



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER  
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931

April 30, 2001

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.  
ATTN: Mr. J. B. Beasley, Jr., Vice President  
P. O. Box 1295  
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION  
REPORT NOS. 50-424/00-06 AND 50-425/00-06

Dear Mr. Beasley:

On March 31, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Vogtle Units 1 and 2 reactor facilities. The enclosed report presents the results of this inspection which were discussed on March 30, 2001, with Mr. J. Gasser and other members of your staff.

This quarterly inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and to compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results this inspection, the inspectors identified one finding of very low safety significance (Green) which was determined to be a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance and because you have entered it into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a Non-Cited Violation in accordance with Section VI.A.I of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny this Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response, with the basis of your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Vogtle facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be publicly available in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Stephen J. Cahill, Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch 2  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-424, 50-425  
License Nos. NPF-68, NPF-81

Enclosure: NRC Integrated Inspection Report  
50-424/00-06 and 50-425/00-06

Attachments: 1. Documents Reviewed  
2. NRC's Revised Reactor Oversight Process Summary

cc w/encl:

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)

REGION II

Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425

License Nos. NPF-68 and NPF-81

Report Nos: 50-424/00-06 and 50-425/00-06

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC)

Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: 7821 River Road  
Waynesboro, GA 30830

Dates: December 31, 2000 through March 31, 2001

Inspectors: J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector  
T. Morrissey, Resident Inspector  
B. Bearden, Maintenance Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17)  
D. Forbes, Radiation Protection Specialist (Sections 2OS2 and 2OS3)  
R. Gibbs, Maintenance Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17)  
B. Sartor, Emergency Preparedness Specialist (Sections 1EP2 through 5 and 4OA1)  
M. Scott, Maintenance Inspector (Sections 1R02 and 1R17)  
J. Wallo, Security Specialist (Sections 3PP1, 3PP2, 4OA1, and 4OA3)

Approved by: Stephen J. Cahill, Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch 2  
Division of Reactor Projects

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000424-00-06, IR 05000425-00-06, on 12/31/2000-03/31/2001; Southern Nuclear Operating Company; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Resident Inspector Report, Access Control.

This report covers a 13 week period of inspection conducted by resident inspectors, regional maintenance inspectors, a regional security specialist, a regional emergency preparedness inspector, and a regional radiation specialist.

### A. Inspector Identified Findings

#### **Cornerstone: Physical Protection**

Green. A non-cited violation of licensee procedures as required by 10 CFR Part 73.55 was identified due to the licensee failing to promptly enter potentially disqualifying information into the Plant Access Data System (PADS) for an individual who had apparently failed to provide accurate criminal history information during employee screening. Also, telephone contact was not made with other utilities where the individual was actively badged, notifying them of the information. The licensee received the criminal history information on March 29, 1999. PADS was not updated until September 20, 2000.

Using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process, this finding was determined to be of very low significance due to the absence of a malevolent act. It was more than minor because the individual was able to access two other Nuclear Plants after the licensee had received the potentially disqualifying information from the criminal history check. This information is relied upon by other utilities participating in the PADS program and may have led to a decision by the other utilities to deny the worker unescorted access (Section 3PP2).

### B. Licensee Identified Findings

None

## Report Details

### Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at essentially 100% Rated Thermal Power (RTP) throughout the inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at essentially 100% RTP until March 20, when a coastdown was initiated in preparation for a planned refueling outage. At the end of the inspection period, the unit was at approximately 95% RTP and continuing to coastdown.

### **1. REACTOR SAFETY** **Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity**

#### 1R02 Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the completed safety evaluations listed in Attachment 1 to verify compliance with the requirements of licensee procedure 00056-C, Safety and Environmental Evaluations, and 10 CFR 50.59, Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments. The sample included evaluations of plant modifications, procedure revisions, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) changes, tests, and non-routine operating configurations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed two audit reports, a self assessment, and sixteen Condition Reports (CRs) listed in Attachment 1 to confirm that the licensee was identifying issues and initiating actions to resolve concerns.

##### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

#### 1R04 Equipment Alignment

##### .1 Partial System Walkdowns

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted partial walkdowns of the following systems to evaluate the operability of selected trains or backup systems when the redundant train or system was inoperable or out of service. The walkdowns included verification of local and control room switch and breaker positions to ensure the systems were correctly aligned based on the inspectors' system knowledge.

- 1A, 1B, and 2A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) systems
- 2B Safety Injection (SI) system
- 2B High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) system
- 2B Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Complete System Walkdowna. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a complete system walkdown on accessible portions of the Unit 2, Train A Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) system. The inspectors focused on verifying adequate material condition and correct system alignment. Documents reviewed included: 11150-2, Nuclear Service Cooling Water System Alignment; 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System; Technical Specifications; Updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR); drawings 2X4DB133-1, 2X4DB133-2, 2X4DB134, 2X4DB135-1, and 2X4DB135-2; and CRs 2000001323 and 2000001549. The inspectors also held discussions with the system engineer on temporary modifications, future modifications, operator workarounds, to ensure that impact on the equipment functionality was properly evaluated.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection.1 Routine Tours of Plant Areasa. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to evaluate the licensee's control of combustible materials and ignition sources and the material condition and operational status of fire detection and suppression systems and fire protection barriers. Documents referenced during these tours included: 92000-C, Fire Protection Program; 92015-C, Use, Control and Storage of Flammable/Combustible Materials; 92020-C, Control of Ignition Sources; and Request for Engineering Assistance (REA) 99-VAA650, Door Database. The inspectors also compared the licensee's fire protection procedures to the requirements in UFSAR Section 9. The inspectors periodically reviewed the licensee's fire protection Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) log to determine if the corrective actions were properly prioritized. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed CRs 2001000034, 2001000036, 2001000086, 2001000324, 2001000343, and 2001000415 to verify that fire protection issues were being appropriately addressed in the corrective action program.

- 1A and 1B EDG rooms
- 2B SI pump room
- 2B HHSI system rooms
- 2A and 2B spent fuel pool cooling pump and heat exchanger rooms
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 125V DC battery rooms
- 2A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump room

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Fire Brigade Drills

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an unannounced fire brigade drill. The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the licensee's personnel to respond and fight fires in accordance with procedures 92005-C, Fire Response Procedure, and 91001-C, Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On March 12, the inspectors observed a simulator evaluation of licensed operators. The inspectors assessed the following items: 1) use of emergency operating, annunciator response, and emergency classification procedures, 2) control board manipulations, including high-risk operator actions, 3) crew command and control, 4) communications, and 5) effectiveness of the post training critique. The inspectors also verified that the simulator control boards closely matched the actual control boards in the control room.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule (MR) Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following equipment issues and associated CRs to assess the effectiveness of licensee maintenance efforts related to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and licensee procedure 50028-C, Engineering Maintenance Rule Implementation. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the Maintenance Rule regarding characterization of failures, performance criteria or a(1) performance goals, and corrective actions. The inspectors also verified that equipment problems were being identified at the appropriate level, entered into the corrective action program and appropriately dispositioned.



- 1A Hydrogen Monitor Low Flow Vacuum Switch Did Not Change State as Expected (CR 2000002339)
- Trip of Unit 2 Charger 2ND3BCA (CR 2001000016)
- 2A SI Pump Motor Cooler Relief (PSV11746) Failed to Open During Set Pressure Test (CR 2001000044)
- Unit 1 120V AC Inverter 1AD1111 Failure (CR 2001000031)
- Unit 2 Post Accident Monitoring System RPU 3A Failure (CR 2001000071)
- Standby Auxiliary Transformer Feeder Breaker H1222 Failed to Close (CR 2001000284)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

For the maintenance activities listed below, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's risk management effectiveness and compliance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). The inspectors verified that appropriate risk assessments were conducted prior to work performance and that risk management controls were implemented in accordance with licensee procedure 00354-C, Maintenance Scheduling. The inspectors verified that plant risk was reassessed for emergent work activities.

