

April 26, 2001

Mr. M. Reddemann
Site Vice President
Kewaunee and Point Beach Nuclear Plants
Nuclear Management Company, LLC
6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241

SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-266/01-07(DRP); 50-301/01-07(DRP)

Dear Mr. Reddemann:

On March 31, 2001, the NRC completed a baseline inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The results of this inspection were discussed on April 2, 2001, with you and other members of your staff. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if you provide one, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief
Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301
License Nos. DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-266/01-07(DRP);
50-301/01-07(DRP)

See Attached Distribution

cc w/encl: R. Grigg, President and Chief
Operating Officer, WEPCo
M. Wadley, Chief Nuclear Officer, NMC
J. Gadzala, Licensing Manager
D. Weaver, Nuclear Asset Manager
F. Cayia, Plant Manager
J. O'Neill, Jr., Shaw, Pittman,
Potts & Trowbridge
K. Duveneck, Town Chairman
Town of Two Creeks
D. Graham, Director
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A. Bie, Chairperson, Wisconsin
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S. Jenkins, Electric Division
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-266; 50-301
License Nos: DPR-24; DPR-27

Report No: 50-266/01-07; 50-301/01-07

Licensee: Nuclear Management Company, LLC

Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2

Location: 6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI 54241

Dates: February 13 through March 31, 2001

Inspectors: P. Krohn, Senior Resident Inspector
P. Loudon, Senior Resident Inspector, Clinton
R. Powell, Resident Inspector
D. Jones, Regional Inspector
B. Scott, Regional Inspector
K. Stoedter, Regional Inspector

Approved by: Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief
Branch 5
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000266-01-07(DRP); IR 05000301-01-07(DPR), on 02/13 through 03/31/2001; Nuclear Management Company, LLC. Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2.

The inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors and regional inspectors. No findings were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

A. Inspector-Identified Findings

None.

B. Licensee-Identified Findings

Violations of very low significance which were identified by the licensee have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned appear reasonable. These violations are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details

Summary of Plant Status: Both units operated at or near 100 percent power throughout the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 'A' Train Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of the 'A' train EDGs to verify system operability. The system was selected due to its safety significance and risk importance. The inspectors used EDG checklists (CLs) CL 11A G-01, "G-01 Diesel Generator Checklist," Revision 19, and CL 11A G-02, "G-02 Diesel Generator Checklist," Revision 21. The inspectors also used selected portions of system electrical, fuel oil, lubricating oil, and starting air drawings to accomplish the inspection.

The inspectors conducted the walkdown to verify the correct position of control switches, breakers, louvers, dampers, and valves associated with 'A' train EDG system and ventilation, heating, fuel oil transfer, and engine control power alignments associated with support systems. The inspectors also evaluated appropriate control room switch positions and valve configurations. Finally, the inspectors evaluated other elements such as material condition, housekeeping, fire barrier integrity between critical components, proper venting of fuel oil storage and day tanks, and component labeling.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Unit 2 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System

The inspectors performed a partial system walkdown of the Unit 2 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP) to verify system operability. The system was selected due to its safety significance, risk importance, and role in meeting station blackout criteria. The inspectors used auxiliary feedwater CL 13E Part 1, "Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Lineup Turbine-Driven - Unit 2," Revision 14, and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Figure 10.2.1, Sheet 2, "Units 1 & 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Flow Diagram," Revision dated June 2000, to determine proper system configuration. The inspectors also referenced design basis document (DBD) DBD-01, "Auxiliary Feedwater System," Revision 1, Section 3.3, "Piping," to determine if TDAFWP discharge piping, which had been painted, had been fabricated with an acceptable material.

During the walkdown, the inspectors evaluated the position of open, shut, locked, and throttled valves; whether control power was aligned to select motor operated valves; inspected motor operated valve material condition; checked to see if TDAFWP steam supply valves were aligned to the correct control configurations allowing automatic repositioning during safety injection or low-low steam generator level conditions; and noted if proper lubricating oil levels in the TDAFWP turbine, pump, and governor reservoirs existed.

c. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors walked down the following areas to assess the overall readiness of fire protection equipment and barriers:

- Cable Spreading Room, Fire Zone 318
- Non-Vital Switchgear Area, Fire Zone 319

Emphasis was placed on the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, the material condition of fire protection equipment, and the material condition and operational status of fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or propagation. Area conditions/configurations were evaluated based on information provided in the licensee's "Fire Protection Evaluation Report," dated August 1999.

The inspectors looked at fire hoses, sprinklers, and portable fire extinguishers to verify that they were installed at their designated locations, were in satisfactory physical condition, and were unobstructed. The inspectors also evaluated the physical location and condition of fire detection devices. Additionally, passive features such as fire doors, fire dampers, and mechanical and electrical penetration seals were inspected to verify that they were located per Fire Protection Evaluation Report requirements and were in good physical condition.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the licensee perform a visual and eddy current inspection of the Unit 2, 'A' train EDG, G-02, jacket water heat exchangers, Serial Numbers 2444522 and 2269843. The inspectors reviewed eddy current probe calibration files and the nondestructive examination vendor's characterization of several indications as magnetic permeability variations rather than tubes containing defects or damage. The inspectors

examined the open heat exchangers for evidence of biofouling, gasket seal conditions, and zebra mussel intrusions. Finally, the inspectors evaluated the frequency of the inspection to verify that it was sufficient to detect degradation prior to the loss of heat removal capabilities below design values.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed quarterly observations of licensed operator simulator training. On February 15, 2001, the inspectors observed licensed operator training involving the following procedures:

- Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) AOP 1B, "Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction," Revision 12
- AOP 9B, "Component Cooling Water System Malfunction," Revision 14
- AOP 12A, "Oil, Hazardous Material, and Radioactive Materials Spill," Revision 15
- Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) 0 Unit 1, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," Revision 34
- EOP 0.1 Unit 1, "Reactor Trip Response," Revision 23.

The inspectors evaluated crew performance for clarity and formality of communication; the ability to take timely action in the safe direction; the prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying of alarms; the correct use and implementation of procedures, including alarm response procedures; timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and the group dynamics.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the maintenance rule requirements to ensure that component and equipment failures were identified, entered, and scoped within the maintenance rule and that select structures, systems, or components were properly categorized and classified as (a)(1) or (a)(2) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65. The inspectors reviewed maintenance work orders (WOs), (a)(1) corrective action plans, and a sample of condition reports (CRs) to verify the licensee was identifying issues related to the maintenance rule at an appropriate threshold, and corrective actions were appropriate. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's performance criteria to ensure that the criteria adequately monitored equipment performance, and reviewed licensee changes to performance criteria to

verify they were reflected in the licensee's probabilistic risk assessment. Specific systems reviewed were:

- Control Room Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
- Cable Spreading Room Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning
- Facade Freeze Protection.

