From: "Tesfaye, Getachew" <Getachew.Tesfaye@ccnppi.com>
To: "'rlc2@nrc.gov'" <rlc2@nrc.gov>
Date: 4/20/01 11:38AM
Subject: C-3 Phone Call Summary

Bob,
Attached is summary you requested. If you have any question, I will be here for the next couple of hours; please call me.
Getachew

> <<C32001Summary.doc>>

Mail Envelope Properties (3AE057F3.A4A : 1 : 55882)

Subject: C-3 Phone Call Summary
Creation Date: 4/20/01 11:35AM
From: "Tesfaye, Getachew" <Getachew.Tesfaye@ccnppi.com>

Created By: Getachew.Tesfaye@ccnppi.com

Recipients
nrc.gov
owf4_po.OWFN_DO
RLC2 (Robert Clark)

Post Office	Route
owf4_po.OWFN_DO	nrc.gov

Files	Size	Date & Time
MESSAGE	170	04/20/01 11:35AM
C32001Summary.doc	23552	
Header	933	

Options
Expiration Date: None
Priority: Standard
Reply Requested: No
Return Notification: None

Concealed Subject: No
Security: Standard

C3 Phone Call Questions

Attendees:

CCNPP – Pete Katz, Mike Navin, Al Thornton, John Haydin, Ed Broczkowski, Getachew Tesfaye, Joe Mate

NRC - ?

1) **Was there any primary-to-secondary leakage present in the SGs during the last cycle?**

CCNPP operated with very low primary-to-secondary leakage of approximately 0.03 gpd in the 21 Steam Generator. The leakage is probably due to a weeping tube plug. There was no detectable leakage in the 22 Steam Generator.

2) Did the inspection reveal any new degradation mechanisms?

CCNPP Unit 2 SGs did not experience any new degradation mechanisms during the 2001 inspection.

3) Did we compare the results of this outage to previous outages? Were there any differences in indications?

CCNPP does perform historical 'look-ups' on indications, especially with regards to MBMs and wear for trending purposes. During the data comparison process, no significant findings were identified between the
2001 data and previous inspections. The indications found in the 2001 inspection are consistent (size and significance) with those found in

previous inspections.

4) Discuss the new inspection results.

A table was provided to the NRC prior to the phone call that summarized, by damage mechanism, the results of the 2001 inspection. We also verbally detailed our inspection scope for the 2001 inspection on the call. Several questions were asked in regards to the scope and how we define certain regions. CCNPP defines the Low Rows as Rows 1 & 2 only. The steam blanket is defined as Rows 6 – 15 based on previous eddy current experience. We did find a small indication in Row 6 that caused us to expand to Row 5 this outage. We define special interest as all the bobbin calls that are inspected via the plus point probe. The one indication noted in the table that was plugged due to a bobbin call was a wear indication. Several tubes were plugged for geometric anomalies in the low row U-Bends. Similar indications were seen on Unit 1 and other CE utilities have also seen and plugged these geometric indications. We do not have any historical data on these locations since this is the first 100% inspection of Rows 1 & 2 on Unit 2.

5) Are there any plans to pressure test or did we perform any pressure tests?

No In-situ Testing was performed based on the fact that none of the indications met the initial in-situ screening criteria for testing.

6) What steps were taken in response to the IP-2 Tube Failure?

CCNPP expanded to a 100% plus point examination of the tubes in Rows 1 & 2. We participated in the CE Owners Group Susceptibility Study. We placed a high degree of emphasis on data quality when examining the Low Row Data. We monitored data quality with the use of 'data cops' to check the data for noise problems as it was acquired. We ran several of the low row tubes with single guide tubes to prevent noise problems with the data. We placed a high degree of emphasis on training the analysts on what happened at IP2. Specific training material was added to our Site Specific Performance Demonstration (SSPD) on the IP2 Event including actual eddy

current data. Our independent Level III Analyst or site Level II QDA was required to look at every tube in the Low Row Region.

7) Are there any additional SG Activities remaining in the outage?

No additional steam generator activities are planned for the 2001 outage. Nozzle dams are removed and manways are re-installed.