- Repair EDG 1A jacket water leak (Maintenance Work Order (MWO) 10100005)
- 2A SI system outage
- Unit 2 containment fan #3 and #4 system outage
- 2A HHSI pump system outage
- Emergent work to replace iso-phase bus duct cooling fan belts (MWO 20100622)
- 1A and 1B EDG system outages
- Replace solid state protection system slave relay K704 (MWO 10100731)
- Repair 2B EDG turbo charger lube oil leak (MWO 20100968)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following licensee evaluations of degraded equipment or non-conforming conditions. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations, the adequacy of compensatory measures, and the impact on continued plant operation.

- Ice Formation on Motor Cooler Piping of Unit 2 NSCW Pump #6 (CR 2000002382)
- Water Found in Unit 2 Normal Charging Pump Outboard Bearing Oil Sample (CR 2001000011)
- Request for Engineering Review (RER) 2000-0025, Engineering Evaluation to Allow Racking Doors to Be Left Open on the 1E 4160 V Busses, AA02 and BA03
- Sediment Buildup in Cell 40 of 1E Battery 2BD1B (CR 2001000139)
- Auxiliary Feedwater Stop Check Valve 2-1302-U4-116 Seat Leakage (CR 2001000468)
- Degraded Penetration Seal Between Unit 2 Control Room and Cable Spreading Room (CR 2001000126)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the 17 Design Change Packages (DCPs) and Minor Design Changes (MDCs) listed in Attachment 1 to verify that the modified systems' design had not been degraded and that the modifications did not result in the plant operating in an unsafe condition. The inspectors evaluated the DCPs and MDCs against the requirements of licensee procedure 58007-C, Design Changes Packages.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed or witnessed post-maintenance testing of the following equipment to verify that work activities were properly performed and that acceptance criteria were met demonstrating that the equipment was operable. Other documents reviewed included licensee procedure 29401-C, Work Order Functional Tests. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed CR 2001000199 to verify that the licensee had adequately identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions for the associated post-maintenance test problem.

- 2A SI System
- Plant Wilson Blackstart Diesel Generator
- Unit 2 Containment Cooler Fan #3 and #4 System
- 2A HHSI Pump System
- 1A and 1B EDG

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testinga. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the testing or reviewed completed records to verify that testing was conducted in accordance with the procedures and that the acceptance criteria were met. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed CRs 2001000006, 2001000018, 2001000020, and 2001000027 to verify that the licensee had adequately identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions for the associated surveillance test problems.

- 14980-1, Diesel Generator Operability Test (for 1B EDG)
- 14421-2, Solid State Protection System and Reactor Trip Breaker Train B Operability Test
- 14808-2, Centrifugal Charging Pump and Check Valve IST and Response Time Test (for 2A pump)
- 14667-1, Train B Diesel Generator and ESFAS Test
- 14666-1, Train A Diesel Generator and ESFAS Test
- 14805-1, Residual Heat Removal Pump and Check Valve IST (for 1B RHR pump)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness**1EP2 Alert Notification System Testinga. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the alert and notification system (ANS) design and the testing program. System design and completed test report results were compared to the requirements of Section D, Appendix 3 of the Emergency Plan.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Augmentation Testinga. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the design of the ERO Augmentation system and the licensee's capability to staff emergency response facilities within stated timeliness goals of Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 91101-C, Emergency Response Organization.

The inspectors reviewed the November 18, 1999 Augmentation Drill report and verified that the minimum staffing requirements for the emergency organization met the Emergency Plan requirements. The inspectors also reviewed ERO personnel training records to verify they were certified in accordance with licensee procedure 91101-C.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed changes to the Emergency Plan and the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) to determine if any of the changes decreased the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. The review was performed against the requirements of 10CFR 50.54(q).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated emergency preparedness weaknesses and deficiencies identified from past drills to determine if these items had been submitted for corrective action as required by Section N.4, of the Emergency Plan. The inspectors reviewed exercise and drill critique reports and the identified corrective actions to verify the corrective actions had been scheduled and responsibilities assigned.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

On March 1, the inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator and Technical Support Center to assess if event classification, notification, and protective action recommendations were conducted in accordance with applicable emergency plan implementing procedures. Additionally, the inspectors attended the post drill critique to assess the licensee's effectiveness in identifying areas for improvement.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

## 2. RADIATION SAFETY

### Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

#### 2OS2 As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors attended an ALARA briefing for maintenance on the Unit 1 spent fuel pool heat exchanger pump and reviewed annual doses and dose goals for the year 2000 to determine if the licensee was implementing ALARA processes as required by 10 CFR 20.1101(b) and licensee procedure 00910-C, VEGP ALARA Program.

##### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

#### 2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

##### .1 Area Radiation Monitors (ARMs)

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and operability of ARMs identified in the UFSAR. The inspectors observed equipment material condition and compared both local and control room ARM indications to verify they were in agreement. Using licensee procedures 24988-C, Channel Calibration Of The Area DRMS Monitors, and 24989-C, Channel Calibration Of The High Range Containment Area DRMS Monitors, the inspectors reviewed alarm set points and current calibration records for control room area radiation monitors and containment high and low range area radiation monitors.

##### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

##### .2 Portable Survey Instrumentation

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the accuracy, operability, calibration, storage, and in-field source checks of portable survey instruments, portal monitors, electronic dosimetry and whole body counters to determine if the licensee was implementing licensee procedures to survey for radiation doses to workers as required by 10 CFR Part 20.1501. During this review, the inspectors used the following licensee procedures:

- 43670-C, Calibration Of Dose Rate Meters
- 43638-C, Calibration Of The Eberline SAC-4 Scintillation Alpha Center
- 43651-C, Calibration Of The SPM-904 Personnel Portal Monitor
- 44022-C, Operation And Calibration Of The Whole Body Counter
- 45009-C, Calibration Of Electronic Direct Reading Dosimeters
- 43635-C, Operation, Use And Calibration Of The AMS-3 Continuous Air Monitor Electronics
- 43685-C, Calibration And Operation Of The ASP-1

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an individual respirator fit test, equipment staged for use, availability of operator eyeglasses, and verified required SCBA training for operators was current. The inspectors also reviewed licensee SCBA training lesson plan FP-LP-00104-05-C to verify program requirements were included in the training.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**3. SAFEGUARDS**  
**Cornerstone: Physical Protection**

3PP1 Access Authorization (Behavior Observation Program)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated licensee procedures, Fitness For Duty (FFD) reports, and licensee audits. Additionally, the inspectors interviewed five representatives of licensee management and five escort personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of their training and abilities to recognize aberrant behavioral traits, physiological indications of narcotic and alcohol use, and work call-out reporting procedures. Licensee compliance was evaluated against requirements in the Physical Security Plan and associated procedures, and 10 CFR Part 26, Fitness For Duty Programs.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3PP2 Access Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed access control activities to assess if officers could detect contraband before personnel entered the protected area. The protective barriers for the Final Access Control facility were inspected to ensure compliance with protection standards in the Physical Security Plan. Lock, combination, and key control procedures were evaluated. Aspects of the site access authorization program were reviewed. Additionally, the inspectors observed search/access control equipment testing and reviewed log entries to assess if access control equipment testing was performed as

required by licensee procedures 90202-C, Testing Explosive Detector Units, 90203-C, Metal Detector Testing, 90204-C, X-Ray Equipment Test Procedure, and 90202-C, 7-Day Testing for the Security Perimeter and Duress Alarm System. Licensee compliance was evaluated against requirements in the Plant Physical Security Plan and associated procedures, and 10 CFR 73.55, Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage, and 10 CFR 73.56, Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants.

b. Findings

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the inspectors for the licensee failure to properly process disqualifying background information received as part of an individual's site access authorization. The finding was a non-cited violation of licensee procedures as required by 10 CFR Part 73.55.

