



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

September 11, 1995

Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia
Executive Vice President, Nuclear
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
P. O. Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2
(TAC NO. M91295)

Dear Mr. Sylvia:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 69 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated January 6, 1995.

The amendment incorporates Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1 from Standard TSs into TS 3/4.3.7.5, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation and make associated changes in TS 3/4.4.2, Safety Relief Valves.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Gordon E. Edison, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-410

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 69 to
NPF-69
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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Original signed by:
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DATE	8/31/95	8/31/95	8/31/95	9/2/95	8/31/95

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B. Ralph Sylvia
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
Unit 2

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DATED: September 11, 1995

AMENDMENT NO. 69 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-69-NINE MILE POINT
UNIT 2

Docket File

PUBLIC

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-410

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 69
License No. NPF-69


1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) dated January 6, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, as revised through Amendment No. 69 are hereby incorporated into this license. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Ledyard B. Marsh, Director
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 11, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 69 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-69

DOCKET NO. 50-410

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages

3/4 3-81
3/4 3-82
3/4 3-83
3/4 3-84
3/4 3-85
3/4 3-86
3/4 3-87
3/4 4-10
3/4 4-11

Insert Pages

3/4 3-81
3/4 3-82
3/4 3-83
3/4 3-84
3/4 3-85
3/4 3-86
3/4 3-87
3/4 4-10
3/4 4-11

INSTRUMENTATION

MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.3.7.5 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.7.5-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Operational Conditions 1 and 2.

ACTION:

- a. With one or more accident monitoring instrumentation channels inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.7.5-1.
- b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.7.5 Each of the above required accident monitoring instrumentation channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.7.5-1.

TABLE 3.3.7.5-1

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>REQUIRED NUMBER OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
1. Reactor Vessel Pressure	2	80
2. Reactor Vessel Water Level		
a. Fuel Zone	2	80
b. Wide Range	2	80
3. Suppression Pool Water Level		
a. Narrow Range	2	80
b. Wide Range	2	80
4. Suppression Pool Water Temperature	2/Quadrant	80
5. Suppression Chamber Pressure	2	80
6. Suppression Chamber Air Temperature	2	80
7. Drywell Pressure		
a. Narrow Range	2	80
b. Wide Range	2	80
8. Drywell Air Temperature	2	80
9. Drywell Oxygen Concentration	2	80
10. Drywell Hydrogen Concentration Analyzer and Monitor	2	80

TABLE 3.3.7.5-1 (Continued)

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>REQUIRED NUMBER OF CHANNELS</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
11. Drywell High Range Radiation Monitors	2	81
12. Penetration Flow Path Primary Containment Isolation Valve Position Indication*	2**	80**

* Not required for isolation valves whose associated flow path is isolated by at least one closed and deactivated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.

** Only one position indication channel is required for penetration flow paths with only one control room indication channel. If this one channel becomes inoperable, entry into ACTION 80b is required.

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

ACTION

- ACTION 80 - a.** With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels for one or more functions one less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3.7.5-1, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 30 days or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the following 14 days outlining the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channel(s) of the function(s) to OPERABLE status.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels for one or more functions two less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3.7.5-1, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- ACTION 81 - a.** With the number of OPERABLE Drywell High Range Radiation Monitors one less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3.7.5-1, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the following 14 days outlining the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channel of the function to OPERABLE status.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE Drywell High Range Radiation Monitors two less than the Required Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3.7.5-1, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the following 14 days outlining the preplanned alternate method of monitoring, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the instrumentation channel(s) of the function to OPERABLE status.

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TABLE 4.3.7.5-1

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>INSTRUMENT</u>	<u>CHANNEL CHECK</u>	<u>CHANNEL CALIBRATION</u>
1. Reactor Vessel Pressure	M	R
2. Reactor Vessel Water Level		
a. Fuel Zone	M	R
b. Wide Range	M	R
3. Suppression Pool Water Level		
a. Narrow Range	M	R
b. Wide Range	M	R
4. Suppression Pool Water Temperature	M	R*
5. Suppression Chamber Pressure	M	R
6. Suppression Chamber Air Temperature	M	R*
7. Drywell Pressure		
a. Narrow Range	M	R
b. Wide Range	M	R
8. Drywell Air Temperature	M	R*
9. Drywell Oxygen Concentration	M	R
10. Drywell Hydrogen Concentration Analyzer and Monitor	M	Q**
11. Drywell High Range Radiation Monitors	M	R†
12. Penetration Flow Path Primary Containment Isolation Valve Position Indication	M††	R***

TABLE 4.3.7.5-1 (Continued)

