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JUN 25 1975

Dockets Nos. 50-277
and 50-278

Philadelphia Electric Company
ATTN: Mr. Edward G. Bauer, Jr., Esquire
Vice President and General Counsel
2301 Market Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendments Nos. 9 and 7 to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3. The amendments include Changes Nos. 10 and 7 to the Technical Specifications and is in response to your application dated February 28, 1975, and supplement dated May 13, 1975.

The amendments permit changes to the Technical Specifications that modify limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for installed filters in the standby gas treatment system and in the control room air treatment system.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

/S/

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Reactor Licensing

Enclosures:
1. Amendments Nos. 9 and 7
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Federal Register Notice

cc: See next page

OFFICE ➤	ORB#3	ORB#3	OELD	ORB#3	RETR	
SURNAME ➤	SATeets:amt	DJaffe	VARGA	GLear GL	PCollins	
DATE ➤	6/17/75	6/18/75	6/24/75	6/25/75	6/19/75	

Philadelphia Electric Company

cc: w/enclosures

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Philadelphia Electric Company
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Berlin, Roisman & Kessler
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Chairman, Board of Supervisors
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York, Pennsylvania 17401

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

JUN 2 5 1975

Dockets Nos. 50-277
and 50-278

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Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendments Nos. 9 and 7 to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3. The amendments include Changes Nos. 10 and 7 to the Technical Specifications and is in response to your application dated February 28, 1975, and supplement dated May 13, 1975.

The amendments permit changes to the Technical Specifications that modify limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for installed filters in the standby gas treatment system and in the control room air treatment system.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

George Lear

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Reactor Licensing

Enclosures:
1. Amendments Nos. 9 and 7
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-277

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 9
License No. DPR-44

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Philadelphia Electric Company, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company, and Atlantic City Electric Company (the licensees) dated February 28, 1975 and supplement dated May 13, 1975, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by a change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.(C).2 of Facility License No. DPR-44 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications, as revised by issued changes thereto through Change No. 10."

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

George Lear

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Reactor Licensing

Attachment:
Change No. 10
Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: JUN 2 5 1975

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 9

CHANGE NO. 10 TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR- 44

DOCKET NO. 50- 277

Replace pages 175, 176, 196, 197, 198, 233, 234, 235, 236, and 236a, with the attached revised pages. (No changes made on pages 176 and 234).

Add the following new pages:

175a

233a, and

235a

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.7.B. Standby Gas Treatment System	4.7.B. Standby Gas Treatment System
1. Except as specified in 3.7.B.3 below, both filter trains of the standby gas treatment system and at least two system fans shall be operable at all times when secondary containment integrity is required.	1. At least once per operating cycle, the following conditions shall be demonstrated. a. Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 8 inches of water at approximately 8,000 CFM b. Inlet heater is capable of providing at least 40 KW.
2. a. The results of the in-place cold DOP and halogenated hydrocarbon tests at approximately 8,000 CFM on HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks shall show $\geq$99% DOP removal and $\geq$99% halogenated hydrocarbon removal or that filter train shall not be considered operable.	2. a. The tests and sample analysis of Specification 3.7.B.2 shall be performed initially and at least once per year for standby service; or after every 720 hours of filter train operation; or following significant painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system when it is in operation.
b. The results of laboratory carbon sample analysis shall show $\geq$95% radioactive methyl iodide removal at a velocity within 20% of system design, 0.5 to 1.5 mg/m^3 inlet methyl iodide concentration, $\geq$70% relative humidity and $\geq$190°F or that filter train shall be considered inoperable.	b. Cold DOP testing shall be performed after each complete or partial replacement of the HEPA filter bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing. 10
c. If gas flow capability of 8,000 CFM + 800 CFM can not be provided to a filter train by the fans, that filter train shall not be considered operable.	c. Halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant testing shall be performed after each complete or partial replacement of the charcoal adsorber bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing. d. Testing of gasket seals for housing doors downsteam of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers shall be performed at and in conformance with each test performed for compliance with Specification 4.7.B.2.a.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
	e. A dry gas purge shall be provided to the filters to insure that the relative humidity in the filter systems does not exceed 70% during idle periods.
3. From and after the date that one filter train and/or two fans of the standby gas treatment system is made or found to be inoperable, reactor operation or fuel handling is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days, unless such filter train or fans are sooner made operable, provided that during such 7 days all active components of one standby gas treatment system train shall be operable.	3. a. At least once per operating cycle automatic initiation of each filter train of the standb gas treatment system shall be demonstrated. b. When one filter train of the standby gas treatment system becomes inoperable the other filter train and one fan shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter, except that the filter and charcoal tests as described in 3.7.B.2.a and 3.7.B.2.b are not required.
4. If Specifications 3.7.B.1 and 3.7.B.3 are not met, both units shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours and fuel handling operations shall be prohibited.	10

