

September 17, 1996

Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia  
Executive Vice President  
and Chief Nuclear Officer  
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Generation Business Group D-2  
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Syracuse, NY 13202

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2  
(TAC NO. M95405)

Dear Mr. Sylvia:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 77 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated May 15, 1996.

The amendment revises TS 3/4.3.2, "Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," to establish a range of allowable values and trip setpoints for high temperatures in the Main Steam Line Tunnel Lead Enclosure.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,  
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:  
Darl S. Hood, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-410

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 77 to NPF-69  
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

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and Chief Nuclear Officer  
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation  
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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Darl S. Hood".

Darl S. Hood, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-410

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cc w/encls: See next page

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DATED: September 17, 1996

AMENDMENT NO. 77 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-69-NINE MILE POINT  
UNIT 2

Docket File  
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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-410

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 77  
License No. NPF-69

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) dated May 15, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, as revised through Amendment No. 77 are hereby incorporated into this license. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Alexander W. Dromerick, Acting Director  
Project Directorate I-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 17, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 77 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-69

DOCKET NO. 50-410

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages

v  
3/4 3-17  
3/4 3-19A  
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3/4 3-25  
3/4 3-28

Insert Pages

v  
3/4 3-17  
3/4 3-19A  
3/4 3-19B\*  
3/4 3-25  
3/4 3-28

\* New page



INDEX

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
<u>REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS (Continued)</u>	
3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM .....	3/4 1-19
Figure 3.1.5-1 Sodium Pentaborate Tank Volume vs. Concentration Requirements .....	3/4 1-22
<u>3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS</u>	
3/4.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE .....	3/4 2-1
3/4.2.2 AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR SETPOINTS .....	3/4 2-2
3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (ODYN OPTION B) .....	3/4 2-3
3/4.2.4 LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE .....	3/4 2-5
<u>3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION</u>	
3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION .....	3/4 3-1
Table 3.3.1-1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation .....	3/4 3-2
Table 3.3.1-2 Reactor Protection System Response Times .....	3/4 3-6
Table 4.3.1.1-1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements .....	3/4 3-7
3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION .....	3/4 3-10
Table 3.3.2-1 Isolation Actuation Instrumentation .....	3/4 3-12
Table 3.3.2-2 Isolation Actuation Instrumentation Setpoints .....	3/4 3-17
Figure 3.3.2-1 Allowable and Trip Setpoint Values for the Main Steam Line Tunnel Lead Enclosure .....	3/4 3-19B
Table 3.3.2-3 Isolation System Instrumentation Response Time .....	3/4 3-20
Table 3.3.2-4 Valve Groups and Associated Isolation Signals .....	3/4 3-22
Table 4.3.2.1-1 Isolation Actuation Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements .....	3/4 3-25
3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ..	3/4 3-29
Table 3.3.3-1 Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation .....	3/4 3-30
Table 3.3.3-2 Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation Setpoints .....	3/4 3-35
Table 3.3.3-3 Emergency Core Cooling System Response Times .....	3/4 3-39

TABLE 3.3.2-2

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

<u>TRIP FUNCTION</u>	<u>TRIP SETPOINT</u>	<u>ALLOWABLE VALUE</u>
1. <u>Primary Containment Isolation Signals</u> (Continued)		
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level*		
1) Low, Low, Low, Level 1	≥ 17.8 in.	≥ 10.8 in.
2) Low, Low, Level 2	≥ 108.8 in.	≥ 101.8 in.
3) Low, Level 3	≥ 159.3 in.	≥ 157.8 in.
b. Drywell Pressure - High	≤ 1.68 psig	≤ 1.88 psig
c. Main Steam Line		
1) Radiation - High**	≤ 3x Full Power Background	≤ 3.6x Full Power Background
2) Pressure - Low	≥ 766 psig	≥ 746 psig
3) Flow - High	≤ 121.5 psid	≤ 122.8 psid
d. Main Steam Line Tunnel		
1) Temperature - High	≤ 167.2°F	≤ 170.6°F
2) ΔTemperature - High	≤ 70.0°F	≤ 71.7°F
3) Temperature - High MSL Lead Enclosure***	≤ 148.2°F	≤ 151.6°F
e. Condenser Vacuum Low	≥ 8.5 in Hg vacuum	≥ 7.6 in. Hg vacuum
f. RHR Equipment Area Temperature - High (HXs/A&B Pump Rooms)	≤ 135°F	≤ 144.5°F
g. Reactor Vessel Pressure - High (RHR Cut-in Permissive)	≤ 128 psig	≤ 148 psig
h. SGTS Exhaust - High Radiation	≤ 5.7x10 <sup>-3</sup> μCi/cc	≤ 1.0x10 <sup>-2</sup> μCi/cc