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

TABLE NOTATIONS

- * Excludes sensors; sensor comparison shall be done in lieu of sensor calibration.
- ** Using sample gas containing:
 - a. One volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen.
 - b. Four volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen.
- *** The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall consist of position indication verification using ASME Section XI IWV-3300 test criteria.
- † The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall consist of an electronic calibration of the channel, not including the detector, for range decades above 10 R/hr and a one point calibration check of the detector below 10 R/hr with an installed or portable gamma source.
- †† Red, Green or other indication shall be verified as indicating valve position.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.4.2 The safety valve function of at least 16 of the following reactor coolant system safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE with the specified code safety valve function lift settings*:

- 2 safety/relief valves @ 1148 psig $\pm 1\%$
- 4 safety/relief valves @ 1175 psig $\pm 1\%$
- 4 safety/relief valves @ 1185 psig $\pm 1\%$
- 4 safety/relief valves @ 1195 psig $\pm 1\%$
- 4 safety/relief valves @ 1205 psig $\pm 1\%$

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With the safety valve function of one or more of the above required 16 safety/relief valves inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.
- b. With one or more safety/relief valves stuck open, provided that the average water temperature in the suppression pool is less than 110°F, close the stuck-open safety/relief valve(s); if unable to close the open valve(s) within 5 minutes or if the average water temperature in the suppression pool is 110°F or more, place the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position.

* The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valves at nominal operating temperatures and pressures.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2 No requirements other than Specification 4.0.5.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 69 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-69

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2

DOCKET NO. 50-410

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated January 6, 1995, the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2, (NMP-2) Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would incorporate Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3.1 from NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical Specifications General Electric Plants BWR/4," dated September 1992, into TS 3/4.3.7.5, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation and make associated changes in TS 3/4.4.2, Safety Relief Valves.

2.0 BACKGROUND

The purpose of the post-accident monitoring (PAM) instrumentation is to display variables that provide information required by the control room operators during accident situations. This information provides the necessary support for the operator to take the manual actions required for safety systems to accomplish their safety functions for design basis accidents (DBAs). The operability of the PAM instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected parameters for the operator to monitor and to assess unit status and behavior following an accident. The following evaluation addresses the operability requirements and the associated required actions.

3.0 EVALUATION

Incorporation of the Standard Technical Specifications (STSs) LCO 3.3.3.1 would:

- a. Delete the column titled "Minimum Channels Operable" from TS Table 3.3.7.5-1 and the column titled "Applicable Operational Conditions" from TS Tables 3.3.7.5-1 and 4.3.7.5-1.
- b. Revise the action statements in TS Table 3.3.7.5-1 associated with inoperability of instrumentation for the PAM parameters.
- c. Revise LCO 3.3.7.5 to indicate that PAM is required to be operable in Operational Conditions 1 and 2.
- d. Revise LCO 3.3.7.5 to include an exception from TS 3.0.4.

- e. Revise the "Required Number of Channels" and the name of the primary containment isolation valve (PCIV) position instrumentation in TS Tables 3.3.7.5-1 and 4.3.7.5-1.
- f. Delete the operability and surveillance requirements from TS Tables 3.3.7-5.1 and 4.3.7.5-1 for safety relief valve position, residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger service water radiation, refuel platform area radiation, and neutron flux monitoring instrumentation.
- g. Revise TS 3/4.4.2 to reference the safety relief valve testing performed under TS 4.0.5, revise LCO 3.4.2 to remove the operability requirements and action statements associated with safety relief valve acoustic monitors, and delete the surveillance requirements associated with safety relief valve acoustic monitors.

3.1 Required Channels

The licensee proposed a revision to TS Table 3.3.7.5-1 to the format presented in STS Table 3.3.3.1-1 by deleting the column titled "Minimum Channels Operable." LCO 3.3.3.1 of the STS requires two operable channels for most PAM functions. Two operable channels ensure that no single failure prevents the operator from getting information necessary for determining the safety status of the unit, and bringing the unit to a safe condition following an accident.

Consistent with STS Table 3.3.3.1-1, the licensee has proposed that two channels for each parameter be provided as specified in TS Table 3.3.7.5-1, and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.2 Applicable Operational Conditions

The licensee proposed a revision to TS Tables 3.3.7.5-1 and 4.3.7.5-1 to the format presented in STS Table 3.3.3.1-1 by deleting the column titled "Applicable Operational Conditions." LCO 3.3.3.1 of the STS includes the applicability requirements for PAM instrumentation. Consistent with STS LCO 3.3.3.1 and STS Table 3.3.3.1-1, the licensee has proposed that the applicability requirements be included in LCO 3.3.7.5, and is, therefore, acceptable.

The current TS Tables 3.3.7.5-1 and 4.3.7.5-1 require reactor water level, suppression pool water level, and drywell high range radiation instrumentation to be operable in Operational Conditions 1, 2, and 3. The licensee has proposed the deletion of the requirement to have these instruments operable in Operational Condition 3, Hot Shutdown. PAM variables are related to diagnosis and preplanned actions required to mitigate DBAs. DBAs are assumed to occur during Operational Conditions 1 and 2. Therefore, these instruments are not required to be operational in Operational Condition 3. This is consistent with STS LCO 3.3.3.1 which requires PAM instrumentation to be operational in Operational Conditions 1 and 2. Therefore, the deletion of the requirement

for reactor water level, suppression pool water level, and drywell high range radiation instrumentation to be operable in Operational Condition 3 is acceptable.