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.7.C Secondary Containment	4.7.C Secondary Containment
1. Secondary containment integrity shall be maintained during all modes of plant operation except when all of the following conditions are met.	1. Secondary containment surveillance shall be performed as indicated below:
a. The reactor is subcritical and Specification 3.3.A is met.	a. A preoperational secondary containment capability test shall be conducted after isolating the reactor building and placing either standby gas treatment system filter train in operation. Such tests shall demonstrate the capability to maintain 1/4 inch of water vacuum under calm wind (< 5 mph) conditions with a filter train flow rate of not more than 10,500 cfm.
b. The reactor water temperature is below 212°F and the reactor coolant system is vented.	b. Additional tests shall be performed during the first operating cycle under an adequate number of different environmental wind conditions to enable valid extrapolation of the test results.
c. No activity is being performed which can reduce the shutdown margin below that specified in Specification 3.3.A.	c. Secondary containment capability to maintain 1/4 inch of water vacuum under calm wind (< 5 mph) conditions with a filter train flow rate of not more than 10,500 cfm, shall be demonstrated at each refueling outage prior to refueling.
d. The fuel cask or irradiated fuel is not being moved in the reactor building.	d. After a secondary containment violation is determined, the standby gas treatment system will be operated immediately after the affected zones are isolated from the remainder of the secondary containment to confirm its ability to maintain the remainder of the secondary containment at 1/4 inch of water negative pressure under calm wind conditions.
2. If Specification 3.7.C.1 cannot be met, procedures shall be initiated to establish conditions listed in Specification 3.7.C.1a through d.	

Standby Gas Treatment System and Secondary Containment

The secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive materials which might result from a serious accident. The reactor building provides secondary containment during reactor operation, when the drywell is sealed and in service; the reactor building provides primary containment when the reactor is shutdown and the drywell is open, as during refueling. Because the secondary containment is an integral part of the complete containment system, secondary containment is required at all times that primary containment is required as well as during refueling.

The standby gas treatment system is designed to service either or both secondary and primary containments. It consists of two parallel, redundant filter trains (HEPA Filters and Charcoal Filters in Series) which exhaust to a common duct served by three full capacity fans. The system is designed to filter and exhaust either or both reactor building atmospheres to the stack during secondary containment isolation conditions, with a minimum release of radioactive materials from the reactor buildings to the environs. The standby gas treatment fans are designed to automatically start upon containment isolation of either unit and maintain the reactor building pressure at approximately a negative 1/4 inch water gauge pressure; all leakage should be in-leakage. Should a fan fail to start, the redundant common fan is designed to start automatically. When one standby treatment filter train is inoperable weekly testing of the other filter train substantiates the availability of an operable filter train and results in no added risk; thus reactor operation or refueling operations can continue. A period of 7 days is allowed before requiring plant shutdown to provide sufficient repair time because there is no immediate threat to the containment system performance. During the repair period, the daily testing of the operable train is sufficiently frequent to insure its availability without increasing its risk of failure due to increased operational testing. If neither filter train is operable, the plant is brought to a condition where the system is not required. 10

High efficiency particulate absolute (HEPA) filters are installed before and after the charcoal adsorbers to minimize potential release of particulates to the environment and to prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential release of radioiodine to the environment. The in-place test results should indicate a system leak tightness of less than 1 percent bypass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers and a HEPA efficiency of at least 99 percent removal of DOP particulates. The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiencies of at least 95 percent for expected accident conditions. If the efficiencies of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are as specified, the resulting doses will be less than the 10 CFR 100 guidelines for the accidents analyzed.

The analysis of the loss-of-coolant accident assumed a charcoal filter efficiency of 90%, and TID 14844 fission product source term. Hence, requiring 99% effeciency for both the charcoal and particulate filters provides adequate margin. A 40 KW heater maintains relative humidity below 70% in order to assure the efficient removal of methyl iodine on the impregnated charcoal filters.

4.7.B & 4.7.C BASES

Standby Gas Treatment System and Secondary Containment

Initiating reactor building isolation and operation of the standby gas treatment system to maintain at least a 1/4 inch of water vacuum within the secondary containment provides an adequate test of the operation of the reactor building isolation valves, leak tightness of the reactor building and performance of the standby gas treatment system. Functionally testing the initiating sensors and associated trip channels demonstrates the capability for automatic actuation. Periodic testing gives sufficient confidence of reactor building integrity and standby gas treatment system performance capability.

The test frequencies are adequate to detect equipment deterioration prior to significant defects, but the tests are not frequent enough to load the filters, thus reducing their reserve capacity too quickly. That the testing frequency is adequate to detect deterioration was demonstrated by the tests which showed no loss of filter efficiency after 2 years of operation in the rugged shipboard environment on the NS Savannah (ORNL 3726). Pressure drop tests across filter sections are performed to detect gross plugging or leak paths through the filter media. Considering the relatively short time that the fans may be run for test purposes, plugging is unlikely, and the test interval of once per operating cycle is reasonable.

Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than 8 inches of water at approximately 8,000 CFM will indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter. Heater capability and pressure drop are determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance capability is sufficiently frequent. HEPA filters are designed for 10 inches of water, therefore, 8 inches across the entire train is sufficiently conservative. 10

HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers tested at the specified frequency is sufficient to show that these components can perform as evaluated. If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the system shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified according to Regulatory Guide 1.52. Any HEPA filters found defective shall be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to Regulatory Position C.3.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Iodine removal tests should follow RDT Standard M-16-1T.

