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Docket No. 50-219

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TAC# 13047

Mr. I. R. Finfrock, Jr.
 Vice President - Generation
 Jersey Central Power & Light Company
 Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road
 Morristown, New Jersey 07960

Dear Mr. Finfrock:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 48 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16 for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application dated March 4, 1980.

This amendment approves MAPLHGR limits and multiplier for five and four recirculation loop operation and deletes unnecessary specifications for fuel which is no longer in the core.

Copies of our related Safety Evaluation and the Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief
 Operating Reactors Branch #5
 Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 48 to License No. DPR-16
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice of Issuance

cc w/enclosures:
 See next page

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OFFICE	DL: ORB #5 HSmith:cc	DL: ORB #5 WPaulson	OELD OELD	DL: ORB #5 DCrutchfield	DL: ORB #5 GLainsas
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

June 2, 1980

Docket No. 50-219

Mr. I. R. Finfrock, Jr.
Vice President - Generation
Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road
Morristown, New Jersey 07960

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See next page

June 2, 1980

cc

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**w/cy of JCP&LCo filing dtd. 3/4/80

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-219

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 48
License No. DPR-16

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Jersey Central Power & Light Company (the licensee) dated March 4, 1980, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 3.B. of Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16 is hereby amended to read as follows:

3.B Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 48, are hereby incorporated in the license. the licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #5
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: June 2, 1980

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 48
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-16
DOCKET NO. 50-219

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

<u>REMOVE</u>	<u>INSERT</u>
2.1.1	2.1.1
3.10-1	3.10-1
3.10-2	3.10-2
3.10-4	3.10-4
3.10-5	3.10-5
3.10-6	3.10-6
3.10-9	3.10-9
--	3.10-10
--	3.10-11
4.10-1	4.10-1
4.10-2	4.10-2

SECTION 2

SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS2.1 SAFETY LIMIT - FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY

Applicability: Applies to the interrelated variables associated with fuel thermal behavior.

Objective: To establish limits on the important thermal hydraulic variables to assure the integrity of the fuel cladding.

Specifications: A. When the reactor pressure is greater than 600 psia, the combination of reactor core flow and reactor thermal power to water shall not exceed the limit shown on Figure 2.1.1 for any fuel type.

A.1 Figure 2.1.1 applies directly when the total peaking factor is less than or equal to the following:

Fuel Type I I I F

- | | |
|--|------|
| a. Axial peak at core midplane or below of | 2.74 |
| b. Axial peak above core midplane of | 2.50 |

For 8 x 8 Fuel

- | | |
|--|------|
| a. Axial peak at core midplane or below of | 2.78 |
| b. Axial peak above midplane of | 2.61 |

A.2 For total peaking factors greater than those specified in Specification 2.1.A.1, the safety limit is reduced by the following:

$$SL = SL_0 \times \frac{PF_0}{PF}$$

where: SL = reduced safety limit
 SL₀ = safety limit from figure 2.1.1
 PF₀ = peaking factor specified in Specification 2.1.A.1
 PF = actual peaking factor

- B. When the reactor pressure is less than 600 psia or reactor flow is less than 10 percent of design, the reactor thermal power shall not exceed 354 Mwt.
- C. The neutron flux shall not exceed its scram setting for longer than 1.75 seconds.

3.10 CORE LIMITS

Applicability: Applies to core conditions required to meet the Final Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Performance.

Objective: To assure conformance to the peak clad temperature limitations during a postulated loss-of-coolant accident as specified in 10 CFR 50.46 (January 4, 1974) and to assure conformance to the 17.2 KW/ft. (for 7 x 7 fuel) and 14.5 KW/ft. (for 8 x 8 fuel) operating limits for local linear heat generation rate.

