UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

July 21, 1993

Docket No. 50-410

Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia
Executive Vice President, Nuclear
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
301 Plainfield Road
Syracuse, New York 13212

Dear Mr. Sylvia:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2 (TAC NO. M85322)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 44 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated December 30, 1992, as supplemented May 19, 1993.

The amendment revises TS 3.4.3.1, 3.4.3.2, and 4.4.3.2.1.b. and associated Bases to incorporate the NRC staff positions on reactor coolant system leakage detection delineated in Generic Letter 88-01, "NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping."

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

John E. Menning, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 44 to NPF-69
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

cc:

Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire
Winston & Strawn
1400 L Street, NW.
Washington, DC 20005-3502

Mr. Richard Goldsmith
Syracuse University
College of Law
E. I. White Hall Campus
Syracuse, New York 12223

Resident Inspector
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
P. O. Box 126
Lycoming, New York 13093

Gary D. Wilson, Esquire
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
300 Erie Boulevard West
Syracuse, New York 13202

Mr. David K. Greene
Manager Licensing
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
301 Plainfield Road
Syracuse, New York 13212

Ms. Donna Ross
New York State Energy Office
2 Empire State Plaza
16th Floor
Albany, New York 12223

Supervisor
Town of Scriba
Route 8, Box 382
Oswego, New York 13126

Regional Administrator, Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Charles Donaldson, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General
New York Department of Law
120 Broadway
New York, New York 10271

Mr. Richard M. Kessel
Chair and Executive Director
State Consumer Protection Board
99 Washington Avenue
Albany, New York 12210

Mr. Martin J. McCormick Jr.
Plant Manager, Unit 2
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
P. O. Box 32
Lycoming, New York 13093

Vice President - Nuclear Generation
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
P. O. Box 32
Lycoming, New York 13093

DATED: July 21, 1993

AMENDMENT NO. 44 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-69-NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2

Docket File
NRC & Local PDRs
PDI-1 Reading
S. Varga, 14/E/4
J. Calvo, 14/A/4
R. Capra
C. Vogan
J. Menning
OGC-WF
D. Hagan, 3302 MNBB
G. Hill (2), P1-22
Wanda Jones, P-370
C. Grimes, 11/F/23
ACRS (10)
OPA
OC/LFDCB
PD plant-specific file
C. Cowgill, Region I
J. Strosnider, 7/D/3
R. Clark, 14/E/21

cc: Plant Service list

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-410

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 44
License No. NPF-69

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) dated December 30, 1992, as supplemented May 19, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, as revised through Amendment No. 44 are hereby incorporated into this license. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Robert A. Capra

Robert A. Capra, Director
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: July 21, 1993

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 44 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-69

DOCKET NO. 50-410

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
3/4 4-12	3/4 4-12
-	3/4 4-12a (added page)
3/4 4-13	3/4 4-13
3/4 4-14	3/4 4-14
-	3/4 4-14a (added page)
B3/4 4-3	B3/4 4-3
B3/4 4-3a	B3/4 4-3a

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

3/4.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.4.3.1 The following reactor coolant system leakage detection systems shall be OPERABLE:

a. The primary containment airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring system,

b. The primary containment airborne gaseous radioactivity monitoring system,

c. The drywell floor drain tank fill rate monitoring system, and

d. Drywell equipment drain tank fill rate monitoring system.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With the primary containment airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring system or the primary containment airborne gaseous radioactivity monitoring system inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 12 hours; otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

b. With the drywell equipment drain tank fill rate monitoring system inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided that the drywell equipment drain tank fill rate is determined via alternate methods; otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

c. With the drywell floor drain tank fill rate monitoring system inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided that the drywell floor drain tank fill rate is determined via alternate methods; otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

d. With both drywell floor drain and the drywell equipment drain tank fill rate monitoring systems inoperable, restore either system to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

3/4.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.1 The reactor coolant system leakage detection systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Primary containment atmosphere particulate and gaseous monitoring systems-performance of a CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours, a SOURCE CHECK at least once per 31 days, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 184 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

b. Primary containment sump flow monitoring system-performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION TEST at least once per 18 months.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.4.3.2 Reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage shall be limited to:

a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE.
b. 5 gpm UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE.
c. 25 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE averaged over any 24-hour period.
d. 0.5 gpm leakage per nominal inch of valve size up to a maximum 5 gpm at an RCS pressure of 1020 $\pm$ 20 psig from any reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4.3.2-1.
e. 2 gpm increase in UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE within any 24-hour period in Mode 1.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.

