7/15/99 (1)

SFP Public Meeting A.M.

* How to analyze plants for future decommissioning decisions
* What have to do to justify exemptions.

Paul Gunter - Sabotage not taken into account.

G. Holahan - ① Should be sabotage/safeguards section in the report. ② explain why not looking at low conseq/high prob events

Ed Burns

→ "Near an upper bound" - applies to one deterministic input (time)

→ ~~"Consistency" - measure of risk - safety goal~~

→ NR-1353 vs. Draft ~~##~~ report

→ No uncertainty analysis

→ "boil down" vs fuel uncovery

~~→ readstate~~

→ No difference in doses between boil down + rapid loss of water.

462

(2) 7/15/99

timing - deterministic + not from INEG-96-033;

[Copy of missing slide]

→ onset of oxidation - 800°C vs 1600°C fire ignition

REAL, PROBABLE Events

break

D. Lochbaum - ① No one knows if there will be more chances to discuss safeguards.

② ignored plant worker health ③ - Human performance bad mgt led to problems at operating plants; why should public believe there will be adequate mgt oversight.

~~Mike Meisner~~ -

Gary H - Do we need to put in a spectrum of heat loads + pool volumes in our analysis?

7/15/99 (3)

M. Maisner — (0.1 per shift prob of error)

G Holahan — What kinds of things need to be done to "reset" operator eyes.

(Conservative view)

Common sense —

Ray Shadhas — People out in industry selling selves as "lowest cost", hire me"

GPU Nuclear —

Maine Yankee — heatup = 60% of ANS heat load.

"Maintaining Safety" Goals — Afternoon

Industry Panel

→ "When decommission, not decrease effectiveness of fire plan"

"Operators won't follow one strategy" Is it proceduralized? Part of Certified Fuel Handling

→ Ans = ?

If in FSAR ⇒ equipment needs to be functional.

¿ How do we credit security rounds?

Required to take local rounds 1-2 per shift
" " " logs + have #s approved
What does "required" mean?

Training – design, actions of system, exams.

~~Choose to do = required~~

Reg Guide 1.33 - requires you to have procedures.

7/15/99

(5)

Staff Concerns

1. Organizational Attentiveness / Effectiveness –

R. Barnett – Good that SROs become CFHs + organizational people continue @ plant who were part of effectively operated ~~org~~ organization.

Paul Gunther – enforce attentiveness by enforcement.

* "Risk addressed to a level we feel is appropriate."

R Barnett * We will try + requantify it (PRA)

M. Masnes – "What is acceptable risk level?"

[Priority of Concerns]

→ Merimeche Fault in New England – New Info.

→ [BWR Decomm. T.S.]

Who is looking at that