

66/51/4

9

SFP Public Meeting

A.M.

- * But analyze plans for future decision making
- * What have to do to justify assumptions.

* What have we to do to justify ourselves.

Paul Hunter - Sabotege not taken into account.

G. Herchen - ① Should the sabotage / safe guards action in the report. ② explain why not looking at low energy / high profit events

high foot events

23 June 1963

→ "Near an upper bound" - apply to one determinate input (line)

→ Consistency - measure of risk - safety goal

→ NR-1353 vs. Dayt ~~the~~ report

→ No uncertainty analysis

→ "Boil down" = feel recovery

A Madafatu

→ No difference in depression between best down + rapid loss of water.

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Timing - determined from IUEC-96-033;

[^{missing} Copy of slide]

→ met of oxidation - 800°C vs 1600°C ² fine ignition
REAL, PROBABLE Events

break

① hotbeam - ONO are known if there will be more chances to discuss afterwards.

② ignored plant worker health ③. Human performance. Had not led to problems at operating plants; why should public believe there will be all good not overnight.

hide the issues -

④ Gray # - Do we need to put in a spectrum of heat loads + not volumes in our analysis?

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M. Maisner — (0.1 per shift prob of error)

G. Holahan — What kinds of things need to be done to "reset" operator eyes.

(Conservative view)
Common sense —

Ray Shadhas — People out in industry selling selves as "lowest cost", "hire me"

GPU Nuclear —

Maine Yankee — heatup = 60% of AWS heat load.

"Maintaining Safety"
Goals

Afternoon

Industry Panel

→ "When decommission, not decrease effectiveness of ^{fire} plan"

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(4)

"Operators won't follow one strategy" Is it proceduralized? Part of Certified Fuel Handling

Ans: = ?

If in FSAK $\Rightarrow$ assignment needs to be functional.

How do we credit security rounds?

Required to take local rounds 1-2 per shift
" " " logs + have # approved
What does "required" mean?

Training - design, actions of system, exams.

Choice to do $\neq$ required

Reg Sube 1.33 - requires you to have procedures.

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(5)

Staff Concerns

1. Organizational Attentiveness/Effectiveness -

R. Barnett - Good that SROs become CFHs + organizational people continue @ plant who were part of effectively operated ~~sys~~ organizations.

Paul Gunther - enforce attentiveness by enforcement.

* "Risk addressed to a level we feel is appropriate."

R. Barnett * We will try & requantify it (PRA)

M. Mäurer - "What is acceptable risk level?"

[Priority of Concerns]

→ Merimeeche Fault in New England - New Info.

→ [BWR Decomm. T.S.]

Who is looking at that