Specification: A. Average Planar LHGR

During power operation, the average linear heat generation rate (LHGR) of all the rods in any fuel assembly, as a function of average planar exposure, at any axial location shall not exceed the product of the maximum average planar LHGR (MAPLHGR) limit shown in Figures 3.10-1 (for 5-loop operation) and 3.10-2 (for 4-loop operation) and the axial MAPLHGR multiplier in Figure 3.10-3. If at any time during power operation it is determined by normal surveillance that the limiting value for APLHGR is being exceeded, action shall be initiated to restore operation to within the prescribed limits. If the APLHGR is not returned to within the prescribed limits within two (2) hours, action shall be initiated to bring the reactor to the cold shutdown condition within 36 hours. During this period surveillance and corresponding action shall continue until reactor operation is within the prescribed limits at which time power operation may be continued.

B. Local LHGR

During power operation, the linear heat generation rate (LHGR) of any rod in any fuel assembly, at any axial location shall not exceed the maximum allowable LHGR as calculated by the following equation:

$$\text{LHGR} \leq \text{LHGR}_d \left[1 - \frac{\Delta P}{P} \max \left(\frac{L}{\text{LT}} \right) \right]$$

Where: LHGR_d = Limiting LHGR

$\frac{\Delta P}{P}$ = Maximum Power Spiking Penalty

LT = Total Core Length - 144 inches

L = Axial position above bottom of core

<u>Fuel Type</u>	<u>LHGR_d</u>	<u>ΔP/P</u>
IIIF	17.2	.033
V	14.5	.033
VB	14.5	.039

If at any time during operation it is determined by normal surveillance that the limiting value for LHGR is being exceeded, action shall be initiated to restore operation to within the prescribed limits. If the LHGR is not returned to within the prescribed limits within two (2) hours, action shall be initiated to bring the reactor to the cold shutdown condition within 36 hours. During this period, surveillance and corresponding action shall continue until reactor operation is within the prescribed limits at which time power operation may be continued.

C. Assembly Averaged Power Void Relationship
(Applicable to Fuel Type IIIF for 4-loop Operation Only)

During power operation, the assembly average void fraction and assembly power shall be such that the following relationship is satisfied:

$$\left(\frac{I-VF}{PR \times FCP} \right) \geq B$$

Where: VF = Bundle average void fraction
PR = Assembly radial power factor
FCP = Fractional core power (relative to 1930 MWt)
B = Power-Void limit

The limiting values of "B" for fuel type IIIF is .377.

D. Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)

During steady state power operation, MCPR shall be greater than or equal to the following:

<u>ARPM Status</u>	<u>MCPR Limit</u>
1. If any two (2) LPRM assemblies which are input to the APRM system and are separated in distance by less than	1.64

affect the calculated peak clad temperature by less than $\pm 20^{\circ}\text{F}$ relative to the peak temperature for a typical fuel design, the limit on the average linear heat generation rate is sufficient to assure that calculated temperatures are below the limits specified in 10 CFR 50.46 (January 4, 1974).

The maximum average planar LHGR limits shown in Figure 3.10-1 for Type IIIIF, V and VB fuel for five loop operation and in Figure 3.10-2 for Type V and VB fuel for four loop operation are the result of LOCA analyses performed by Exxon Nuclear Company utilizing an evaluation model developed by Exxon Nuclear Company in compliance with Appendix K to 10 CFR 50 (2). Operation is permitted with the four-loop limits of Figure 3.10-2 provided the fifth loop has its discharge valve closed and its bypass and suction valves open. In addition, the maximum average planar LHGR limits shown in Figures 3.10-1 and 3.10-2 for Type V and VB fuel were analyzed with 100% of the spray cooling coefficients specified in Appendix K to 10 CFR Part 50 for 7x7 fuel. These spray heat transfer coefficients were justified in the ENC Spray Cooling Heat Transfer Test Program (3).

The maximum average planar LHGR limits shown in Figure 3.10-2 for Type IIIIF fuel for four loop operation is the result of LOCA analyses performed by Exxon Nuclear Company utilizing blowdown results obtained from a General Electric Company evaluation model in compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix K(1). Single failure considerations were based on the revised Oyster Creek Single Failure Analysis submitted to the Staff on July 15, 1975.