The in-place testing of charcoal filters is performed using a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant gas, which is injected into the system upstream of the charcoal filters. Measurements of the gas concentration upstream and downstream of the charcoal filters are made. The ratio of the inlet and outlet concentrations gives an overall indication of the leak tightness of the system. Although this is basically a leak test, since the filters have charcoal of known efficiency and holding capacity for elemental iodine and methyl iodine, the test also gives an indication of the relative efficiency of the installed system.

Measuring the heater capacity at a frequency of once per operating cycle is sufficient to insure adequate heat input to insure relative humidities at or below 70%. Considering the simplicity of the heating circuit a duct heater test frequency of once during each operating cycle is sufficient.

With doors closed and a fan in operation, DOP aerosol is sprayed externally along the full linear periphery of each respective door to check the gasket seal. Detection of DOP in the fan exhaust is considered an unacceptable test result and the gaskets are repaired and the test repeated.

4.7.B & 4.7.C BASES (Cont'd)

The HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign material. Conducting the same tests and sample analysis as required for operational use after significant exposure as determined by the supervisor on duty is considered prudent to insure operability of the components. 10

Demonstration of the automatic initiation capability assures system performance capability. When one standby gas treatment system train is inoperable, the weekly testing of the other system filter train is considered more than adequate to insure availability of a viable system. This substantiates the availability of the operable filter train and thus permits reactor operation or refueling operation to continue for a limited period of time sufficient to permit repair.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.11.A. Additional Safety Related Plant Capabilities	4.11.A Additional Safety Related Plant Capabilities
A. Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation System	A. Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation System
1. Except as specified in Specification 3.11.A.3 below, the control room emergency ventilation system shall be operable at all times when secondary containment integrity is required.	1. At least once per operating cycle, the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks shall be demonstrated to be less than 8 inches of water at system design flow rate.
2. a. The results of the in-place cold DOP and halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant tests at approximately 3,000 CFM on HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber filter trains shall show $\geq$99% DOP removal and $\geq$99% halogenated hydrocarbon removal or that filter train shall not be considered operable.	2. a. The tests and sample analysis of Specification 3.11.A.2 shall be performed initially and at least once per year for standby service; or after every 720 hours of system operation; or following significant painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system while it is in operation. 10
b. The results of laboratory carbon sample analysis shall show 90% radioactive methyl iodide removal at a velocity within 20% of system design, 0.05 to 0.15 mg/m^3 inlet methyl iodide concentration, $\geq$95% relative humidity and $\geq$125°F, or that filter train shall not be considered operable.	b. Cold DOP testing shall be performed after each complete or partial replacement of the HEPA filter train or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.
c. Fans shall be shown to operate at approximately 3,000 CFM + 300 CFM (design flow for the filter train).	c. Halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant testing shall be performed after each complete or partial replacement of the charcoal adsorber filters or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.
	d. A dry gas purge shall be provided to the filters to insure that the relative humidity in the filter systems does not exceed 70% during idle periods.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.	3. At least once per operating cycle automatic initiation of the control room air treatment system shall be demonstrated.
3. a. Neither reactor shall have a coolant temperature greater than 212°F unless both of the control room emergency ventilation air supply fans and fresh air filter trains are available for normal operation except that one emergency ventilation air supply fan and filter may be out of service for 7 days.	
4. If Specifications 3.11.A.1 and 3.11.A.3 can not be met, reactor shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours for reactor operations and fuel handling operations shall be terminated immediately.	4. Operability of the main control room air intake radiation monitors shall be tested every 3 months. 10
5. At least 1 of the 2 main control room intake air radiation monitors shall be operable with the inoperable channel failed safe whenever the control room emergency ventilation air supply fans and filter trains are required to be operable by 3.11.A.3 or filtration of the control room ventilation intake air must be initiated.	

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.11.A (Cont'd.)	4.11.A (Cont'd.)
	d. A sample of the charcoal filter shall be analyzed once per year to assure halogen removal efficiency of at least 99.5 percent.
2. At least 1 of the 2 main control room intake air radiation monitors shall be operable with the inoperable channel failed safe whenever the control room emergency ventilation air supply fans and filter trains are required to be operable by 3.11.A.1 or filtration of the control room ventilation intake air must be initiated.	2. Operability of the main control room air intake radiation monitors shall be tested every 3 months.
B. Alternate Heat Sink Facility	B. Alternate Heat Sink Facility
The level in the emergency reservoir of the Alternate Heat Sink Facility shall not be less than 17'. Should the level drop below this point action shall be taken to restore the level to above the minimum, within 7 days.	1. The level in the emergency reservoir of the Alternate Heat Sink Facility shall be checked once per month.
	2. Once a year the portable fire pump which is used to provide makeup water to the emergency reservoir will be checked for operability and availability.
C. Emergency Shutdown Control Panel	C. Emergency Shutdown Control Panel
1. At all times when not in use or being maintained, the emergency shutdown control panels shall be secured.	1. The emergency shutdown control panels shall be visually checked once per week to verify they are secured.
	2. Operability of the switches on the emergency shutdown control panels shall be tested by electrical check once per refueling outage.

