBR Safety Limit. This is the acceptance limit for the RCS DNB parameters. Changes to the facility that could impact these parameters must be assessed for their impact on the DNBR criterion.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

The transients analyzed for include loss of coolant flow events and dropped or stuck Control Element Assembly (CEA) events. A key assumption for the analysis of these events is that the core power distribution is within the limits of LCO 3.1.7, "Regulating CEA Insertion Limits"; LCO 3.1.8, "Part Length CEA Insertion Limits"; LCO 3.2.3, "AZIMUTHAL POWER TILT (T_q)"; and LCO 3.2.5, "AXIAL SHAPE INDEX (ASI).

The RCS DNB limits satisfy Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.56(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

This LCO specifies limits on the monitored process variables – RCS pressurizer pressure, RCS cold leg temperature, and RCS total flow rate – to ensure that the core operates within the limits assumed for the plant safety analyses. Operating within these limits will result in meeting the DNBR criterion in the event of a DNB limited transient.

The LCO numerical value for minimum flow rate is given for the measurement location but has not been adjusted for instrument error. Plant specific limits of instrument error are established by the plant staff to meet the operational requirements of minimum flow rate.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 1 for RCS flow rate, MODES 1 and 2 for RCS pressurizer pressure, Mode 1 for RCS cold leg temperature, and MODE 2 with $K_{eff} \geq 1$ for RCS cold leg temperature, the limits must be maintained during steady state operation in order to ensure that DNBR criteria will be met in the event of an unplanned loss of forced coolant flow or other DNB limited transient. In all other MODES, the power level is low enough so that DNBR is not a concern.

(continued)

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.16 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

GDC 30 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 (Ref. 1) requires means for detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the location of the source of RCS LEAKAGE. Regulatory Guide 1.45 (Ref. 2) describes acceptable methods for selecting leakage detection systems.

Leakage detection systems must have the capability to detect significant Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) degradation as soon after occurrence as practical to minimize the potential for propagation to a gross failure. Thus, an early indication or warning signal is necessary to permit proper evaluation of all unidentified LEAKAGE.

Industry practice has shown that water flow changes of 0.5 gpm to 1.0 gpm can readily be detected in contained volumes by monitoring changes in water level, in flow rate, or in the operating frequency of a pump. The containment sump monitor consists of instrumentation used to monitor containment sump level and flow (pump run time). The containment sump used to collect unidentified LEAKAGE is instrumented to alarm if the rate of level increase corresponds to a sump inflow greater than 1 gpm for 1 hour (Ref. 3). This sensitivity is acceptable for detecting increases in unidentified LEAKAGE.

The reactor coolant contains radioactivity that, when released to the containment, can be detected by radiation monitoring instrumentation. Reactor coolant radioactivity levels will be low during initial reactor startup and for a few weeks thereafter until activated corrosion products have been formed and fission products appear from fuel element cladding contamination or cladding defects. Instrument sensitivities of 10^{-9} µCi/cc radioactivity for particulate monitoring and of 10^{-6} µCi/cc radioactivity for gaseous monitoring are practical for these leakage detection systems. Radioactivity detection systems are included for monitoring both particulate and gaseous activities, because of their sensitivities and responses to RCS LEAKAGE.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

An increase in humidity of the containment atmosphere would indicate release of water vapor to the containment. Dew point temperature or relative humidity measurements can thus be used to monitor increasing humidity levels of the containment atmosphere as an indicator of potential RCS LEAKAGE.

Since the humidity level is influenced by several factors, a quantitative evaluation of an indicated leakage rate by this means may be questionable and should be compared to observed increases in liquid flow into or from the containment sump. Humidity level monitoring is considered most useful as an indirect alarm or indication to alert the operator to a potential problem. Humidity monitors are not required by this LCO.

Air temperature and pressure monitoring methods may also be used to infer unidentified LEAKAGE to the containment. Containment temperature and pressure fluctuate slightly during plant operation, but a rise above the normally indicated range of values may indicate RCS LEAKAGE into the containment. The relevance of temperature and pressure measurements are affected by containment free volume and, for temperature, detector location. Alarm signals from these instruments can be valuable in recognizing a sizable leakage to the containment. Temperature and pressure monitors are not required by this LCO.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The need to evaluate the severity of an alarm or an indication is important to the operators, and the ability to compare and verify with indications from other systems is necessary. The RCS leakage detection instrumentation is described in the UFSAR (Ref. 3). Multiple instrument locations are utilized, if needed, to help identify the location of the LEAKAGE source.

(continued)

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.10 Essential Chilled Water (EC) System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The EC System provides a heat transfer system to the ultimate heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from selected safety related air handling systems during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient.

The EC System is a closed loop system consisting of two independent trains. Each 100% capacity train includes a heat exchanger, surge tank, pump, chemical addition tank, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation. An independent 100% capacity chilled water refrigeration unit cools each train. The EC System is actuated on receipt of an ESFAS signal and supplies chilled water to the Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) units in Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) equipment areas (e.g., the main control room, DC equipment room, AFW pump rooms, EW pump rooms and safety injection pump rooms).

The flow path for the EC System includes the closed loop of piping to all serviced equipment.

During normal operation, the normal Chilled Water System (WC) and the normal HVAC System cools the areas served by the EC System. The WC System and the normal HVAC System are nonsafety grade systems. Following ESFAS actuations, the EC System with essential HVAC units provide this cooling function to the control room and safety grade equipment. Additional information about the design and operation of the system, along with a list of components served, can be found in the UFSAR, Section 9.2.9 (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The design basis of the EC System is to remove the post accident heat load from ESF spaces following a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power. Each train provides chilled water to the HVAC units. The EC system design flowrates and temperatures are referenced in the Design Bases Manual.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS (continued)

The maximum heat load in the ESF pump room area occurs during the recirculation phase following a loss of coolant accident. During recirculation, hot fluid from the containment sump is supplied to the high pressure safety injection and containment spray pumps. This heat load to the area atmosphere must be removed by the EC System to ensure that these pumps remain OPERABLE.