The inspectors reviewed various corrective action program documents (CRs), in addition to the following documents:

- Calculation 98-0169, "PRA [Probabilistic Risk Assessment] Assessment of MR [Maintenance Rule] APC [Availability Performance Criteria] and RPC [Reliability Performance Criteria]," Revision 1
- "1999 Annual Report for the Maintenance Rule," dated March 30, 2000
- Nuclear Power Business Unit Procedure (NP) 7.7.4, "Scope and Risk Significant Determination for the Maintenance Rule," Revision 6
- NP 7.7.5, "Determining, Monitoring and Evaluating Performance Criteria for the Maintenance Rule," Revision 7
- NP 7.7.6, "Work Order Review and MPFF [Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure] Determination for the Maintenance Rule," Revision 3
- DBD-31, "Control Room HVAC and Habitability," Revision 1
- DBD 29, "Cable Spreading Room Heating and Ventilation," Revision 0.

Finally, the inspectors reviewed CR 01-0641, "Control Room Ventilation VNCR Maintenance Rule Performance," and CR 01-0811, "Work Order Functional Failure Status," which were initiated as a result of this inspection activity and were reviewed as part of the inspection scope.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation of plant risk, scheduling, configuration control, and performance of maintenance associated with planned and emergent work activities and verified that scheduled and emergent work activities were adequately managed. In particular, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for conducting maintenance risk safety assessments to verify that the licensee's planning, risk management tools, and the assessment and management of online risk were adequate. The inspectors also reviewed licensee actions to address increased online risk during periods when equipment was out-of-service for maintenance, such as establishing compensatory actions, minimizing the duration of the activity, obtaining appropriate management approval, and informing appropriate plant staff, to verify that the actions were accomplished when online risk was increased due to maintenance on risk-significant structures, systems, or components. The following specific activities were reviewed:

- The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week of February 11, 2001. This included work associated with service water (SW) Pump P32E.
- The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week of March 4, 2001. This included work associated with Unit 1 component cooling water (CCW) Pump 1P-11B.
- The maintenance risk assessment for work planned for the week of March 24, 2001. This included work associated with Unit 1 'A' Train EDG and SW system strainers.

Finally, the inspectors reviewed CR 01-0614, "PPG/PSA [Production Planning Group/Probabilistic Safety Assessment] Did Not Identify a Yellow Entry in Safety Monitor," which was initiated as a result of this inspection activity and was reviewed as part of the inspection scope.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and evaluated operator response to failure of both plant process computer systems (PPCSs) that occurred on February 21, 2001. The inspectors evaluated operator performance to verify that actions were taken in a timely manner in accordance with AOP-21, "Plant Process Computer Systems Malfunction," Revision 0, and that reactivity manipulations were made as directed by the AOP. Additionally, the inspectors observed supervisory oversight during a time when both units were simultaneously executing an AOP. Finally, the inspectors reviewed CR 01-0556, "Loss of Both PPCS Trains," which was initiated as a result of the event.

The inspectors observed and evaluated operator response to winds in excess of 40 miles per hour encountered on February 25, 2001. The inspectors evaluated operator performance to verify that actions were taken in a timely manner in accordance with AOP-13C, "Severe Weather Conditions," Revision 9. Finally, the inspectors reviewed CR 01-0585, "Site Not Prepared for High Winds," which was initiated as a result of the event.

The inspectors observed and evaluated operator response to Unit 1 control bank 'D' automatic outward rod motion (one step) on February 28, 2001. The inspectors evaluated operator performance to verify that actions were taken in a timely manner in accordance with AOP 6C Unit 1, "Uncontrolled Motion of RCCA(s) [Rod Cluster Control Assembly]," Revision 9. Finally, the inspectors reviewed CR 01-0629, "Unit 1 Spurious Rod Signal," which was initiated as a result of the event.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the operability evaluations listed below to verify that they addressed the applicable current licensing basis requirements and commitments, and provided an adequate basis for justifying operability. Independent reviews were conducted and included a discussion with licensee personnel and reviews of design and licensing basis documentation. The inspectors reviewed the following operability evaluations:

- CR 00-2769, "Component Cooling Relief Valve Improperly Replaced"

During performance of corrective actions for another CR, the licensee identified that 2CC-0747B, Heat Exchanger 8B Boric Acid Evaporator CCW Outlet Relief Valve, had been improperly replaced. The inspectors reviewed the effect of the relief valve having been installed without back pressure compensation to verify that the maximum pressure in the CCW section of piping affected would not have been exceeded.

- CR 00-4097, "1MS-2083 CIV [Containment Isolation Valve] Exceeded Closure Time"

During performance of Inservice Test (IT) 80, "Main and Rad Waste Steam Valves (Quarterly) Unit 1," Revision 20, the stroke time for 1MS-2083, 1HX-1A Steam Generator Sample Isolation Valve, was found outside of the acceptance band. The inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation screening, SCR 2000-1129, and temporary procedure change, 2000-0789, associated with the operability determination. The inspectors referenced Code requirements found in American Society of Mechanical Engineers OM Part 10, paragraph 4.2.1.9, and reviewed CR 01-0562, "Operable But Degraded Concerns - Compensatory Actions," written as a result of the licensee's interpretation of Code requirements.

- CR 01-0626, "10 CFR 21 G-03 and G-04 Agastats"

The licensee received a 10 CFR Part 21 notification (Log Number 2001-07-0, "Potential Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperability for Agastat Relays Used With Woodward 2301A Electric Governors") identifying a design deficiency associated with the use of Agastat E-7000 relays in low-voltage/low-current applications outside the stated design values of the relays. The design deficiency was applicable to Point Beach in that EDGs G-03 and G-04 2301A electronic governors use a low-voltage/low-current signal to monitor the status of relay contacts in the "open for minimum fuel" and the "close for minimum speed, close for idle" input circuitry. As stated in the Part 21 notification, improper relay contact continuity, defined to be greater than 1 ohm, could activate the "open for minimum fuel" input and cause the EDG to fail-to-start or shutdown.

- CR 01-0754, "Unexplained observed jacket water level increase identified by operations on or about 2/26/01."