3.11 BASES

A. Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation System

The control room air treatment system is designed to filter the control room atmosphere for intake air during control room isolation conditions. The control room air treatment system is designed to automatically start upon control room isolation and to maintain the control room at a positive pressure so that all leakage should be out leakage.

High efficiency particulate absolute (HEPA) filters are installed before the charcoal adsorbers to prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential intake of radioiodine to the control room. The in-place test results should indicate a system leak tightness of less than 1 percent bypass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers and a HEPA efficiency of at least 99 percent removal of DOP particulates. The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 90 percent for expected accident conditions. If the efficiencies of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are as specified, the resulting doses will be less than the allowable levels stated in Criterion 19 of the General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. 10

One main control room emergency ventilation air supply fan provides adequate ventilation flow under accident conditions. Should one emergency ventilation air supply fan and/or fresh air filter train be out of service during reactor operation, the allowable repair time of 7 days is justified.

At least one channel (detector) in the Control Room Ventilation Intake Radiation Monitoring System for indication-alarm of radioactive air being drawn into the main control room is considered adequate. Main control room intake air filtration is initiated when a trip signal from the detectors is given via failure or isolate signals from both channels or a failure signal in one channel and an isolate signal in the other channel.

3.11 BASES

B. Alternate Heat Sink

The alternate heat sink is provided as an alternate source of cooling water to the plants in the unlikely event of loss of the normal heat sink (Conowingo Pond) or the maximum credible flood. For the condition of loss of the normal heat sink, the contained volume of water (approximately 3.7 million gallons, which corresponds to a gauge reading of 17') provides a minimum of seven days cooling water to both plants for decay heat removal. The operability requirements for the alternate heat sink are specified in Specification 3.9. 10

C. Emergency Shutdown Control Panels

The Emergency Shutdown Control Panels are provided to assure the capability of taking the plants to the hot shutdown condition external to the control room for the unlikely condition that the control room becomes uninhabitable.

4.11 BASES

A. Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation System

Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than 8 inches of water at the system design flow rate will indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter. Pressure drop determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance capability is adequate. HEPA filters are designed for 10 inches of water, therefore, 8 inches across the entire train is sufficiently conservative.

The frequency of tests and sample analysis are sufficient to show that the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. Iodine removal efficiency tests should follow RDT Standard M-16-1T. If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the system shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified according to Regulatory Guide 1.52. Any HEPA filters found defective shall be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to Regulatory Position C.3.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52. The in-place testing of charcoal filters is performed using a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant gas which is injected into the system upstream of the charcoal filters. Measurements of the gas concentration upstream and downstream of the charcoal filters are made. The ratio of the inlet and outlet concentrations gives an overall indication of the leak tightness of the system. Although this is basically a leak test, since the filters have charcoal of known efficiency and holding capacity for elemental iodine and methyl iodine the test also gives an indication of the relative efficiency of the installed system. 10

The HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign material. Conducting the same tests and sample analysis as required for operational use after significant exposure as determined by the supervisor on duty is considered prudent to insure operability of the components.

Demonstration of the automatic initiation capability enhances radiation protection to the control room personnel by insuring prompt initiation.

4.11 BASES

B. Alternate Heat Sink Facility

No surveillance requirement other than a monthly level check is expressed for the alternate heat sink since the associated equipment surveillance testing is conducted as required by Specification 3.9.

C. Emergency Shutdown Control Panels 10

Once per week verification of the panels being properly secured is considered adequate. The associated equipment is proven operable during surveillance testing of that equipment. An operability verification by electrical test at each refueling outage is adequate to assure that the panels are available and can perform their design function.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-278

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNIT 3

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 7
License No. DPR-56

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Philadelphia Electric Company, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company, and Atlantic City Electric Company (the licensees) dated February 28, 1975 and supplement dated May 13, 1975, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by a change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.(C).2 of Facility License No. DPR-56 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications, as revised by issued changes thereto through Change No. 7."

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

George Lear

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Reactor Licensing

Attachment:
Change No. 7
Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: JUN 2 5 1975

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 7

CHANGE NO. 7 TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-56

DOCKET NO. 50-278

Replace pages 175, 176, 196, 197, 198, 233, 234, 235, 236, and 236a, with the attached revised pages. (No changes made on pages 176 and 234).

