

<b>TWG Issue Checklist</b>			
	Concern identified by:	Responsibility to address issue:	Location of discussion in final report:
<u>Human Reliability Analysis (NEI)</u> : HRA values do not give sufficient credit for operator actions. (Union of Concerned Scientist, 11/12/99 letter): Industry record dealing with self-revealing problems (SFP draindown) does not warrant credit.	NEI	-Gareth Parry -ITQR (INEL)	
<u>Heavy Loads</u> : Heavy load risk does not give sufficient credit for NUREG -0612 actions and uses upper bound values. NEI Proposed Phase I/II actions. TWG improved statistical methods and used new information. Risk values included in ITQR.	NEI	-Ed Thom -ITQR (INEL)	
<u>Seismic Events</u> : Seismic screening of SFP's through use of a checklist. Staff concern that NEI's proposed checklist may need some augmentation.	-NEI -Goutam	-Goutam -ITQR - (Bob Kennedy)	
<u>SFP and Concrete Aging</u> : p 463 of the July 16, 1999 Workshop transcrip, Gary Holahan said that the NRC will discuss the issue of concrete strength over time and the potential aging/degradation issue for spent fuel pools.	Peter Atherton	Goutam Bagchi	
<u>SFP/Seismic</u> : Examine transfer tube and other SFP design vulnerabilities for seismic event		Goutam Bagchi	
<u>Thermal Hydraulic Assessment</u> : (1) Maximum clad temperature is too conservative compared to the zirconium ignition temperature. (2) Time frame (window) for zirc. fire concern. (3) Adiabatic heat-up conditions (4) Time to boil-off the coolant (5) Discuss importance of end state of fuel uncoverly without zirc fire. (Union of Concerned Scientist, 11/12/00 letter)	NEI	-Joe Staudenmeier -ITQR (PNNL)	
<u>Partial Draindown of SFP</u> : The draft does not address this event or consider the implications of a partial draindown as being as serious or worse then a complete draindown.	Institute for Resource and Security Studies	Joe Staudenmeier	
<u>Exothermic Reactions</u> : The draft does not address the potential for an exothermic reaction between steam/zirconium. (Potential hydrogen explosion)	Institute for Resource and Security Studies	Joe Staudenmeier	

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<p><b>Criticality:</b> Address the potential for criticality accident to occur @ decomm. plants.</p>	<p>Member of Public</p>	<p>-Larry Kopp -ITQR (Scientech)</p>	
<p><b>Safeguards:</b> Address the potential/threat of vehicle-borne bombs.</p>	<p>Member of Public</p>	<p>Bob Skelton</p>	
<p><b>Operating Experience:</b> Maintain SFP capabilities addressed in BL 94-01 for decomm. plants.</p>		<p>Diane Jackson</p>	
<p><b>Consequences:</b> Offsite radiological consequence analysis for a severe SFP accident.</p>	<p>NRR</p>	<p>-RESEARCH</p>	
<p><b>Impact of Decommissioning on Operating Units:</b> Address the impacts on operating units of removing the water from a SFP at a decommissioning site (for example, Millstone and SONGS)</p>	<p>Rich Barrett, Sam Collins</p>		
<p><b>RG 1.174 Risk Criteria</b></p>	<p>Gary Holahan</p>	<p>Rich Barrett and Glenn Kelly</p>	
<p><b>EP:</b> What will the EP program look like for a decommissioned site with a small chance of zirc. fire (ad hoc or will some measures be maintained for a certain time period).</p>	<p>Decomm. Projects</p>		
<p><b>PRA:</b> NRC should truncate response durations from 24 to 48 hours. It is unrealistic to assume mispositioned valves/degraded cooling systems will go unnoticed for several shift changes. <b>UCS:</b> Industry track record contradicts this assertion.</p>	<p>NEI</p>	<p>Glenn Kelly</p>	