The finding was identified as a result of inspector's follow-up of LER 50-424/0001S00, Failure to Provide Complete Background Information, which is dispositioned separately in section 4OA3 of this report. The licensee received criminal history background information on March 29, 1999 for an individual that had recently been badged at Vogtle. The individual had not provided accurate criminal history information during the initial employee screening and the background information received indicated potentially disqualifying information. However, at that time, the individual was no longer at Vogtle and the licensee did not follow the requirements of Southern Nuclear Procedure CSD-2, Revision 21, paragraph 6.15.8., and the Vogtle Physical Security Plan (PSP), para. 3.2.1. Specifically, the licensee failed to enter the potentially disqualifying information into Plant Access Data System (PADS) within one business day. The information was not entered into PADS until September 20, 2000 when the individual returned to the Vogtle site to obtain access. Also, the licensee's procedure was not followed in that no telephone contact was made with other utilities where the individual was actively badged (as indicated in PADS), notifying them of the information. This action was not taken until raised by the inspectors during this inspection. Although the licensee recognized the individual should be denied access in September 2000, the inspectors identified that the licensee had not taken corrective action to fully address that their process had not been followed in March of 1999. A Condition Report in the licensee's corrective action system had not been initiated.

This issue was identified as more than a minor finding because the individual was able to access two other Nuclear Plants after the licensee had received the potentially disqualifying information from the criminal history check. This information is relied upon by other utilities participating in the PADS program and may have led to a decision by the other utilities to deny the worker unescorted access. Using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process, and identifying the finding as a vulnerability in Access Control, minus a malevolent act, and with fewer than two similar findings in four quarters, the issue was determined to be within the licensee response band and a Green Finding.

10 CFR Part 73.55, paragraph (b) (3) (i) indicates that a licensee's management system shall include written security procedures that document the structure of the security organization and detail the duties of guards, watchmen, and other individuals responsible

for security. Also, the Vogtle Nuclear Plant PSP, paragraph 3.2.1, requires that a management organization provide for the development, revision, implementation, and enforcement of the PSP and implementing procedures. Additionally, security procedure CSD-2, revision 21, paragraph 6.15.8 requires that appropriate data indicating potentially disqualifying information shall be entered into PADS within one business day of receipt. If the worker is actively badged at other sites, they will telephonically notify the other licensees of the information at the time the information is entered into PADS. Because of the very low safety significance of the finding and because the licensee included the issue in their corrective action program (CR 2001000521) this procedural violation therefore meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV). It is identified as NCV 50-424, 425/00006-01, Disqualifying Background Information Not Processed Per Licensee Procedures.

#### 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

##### 4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

###### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PI data for the PIs listed below. The inspectors reviewed PI data submitted to the NRC to determine accuracy and completeness. Documentation reviewed included operator logs, licensee maintenance rule database, Licensee Event Reports, licensee monthly PI Summary reports, completed radiochemistry datasheets from licensee procedure 35110-C, Chemistry Control of the Reactor Coolant System, tracking and trending reports, security event reports for 2000, and the licensee's monthly PI Summary reports. In addition, the inspectors discussed the PI's reviewed with the licensee personnel. Licensee performance was evaluated against requirements in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.

###### Mitigating Systems Cornerstone

- Emergency AC Power (First thru Fourth Quarters of 2000)
- High Head Safety Injection (First thru Fourth Quarters of 2000)
- Residual Heat Removal Safety System Unavailability (First thru Fourth Quarters of 2000)
- Safety System Functional Failures (First thru Fourth Quarters of 2000)

###### Barrier Integrity Cornerstone

- Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity (First thru Fourth Quarters of 2000)

###### Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone

- Emergency Response Organization (ERO) drill and exercise performance (DEP) Previous Eight Quarters Ending December 2000)
- ERO Drill Participation (Previous Eight Quarters Ending December 2000)
- Alert and Notification System Reliability (Previous 12 months)



Physical Protection Cornerstone

- Fitness-for-Duty
- Personnel Screening
- Protected Area Security Equipment

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-upLicensee Event Reports (LERs)

LER 50-424/00-004-00, Procedure Inadequacy Leads to Reactor Trip During Surveillance Testing. This LER was reviewed by the inspectors and verified to be included in the licensee's corrective action program. No findings of significance were identified and the LER was closed.