Table 3.3.2-2 (Continued)

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

- \*\*** Within 24 hours prior to the planned start of the hydrogen injection test and with the reactor power at greater than 20% rated power, the normal full-power radiation background level and associated trip and alarm setpoints may be changed based on a calculated value of the radiation level expected during the test. The background radiation level and associated trip and alarm setpoints may be adjusted during the test program based on either calculations or measurements of actual radiation levels resulting from hydrogen injection. The background radiation level shall be determined and associated trip and alarm setpoints shall be reset within 24 hours after completion of the hydrogen injection test. At reactor power levels below 20% rated power hydrogen injection shall be terminated, and control rod withdrawal is prohibited until the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor trip setpoint is restored to its pre-test value.
- \*\*\*** The trip setpoint and allowable value for a channel may be established based on Figure 3.3.2-1, if:
- a. the actual ambient temperature reading for all operable channels in the Lead Enclosure area are equal to or greater than the ambient temperature used as the basis for the setpoint, and
  - b. the absence of steam leaks in the Main Steam Line Tunnel Lead Enclosure area is verified by visual inspection prior to increasing a channel setpoint, and
  - c. a surveillance is implemented in accordance with Note "d" of Table 4.3.2.1-1.




FIGURE 3.3.2-1 Allowable and Trip Setpoint Values for the Main Steam Line Tunnel Lead Enclosure

**TABLE 4.3.2.1-1**

**ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS**

<u>TRIP FUNCTION</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL FUNCTION TEST</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>	<u>OPERATION CONDITIONS FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED</u>
1. <u>Primary Containment Isolation Signals</u>				
a. Reactor Vessel Water Level				
1) Low, Low, Low, Level 1	S	Q	R(a)	1, 2, 3
2) Low, Low, Level 2	S	Q	R(a)	1, 2, 3 and *
3) Low, Level 3	S	Q	R(a)	1, 2, 3
b. Drywell Pressure - High	S	Q	R(a)	1, 2, 3
c. Main Steam Line				
1) Radiation - High	S	Q	R	1, 2, 3
2) Pressure - Low	S	Q	R(a)	1
3) Flow - High	S	Q	R(a)	1, 2, 3
d. Main Steam Line Tunnel				
1) Temperature - High	S	Q	R(b)	1, 2, 3
2) ΔTemperature - High	S	Q	R(b)	1, 2, 3
3) Temperature - High MSL Lead Enclosure	S(d)	Q	R(b)	1, 2, 3
e. Condenser Vacuum - Low	S	Q	R(a)	1, 2**, 3**
f. RHR Equipment Area Temperature - High (HXs/A&B Pump Rooms)	S	Q	R(b)	1, 2, 3
g. Reactor Vessel Pressure High (RHR Cut-in Permissive)	S	Q	R(a)	1, 2, 3

NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2

3/4 3-25

AMENDMENT NO. 44 77

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TABLE NOTATIONS

- \* During CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. This only applies to secondary containment isolation and automatic start of SGTS.
- \*\* When any turbine stop valve is greater than 90% open and/or when the key-locked condenser low vacuum bypass switch is open (in Normal position).
- † When handling irradiated fuel in the reactor building and during CORE ALTERATIONS and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
- (a) Perform the calibration procedure for the trip unit setpoint at least once per 92 days.
- (b) Calibration excludes sensors; sensor response and comparison shall be done in lieu of.
- (c) Manual isolation pushbuttons are tested at least once per operating cycle during shutdown. All other circuitry associated with manual isolation shall receive a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 92 days as part of the circuitry required to be tested for the automatic system isolation.
- (d) In addition to the normal shift channel check, if a channel setpoint has been established using Figure 3.3.2-1, then once per shift the actual ambient temperature reading for all operable channels in the Lead Enclosure area shall be verified to be equal to or greater than the ambient temperature used as the basis for the setpoint.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 77 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-69

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2

DOCKET NO. 50-410

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated May 15, 1996, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) requested an amendment to the operating license to change the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (NMP2). The proposed amendment would revise TS 3/4.3.2, "Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," to establish a range of allowable values and trip setpoints for high temperatures in the Main Steam Line Tunnel Lead Enclosure (MSLTLE). The change is intended to prevent unnecessary challenges to the plant and its safety systems due to environmental conditions.