The effect of axial power profile peak location is evaluated for the worst break size by performing a series of fuel heat-up calculations. A set of multipliers is devised to reduce the allowable bottom skewed axial power peaks relative to center or above center peaked profiles. The major factors which lead to the lower MAPLHGR limits with bottom skewed axial power profiles are the change in canister quench time at the axial peak location and a deterioration in heat transfer during the extended downward flow period during blowdown. The MAPLHGR multiplier in Figure 3.10-3 shall only be applied to MAPLHGR determined by the evaluation model described in reference 2.

The possible effects of fuel pellet densification are : 1) creep collapse of the cladding due to axial gap formation; 2) increase in the LHGR because of pellet column shortening; 3) power spikes due to axial gap formation; and 4) changes in stored energy due to increased radial gap size.

Calculations show that clad collapse is conservatively predicted not to occur during the exposure lifetime of the fuel. Therefore, clad collapse is not considered in the analyses.

Since axial thermal expansion of the fuel pellets is greater than axial shrinkage due to densification, the analyses of peak clad temperature do not consider any change in LHGR due to pellet column shortening. Although the formation of axial gaps might produce a local power spike at one location on any one rod in a fuel assembly, the increase in local power density would be on the order of only 2% at the axial midplane. Since small local variations in power distribution have a small effect on peak clad temperature, power spikes were not considered in the analysis of loss-of-coolant accidents.

Changes in gap size affect the peak clad temperatures by their effect on pellet clad thermal conductance and fuel pellet stored energy. Treatment of this effect combined with the effects of pellet cracking, relocation and subsequent gap closure are discussed in XN-174. Pellet-clad thermal conductance for Type IIIIF, V and VB fuel was calculated using the GAPEX model (XN-174).

The specification for local LHGR assures that the linear heat generation rate in any rod is less than the limiting linear heat generation even if fuel pellet densification is postulated. The power spike penalty for Type IIIIF, V and VB fuel is based on analyses presented in Facility Change Request No. 5, Facility Change Request No. 6 and Amendment No. 76, respectively. The analysis assumes a linearly increasing variation in axial gaps between core bottom and top, and assures with 95% confidence that no more than one fuel rods exceeds the design linear heat generation rate due to power spiking.

The General Electric non-jet pump BWR BCCS model (1) utilizes an empirical correlation to determine the duration of nucleate boiling heat transfer in the early period following the postulated pipe break. This correlation for time to dryout is found to be proportional to the ratio of assembly water volume to power. Dryout time is a significant parameter in determining the extent of nucleate and transition boiling heat transfer, and consequently the peak cladding temperature.

By maintaining reactor power and void fraction as specified in 3.10.C, dryout times at least as long as that used in the LOCA


analysis will be assured. The limiting value of B in Specification 3.10.C was developed for core conditions of 100% power and 70% flow, the minimum flow that could be achieved without automatic plant trip (flow biased high neutron flux scram). Such a condition is never achieved during actual operation due to the neutron flux rod block and the inherent reactor powerflow relationship. The MAPLHGR results for fuel type IIIIF shown in Figure 3.10-2 were evaluated for 102% power and 70% flow, thus the 2% conservatism for instrument uncertainty is retained in the limiting value of B. Additional conservatism is provided by the following assumptions used in determining the B limit.

1. All heat was assumed to be removed by the active channel flow. No credit was taken for heat removal by leakage flow (10% of total flow).
2. Each fuel type was assumed to be operating at full thermal power rather than the reduced power resulting from the more limiting conditions imposed by Figure 3.10-2.

The loss of coolant accident (LOCA) analyses are performed using an initial core flow that is 70% of the rated value. The rationale for use of this value of flow is based on the possibility of achieving full power (100% rated power) at a reduced flow condition. The magnitude of the reduced flow is limited by the flow relationship for overpower scram. The low flow condition for the LOCA analysis ensures a conservative analysis because this initial condition is associated with a higher initial quality in the core relative to higher flow-lower quality conditions at full power. The high quality-low flow condition for the steady-state core operation results in rapid voiding of the core during the blowdown period of the LOCA. The rapid degradation of the coolant conditions due to voiding results in a decrease in the time to boiling transition and thus degradation of heat transfer with consequent higher peak cladding temperatures. Thus, analysis of the LOCA using 70% flow and 102% power provides a conservative basis for evaluation of the peak cladding temperature and the maximum average planar linear heat generation rate (MAPLHGR) for the reactor.

The minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) calculated for the initial conditions of the LOCA represents the thermal margin of the hot assembly to the boiling transition point. An increase in core flow from 70% would result in additional thermal margin (higher MCPR value). The conservative ECCS analysis bounds the range of permitted reactor operating conditions so long as operating MCPR's are above the values

FIGURE 3.10-1
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE AVERAGE PLANAR
LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE
(FIVE LOOP OPERATION)



Amendment No. 16, 24, 30, 33, 35, 39, 48

FIGURE 3.10-2
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE AVERAGE PLANAR
LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE
(FOUR LOOP OPERATION)





FIGURE 3.10-3

AXIAL MAPLHGR MULTIPLIER



4.10 ECCS RELATED CORE LIMITS

Applicability: Applies to the periodic measurement during power operation of core parameters related to ECCS performance.

Objective: To assure that the limits of Section 3.10 are not being violated.

Specification: A. Average Planar LHGR.

The APLHGR for each type of fuel as a function of average planar exposure shall be checked daily during reactor operation at $\geq 25\%$ rated thermal power.

B. Local LHGR

The LHGR as a function of core height shall be checked daily during reactor operation at $\geq 25\%$ rated thermal power.

C. Assembly Averaged Power-Void Relationship
(Applicable to Fuel Type IIIIF for 4-Loop Operation Only)

Compliance with the Power-Void Relationship in Section 3.10. will be verified at least once during a startup between 50% and 70% power, when steady state power operation is attained and at least every 72 hours thereafter during power operation.

D. Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR).

MCPR and APRM status shall be checked daily during reactor operation and $\geq 25\%$ rated thermal power.

Basis: The LHGR shall be checked daily to determine whether fuel burnup or control rod movement has caused changes in power distribution. Since changes due to burnup are slow, and only a few control rods are moved daily, a daily check of power distribution is adequate.

The Power-Void Relationship is verified between 50% and 70% power during a startup. This single verification during startup is acceptable since operating experience has shown that even under the most extreme void conditions encountered at lower power levels, the relationship is not violated. Additionally reduced power operation involves less stored heat in the core and lower decay heat rates which would add further margin to limiting peak clad temperatures in the event of a LOCA.

Verification when steady state power operation is attained and every 72 hours thereafter is appropriate since once steady state conditions are achieved, the void fraction, radial peaking factor, and power level that combine to form the relationship are unlikely to change so rapidly to result in a significant change during that period.

The minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) is unlikely to change significantly during steady state power operation so that 24 hours is an acceptable frequency for surveillance. In the event of a single pump trip, 24 hour surveillance interval remains acceptable because the accompanying power reduction is much larger than the change in MAPLHGR limits for four loop operation at the corresponding lower steady state power level as compared to five loop operation. The 24 hour frequency is also acceptable for the APRM status check since neutron monitoring system failures are infrequent and a downscale failure of either an APRM or LPRM initiates a control rod withdrawal block thus precluding the possibility of a control rod withdrawal error.

At core power levels less than or equal to 25% rated thermal power the reactor will be operating at or above the minimum recirculation pump speed. For all designated control rod patterns which may be employed at this point, operating plant experience and thermal hydraulic analysis indicate that the resulting APLHGR, LHGR and MCPR values all have considerable margin to the limits of section 3.10. Consequently, monitoring of these quantities below 25% of rated thermal power is not required.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 48 TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-16

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-219

1.0 Introduction

By letter dated March 4, 1980 (Reference 1), Jersey Central Power & Light Company (the licensee), requested an amendment to Appendix A of Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16 for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. The request proposed two sets of Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (MAPLHGR) limits. One limit is for five recirculation loop operation and the other is for four recirculation loop operation. The limits for five loop operation are identical to those previously approved by License Amendment No. 33 for Oyster Creek, except that the limit for fuel types V and VB have been extended to 40 Giga-Watt-Day per Metric Tonne Metal (GWD/MTM). The limits for four loop operation result from a new Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) performance analysis with the exception of the limits for fuel type III. Fuel type III limits are the same as the current specification limits. This proposed change would also re-establish the MAPLHGR multiplier in the plant Technical Specifications for five and four loop operation, and delete unnecessary specifications for fuel which is no longer in the core. The modifications for four loop operation are supported by an Exxon ECCS performance analysis enclosed in Reference 1.