LER 50-424,425/00-01S-00, Failure to Provide Complete Background Information. This LER described a failure on the part of a contract employee to provide the licensee with complete criminal history information for determination in granting unescorted access to the plant. Following receipt of disqualifying criminal history information, licensee security staff properly denied the contractor access during a subsequent visit. See section 3PP2 above for additional information identified during the inspection. No findings of significance were identified with the specific actions discussed in the LER, so the LER was closed.

4OA5 Management MeetingsExit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 30, 2001. Interim exits were held February 9, March 2, March 9, and March 30 to discuss the results of inspections conducted by region-based inspectors. An interim telephone exit was conducted on April 11, 2001, to discuss the finding in section 3PP2. The licensee had dissenting comments on significance determination and NRC-identification credit for that issue. No proprietary information was identified.

## PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

- W. Bargeron, Manager Operations
- R. Brown, Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness
- W. Burmeister, Manager Engineering Support
- C. Eckert, Modifications Manager
- G. Frederick, Plant Operations Assistant General Manager
- J. Gasser, Nuclear Plant General Manager
- K. Holmes, Manager Maintenance

P. Rushton, Plant Support Assistant General Manager

NRC

S. Cahill, Chief, Division of Reactor Projects

**ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED**

Closed

50-424,425/00006-01	NCV	Disqualifying Background Information Not Processed Per Licensee Procedures (Section 3PP2)
50-424,425/00-01S-00	LER	Failure to Provide Complete Background Information (Section 4OA3)
50-424/00-04-00	LER	Procedure Inadequacy Leads to Reactor Trip During Surveillance Testing (Section 4OA3)

## DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

### Sections 1R02 and 1R017

#### Modifications and 10 CFR 50.59s Reviewed (\* indicates full 50.59, including USQD):

DCP 98-V1N0015	Reactor Coolant Level Indication, Rev. 0 *
DCP 98-VAN0040	Centrifugal Charging Pump Main Lube Oil Pump Coupling, Rev. 0*
DCP 99-V1N0015	Replacement of Westinghouse 7300 Process Protection and Control Cabinet Power Supplies, Rev. 0 *
MDC 00-V1M0004	Simplification of the Delta-T Deviation and Tavq Deviation Alarm Circuits, Rev. 0 *
DCP 00-VAN0034	Rod Control Lag Addition, Rev. 0 *
MDC 00-V1M009	Stationary and Moveable Gripper Coil Isolation Diode Removal, Rev. 0 *
DCP 98-V1N0013	Containment Isolation Valves, Rev. 0 *
DCP 97-VAN0044	Essential Chillwater Electro-Hydraulic Control Valves, Rev. 0 *
DCP 97-V1N0067	Solid State Protection System Enhancements, Rev. 0 *
DCP 98-V1N0034	RHR System Hot Leg Vent Piping, Rev. 0 *
DCP 98-V1N061	PORV 1PV-455A Setpoint Change, Rev. 0 *
DCP 97-V2N049	Centrifugal Charging Pump A and B Discharge Orifices, Rev. 0 *
DCP 97-V1N0037	Improve MSIV Reliability, Rev. 0 *
DCP 97-V1N0071	Bit Discharge Operator Replacement, Rev. 0*
Procedure 18009-C	Steam Generator Tube Leak, Rev. 18
Procedure 18017-C	Abnormal Grid Disturbance/Loss of Grid, Rev. 3
Procedure 18019-C	Loss of Residual Heat Removal. Rev. 21
Procedure 18021-C	Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System, Rev. 11
Procedure 18032-C	Loss of 120 Volt AC Instrument Power, Rev. 18
Procedure 19014-C	Transition to Hot Leg Recirculation (ES-1.4), Rev. 12
Procedure 19112-C	LOCA Outside of Containment (ECA-1.2), Rev. 4
Procedure 20236-C	Breaker Maintenance, Rev. 1
Procedure 23290-C	Agastat 7000 Series Timing Relay Calibration, Rev. 8
Procedure 24252-2	NSCW Pump Pressure Interlock 2P-1609 Channel Calibration, Rev. 4
Procedure 24360-1	NSCW, ESF Water Chiller 1F-1802 Channel Calibration, Rev. 8
Procedure 24562-1	Containment Sump Level 1L-7777 Channel Calibration, Rev. 13
Procedure 27571-C	Terry Turbine Maintenance, Rev. 9
Procedure 27572-C	Terry Turbine Type GS2 Governor Valve Maintenance, Rev. 9
Procedure 27710-C	125VDC Circuit Breaker Inspection Testing, Rev. 31