Add the following new pages:

175a

233a, and

235a

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.7.B. Standby Gas Treatment System	4.7.B. Standby Gas Treatment System
1. Except as specified in 3.7.B.3 below, both filter trains of the standby gas treatment system and at least two system fans shall be operable at all times when secondary containment integrity is required.	1. At least once per operating cycle, the following conditions shall be demonstrated. a. Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks is less than 8 inches of water at approximately 8,000 CFM b. Inlet heater is capable of providing at least 40 KW.
2. a. The results of the in-place cold DOP and halogenated hydrocarbon tests at approximately 8,000 CFM on HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks shall show $\geq$99% DOP removal and $\geq$99% halogenated hydrocarbon removal or that filter train shall not be considered operable.	2. a. The tests and sample analysis of Specification 3.7.B.2 shall be performed initially and at least once per year for standby service; or after every 720 hours of filter train operation; or following significant painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system when it is in operation.
b. The results of laboratory carbon sample analysis shall show $\geq$95% radioactive methyl iodide removal at a velocity within 20% of system design, 0.5 to 1.5 mg/m^3 inlet methyl iodide concentration, $\geq$70% relative humidity and $\geq$190°F or that filter train shall be considered inoperable.	b. Cold DOP testing shall be performed after each complete or partial replacement of the HEPA filter bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.
c. If gas flow capability of 8,000 CFM + 800 CFM can not be provided to a filter train by the fans, that filter train shall not be considered operable.	c. Halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant testing shall be performe after each complete or partial replacement of the charcoal adsorber bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.
	d. Testing of gasket seals for housing doors downsteam of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers shall be performed at and in conformance with each test performed for compliance with Specification 4.7.B.2.a.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
	e. A dry gas purge shall be provided to the filters to insure that the relative humidity in the filter systems does not exceed 70% during idle periods.
3. From and after the date that one filter train and/or two fans of the standby gas treatment system is made or found to be inoperable, reactor operation or fuel handling is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days, unless such filter train or fans are sooner made operable, provided that during such 7 days all active components of one standby gas treatment system trains shall be operable.	3. a. At least once per operating cycle automatic initiation of each filter train of the standb gas treatment system shall be demonstrated. b. When one filter train of the standby gas treatment system becomes inoperable the other filter train and one fan shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter, except that the filter and charcoal tests as described in 3.7.B.2.a and 3.7.B.2.b are not required.
4. If Specifications 3.7.B.1 and 3.7.B.3 are not met, both units shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours and fuel handling operations shall be prohibited.	7

LIMITING CONDITIONS OR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.7.C Secondary Containment	4.7.C Secondary Containment
1. Secondary containment integrity shall be maintained during all modes of plant operation except when all of the following conditions are met.	1. Secondary containment surveillance shall be performed as indicated below:
a. The reactor is subcritical and Specification 3.3.A is met.	a. A preoperational secondary containment capability test shall be conducted after isolating the reactor building and placing either standby gas treatment system filter train in operation. Such tests shall demonstrate the capability to maintain 1/4 inch of water vacuum under calm wind (< 5 mph) conditions with a filter train flow rate of not more than 10,500 cfm.
b. The reactor water temperature is below 212°F and the reactor coolant system is vented.	b. Additional tests shall be performed during the first operating cycle under an adequate number of different environmental wind conditions to enable valid extrapolation of the test results.
c. No activity is being performed which can reduce the shutdown margin below that specified in Specification 3.3.A.	c. Secondary containment capability to maintain 1/4 inch of water vacuum under calm wind (< 5 mph) conditions with a filter train flow rate of not more than 10,500 cfm, shall be demonstrated at each refueling outage prior to refueling.
d. The fuel cask or irradiated fuel is not being moved in the reactor building.	d. After a secondary containment violation is determined, the standby gas treatment system will be operated immediately after the affected zones are isolated from the remainder of the secondary containment to confirm its ability to maintain the remainder of the secondary containment at 1/4 inch of water negative pressure under calm wind conditions.
2. If Specification 3.7.C.1 cannot be met, procedures shall be initiated to establish conditions listed in Specification 3.7.C.1a through d.	

3.7.B & 3.7.C BASES

Standby Gas Treatment System and Secondary Containment

The secondary containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive materials which might result from a serious accident. The reactor building provides secondary containment during reactor operation, when the drywell is sealed and in service; the reactor building provides primary containment when the reactor is shutdown and the drywell is open, as during refueling. Because the secondary containment is an integral part of the complete containment system, secondary containment is required at all times that primary containment is required as well as during refueling.

The standby gas treatment system is designed to service either or both secondary and primary containments. It consists of two parallel, redundant filter trains (HEPA Filters and Charcoal Filters in Series) which exhaust to a common duct served by three full capacity fans. The system is designed to filter and exhaust either or both reactor building atmospheres to the stack during secondary containment isolation conditions, with a minimum release of radioactive materials from the reactor buildings to the environs. The standby gas treatment fans are designed to automatically start upon containment isolation of either unit and maintain the reactor building pressure at approximately a negative 1/4 inch water gauge pressure; all leakage should be in-leakage. Should a fan fail to start, the redundant common fan is designed to start automatically. When one standby treatment filter train is inoperable weekly testing of the other filter train substantiates the availability of an operable filter train and results in no added risk; thus reactor operation or refueling operations can continue. A period of 7 days is allowed before requiring plant shutdown to provide sufficient repair time because there is no immediate threat to the containment system performance. During the repair period, the daily testing of the operable train is sufficiently frequent to insure its availability without increasing its risk of failure due to increased operational testing. If neither filter train is operable, the plant is brought to a condition where the system is not required. 7

High efficiency particulate absolute (HEPA) filters are installed before and after the charcoal adsorbers to minimize potential release of particulates to the environment and to prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential release of radioiodine to the environment. The in-place test results should indicate a system leak tightness of less than 1 percent bypass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers and a HEPA efficiency of at least 99 percent removal of DOP particulates. The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiencies of at least 95 percent for expected accident conditions. If the efficiencies of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are as specified, the resulting doses will be less than the 10 CFR 100 guidelines for the accidents analyzed.