This CR addressed a condition identified on the G-02 EDG concerning a slowly increasing jacket water cooling expansion tank level.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (OWAs)

.1 Unit 1 Turbine Building Auxiliary Operator Rounds Accompaniment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors accompanied a Unit 1 turbine building operator during the performance of a normal rounds tour on February 24, 2001. The inspectors observed all log readings and equipment manipulations made by the operator. Any actions which indicated a potential problem that could increase initiating event frequencies, impact multiple mitigating systems, or affect the ability to respond to plant transients and accidents were considered as possible OWAs. The inspectors referenced "Point Beach Nuclear Plant Turbine Building Shift Log - Unit 1," Revision 54, while accompanying the turbine building auxiliary operator and the definition of OWAs as defined in Procedure NP 2.1.4, "Operator Workarounds," Revision 0, Step 2.2.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Unit 2 Turbine Building Auxiliary Operator Rounds Accompaniment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors accompanied a Unit 2 turbine building operator during the performance of a normal rounds tour on March 16, 2001. The inspectors observed all log readings and equipment manipulations made by the operator, including manual operations and frequent adjustments to heating steam systems, main feed pump filters, and air compressor aftercoolers. Any actions which indicated a potential problem that could increase initiating event frequencies, impact multiple mitigating systems, or affect the ability to respond to plant transients and accidents were considered as possible OWAs. The inspectors referenced Point Beach Nuclear Plant Turbine Building Shift Log - Unit 2, Revision 40, while accompanying the turbine building auxiliary operator and the definition of OWAs as defined in Procedure NP 2.1.4, "Operator Workarounds," Revision 0, Step 2.2.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Primary Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Operator Rounds Accompaniment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors accompanied the common primary auxiliary building operator during the performance of a normal rounds tour on February 17, 2001. The inspectors observed all log readings and equipment manipulations made by the operator. Any actions which indicated a potential problem that could increase initiating event frequencies, impact multiple mitigating systems, or affect the ability to respond to plant transients and accidents were considered as possible OWAs. The inspectors referenced "Point Beach Nuclear Plant Auxiliary Building Shift Log," Revision 48, while accompanying the auxiliary operator and the definition of OWAs as defined in Procedure NP 2.1.4, "Operator Workarounds," Revision 0, Step 2.2.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 OWAs - Cumulative Effects Assessment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of all documented OWAs on reliability, availability, and potential for mis-operation of a system; the potential for increasing initiating event frequency or impact on multiple mitigating systems; and the ability of operators to respond in a correct and timely manner to plant transients and accidents. The inspectors assessed the cumulative effects of those OWAs provided in the Operations Department document, "Operator Work Around Summary," dated February 12, 2001. The inspectors also referenced Administrative Procedure 2.1.4, "Operator Workarounds," Revision 0, to evaluate the licensee's procedure for determining the cumulative effects of OWAs. The inspectors also reviewed portions of the licensee's probabilistic risk analysis, "Point Beach Nuclear Plant Individual Plant Examination Summary Report," dated June 30, 1993, to determine if any of the OWAs impacted assumptions made in the risk analysis.

The inspectors considered the combined reactivity management effects of OWAs 2-01C-001 CV and 0-98R-013 CC. Operator workaround 2-01C-001 CV concerned the chemical and volume control system and the inability to use two letdown orifices at the higher Unit 2 reactor coolant system pressure of 2235 psig. The inspectors reviewed the effect of letdown limitations, when early in core life with a positive temperature coefficient of reactivity, boration timeliness for reactivity management would be of increased importance. Operator workaround 0-98R-013 CC concerned changes in CCW water temperatures which caused changes in the chemical and volume control system letdown temperatures. Changes in letdown temperature, in turn, caused changes in the chemical and volume control system demineralizer's affinity for boron and resulted in slight boron concentration changes in the reactor coolant system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT)

.1 SW Pump P-32F

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and reviewed PMT activities following replacement of the SW Pump P-32F expansion joint to ensure that the test was adequate for the scope of the maintenance work which had been performed. The inspectors also evaluated the test activities to verify that the impact of the testing had been properly characterized during the pre-job briefing; the test was performed as written and all testing prerequisites were satisfied; and that the test data were complete, appropriately verified, and met the requirements of the testing procedure. Following the completion of the test, the inspectors walked down portions of the SW system to verify that the test equipment was removed and that the equipment was returned to a condition in which it could perform its safety function. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the following documents:

- WO 9925555, "P-32F SW Pump Discharge Expansion Joint"
- Routine Maintenance Procedure (RMP) 9216-3, "Service Water Pump Vibration Testing and Balancing For Post Maintenance Testing," Revision 4, Temporary Change Number 2001-0116
- IT 07F, "P-32F Service Water Pump (Quarterly)," Revision 8.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 CCW Pump 2P-11A

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and reviewed PMT activities following the replacement of the pump seals to verify that the post-maintenance test was adequate for the scope of the work that had been performed. The inspectors also evaluated the test activities to verify that the impact of the testing had been properly characterized during the pre-job briefing; the test was performed as written and all testing prerequisites were satisfied; and that the test data were complete, appropriately verified, and met the requirements of the testing procedure. During the post-maintenance test, the inspectors independently checked the running CCW pump for abnormal sounds, gland leakage, elevated bearing and seal temperatures, and proper motor ventilation cooling flows. The inspectors also observed acquisition of vibration readings and compared these to alert and action levels. Following the completion of the test, the inspectors walked down portions of the CCW system to verify that the test equipment was removed and that the

equipment was returned to a condition in which it could perform its safety function. The inspectors reviewed the following documents:

- WO 9931794, "2P-11A Inboard Seal Leak"
- IT 13, "Component Cooling Water Pumps and Valves (Quarterly) Unit 2," Revision 26.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 SW Pump P-32D

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and reviewed PMT activities following the oil change and lubrication of the 'D' SW pump motor to verify that the test was adequate for the scope of the work that had been performed. The inspectors evaluated the test activities to verify that the test was performed as written and all testing prerequisites were satisfied, and that the test data were appropriately reviewed and met the requirements of the testing procedure. During the post-maintenance test, the inspectors checked the running SW pump motor upper bearing oil level and the extent of the lower bearing grease leakage. The inspectors performed an independent check of the controlled oil usage program to verify that the type of oil added to the pump was correct and had been acquired from the correct storage drum in the lubricating oil storage room. The inspectors checked the running SW pump for abnormal sounds, gland leakage, elevated bearing and seal temperatures, and proper motor ventilation cooling flows. The inspectors walked down portions of the SW system following completion of the post-maintenance test to verify that the SW pump was returned to a condition in which it could perform its safety function. The inspectors reviewed WO 9923090, "Change Oil and Lubricate P-32D Service Water Pump," as part of this inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Electrically-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump P-38A

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PMT activities following completion of maintenance on the Unit 0 electrically-driven auxiliary feed pumps and valves to ensure that the testing was adequate for the scope of maintenance work which had been performed. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed Point Beach Test Procedure IT-10, "Test of Electrically-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pumps and Valves," Revision 41, to verify that testing acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the following documents:

- Point Beach DBD-01, "Auxiliary Feedwater System"

- WO 9934148, "Drill Holes in Orifice in Accordance With MR 99-029A, to Increase P-38A Recirculation Flow"
- WO 9923206, "Follow Test Procedure IT-10."