3.3 Exception to the Provisions of TS 3.0.4

The licensee has proposed a revision to LCO 3.3.7.5 to include an exception from the provisions of TS 3.0.4. TS 3.0.4 prohibits entry into operational conditions unless the conditions for LCOs are met without reliance on provisions contained in action statements. The provisions of TS 3.0.4 are not applicable for PAM instrumentation because the PAM instrumentation restoration requirements provide adequate time to restore inoperable channels without placing undue pressure on plant personnel. STS LCO 3.3.3.1 includes a similar exception from the provisions of TS 3.0.4. The proposed exception from the provisions of TS 3.0.4 is consistent with the STS, and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.4 Primary Containment Isolation Valves

The licensee has proposed a revision to the "Required Number of Channels" and the name of the PCIV instrumentation in TS Tables 3.3.7.5-1 and 4.3.7.5-1. BASES 3.3.3.1 of the STS states that for PCIV position, the important information is the isolation status of the containment penetration. For containment penetrations with only one active PCIV having control room indication, only a single channel of valve position information is required to be operable. To assure correct implementation of the required actions the licensee has proposed to revise the name from "Primary Containment Isolation Valve Position Indication" to "Penetration Flow Path Primary Containment Isolation Valve Position Indication" and revise the "Required Number of Channels" from 1 channel per PCIV to 2 channels per penetration. A footnote has also been proposed to clarify that only one instrument channel is required for penetrations with only one active PCIV. The licensee's proposal is consistent with STS Bases 3.3.3.1, and is, therefore, acceptable.

3.5 RHR Heat Exchanger Service Water Radiation

RHR heat exchanger service water radiation is not a Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident", variable and is not considered appropriate instrumentation for incorporation in the PAM TSs. Therefore, RHR heat exchanger service water radiation monitoring instrumentation is being deleted from TS Tables 3.3.7.5-1 and 4.3.7.5-1. The deletion of RHR heat exchanger service water radiation monitoring instrumentation from TS Tables 3.3.7.5-1 and 3.3.7.5-1 is acceptable.

3.6 Refuel Platform Area Radiation

Refuel platform area radiation monitoring is not a RG 1.97 variable, and is not considered appropriate instrumentation for incorporation in the PAM TSs. Therefore, refuel platform area radiation monitoring instrumentation is being

deleted from TS Tables 3.3.7.5-1 and 4.3.7.5-1. The deletion of refuel platform area radiation monitoring instrumentation from TS Tables 3.3.7.5-1 and 4.3.7.5-1 is acceptable.

3.7 Neutron Flux

Neutron flux monitoring instrumentation is Type B as defined in RG 1.97 and conforms to the design and function criteria of NEDO-31558A previously approved by the staff. This instrumentation is not considered appropriate for incorporation in the PAM TSs. Therefore, neutron flux monitoring instrumentation is being deleted from TS Tables 3.3.7.5-1 and 4.3.7.5-1. The deletion of neutron flux monitoring instrumentation from TS Tables 3.3.7.5-1 and 4.3.7.5-1 is acceptable.

3.8 Safety Relief Valve Position

Safety relief valve position monitoring is Type D, Category 2 as defined in RG 1.97. Type D, Category 2 instrumentation is not considered appropriate instrumentation for incorporation in the PAM TSs. Therefore, safety relief valve position monitoring instrumentation is being deleted from TS Tables 3.3.7.5-1 and 4.3.7.5-1. The deletion of safety relief valve position monitoring instrumentation from TS Tables 3.3.7.5-1 and 4.3.7.5-1 is acceptable.

TS 3/4.4.2 includes operability and surveillance requirements for safety relief valves. Consistent with the deletion of safety relief valve position instrumentation from TS Tables 3.3.7.5-1 and 4.3.7.5-1, the licensee has proposed the revision of TS 3/4.4.2 to delete operability and surveillance requirements for safety relief valve acoustic monitors. The licensee has proposed that LCO 3.4.2 be revised to delete operability requirements and action statements associated with safety relief valve acoustic monitors. The licensee has also proposed that a new surveillance requirement be added to TS 3/4.4.2 which would clarify that all required surveillance for the safety function of the safety relief valves are accomplished under TS 4.0.5. Since safety relief valve position information is not required, the proposed revisions to TS 3/4.4.2 are acceptable.

Based on our review of the proposed amendment, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed changes to the PAM instrumentation operability requirements for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2, TS conform to the STS and their bases and the guidelines of RG 1.97. The staff determined that the proposed TS changes provide appropriate LCO and action statements for the PAM instrumentation, and are, therefore, acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (60 FR 8748). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: B. Marcus

Date: September 11, 1995