July 2, 1991

Amdt Correction to ~~Amdt~~ 152 to DPR-16

Docket No. 50-219

Distribution:

Docket File	GHill (4)
NRC & Local PDRs	WJones
PD I-4 Plant	CGrimes
SVarga	ACRS (10)
JCalvo	GPA/PA
SNorris	OC/LFMB
ADromerick	CWHehl
OGC	
DHagan	

Mr. John J. Barton, Director
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Post Office Box 388
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Dear Mr. Barton:

On June 5, 1991, the Commission issued Amendment No. 152 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16 for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station in response to your application dated November 19, 1990.

The Amendment revised page 3.1-4 of the Technical Specifications. We have discovered that the revisions made by Amendment No. 149 were not incorporated when Amendment No. 152 was issued. Enclosed is a corrected page 3.1-4.

Sincerely,

/s/

Alexander W. Dromerick, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-4
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:
Page 3.1-4

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

050073

9107100021 910702
PDR ADOCK 05000219
P PDR

OFC	:PDI-4:LA	:PDI-4:LA	:PDI-4:D	:	:
NAME	:SNorris	:ADromerick:cn	:JFStolz	:	:
DATE	:7/2/91	:7/2/91	:7/2/91	:	:

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Document Name: JJB

CP-1

DF01
1/1

Mr. John J. Barton
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

cc:

Ernest L. Blake, Jr.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge
2300 N Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20037

I. H. Jolles, Executive Vice President
GPU Service Corporation
100 Interpace Parkway
Parsipanny, New Jersey 07054

Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

BWR Licensing Manager
GPU Nuclear Corporation
1 Upper Pond Road
Parsippany, New Jersey 07054

Mayor
Lacey Township
818 West Lacey Road
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensing Manager
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Mail Stop: Site Emergency Bldg.
P. O. Box 388
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Resident Inspector
c/o U.S. NRC
Post Office Box 445
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Kent Tosch, Chief
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
Bureau of Nuclear Engineering
CN 415
Trenton, New Jersey 08625

particular protection instrument is not required; or the plant is placed in the protection or safe condition that the instrument initiates. This is accomplished in a normal manner without subjecting the plant to abnormal operations conditions. The action and out-of-service requirements apply to all instrumentation within a particular function, e.g., if the requirements on any one of the ten scram functions cannot be met then control rods shall be inserted.

The trip level settings not specified in Specification 2.3 have been included in this specification. The bases for these settings are discussed below.

The high drywell pressure trip setting is $\leq$ 3.5 psig. This trip will scram the reactor, initiate containment spray in conjunction with low low reactor water level, initiate core spray, initiate primary containment isolation, initiate automatic depressurization in conjunction with low-low-low-reactor water level, initiate the standby gas treatment system and isolate the reactor building. The scram function shuts the core down during the loss-of-coolant accidents. A steam leak of about 15 gpm and a liquid leak of about 35 gpm from the primary system will cause drywell pressure to reach the scram point; and, therefore, the scram provides protection for breaks greater than the above.

High drywell pressure provides a second means of initiating the core spray to mitigate the consequences of loss-of-coolant accident. Its trip setting of $\leq$3.5 psig initiates the core spray in time to provide adequate core cooling. The break size coverage of high drywell pressure was discussed above. Low-low water level and high drywell pressure in addition to initiating core spray also causes isolation valve closure. These settings are adequate to cause isolation to minimize the offsite dose within required limits.

It is permissible to make the drywell pressure instrument channels inoperable during performance of the integrated primary containment leakage rate test provided the reactor is in the cold shutdown condition. The reason for this is that the Engineered Safety Features, which are effective in case of a LOCA under these conditions, will still be effective because they will be activated (when the Engineered Safety Features system is required as identified in the technical specification of the system) by low-low reactor water level.*

The scram discharge volume has two separate instrument volumes utilized to detect water accumulation. The high water level is based on the design that the water in the SDIV's, as detected by either set of level instruments, shall not be allowed to exceed 29.0 gallons; thereby, permitting 137 control rods to scram. To provide further margin, an accumulation of not more than 14.0 gallons of water, as detected by either instrument volume, will result in a rod block and an alarm. The accumulation of not more than 7.0 gallons of water, as detected in either instrument volume will result in an alarm.

Detailed analyses of transients have shown that sufficient protection is provided by other scrams below 45% power to permit bypassing of the turbine trip and generator load rejection scrams. However, for operational convenience, 40% of rated power has been chosen as the setpoint below which these trips are bypassed. This setpoint is coincident with bypass valve capacity.

A low condenser vacuum scram trip of 20 inches Hg has been provided to protect the main condenser in the event that vacuum is lost. A loss of condenser vacuum would cause the turbine stop valves to close, resulting in a turbine trip