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 EDG G-02 Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed and observed the following PMT activities associated with the cleaning and inspection of the G-02 EDG jacket water heat exchanger that was conducted under WO 9934403 and IT 72, "Service Water Valves (Quarterly)," Revision 15.

As part of the PMT observations, the inspectors reviewed the test to verify that it was adequate for the scope of the maintenance work which had been performed. The inspectors also interviewed the EDG vendor representative and reviewed the material safety data sheets to verify that the method for replacing the coolant, corrosion inhibitor, and service water that cools the coolant were appropriate. Following the completion of the test, the inspectors walked down the EDG to verify that the test equipment was removed and that the equipment was returned to a condition in which it could perform its safety function.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.6 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Logic Train 'A' and 'B' Monthly Test

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PMT activities following completion of the monthly RPS logic system testing to ensure that reactor trip breakers were appropriately returned to service following the testing. The inspectors reviewed the following documents as part of this review:

- 2ICP 02.003, "Reactor Protection System Logic Monthly Surveillance Test," Revision 5
- 2ICP 02.003A-1, "Reactor Protection System Logic Train A Monthly Surveillance Test," Revision 16
- 2ICP 02.003B-1, "Reactor Protection System Logic Train A Monthly Surveillance Test," Revision 17.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

.1 Containment Airlock Door Seal Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed completed copies of Units 1 and 2 containment airlock door seal surveillance testing performed on February 15, 2001, to verify that the airlocks were capable of performing their intended safety related function and that the surveillance test satisfied the requirements contained in the Technical Specifications (TSs), the FSAR, and licensee procedures. The inspectors reviewed the significance of the lack of calibration and controls on the barometric pressure gage located in the Unit 1 facade, Elevation 66'. The inspectors also examined the completeness of the test data, supervisory review of completed surveillance tests results, and leakage measurement equipment calibration procedures. Following completion of the surveillance test, the inspectors inspected the containment airlock doors to verify that the test equipment was removed and the airlocks were returned to a condition in which their safety function could be performed.

The inspectors reviewed the following documents:

- TS 10A, "Containment Airlock Door Seal Testing - Unit 1," Revision 21
- TS 10A, Appendix B, "Hatch Door Seals - Unit 1," Revision 16
- TS 10A, "Containment Airlock Door Seal Testing - Unit 2," Revision 25
- TS 10A, Appendix B, "Hatch Door Seals - Unit 2," Revision 16
- FSAR Section 5.1.1, "Containment System Structure Design Bases," Revision dated June 2000
- FSAR Section 5.5, "Minimum Operating Conditions for Containment Integrity, External Pressure and Internal Vacuum, and Leakage," Revision dated June 2000
- FSAR Section 14.3, "Primary System Rupture," Revision dated June 2000
- CR 01-0632, "Steps in TS 10A, Appendix B Conducted on 2/16/01 Were Not Signed Off or N/A'd"
- CR 01-0670, "Lack of Controls for Barometer Used in Containment Upper Hatch Door Seal Testing"
- CR 01-0654, "FSAR Figure 14.3.4-17 Shows Peak Containment Temperature to be 292 Degrees Fahrenheit. FSAR 5.1.1 States Peak Containment Temperature is 286 Degrees Fahrenheit."

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Halon 1301 Fire Suppression System Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed and observed the semiannual surveillance testing of the Halon 1301 fire suppression system. The inspectors reviewed the following documents:

- TS Test TS-78, "Semiannual Halon 1301 Fire Suppression System Surveillance Test," Revision 12
- Point Beach Fire Protection Evaluation Report, Volume 4, Section 7.0, "Fire Protection Licensing Basis," August 1995.

The inspectors reviewed the test procedure for appropriateness. The inspectors also observed significant parts of the performance of the test to verify that the test was performed as written and all testing prerequisites were satisfied; that the test data were appropriately reviewed and met the requirements of the testing procedure; and that compensatory fire watches were established for the affected areas and were conducted at the appropriate periodicity. Following completion of the test, the inspectors walked down portions of the halon system to verify that it was returned to a condition in which it could perform its function.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Unit 1 Reactor Water Storage Tank (RWST) Level Transmitter and Indicator Calibrations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed Unit 1 RWST level transmitter and indicator calibrations on March 12 and 13, 2001. The level transmitters and indicators were calibrated once per refueling cycle and were risk significant in that these instruments were used in EOPs to manually transition from the injection to the containment sump recirculation phase of core inventory addition during a design basis accident. During the surveillance test, the inspectors observed the following specific activities or conditions to verify that they were adequate: calibration techniques; the condition of local heat tracing systems on RWST level sensing lines; wire removal and landing practices; radiation worker practices for removing, venting, and placing in service potentially contaminated detectors and transmitters; the calibration status of testing instruments; range adjustments made to control board indications when out-of-tolerance readings were found; level transmitter venting and restoration techniques so as to minimize air introduction into the detector; and temporary change notices made to the surveillance acceptance criteria. The inspectors also reviewed FSAR design basis requirements concerning the changeover from the injection to sump recirculation phase during a design basis accident and the RWST levels and inventories at which the transition was to occur. Following completion of the surveillance test, the inspectors walked down portions of the RWST to verify that the test equipment was removed and the RWST level transmitters and indicators were returned to a condition in which their safety function could be performed.

The inspectors reviewed the following documents:

- Instrumentation and Control Procedure (ICP) 4.19, "Instrumentation for Operations Inservice Test Support - Attachments 3A (L973, RWST Tank Level Transmitter), 5A (L972, RWST Tank Level Transmitter), 5B (I972, RWST Tank

Level Control Room Annunciators), and 6A (RWST Tank Local Barton Gage),” Revision 32

- FSAR Section 6.2, “Safety Injection System,” Revision dated June 2000
- FSAR Section 14.3.2, “Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident Analysis,” Revision dated June 2000
- Temporary Change Notice (TCN) 2001-0179, ICP 4.19, “Instrumentation for Operations Inservice Test Support,” dated 3/13/01
- EOP 1.3, Unit 1, “Transfer to Containment Sump Recirculation,” Steps 33 and 34, Revision 26
- CR 01-0789, “Initial Review of TCN 2001-0179 for ICP 4.19 Missed an Error in the Procedure.”