b. With any RCS leakage greater than the limits in Specification 3.4.3.2.b and/or c (above), reduce the leakage rate to within the limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

c. With any RCS pressure isolation valve leakage greater than the above limit, isolate the high-pressure portion of the affected system from the low-pressure portion within 4 hours by use of at least two other closed (manual or deactivated automatic or check*) valves, or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

d. With one or more of the high/low-pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors shown in Table 3.4.3.2-2 inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or verify the pressure to be less than the alarm setpoint at least once per 12 hours; restore the inoperable monitor(s) to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

*Which have been verified not to exceed the allowable leakage limit at the last refueling outage.

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

e. With one or more of the required interlocks shown in Table 3.4.3.2-3 inoperable, restore the inoperable interlock to OPERABLE status within 7 days or isolate the affected heat exchanger(s) from the RCIC steam supply by closing and deenergizing heat exchanger valves 2 RHS*MOV22A and 2RHS*MOV80A or 2RHS*MOV22B and 2RHS*MOV80B, as appropriate.

f. With any reactor coolant system leakage greater than the limit in 3.4.3.2.e above, identify the source of leakage within 4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.2.1 The RCS leakage shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by:

a. Monitoring the primary containment airborne particulate radioactivity at least once per 12 hours,

b. Monitoring the drywell floor drain tank and equipment drain tank fill rate at least once per 8 hours,

c. Monitoring the primary containment airborne gaseous radioactivity at least once per 12 hours, and

d. Monitoring the reactor vessel head flange leak detection system at least once per 24 hours.

4.4.3.2.2 Each RCS pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4.3.2-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by leak testing pursuant to Specification 4.0.5 as outlined in the ASME Code Section XI, paragraph IWV-3427(b) and verifying the leakage of each valve to be within the specified limit:

a. At least once per 18 months, and
b. Before returning the valve to service following maintenance, repair, or replacement work on the valve.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.2.3 The high/low-pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors shall be demonstrated OPERABLE with setpoints per Table 3.4.3.2-2 by performance of a:

a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and
b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

4.4.3.2.4 The high/low-pressure interface interlock for the steam condensing mode bypass valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE with trips setpoints per Table 3.4.3.2-3 by performance of:

a. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 92 days, and
b. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

RECIRCULATION SYSTEM

3/4.4.1 (Continued)

recirculation pump and recirculation nozzles. Sudden equalization of a temperature difference $\geq$ 145°F between the reactor vessel bottom head coolant and the coolant in the upper region of the reactor vessel by increasing core flow rate would cause undue stress in the reactor vessel bottom head.

3/4.4.2 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVES

The safety/relief valves operate during a postulated ATWS event to prevent the reactor coolant system from being pressurized above a design allowable value of 1375 psig in accordance with the ASME Code. A total of 16 OPERABLE safety/relief valves is required to limit local pressure at active components to within ASME III allowable design values (Service Level A). All other appropriate ASME III limits are also bounded by this requirement. Specified surveillance intervals have been determined in accordance with GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-Of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specification," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R. D. Binz IV from C. E. Rossi dated July 21, 1992).

The safety/relief valve lift settings will be demonstrated only during shutdown in accordance with the provisions of Specification 4.0.5.

3/4.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

3/4.4.3.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The RCS leakage detection systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary. These detection systems are consistent with the recommendations of RG 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems," May 1973.

Generic Letter 88-01, Supplement 1, allows for alternate methods to determine drywell leakage when the normal leakage monitoring systems are inoperable. These alternate methods may be used for up to 30 days, provided their suitability with regard to accuracy and inspectability is demonstrated. The alternate methods given in the Generic Letter Supplement are to manually pump down the drain tank, or to measure the differences in tank level.

3/4.4.3.2. OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

The allowable leakage rates from the reactor coolant system have been based on the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of cracks in pipes. The background leakage normally expected to result from equipment design and the detection capability of the instrumentation for determining system leakage were also considered. The evidence obtained from experiments suggests that for leakage somewhat greater than that specified for UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE, the probability is small

3/4.4.3.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE (Continued)

that the imperfection or crack associated with such leakage would grow rapidly. An UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE increase of > 2 gpm within the previous 24 hour period indicates a potential flaw in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and must be quickly evaluated to determine the source and extent of the leakage. The increase is measured relative to the steady state value; temporary changes in leakage rate as a result of transient conditions (e.g., startup) are not considered. As such, the 2 gpm increase limit is only applicable in MODE 1 when operating pressures and temperatures are established. However, in all cases, if the leakage rates exceed the values specified or the leakage is located and known to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, the reactor will be shut down to allow further investigation and corrective action.