The analysis of the loss-of-coolant accident assumed a charcoal filter efficiency of 90%, and TID 14844 fission product source term. Hence, requiring 99% effeciency for both the charcoal and particulate filters provides adequate margin. A 40 KW heater maintains relative humidity below 70% in order to assure the efficient removal of methyl iodine on the impregnated charcoal filters.

4.7.B & 4.7.C BASES

Standby Gas Treatment System and Secondary Containment

Initiating reactor building isolation and operation of the standby gas treatment system to maintain at least a 1/4 inch of water vacuum within the secondary containment provides an adequate test of the operation of the reactor building isolation valves, leak tightness of the reactor building and performance of the standby gas treatment system. Functionally testing the initiating sensors and associated trip channels demonstrates the capability for automatic actuation. Periodic testing gives sufficient confidence of reactor building integrity and standby gas treatment system performance capability.

The test frequencies are adequate to detect equipment deterioration prior to significant defects, but the tests are not frequent enough to load the filters, thus reducing their reserve capacity too quickly. That the testing frequency is adequate to detect deterioration was demonstrated by the tests which showed no loss of filter efficiency after 2 years of operation in the rugged shipboard environment on the NS Savannah (ORNL 3726). Pressure drop tests across filter sections are performed to detect gross plugging or leak paths through the filter media. Considering the relatively short time that the fans may be run for test purposes, plugging is unlikely, and the test interval of once per operating cycle is reasonable.

Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than 8 inches of water at approximately 8,000 CFM will indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter. Heater capability and pressure drop are determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance capability is sufficiently frequent. HEPA filters are designed for 10 inches of water, therefore, 8 inches across the entire train is sufficiently conservative. 7

HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers tested at the specified frequency is sufficient to show that these components can perform as evaluated. If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the system shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified according to Regulatory Guide 1.52. Any HEPA filters found defective shall be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to Regulatory Position C.3.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Iodine removal tests should follow RDT Standard M-16-1T.

The in-place testing of charcoal filters is performed using a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant gas, which is injected into the system upstream of the charcoal filters. Measurements of the gas concentration upstream and downstream of the charcoal filters are made. The ratio of the inlet and outlet concentrations gives an overall indication of the leak tightness of the system. Although this is basically a leak test, since the filters have charcoal of known efficiency and holding capacity for elemental iodine and methyl iodine, the test also gives an indication of the relative efficiency of the installed system.

Measuring the heater capacity at a frequency of once per operating cycle is sufficient to insure adequate heat input to insure relative humidities at or below 70%. Considering the simplicity of the heating circuit a duct heater test frequency of once during each operating cycle is sufficient.

With doors closed and a fan in operation, DOP aerosol is sprayed externally along the full linear periphery of each respective door to check the gasket seal. Detection of DOP in the fan exhaust is considered an unacceptable test result and the gaskets are repaired and the test repeated.

4.7.B & 4.7.C BASES (Cont'd)

The HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign material. Conducting the same tests and sample analysis as required for operational use after significant exposure as determined by the supervisor on duty is considered prudent to insure operability of the components.

Demonstration of the automatic initiation capability assures system performance capability. When one standby gas treatment system train is inoperable, the weekly testing of the other system filter train is considered more than adequate to insure availability of a viable system. This substantiates the availability of the operable filter train and thus permits reactor operation or refueling operation to continue for a limited period of time sufficient to permit repair. 7