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

.1 CCW Heat Exchangers

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the temporary SW return piping from the CCW heat exchangers which was installed to allow installation of a permanent alternate CCW heat exchanger SW return line. The inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation and performed a walkdown of applicable portions of the SW system to verify that the system design function would be maintained with the temporary SW return piping installed when system operability was required. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the following documents:

- Installation Work Plan (IWP) 98-024*E-03, “Installation of an Alternate SW Return Header for the CCW Heat Exchangers,” Revision 1
- Point Beach FSAR, Section 9.1, “Component Cooling Water,” dated June 2000
- Point Beach FSAR, Section 9.6, “Service Water System,” dated June 2000.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Temperature Monitoring of the South Half of the Circulating Water Intake Structure

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the temporary temperature monitoring system installed at the south side of the circulating water intake structure. The temporary system was installed to provide temperature indication in the control room to optimize ice melt operations. The inspectors reviewed the safety evaluation, performed a walkdown of accessible components of the temporary system and reviewed control room indications to verify that the system design function would be maintained with the temporary monitoring

system installed when system operability was required. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the following documents:

- Temporary Modification (TM) TM 01-004, "Temperature Monitoring of the South Half of the PBNP [Point Beach Nuclear Plant] Water Intake Structure"
- Design Documentation, "Temperature Monitoring of the South Half of the PBNP Water Intake Structure," dated January 22, 2001
- Design Documentation, "Lake Temperature Monitoring at Circ Water Intake Crib, SE [Southeast] and SW [Southwest] Locations," dated March 9, 2001
- 10 CFR 50.59/72.48 Screening and Safety Evaluations SCR 2001-0056 and SCR 2001-0056-01, "TM 2001-004"
- Operating Instruction (OI) 38, "Circulating Water System Operation," Revisions 19-22
- Root Cause Evaluation (RCE) 00-007, "Unit 1 Manual Trip Due to Decreasing Fore Bay Level."

Finally, the inspectors reviewed CR 01-0690, "Erroneous Information in OI-38," which was initiated as a result of this inspection activity and was reviewed as part of the inspection scope. This CR involved the physical location of the temperature monitoring devices having been relocated from twenty feet away from the intake structure to one foot from the intake structure without a review of operating guidance provided in OI-38.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP1 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the control room simulator and technical support center during an emergency preparedness drill conducted on March 22, 2001. The inspection focused on the ability of the licensee to appropriately classify emergency conditions, complete timely notifications, and implement appropriate protective action recommendations in accordance with approved procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies

- .1 (Closed) Inspection Followup Items (IFIs) 50-266/98020-02, 03, 05; 50-301/98020-02, 03, 05: Untimely Deployment of Repair Teams During An Exercise. Restructure the Emergency Classification Procedure. Revise Procedure for Collection of Environmental Samples.

During the 1998 emergency preparedness exercise, the following concerns were identified: several repair teams were not deployed in a timely manner, the emergency

classification procedure should be restructured, and a procedure for collection of environmental samples should be revised. The inspectors determined that these three concerns were included in the licensee's exercise critique and were tracked in the licensee's corrective action system as CR 98-020, Actions 2, 3, and 5. These concerns did not have safety significance, based on the inspectors' screening of these concerns using the emergency preparedness Significance Determination Process.

- .2 (Closed) IFI 50-266/99010-01; 50-301/99010-01: The licensee made some changes to its Emergency Response Organization (ERO), and a related revision to the ERO's training program needed implementation. The inspectors determined that the licensee implemented its revised ERO training program per an item in the licensee's corrective action item tracking system, CR 99-010. This ERO training program concern did not have safety significance, based on the inspectors' screening of this concern using the emergency preparedness Significance Determination Process.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA3 Event Follow-up

- .1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-266/2001-001-00: Technical Specification Requirements for Testing RPS Actuation System Logic Not Satisfied. This LER discussed testing of the power range low power trip logic and the intermediate range high flux trip logic, which was not conducted within 24 hours after reducing power below 10 percent after having operated in excess of 10 percent power for greater than the monthly surveillance frequency specified in TS Table 15.4.1-1, Item 44. Although the surveillance testing of these trip logics had been accomplished prior to unit startups in the past, the licensee determined that a more conservative interpretation of the TS Table 15.4.1-1, Item 44, would have been to complete this surveillance test within 24 hours of proceeding below 10 percent power during unit shutdowns.

The inspectors reviewed the TS requirements concerning surveillance testing of the power range low power trip logic and the intermediate range high flux trip logic. The inspectors determined that past practices during shutdowns from operations at power that had lasted for greater than one month, had resulted in a missed surveillance test as specified in TS Table 15.4.1-1, Item 44. However, because subsequent testing of the power range low power trip logic and the intermediate range high flux trip logic was successfully conducted prior to the next unit startup, the safety function of the trips was not compromised and the equipment was proved to have been operable. Accordingly, the missed surveillance test was considered to be of very low safety significance (Green) and is dispositioned in Section 4OA7 of this report. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action system as CR 01-0118.

- .2 (Closed) LER 301/2000-003-00: Failure to Comply With Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement to Start Redundant Standby Emergency Power Supply. On November 1, 2000, the licensee staff identified a failure to comply with TS 15.3.7.B.1.g. Specifically, TS 15.3.7.B.1.g. required redundant standby emergency power supplies to be started within 24 hours before or after the normal power supply or emergency power supply to Unit 1 A06/B04 or Unit 2 A05/B03 safeguards busses being taken out-of-

service. On October 30, the normal emergency power supply (EDG G-02) to the Unit 2 safeguards Bus A05/B03 was declared out-of-service, due to the disabling of the control circuit for automatic start of the Train 'A' SW pumps on G-02 breaker closure to Bus 2A05. The circuit was disabled for a planned modification of a direct current (DC) power distribution panel. Contrary to the requirements of TS 15.3.7.B.1.g., the redundant standby emergency power supply (G-04) was not started within 24 hours of G-02 being declared out-of-service. However, because subsequent testing of G-04 was successfully conducted and adequate SW flow was available to support G-02 operation in the absence of 'A' Train SW pumps automatic start, due to plant conditions at the time (Unit 2 refueling outage), the missed action statement was considered to be of very low safety significance (Green) and is dispositioned in Section 4OA7 of this report. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action system as CR 00-3475.