The Surveillance Requirements for RCS pressure isolation valves provide added assurance of valve integrity, thereby reducing the probability of gross valve failure and consequent intersystem LOCA.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 44 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-69

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2

DOCKET NO. 50-410

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On January 25, 1988, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 88-01, "NRC Position on IGSCC (Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking) in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping." Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC or the licensee) responded to the GL for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (NMP-2) in letters dated July 28, 1988, November 1, 1989, and December 14, 1989. The NRC staff provided its Safety Evaluation (SE) for these licensee submittals by letter dated August 17, 1990. As discussed in that SE, the staff concluded that the NMPC submittals were acceptable with the exception of five items. The five unacceptable items were related to the licensee's positions concerning GL 88-01 leakage detection requirements; classification of welds in the Reactor Recirculation System, Residual Heat Removal System, and Reactor Pressure Vessel; inspection plans for welds that had been incorrectly classified as IGSCC Category A and the omission of inspection plans for welds in the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System piping outboard of the isolation valves; omission of appurtenances to components from inspection plans; and the classification of solution treated, Type 316L welds in the RWCU System.

The licensee responded to the NRC's SE of August 17, 1990, in a letter dated November 20, 1990. The NRC staff provided its SE for this NMPC submittal in an enclosure to a letter dated June 24, 1991. The staff found that the licensee's response of November 20, 1990, resolved all open GL 88-01 issues for NMP-2 with the exception of the licensee's position on the classification of solution treated, Type 316L welds in the RWCU System. The staff's SE stated that NMPC should perform in-situ metallography on the subject welds to demonstrate resistance to sensitization and thereby support their classification as IGSCC Category A welds. In the event that the licensee could not perform in-situ metallography, the staff recommended that the welds be reclassified so that they would be inspected more frequently. The NRC staff's SE of June 24, 1991, noted that the licensee committed to adhere to the NRC staff positions on leakage detection and intended to submit a technical specification (TS) amendment request to incorporate these requirements.

By letter dated July 25, 1991, NMPC responded to the NRC staff's SE of June 24, 1991. The licensee indicated that most of the welds in the RWCU System within the scope of GL 88-01 were shop fabricated and solution treated,

and could be classified as IGSCC Category A without further testing for resistance to sensitization. The licensee also stated that the remaining welds within the scope of GL 88-01 were field fabricated and had been reclassified from IGSCC Category A to Category D.

In a letter dated June 25, 1991, the licensee advised the NRC staff that the submittal of a TS amendment request to incorporate the NRC staff positions on leakage detection in GL 88-01 would be delayed. The licensee had originally intended to submit the appropriate amendment request by June 30, 1991. However, in view of the impending issuance of a supplement to GL 88-01 by the NRC and the formation of an ad hoc BWR Owners Group (BWROG) committee to present a response to GL 88-01, NMPC elected to temporarily delay the submittal of a TS amendment request. The licensee stated at that time that an acceptable date for submittal of a TS amendment request would be established once all issues related to leak detection had been resolved.

On February 4, 1992, the NRC issued Supplement 1 to GL 88-01 which provided acceptable alternative NRC staff positions to some of those delineated in the original GL. By letter dated February 13, 1992, NMPC advised the NRC staff that it had revised its position on the classification of shop-fabricated welds in the RWCU System. The licensee indicated that these welds had been reclassified as Category D. This change in position resolved the remaining GL 88-01 issue concerning the classification of solution treated, Type 316L welds in the RWCU System. Although all GL 88-01 issues were resolved at that time, NRC staff review of NMPC responses to the GL remained open pending the submittal of a TS amendment request that incorporated the NRC staff positions on leakage detection.

In a letter dated September 16, 1992, NMPC advised the NRC staff that it would submit a TS amendment request to incorporate the NRC staff positions on leakage detection delineated in GL 88-01 no later than December 31, 1992. The licensee indicated at that time that the BWROG ad hoc committee had completed its work on leakage detection requirements and made no recommendations that challenged the NRC staff positions delineated in GL 88-01 or in Supplement 1 to that GL. The licensee submitted the related TS change request by letter dated December 30, 1992.