Safety Audit and Engineering Audit of Design Changes and Plant Modification Control, July 22, 1999

Safety Audit and Engineering Audit of Corrective Action Program, February 3, 2000

Design Control Self Assessment, April, 2000

CRs Reviewed: 2000000143, 2000000731, 2000000773, 2000001018, 2000002328, 2000002329, 2000001897, 2000001983, 200000204, 2000002247, 2000002295, 2000002329, 2000002366, 2001000290, 2001000295, 2001000598

Sections 3PP1 and 3PP2

Licensee Condition Reports

CR2001000521	CR2000002218	CR2000000407
CR2000001052	CR2000001548	CR2000001741
CR2000002263	CR2000002407	CR2000001456
CR2000000940		

Plant Vogtle Physical Security Plan

\*Plant Vogtle/Southern Nuclear Security Procedures

- Corporate Security Directive # CSD-2
- Procedure # 90202-C
- Procedure # 90205-C
- Procedure # 90203-C
- Procedure # 90204-C

Fitness for Duty Semi-Annual Reports, January through December, 2000

Safeguard Event Logs, 2000

Fitness-for-Duty/Continual Behavior Observation General Employee Training

Fitness-for-Duty/Continual Behavior Observation Supervisory Training

Key and Lock Daily and Annual Inventory Logs

# NRC's REVISED REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS

The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently revamped its inspection, assessment, and enforcement programs for commercial nuclear power plants. The new process takes into account improvements in the performance of the nuclear industry over the past 25 years and improved approaches of inspecting and assessing safety performance at NRC licensed plants.

The new process monitors licensee performance in three broad areas (called strategic performance areas): reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety (protecting plant employees and the public during routine operations), and safeguards (protecting the plant against sabotage or other security threats). The process focuses on licensee performance within each of seven cornerstones of safety in the three areas:

## Reactor Safety

- Initiating Events
- Mitigating Systems
- Barrier Integrity
- Emergency Preparedness

## Radiation Safety

- Occupational
- Public

## Safeguards

- Physical Protection

To monitor these seven cornerstones of safety, the NRC uses two processes that generate information about the safety significance of plant operations: inspections and performance indicators. Inspection findings will be evaluated according to their potential significance for safety, using the Significance Determination Process, and assigned colors of GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW or RED. GREEN findings are indicative of issues that, while they may not be desirable, represent very low safety significance. WHITE findings indicate issues that are of low to moderate safety significance. YELLOW findings are issues that are of substantial safety significance. RED findings represent issues that are of high safety significance with a significant reduction in safety margin.

Performance indicator data will be compared to established criteria for measuring licensee performance in terms of potential safety. Based on prescribed thresholds, the indicators will be classified by color representing varying levels of performance and incremental degradation in safety: GREEN, WHITE, YELLOW, and RED. GREEN indicators represent performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight beyond the baseline inspections. WHITE corresponds to performance that may result in increased NRC oversight. YELLOW represents performance that minimally reduces safety margin and requires even more NRC oversight. RED indicates performance that represents a significant reduction in safety margin but still provides adequate protection to public health and safety.

The assessment process integrates performance indicators and inspection so the agency can reach objective conclusions regarding overall plant performance. The agency will use an Action Matrix to

etermine in a systematic, predictable manner which regulatory actions should be taken based on a licensee's performance. The NRC's actions in response to the significance (as represented by the color) of issues will be the same for performance indicators as for inspection findings. As a licensee's safety performance degrades, the NRC will take more and increasingly significant action, which can include shutting down a plant, as described in the Action Matrix.

More information can be found at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.