- .3 (Closed) LER 50-266/98009-00: Inadequate Technical Specification Surveillance of Undervoltage Contacts in Safeguards Sequence Circuitry. In February 1998, during a review of Generic Letter 96-01, "Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits," the licensee determined that 480-volt undervoltage relay contacts in the opposite unit safeguards sequence circuitry were not tested in accordance with the requirements of TS 15.4.6.A.2 and Table 15.4.1-1, Item 13.

This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 98-0406. The inspectors reviewed the CR and the revised procedures, and concluded that the corrective actions were appropriate for closure of the issue. The inspectors reviewed the Group 1 questions from Manual Chapter 0610*, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," and concluded that the failure to test the 480-volt undervoltage relay contacts in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control," constituted a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. This minor violation is being documented to close out the LER.

4OA5 Other

- .1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-266/96018-17; 50-301/96018-17: The Calculated Reactor Coolant Pump Undervoltage Setpoint (3081 volts) in Calculation N-95-095 was Potentially Contrary to TS 15.2.3.1.B.(6). In December 1996, the NRC Operational Safety Team identified that the calculated voltage setting of 3081 volts, listed in Calculation No. N-95-0095, for the reactor coolant pump undervoltage trip setpoint (accounting for instrument inaccuracies) constituted approximately 70 percent of the observed bus voltage (about 4400 volts). This calculated value of 70 percent was contrary to TS 15.2.3.1.B.(6), which required the reactor coolant pump undervoltage trip to be set at greater than or equal to 75 percent of "nominal voltage."

This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CRs 96-1788 and 97-3399. The inspectors reviewed the CRs and revised calculations, and concluded that the corrective actions were appropriate for closure of the issue. The inspectors reviewed the Group 1 questions from Manual Chapter 0610*, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," and concluded that the failure to set the trip setpoint in accordance with the TS constituted a violation of minor significance that is not subject to

enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. This minor violation is being documented to close out this URI.

- .2 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-266/96018-18; 50-301/96018-18: Maximum Reactor Trip Breaker Opening Time. In December 1996, the NRC Operational Safety Team questioned the validity of the input value of 0.06 seconds for the reactor trip breaker trip time used in Calculation N-95-0095. The input value of 0.06 seconds was based on the longest time of 0.058 seconds recorded during Unit 1 refueling outage R22 reactor trip breaker testing. The inspectors identified that a value of 0.15 seconds had been assumed for this parameter in the Accident Analysis Basis Document DBD-T-35, "Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow," Revision 0, for the complete loss of flow accident. This item was categorized as a Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control."

The inspectors reviewed the revised calculation, revised procedures, and associated screening evaluation, and concluded that the corrective actions were appropriate for closure of the issue.

- .3 (Closed) IFI 50-301/97010-01: Review Unit 2 Containment Fan Cooler Performance Test. This IFI was written to track review of the Unit 2 containment fan coolers performance test, once it has been performed. The completed Unit 2 test results were reviewed during the safety system design and performance capability inspection conducted in April 2000 (Inspection Report 50-266/2000006(DRS); 50-301/2000006(DRS)). No problems were identified with the test.
- .4 (Closed) VIO 50-266/97010-02; 50-301/97010-02: Failure to Follow NP 5.3.1. This violation identified a specific instance where a CR was not written after a relay did not meet its acceptance criteria. The violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 97-1779. The inspectors were able to verify that the relay would have met its safety function, even though it did not meet the criteria; the relay was reset to an acceptable value.
- .5 (Closed) VIO 50-266/98013-02; 50-301/98013-02: Failure to Implement Procedures During Routine Breaker Maintenance. In June 1998, during an NRC medium- and low-voltage power circuit breaker inspection, the team reviewed completed Routine Maintenance Procedure (RMP) 9325, Revision 5, "50-DH-350 4.16 KV [kilovolt] Breaker Maintenance with Solenoid Operating Mechanism." The team noted that significant portions of the procedure requirements for breaker preventive maintenance activities, such as operating mechanism checks and internal breaker adjustments and lubrication requirements, had been marked N/A (not applicable) and were not performed. This was not consistent with vendor requirements and recommendations, and was not a proactive approach to good breaker maintenance. This item was categorized as a Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings."

The inspectors reviewed CR 98-2342, which had been written by the licensee to address the issue, and concluded that the corrective actions were appropriate.

- .6 (Closed) VIO 50-266/98013-03; 50-301/98013-03: Failure to Use Authorized Cleaning Compounds and Lubricants on Safety-Related Breakers. In June 1998, during an NRC medium- and low-voltage power circuit breaker inspection, the team conducted a walkdown of the licensee's lubricant storage locations. The team noted that most of the lubricants and sprays were purchased as commercial grade (non-quality assurance), and had no designated shelf-life. This condition provided a potential for technicians to use non-quality assurance lubricants/sprays on safety-related breaker components. This item was categorized as a Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV, "Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components."

The inspectors reviewed CRs 98-2361 and 98-2362, which had been written by the licensee to address the issue, and concluded that the corrective actions were appropriate.

- .7 (Closed) VIO 50-266/98013-04; 50-301/98013-04: Safety-Related Breakers Direct Current Measures/Adequate Voltage Control. In July 1998, during an NRC medium- and low-voltage power circuit breaker inspection, the team identified that the calculated voltages in Calculations N-92-100 and N-93-056 were not calculated at the battery minimum discharge voltage of 105 volts DC, as specified in the Point Beach FSAR. The calculations provided the allowable voltage drop for DC control circuits to verify that electrically operated breakers (medium- and low-voltage) operated at the minimum available voltage at the close and trip coils. This item was categorized as a Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control."

The inspectors reviewed CRs 98-2357, 98-2628, and 98-2454, which had been written by the licensee to address the issue, and concluded that the corrective actions were appropriate.

- .8 (Closed) IFI 50-266/98013-05; 50-301/98013-05: Insulation/Resistances Procedure Lower Than Recommendations. In July 1998, during an NRC medium- and low-voltage power circuit breaker inspection, the team determined that 4.16-kilovolt and 480-volt breakers were not tested to "open and trip" at the lowest functional control voltage. Normal testing was done at nominal voltage or 135 volts DC.

The inspectors reviewed CR 98-2357, which was written by the licensee to address the issue, and associated work packages, and concluded that the corrective actions were appropriate.

- .9 (Closed) IFI 50-266/98013-06; 50-301/98013-06: Acceptance Criteria Specified in Procedures for Insulation Resistances Were Much Lower Than Industry Recommendations. In July 1998, during an NRC medium- and low-voltage power circuit breaker inspection, the team noted that procedure RMP-9353, "ABB 5-HK-350 4.16 KV Breaker Routine Maintenance," included an acceptance criterion of 5 Megohms for the primary and secondary insulation resistance. The team considered this value low when compared with the industry recommendations of 1000 Megohms. Additionally, similar issues were identified in procedures RMP-9303 and RMP-9305.