2.0 Evaluation

The proposed change was submitted to demonstrate continued compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46. Approval of the proposal would return the MAPLHGR limits of all fuel types (IIIF, V and VB) to those specified in Amendment No. 33 (Reference 2) and extend the limits for type V and VB fuel to 40 GWD/MTM. The ECCS Evaluation Models used for the proposed changes are the same models used to calculate MAPLHGR limits of Amendment No. 33 (Reference 3). The model application to Oyster Creek, including the MAPLHGR limits calculation, is presented in Reference 4. This request also includes a set of MAPLHGR limits of all fuel types (IIIF, V and VB) for four recirculation pump operation. The ECCS evaluation models used for fuel types V and VB are the same models used to calculate MAPLHGR limits for five pump operation. (Reference 3) and the MAPLHGR limits for fuel type IIIF are those of the current Technical Specification. LOCA analyses for the four pump operation are presented in Reference 5.

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Due to the unavailability of critical replacement parts, one recirculation pump was removed from service and the plant operation continued under more restrictive limits adapted (Reference 6 and 7) and specified in the Amendment No. 35 (Reference 8), and modified by Amendment No. 39 (Reference 9). In letters of April 30, 1979 (Reference 6) and May 24, 1979 (Reference 7), the licensee stated that the Oyster Creek Station would continue to operate within the more restrictive limits until such time that the analyses were completed to justify operation at higher limits, or a fifth recirculation pump was restored to service. The proposed Technical Specifications would enable Oyster Creek to operate with five or four recirculation pumps in service.

A license amendment approving the request would also return the MAPLHGR multiplier to the Technical Specifications as approved by Amendment No. 33 (Reference 2). The MAPLHGR would then be applicable to all fuel types for five and four loop operation.

Assembly Averaged Power Void Relationship (AAPVR) would be applicable to fuel type IIIF for four loop operation only. MAPLHGR limits of fuel types IIIF, V and VB for five loop operation and fuel types V and VB for four loop operation are based on ENC NJP-BWR ECCS-EM (Reference 3). This model does not require input from a blowdown analysis of the plant by GE ECCS-EM (Reference 10). Therefore, AAPVR would no longer be applicable to fuel types IIIF, V and VB for five loop operation and fuel types V and VB for four loop operation.

The proposed Technical Specifications would also delete references to fuel types I, II, IIIE for peaking factors in Section 2.1.A.1, local LHGR in Section 3.10.B, and pellet-clad thermal conductance and power spike penalty in the Section 3.10.B basis. These fuel assemblies are no longer in the core and are not expected to be reinserted. Therefore, these references are no longer applicable.

The delay time of isolation condenser initiation from reactor low low water level was changed from 10 to 3 seconds by Amendment No. 39 (9). The event times are reported in References 3 and 5 for five and four loop, respectively. LOCA analyses indicate a 10 second delay. Calculations have not been performed that specifically vary isolation condenser delay time; however, several calculations have been performed in which isolation condenser capability was varied. They include calculations with: (1) no isolation condenser, (2) one isolation condenser operating, (3) both isolation condensers operating. Results of the above calculations are reported in Reference 3. In all cases where isolation condenser capability was modeled, the PCT was decreased, because of a slight increase in the rate of system depressurization. Therefore, the effect of only an additional 7 seconds of isolation condenser injection is expected to be small.

Based on our review of the licensee's submittal, we conclude that the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station would be in conformance with 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K to 10 CFR 50 when operated in accordance with the proposed Technical Specifications. We, therefore, find the licensee's request acceptable.