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR C ATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.11.A. Additional Safety Related Plant Capabilities	4.11.A Additional Safety Related Plant Capabilities
A. Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation System	A. Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation System
1. Except as specified in Specification 3.11.A.3 below, the control room emergency ventilation system shall be operable at all times when secondary containment integrity is required.	1. At least once per operating cycle, the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks shall be demonstrated to be less than 8 inches of water at system design flow rate.
2. a. The results of the in-place cold DOP and halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant tests at approximately 3,000 CFM on HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber filter trains shall show $\geq$99% DOP removal and $\geq$99% halogenated hydrocarbon removal or that filter train shall not be considered operable.	2. a. The tests and sample analysis of Specification 3.11.A.2 shall be performed initially and at least once per year for standby service; or after every 720 hours of system operation; or following significant painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system while it is in operation. 7
b. The results of laboratory carbon sample analysis shall show 90% radioactive methyl iodide removal at a velocity within 20% of system design, 0.05 to 0.15 mg/m^3 inlet methyl iodide concentration, $\geq$95% relative humidity and $\geq$125°F, or that filter train shall not be considered operable.	b. Cold DOP testing shall be performed after each complete or partial replacement of the HEPA filter train or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.
c. Fans shall be shown to operate at approximately 3,000 CFM $\pm$ 300 CFM (design flow for the filter train).	c. Halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant testing shall be performed after each complete or partial replacement of the charcoal adsorber filters or after any structural maintenance on the system housing.
	d. A dry gas purge shall be provided to the filters to insure that the relative humidity in the filter systems does not exceed 70% during idle periods.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.	3. At least once per operating cycle automatic initiation of the control room air treatment system shall be demonstrated.
3. a. Neither reactor shall have a coolant temperature greater than 212°F unless both of the control room emergency ventilation air supply fans and fresh air filter trains are available for normal operation except that one emergency ventilation air supply fan and filter may be out of service for 7 days.	
4. If Specifications 3.11.A.1 and 3.11.A.3 can not be met, reactor shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within 24 hours for reactor operations and fuel handling operations shall be terminated immediately.	4. Operability of the main control room air intake radiation monitors shall be tested every 3 months.
5. At least 1 of the 2 main control room intake air radiation monitors shall be operable with the inoperable channel failed safe whenever the control room emergency ventilation air supply fans and filter trains are required to be operable by 3.11.A.3 or filtration of the control room ventilation intake air must be initiated.	

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
3.11.A (Cont'd.)	4.11.A (Cont'd.)
	d. A sample of the charcoal filter shall be analyzed once per year to assure halogen removal efficiency of at least 99.5 percent.
2. At least 1 of the 2 main control room intake air radiation monitors shall be operable with the inoperable channel failed safe whenever the control room emergency ventilation air supply fans and filter trains are required to be operable by 3.11.A.1 or filtration of the control room ventilation intake air must be initiated.	2. Operability of the main control room air intake radiation monitors shall be tested every 3 months.
B. Alternate Heat Sink Facility	B. Alternate Heat Sink Facility
The level in the emergency reservoir of the Alternate Heat Sink Facility shall not be less than 17'. Should the level drop below this point action shall be taken to restore the level to above the minimum, within 7 days.	1. The level in the emergency reservoir of the Alternate Heat Sink Facility shall be checked once per month.
	2. Once a year the portable fire pump which is used to provide makeup water to the emergency reservoir will be checked for operability and availability.
C. Emergency Shutdown Control Panel	C. Emergency Shutdown Control Panel
1. At all times when not in use or being maintained, the emergency shutdown control panels shall be secured.	1. The emergency shutdown control panels shall be visually checked once per week to verify they are secured.
	2. Operability of the switches on the emergency shutdown control panels shall be tested by electrical check once per refueling outage.

3.11 BASES

A. Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation System

The control room air treatment system is designed to filter the control room atmosphere for intake air during control room isolation conditions. The control room air treatment system is designed to automatically start upon control room isolation and to maintain the control room at a positive pressure so that all leakage should be out leakage.

High efficiency particulate absolute (HEPA) filters are installed before the charcoal adsorbers to prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential intake of radioiodine to the control room. The in-place test results should indicate a system leak tightness of less than 1 percent bypass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers and a HEPA efficiency of at least 99 percent removal of DOP particulates. The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 90 percent for expected accident conditions. If the efficiencies of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers are as specified, the resulting doses will be less than the allowable levels stated in Criterion 19 of the General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. 7

One main control room emergency ventilation air supply fan provides adequate ventilation flow under accident conditions. Should one emergency ventilation air supply fan and/or fresh air filter train be out of service during reactor operation, the allowable repair time of 7 days is justified.

At least one channel (detector) in the Control Room Ventilation Intake Radiation Monitoring System for indication-alarm of radioactive air being drawn into the main control room is considered adequate. Main control room intake air filtration is initiated when a trip signal from the detectors is given via failure or isolate signals from both channels or a failure signal in one channel and an isolate signal in the other channel.

3.11 BASES

B. Alternate Heat Sink

The alternate heat sink is provided as an alternate source of cooling water to the plants in the unlikely event of loss of the normal heat sink (Conowingo Pond) or the maximum credible flood. For the condition of loss of the normal heat sink, the contained volume of water (approximately 3.7 million gallons, which corresponds to a gauge reading of 17') provides a minimum of seven days cooling water to both plants for decay heat removal. The operability requirements for the alternate heat sink are specified in Specification 3.9.

C. Emergency Shutdown Control Panels

The Emergency Shutdown Control Panels are provided to assure the capability of taking the plants to the hot shutdown condition external to the control room for the unlikely condition that the control room becomes uninhabitable.

4.11 BASES

A. Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation System

Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than 8 inches of water at the system design flow rate will indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter. Pressure drop determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance capability is adequate. HEPA filters are designed for 10 inches of water, therefore, 8 inches across the entire train is sufficiently conservative.