The inspectors reviewed the revised procedures and determined that the corrective actions were appropriate for closure of the issue. The inspectors reviewed the Group 1

questions of Manual Chapter 0610*, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," and concluded that the failure to adequately test the 4.16-kilovolt breakers in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control," constituted a violation of minor significance that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. This minor violation is being documented to close out this IFI.

4OA6 Meeting(s)

On April 2, 2001, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. M. Reddemann and other members of licensee management. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4A07 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following findings of very low significance were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG 1600, for being dispositioned as Non-Cited Violations (NCVs).

If you deny the Non-Cited Violations, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Point Beach facility.

<u>NCV Tracking Number</u>	<u>Requirements Licensee Failed to Meet</u>
NCV 266/2001-07-01 301/2001-07-01	Technical Specification Section 15.6.11., Radiation Protection Program, required that an individual entering a high radiation area be under the control of a radiation work permit that includes specification of the radiation dose rates in the immediate work area and other appropriate radiation protection equipment and measures. Contrary to this requirement, during resin transfer operations on February 27, 2001, a laundry decontamination worker entered a high radiation area without getting radiation protection department approval or a brief as required by Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 01-005, Revision 0. This issue was entered in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 01-0611.

NCV 266/2001-07-02
301/2001-07-02

Technical Specification Table 15.4.1-1, "Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations, and Test of Instrument Channels," Item 44, "Reactor Protection System and Emergency Safety Feature Actuation System Logic," required monthly testing of Reactor Protection System trips which includes the power range low power trip and the intermediate range high flux trip logics. Contrary to this requirement, a surveillance test requirement was missed when the licensee failed to test the power range low power and the intermediate range high flux trips within 24 hours after reducing power below 10 percent after having operated in excess of 10 percent power for greater than the monthly surveillance test frequency. This issue was entered in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 01-0118.

NCV 301/2001-07-03

Technical Specification 15.3.7.B.1.g required redundant standby emergency power supplies to be started within 24 hours before or after the normal power supply or emergency power supply to Unit 1 A06/B04 or Unit 2 A05/B03 safeguards busses being taken out-of-service. Contrary to this requirement, the licensee identified that the standby emergency power supply to the Unit 2 A05/B03 was out-of-service for 37 hours without the redundant standby emergency power supply being started. This issue was entered in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 00-3475.

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

M. E. Reddemann, Site Vice President
A. Cayia, Plant Manager
B. J. O'Grady, Operations Manager
V. M. Kaminskas, Maintenance Manager
S. J. Thomas, Radiation Protection Manager
T. Webb, Licensing Manager
R. G. Mende, Director of Engineering
D. D. Schoon, System Engineering Manager

NRC

B. A. Wetzel, Point Beach Project Manager, NRR

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

50-266/2001-07-01 50-301/2001-07-01	NCV	Worker Entered a High Radiation Area Without Getting Radiation Protection Department Approval or Brief (Section 4OA7)
50-266/2001-07-02 50-301/2001-07-02	NCV	Technical Specification Requirements for Testing RPS Actuation System Logic Not Satisfied (Section 4OA7)
50-301/2001-07-03	NCV	Failure to Comply With Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement to Start Redundant Standby Emergency Power Supply (Section 4OA7)

Closed

50-266/98020-02 50-301/98020-02	IFI	Untimely Deployment of Repair Teams During an Exercise (Section 1EP5.1)
50-266/98020-03 50-301/98020-03	IFI	Restructure the Emergency Classification Procedure (Section 1EP5.1)
50-266/98020-05 50-301/98020-05	IFI	Revise Procedure for Collection of Environmental Samples (Section 1EP5.1)
50-266/99010-01 50-301/99010-01	IFI	Implement Revised ERO Training Program (Section 1EP5.2)

50-266/2001-001-00	LER	Technical Specification Requirements for Testing RPS Actuation System Logic Not Satisfied (Section 4OA3.1)
50-301/2000-003-00	LER	Failure to Comply With Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement to Start Redundant Standby Emergency Power Supply (Section 4OA3.2)
50-266/98009-00	LER	Inadequate Technical Specification Surveillance of Undervoltage Contacts in Safeguards Sequence Circuitry (Section 4OA3.3)
50-266/96018-17 50-301/96018-17	URI	The Calculated Reactor Coolant Pump Undervoltage Setpoint (3081 Volts) in Calculation N-95-095 Was Potentially Contrary to TS 15.2.3.1.B.(6) (Section 4OA5.1)
50-266/96018-18 50-301/96018-18	VIO	Maximum Reactor Trip Breaker Opening Time (Section 4OA5.2)
50-301/9710-01	IFI	Review Unit 2 Containment Fan Cooler Performance Test (Section 4OA5.3)
50-266/97010-02 50-301/97010-02	VIO	Failure to Follow NP 5.3.1 (Section 4OA5.4)
50-266/98013-02 50-301/98013-02	VIO	Failure to Implement Procedures During Routine Breaker Maintenance (Section 4OA5.5)
50-266/98013-03 50-301/98013-03	VIO	Failure to Use Authorized Cleaning Compounds and Lubricants on Safety-Related Breakers (Section 4OA5.6)
50-266/98013-04 50-301/98013-04	VIO	Safety-Related Breakers Direct Current Measures/Adequate Voltage Control (Section 4OA5.7)
50-266/98013-05 50-301/98013-05	IFI	Insulation/Resistances Procedure Lower Than Recommendations (Section 4OA5.8)
50-266/98013-06 50-301/98013-06	IFI	Acceptance Criteria Specified in Procedures for Insulation Resistances Were Much Lower Than Industry Recommendations (Section 4OA5.9)

Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

AC	Alternating Current
AOP	Abnormal Operating Procedure
CCW	Component Cooling Water
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CL	Checklist
CR	Condition Report
DBD	Design Basis Document
DC	Direct Current
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
EOP	Emergency Operating Procedure
ERO	Emergency Response Organization
FSAR	Final Safety Analysis Report
ICP	Instrumentation and Control Procedure
IT	Inservice Test
IFI	Inspection Follow Item
IR	Inspection Report
LER	Licensee Event Report
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NP	Nuclear Power Business Unit Procedure
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OI	Operating Instruction
OWA	Operator Workaround
PBNP	Point Beach Nuclear Plant
PMT	Post-Maintenance Testing
PPCS	Plant Process Computer System
psig	Pounds per Square Inch Gauge
RMP	Routine Maintenance Procedure
RPS	Reactor Protection System
RWST	Refueling Water Storage Tank
SW	Service Water
TCN	Temporary Change Notice
TDAFWP	Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
TM	Temporary Modification
TS	Technical Specification
WO	Work Order

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents listed in the inspection report, the documents listed below were reviewed by the inspectors.