2.0 BACKGROUND

The main steam tunnel high temperature isolation actuation instrumentation is part of the Leak Detection System that is discussed in Section 5.2.5 of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and shown on USAR Figure 7.6-1, Sheet 2. The purpose of main steam line tunnel temperature instrumentation is to provide for early detection of a main steam line leak and cause automatic closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). The licensee established the current instrumentation temperature setpoints based upon calculations using an initial 80 °F temperature and a 25 gallon per minute (gpm) steam leak. The average winter temperature in the tunnel is 85 °F and the average summer temperature is 110 °F. The isolation instrumentation setpoints assure that a main steam line leak in the MSLTLE would be isolated before a pipe break occurred (the "leak-before-break" concept).

The licensee finds that a change to the TS is needed because, under the existing TSs, the isolation actuation instrumentation temperature setpoints provide insufficient margin to the actual temperatures for the MSLTLE, particularly during hot summer conditions. To provide the necessary sensitivity throughout the year for a single actuation setpoint, the transient analysis for a steam leak in the MSLTLE utilized the winter temperature as an initial condition. However, using a single temperature actuation setpoint of no more than 148.2 °F and an allowable value of no more than 151.6 °F (80 °F MSLTLE ambient temperature and a 25 gpm steam leak) allows the MSLTLE ambient temperature in the summer to approach the isolation actuation setpoint. Although the MSLTLE high temperatures are not the result of steam leaking in the area, a minor disturbance in the turbine building ventilation system could

result in an unwarranted isolation actuation due to high temperature in the MSLTLE at full power, with resulting MSIVs closure and reactor scram.

### 3.0 EVALUATION

Since the temperature in the MSLTLE resulting from a postulated steam leak depends on the initial ambient temperature in the area, the licensee has calculated the acceptable trip setpoint and allowable temperature for MSLTLE ambient temperatures from 80 °F to 130 °F as shown on TS Figure 3.3.2-1. The methodology utilized to determine the allowable values and setpoints is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Instrument Setpoints for Safety-Related Systems," Revision 2, February 1986, and Instrument Society of America Standard ISA-S67.04, "Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation Used in Nuclear Power Plants," 1982.

The licensee proposes to change the instrumentation setpoint and allowable value for high temperature based upon the MSLTLE ambient temperatures of TS Figure 3.3.2-1 subject to the following three conditions:

- a. The actual ambient temperature reading for all operable channels in the MSLTLE area are equal to or greater than the ambient temperature used as the basis for the setpoint, and
- b. The absence of steam leaks in the MSLTLE area is verified by visual inspection prior to increasing a channel setpoint, and
- c. A surveillance is implemented as follows: "In addition to the normal shift channel check, if a channel setpoint has been established using Figure 3.3.2-1, then once per shift the actual ambient temperature readings for all operable channels in the MSLTLE shall be verified to be equal to or greater than the ambient temperature used as the basis for the setpoint."

Since the calculated values used in Figure 3.3.2-1 are based upon normal operating conditions, the absence of any steam leaks in the MSLTLE needs to be verified prior to increasing the setpoint of any instrument channel. The NRC staff finds that visual inspection in accordance with item b above is a sufficient requirement to this end. The NRC staff also finds that the surveillance required by item c above will provide adequate verification of the continued validity of a setpoint established using Figure 3.3.2-1.

The surveillance frequency of once per shift is adequate to preclude operation outside the allowable range and permit compensatory action should the actual MSLTLE temperature be trending toward the setpoint basis temperature. The licensee has determined that the MSLTLE temperature responds relatively slowly to even large and sudden environmental changes, such as the rapid reduction in lake water temperature that has been experienced at Nine Mile Point in the past. Available compensatory actions include reducing the trip setpoint consistent with the actual ambient temperature and adjusting ventilation system parameters to maintain an elevated ambient temperature.



The licensee has evaluated the increase in MSLTLE ambient temperatures against the Equipment Qualification (EQ) documentation. From this evaluation, the licensee has concluded that all equipment and components in the MSLTLE would remain operable and would perform their intended function under the postulated steam line leakage conditions. The licensee has also evaluated the structural design for an increase in the MSLTLE ambient temperature and found it to be acceptable. The peak temperature as a result of a postulated design basis steam line break will not change, since the dominant effect is the energy released by the break when compared to the postulated steam leakage conditions. Structural impacts are bounded by the steam line break analysis.

In summary, from its review of the licensee's request to establish and use a range of allowable values and trip setpoints for high temperature in the MSLTLE, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee has provided adequate TS requirements to assure that a 25 gpm steam leak will be detected and the MSIVs will be closed as necessary to isolate the leak. This TS change will also provide increased assurance that unwarranted MSIV closures and reactor scrams at full power will not occur due to high normal ambient air conditions in the absence of a steam leak. The NRC staff, therefore, finds the proposed TS changes acceptable.

#### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

#### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding. (61 FR 34893). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

## 6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principle Contributors: Fredrick Paulitz  
Darl Hood

Date: September 17, 1996