3.0 Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

4.0 Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner; and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: June 2, 1980

References

1. Letter from I. R. Finfrock Jr., (JCP&L) to Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation (USNRC), March 4, 1980.
2. NRC (D.L. Ziemann) Letter to JCP&L (I. R. Finfrock). Amendment No. 33 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16 for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, dated November 11, 1978.
3. XN-75-55-(A), XN-75-55, Supplement 1-(A), XN-75-55 Supplement 2-(A), Revision 2, April 1977. Exxon Nuclear Company WREM Based NJP-BWR ECCS Evaluation Model and Application to the Oyster Creek Plant.
4. XN-NF-77-55, Revision I, March 1978. Oyster Creek LOCA Analyses Using the ENC NJP-BWR ECCS Evaluation Model.
5. XN-NF-79-78, January 1980.
LOCA-ECCS Analyses Supporting Four-Pump Operation of Oyster Creek Reactor.
6. JCP&L (I. R. Finfrock) Letter to NRC (Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation). Four Loop Operation, dated April 30, 1979.
7. JCP&L (I. R. Finfrock) Letter to NRC (Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation). Request for Amendment to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16. Technical Specification Change Request No. 73, dated May 24, 1979.
8. NRC (D. L. Ziemann) Letter to JCP&L (I. R. Finfrock). Amendment No. 35 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station dated May 30, 1979.
9. NRC (D. L. Ziemann) Letter to JCP&L (I. R. Finfrock). Amendment No. 39 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, dated July 23, 1979.
10. JCP&L Letter to NRC. Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis Reevaluation and Technical Specification Change Request No. 42, Attachment 1, dated December 23, 1975.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONDOCKET NO. 50-219JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANYNOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO PROVISIONAL
OPERATING LICENSE

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 48 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-16, issued to Jersey Central Power & Light Company (the licensee), which revised the Technical Specifications for operation of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (the facility) located in Ocean County, New Jersey. The amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

This amendment approves MAPLHGR limits and multiplier for five and four recirculation loop operation and deletes unnecessary specifications for fuel which is no longer in the core.

The application for amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated March 4, 1980, (2) Amendment No. 48 to License No. DPR-16, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20555, and at the Ocean County Library, Brick Township Branch, 401 Chambers Bridge Road, Brick Town, New Jersey 08723. A single copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 2nd day of June, 1980.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #5
Division of Licensing

MAPLHAR Limits - 5 and y recirculation 100p oper.

William O. Miller, Chief
License Fee Management Branch, ADM

Date: _____
Amended Form Date: _____

FACILITY AMENDMENT CLASSIFICATION - DOCKET NO(S). 50-219

Licensee: Jersey Central Power + Light

Plant Name and Unit(s): Oyster Creek

License No(s): DPR-16 Mail Control No: 8003110539

Request Dated: 3/4/80 Fee Remitted: Yes No

Assigned TAC No: 13047

Licensee's Fee Classification: Class I , II , III ^(#4,000), IV , V , VI ,
None . (Pre-Final Form)

Amendment No. _____ Date of Issuance _____

1. This request has been reviewed by DOR/DPM in accordance with Section 170.22 of Part 170 and is properly categorized.

2. This request is incorrectly classified and should be properly categorized as Class _____. Justification for classification or reclassification: _____

3. Additional information is required to properly categorize the request: _____

4. This request is a Class _____ type of action and is exempt from fees because it:

(a) _____ was filed by a nonprofit educational institution,

(b) _____ was filed by a Government agency and is not for a power reactor,

(c) _____ is for a Class _____ (can only be a I, II, or III) amendment which results from a written Commission request dated _____ for the application and the amendment is to simplify or clarify license or technical specifications, has only minor safety significance, and is being issued for the convenience of the Commission, or

(d) _____ other (state reason therefor): _____

HS 5/13/80
W Paulson

Dennis M. Cutcliffe
Division of Operating Reactors/Project Management

The above request has been reviewed and is exempt from fees.

William O. Miller, Chief _____ Date _____
License Fee Management Branch