Procedures

RMP-9303 DB-50 Routine Maintenance, Revision 13, May 3, 2000
RMP-26 Reactor Trip and Bypass Breaker Maintenance, Revision 15, May 28, 1997
RMP-9353 ABB 5-HK-350 4.16KV [kilovolt] Breaker Routing Maintenance, Revision 2, December 15, 1998
RMP-9305 DB-75 Routine Maintenance, Revision-6, October 16, 1998
RMP-9303 DB-50 Routine Maintenance, Revision 10, October 16, 1998
MWP-140 DB-25 Routine Maintenance, Revision-5, November 11, 1998
ORT-3A Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC [alternating current] (Train A) Unit-1, Revision-34, October 10, 2000
ORT-3A Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC (Train A) Unit-2, Revision-32, October 10, 2000
ORT-3B Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC (Train A) Unit-1, Revision-31, October 10, 2000
ORT-3B Safety Injection Actuation with Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC (Train B) Unit-1, Revision-31, October 10, 2000
1RMP-9056-3 Calibration and Testing of Safety Related Protective Relays A-01/A02, Revision 4, September 8, 1977

Condition Reports

98-2357 Westinghouse Breaker Open & Trip Lowest Functional Control Voltage Testing
98-2342 Westinghouse DH Breakers Routing Maintenance
98-2628 Minimum control voltage at terminals Calculation N-98-0095
98-2454 Possible Non-conservative Breaker Test
98-1788 Technical Specification Setting for the Reactor Trip on Undervoltage
97-3399 Relay Uncertainty Values Non-conservative
98-2361 Equipment Qualification Program for Circuit Breaker Lubrication
98-2362 LPS1 Usage in Safety Related 4.16 KV Westinghouse Breakers
08-0406 GL [Generic Letter] 96-01 EDG Loading Issue with Degraded / Inoperable 480V UV [Undervoltage] Contacts

Licensee Event Report

LER 266/98-009-00 Inadequate Technical Specification Surveillance of Undervoltage Contacts in Safeguards Sequence Circuitry, March 4, 1998

Work Orders

9811233 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9811241 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9811234 1B52-10C Red Volt & Time Test @ 90V

9811235 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9812466 1B52-12A Reduced Voltage Test
9810413 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9810411 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9810490 Perform Reduced Voltage/Timing Tests
9812468 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9810410 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9812469 1B52-14B Reduced Voltage Test
9810493 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9810400 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9810409 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9812471 1B52-16B Reduced Voltage Test
9810399 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9812472 1B52-17B Reduced Voltage Test
9810755 Troubleshoot BRKR not Closing at 96V
9810408 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9812473 Reduced Voltage Trip Testing
9810406 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9812474 1B52-20A Reduced Voltage Test
9812476 1B52-21A Reduced Voltage Test
9810404 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9812477 1B52-21C Reduced Voltage Test
9810414 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9810398 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9810403 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9811236 1B52-23B Red Volt Time Test @ 90V
9811237 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9908351 4.16KV Pre-Instal Test 30 VAC Insert
9812513 Perform Voltage Trip Testing
9811218 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9811219 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9812514 1A52-80 Reduced Voltage Test
9812515 1A52-81 Reduced Voltage Test
9811220 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9812516 1A52-84 Reduced Voltage Test
9812517 1A52-85 Reduced Voltage Test
9812518 1A52-86 Reduced Voltage Test
9812513 Reduced Voltage Trip Testing
9812486 Perform Reduced Voltage and Timing
9811239 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9811238 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9812487 Perform Voltage & Timing
9812488 Perform Reduced Voltage & Timing
9811240 Perform Voltage & Timing Test
9812489 2B52-27C Reduced Voltage Test
9812490 Perform Voltage and Timing
9812491 Perform Reduced Voltage and Timing
9812492 Perform Reduced Voltage and Timing
9812493 Perform Reduced Voltage and Timing

9810481	Perform Reduced Voltage/Timing Tests
9812538	2B52-29C Reduced Voltage Test
9810482	Perform Reduced Voltage/Timing Tests
9812539	Perform Reduced Voltage and Timing
9812540	2B52-31A Reduced Voltage Test
9812545	2B52-33C Reduced Voltage Test
9812546	Perform Voltage Trip Testing
9812547	Perform Reduced Voltage Trip Testing
9812548	Perform Reduced Voltage Trip Testing
9810479	Perform Voltage/Timing Tests
9812549	2B52-36C Reduced Voltage Test
9810480	Perform Reduced Voltage/Timing Tests
9810483	Perform Reduced Voltage/Timing Tests
9812550	Perform Reduced Voltage Trip Testing
9812551	Perform Reduced Voltage Trip Testing
9812552	Perform Reduced Voltage Trip Testing
9812553	Perform Reduced Voltage Trip Testing
9812554	Perform Reduced Voltage Trip Testing
9812555	Perform Reduced Voltage Trip Testing
9812557	Perform Reduced Voltage Trip Testing
9810417	Test Breaker
9817069	Pre-Installation Inspection of Bkr's
9812193	Perform Reduced Voltage Testing
9812530	2A52-87 Reduced Voltage Test
9812529	Perform Reduced Voltage and Timing
9812531	Perform Reduced Voltage and Timing
9811221	Perform Reduced Voltage and Timing Test
9812532	Perform Reduced Voltage Trip Testing
9811222	Perform Voltage and Timing Test
9811223	Perform Voltage and Timing Test
9812534	Perform Reduced Voltage and Timing
9812467	Perform Reduced Voltage and Timing
9812470	1B52-15C Reduced Voltage Test
9812475	1B52-20C Reduced Voltage Test
9812476	1B52-21A Reduced Voltage Test
9812477	1B52-21C Reduced Voltage Test
9812478	1B52-24C Reduced Voltage Test
9812533	2A52-93 Reduced Voltage Test
9812556	2B52-39C Reduced Voltage Test
9812544	2B52-32C Reduced Voltage Test
9812544	2B52-32C Reduced Voltage Test
99133708	P-38B Breaker Maintenance
9913711	2W-1A1 Breaker Maintenance Per RMP-9
9812543	Perform Reduced Voltage Trip Testing