The frequency of tests and sample analysis are sufficient to show that the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. Iodine removal efficiency tests should follow RDT Standard M-16-1T. If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the system shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified according to Regulatory Guide 1.52. Any HEPA filters found defective shall be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to Regulatory Position C.3.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52. The in-place testing of charcoal filters is performed using a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant gas which is injected into the system upstream of the charcoal filters. Measurements of the gas concentration upstream and downstream of the charcoal filters are made. The ratio of the inlet and outlet concentrations gives an overall indication of the leak tightness of the system. Although this is basically a leak test, since the filters have charcoal of known efficiency and holding capacity for elemental iodine and methyl iodine the test also gives an indication of the relative efficiency of the installed system. 7

The HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals or foreign material. Conducting the same tests and sample analysis as required for operational use after significant exposure as determined by the supervisor on duty is considered prudent to insure operability of the components.

Demonstration of the automatic initiation capability enhances radiation protection to the control room personnel by insuring prompt initiation.

4.11 BASES

B. Alternate Heat Sink Facility

No surveillance requirement other than a monthly level check is expressed for the alternate heat sink since the associated equipment surveillance testing is conducted as required by Specification 3.9.

C. Emergency Shutdown Control Panels

Once per week verification of the panels being properly secured is considered adequate. The associated equipment is proven operable during surveillance testing of that equipment. An operability verification by electrical test at each refueling outage is adequate to assure that the panels are available and can perform their design function.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENTS NOS. 9 AND 7 TO LICENSES NOS. DPR-44 AND DPR-56

(CHANGES NOS. 10 AND 7 TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS)

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 AND 3

DOCKETS NOS. 50-277 AND 50-278

Introduction

On February 28, 1975, Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO) submitted applications for license amendments which proposed to incorporate changes to the Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 Technical Specifications (Appendix A to the license). The amendments would modify limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for installed filters in the standby gas treatment system and in the control room air treatment system. This submittal was in response to our request dated December 10, 1974. Based on discussions with us, PECO modified their original submittal by letter dated May 13, 1975.

Discussion

1. Standby Gas Treatment System

The standby gas treatment system (SGTS) provides a means for minimizing the release of radioactive material from the containment to the environs by first filtering and then exhausting the atmosphere from the reactor building. Primary containment and vent exhaust can also be directed to the SGTS for processing prior to release. Exhaust from the SGTS is discharged through the main offgas stack.

The SGTS consists of two identical, parallel air filtration trains. Each train has the capacity to clean up the reactor building atmosphere upon containment isolation and consists of a demister (moisture separator), electrical heating coil, prefilter, high efficiency particulate absorber

(HEPA) filter, charcoal filter, and HEPA filter. Three exhaust 100% capacity fans (two active and one standby) are provided for both filter trains.

The changes to the Technical Specifications proposed by PECO would provide additional limiting conditions for operation. The filters and fans of the SGTS are to undergo specific tests to assure their operating efficiency. The associated surveillance requirements provide the test intervals.

2. Control Room Air Treatment System

Intake air radiation monitors will isolate the normal control room ventilation path on sensing a high radiation level and will connect the intake to high efficiency filter trains. Two high-efficiency filter trains are provided in parallel with the normal outside air inlet duct. Each filter train consists of inlet and outlet isolation dampers, prefilter, high-efficiency particulate absorber (HEPA), charcoal filter, and final HEPA filter. Heating coils are provided upstream of the filter trains. Two 100% capacity exhaust fans are located down-stream of the filter trains.

The changes to the Technical Specifications proposed by PECO would provide additional limiting conditions for operation. The filter trains of the control room air treatment system are to undergo specific tests to assure their operating efficiency. The associated surveillance requirements provide the test intervals.

Evaluation

The Technical Specifications for installed filter systems as proposed by PECO are quite similar to those that we developed and transmitted to PECO in our letter of December 10, 1974. The changed Technical Specification requirements will further assure that the SGTS filter system will effectively reduce radioactive releases and will further assure that the releases during postulated accident conditions will not exceed the limits of 10 CFR Part 100. In the case of the control room air treatment system, the changed Technical Specifications will further assure that the filter trains will effectively reduce radioactive concentrations in the ventilation intake to the control room during accident conditions and will further assure that the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 are satisfied.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: JUN 2 5 1975

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKETS NOS. 50-277 AND 50-278

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY

DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Notice is hereby given that the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendments Nos. 9 and 7 to Facility Operating Licenses Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 issued to Philadelphia Electric Company, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company, and Atlantic City Electric Company which revised Technical Specifications for operation of Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3, located in York County, Pennsylvania. The amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

The amendment permits changes to the Technical Specifications that would modify limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for installed filters in the standby gas treatment system and in the control room air treatment system.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendments. Prior public notice of these amendments is not required since the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration.

For further details with respect to these actions, see (1) the application for amendment dated February 28, 1975 and supplement dated May 13, 1975, (2) Amendments Nos. 9 and 7 to Licenses Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56, with Changes Nos. 10 and 7, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W. Washington, D. C. and at the Martin Memorial Library, 159 E. Market Street, York, Pennsylvania 17401.

A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Reactor Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 25th day of June, 1975.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

George Lear

George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Reactor Licensing