The EC satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii)..

LCO

Two EC trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide the required redundancy to ensure that the system functions to remove post accident heat loads, assuming the worst single failure.

An EC train is considered OPERABLE when:

a. The associated pump and surge tank are OPERABLE; and

b. The associated piping, valves, heat exchanger, refrigeration unit, and instrumentation and controls required to perform the safety related function are OPERABLE.

The isolation of the EC System from other components or systems renders those components or systems inoperable, but does not necessarily affect the OPERABILITY of the EC System. Isolation of the EC System to any single EC supplied cooling coil, while rendering the cooling coil inoperable, is acceptable and does not impact the OPERABILITY of the EC System. Isolation of the EC System to any additional cooling coil is not acceptable without an engineering evaluation and an operability determination for that configuration (Ref. 2). The EC System is inoperable in this situation, unless it has been specifically evaluated, because it is operating outside of the acceptable limits of the system.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the EC System is required to be OPERABLE when a LOCA or other accident would require ESF operation.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

The worst case single active failure of a component of the CREFS, assuming a loss of offsite power, does not impair the ability of the system to perform its design function.

The CREFS satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Two independent and redundant trains of the CREFS are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming that a single failure disables the other train. Total system failure could result in a control room operator receiving a dose in excess of 5 rem whole body or its equivalent in the event of a large radioactive release.

The CREFS is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control operator exposure are OPERABLE in both trains. A CREFS train is considered OPERABLE when the associated:

a. Fan is OPERABLE;

b. HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and

c. Ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

In addition, the control room boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the CREFS must be OPERABLE to limit operator exposure during and following a DBA.

In MODES 5 and 6, the CREFS is required to cope with the release from a rupture of a waste gas tank.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, the CREFS must be OPERABLE to cope with the release from a fuel handling accident.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1

With one CREFS train inoperable, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE CREFS subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE CREFS train could result in loss of CREFS function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and the ability of the remaining train to provide the required capability.

B.1 and B.2

If the inoperable CREFS cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes the accident risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours, and in MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

C.1

In MODE 5 or 6, if Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CREFS train must be immediately placed in the emergency mode of operation (i.e., fan running, valves/dampers aligned to the post-CREFAS mode, etc.). This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

D.1 and D.2

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, if required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CREFS train must be immediately placed in the emergency mode of operation (i.e., fan running, valves/dampers aligned to the post-CREFAS mode, etc.) or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be suspended immediately. The first action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no undetected failures preventing system operation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected. If the system is not placed in the emergency mode of operation, this action requires suspension

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 and D.2 (continued)

of the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in order to minimize the risk of a release of radioactivity that might require the actuation of CREFS. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

E.1 and E.2

When in MODES 5 and 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies with two CREFS trains inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might enter the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

F.1

If both CREFS trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the CREFS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.11.1

Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they function properly. Since the environment and normal operating conditions on this system are not severe, testing each train once every month provides an adequate check on this system.

Monthly operations for ≥ 15 minutes to demonstrate the function of the system is required. The 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment, and the two train redundancy available.

SR 3.7.11.2

This SR verifies that the required CREFS testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The CREFS filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 3). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency,

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.11.2 (continued)

minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.7.11.3

This SR verifies each CREFS train starts and operates on an actual or simulated actuation signal. This includes verification that the system is automatically placed into a filtration mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks. The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with that specified in Reference 3.

SR 3.7.11.4

This SR verifies the integrity of the control room enclosure and the assumed inleakage rates of potentially contaminated air. The control room positive pressure, with respect to potentially contaminated adjacent areas, is periodically tested to verify proper function of the CREFS. During operation, the CREFS is designed to pressurize the control room ≥ 0.125 inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas in order to prevent unfiltered inleakage. The CREFS is designed to maintain this positive pressure with one train at a ventilation flow rate of ≤1000 cfm. The ventilation flowrate is the outside makeup air flowrate. The Frequency of 18 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is consistent with the guidance provided in NUREG-0800, Section 6.4 (Ref. 4).

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.4.
2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
3. Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Rev. 2).
4. NUREG-0800, Section 6.4, Rev. 2, July 1981.
5. UFSAR, Section 9.4.
6. UFSAR, Section 2.2

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

B.1 and B.2 (continued)

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

C.1

In MODE 5 or 6, if Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CREATCS train must be immediately placed in the emergency mode of operation (i.e., fan running, valves/dampers aligned to the post-CREATCS mode, etc.) This action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no failures preventing automatic actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

D.1 and D.2

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, if Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the Required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CREATCS train must be immediately placed in the emergency mode of operation (i.e., fan running, valves/dampers aligned to the post-CREATCS mode, etc.) or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be suspended immediately. The first action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE, that no undetected failures preventing system operation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected. If the system is not placed in the emergency mode of operation, this action requires suspension of the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in order to minimize the risk of a release of radioactivity that might require the actuation of CREATCS. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

E.1 and E.2

In MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies with two CREATCS trains inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that could result in a release of radioactivity that might require actuation of CREATCS. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. This does not preclude the movement of fuel to a safe position.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS (continued)

F.1

If both CREATCS trains are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, the CREATCS may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.12.1

This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to meet design requirements. This SR consists of a combination of testing and calculations. An 18 month Frequency is appropriate, since significant degradation of the CREATCS is slow and is not expected over this time period.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 9.4.