By letter dated May 19, 1993, the licensee supplemented its submittal of December 30, 1992. The letter of May 19, 1993, modified the description of the alternate method to be used to monitor the drywell floor drain tank fill rate and forwarded two proposed changes to the TS Bases. The May 19, 1993, letter did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 EVALUATION

The NRC staff has evaluated NMPC's license amendment request of December 30, 1992, as supplemented May 19, 1993.

The licensee has proposed to modify TS 3.4.3.1 to read as follows:

Limiting Conditions for Operation

3.4.3.1 The following reactor coolant system leakage detection systems shall be OPERABLE:

a. The primary containment airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring system,

b. The primary containment airborne gaseous radioactivity monitoring system,

c. The drywell floor drain tank fill rate monitoring system, and

d. Drywell equipment drain tank fill rate monitoring system.

ACTION:

a. With the primary containment airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring system or the primary containment airborne gaseous radioactivity monitoring system inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 12 hours; otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

b. With the drywell equipment drain tank fill rate monitoring system inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided that the drywell equipment drain tank fill rate is determined via alternate methods; otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

c. With the drywell floor drain tank fill rate monitoring system inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided that the drywell floor drain tank fill rate is determined via alternate methods; otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

d. With both drywell floor drain and the drywell equipment drain tank fill rate monitoring systems inoperable, restore either system to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

The proposed modifications to TS 3.4.3.1 essentially involve four distinct changes. The first two changes would allow for a 30-day out-of-service time for the drywell floor drain tank or the drywell equipment drain tank fill rate monitoring systems provided that a manual method of determining the fill rate is employed. An orderly shutdown would be required if the inoperable fill rate monitoring system is not restored within 30 days. This would ensure that

the plant will not operate indefinitely in a condition in which the ability to detect an increase in drywell leakage has degraded. The NRC staff has reviewed these proposed changes and finds that they are acceptable since they are consistent with staff position (3) in Supplement 1 to GL 88-01.

The third proposed change to TS 3.4.3.1 would require an orderly shutdown after a 24 hour out-of-service time if the normal drywell floor drain tank and drywell equipment drain tank fill rate monitoring systems are simultaneously inoperable. The NRC staff has reviewed this proposed change and finds it to be acceptable since it would conservatively restrict continued plant operations if both monitoring systems are inoperable.

The fourth proposed change to TS 3.4.3.1 would correct a discrepancy between TS 3.4.3.1 and TS 4.4.3.2.1.a. TS 4.4.3.2.1.a states that the required frequency for the monitoring of containment airborne radioactivity is at least once per 12 hours. TS 3.4.3.1 currently states that if any containment airborne radioactivity monitoring system is inoperable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided that a grab sample is taken and analyzed at least once per 24 hours. The proposed change to TS 3.4.3.1 would require grab sampling at least once per 12 hours and establish consistency with TS 4.4.3.2.1.a. The NRC staff has reviewed this proposed change and finds it to be acceptable since it provides for more frequent grab sampling when the automatic systems are inoperable and resolves the conflict between the requirements of TS 3.4.3.1 and TS 4.4.3.2.1.a.

The licensee has proposed to make additions to TS 3.4.3.2 that would read as follows:

> Limiting Condition for Operation 3.4.3.2.e
>
> Reactor coolant system leakage shall be limited to:
>
> e. 2 gpm increase in UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE within any 24-hour period in Mode 1.
>
> ACTION 3.4.3.2.f.
>
> With any reactor coolant system leakage greater that the limit in 3.4.3.2.e above, identify the source of leakage within 4 hours or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours.

This change would establish a limit on the rate of increase in unidentified leakage during Mode 1 operations and require initiation of a plant shutdown if such leakage increases by 2 gpm within any 24-hour period. The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed change to TS 3.4.3.2 and finds it to be acceptable since it is consistent with staff position (1) on leak detection delineated in GL 88-01.

The licensee has proposed to modify the surveillance requirement in TS 4.4.3.2.1.b. to read as follows:

Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b.

The RCS leakage shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by:

b. Monitoring the drywell floor drain tank and equipment tank fill rate at least once per 8 hours,

This change would decrease the surveillance interval for monitoring the primary containment drywell floor drain tank and equipment drain tank fill rate from at least once per 12 hours to at least once per 8 hours. The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed change to TS 4.4.3.2.1.b and finds it to be acceptable since it consistent with staff position (1) in Supplement 1 to GL 88-01.

The licensee has also proposed two changes to the TS Bases. Specifically, Bases Section 3/4.4.3.1, "Leakage Detection Systems," would be expanded to describe acceptable alternate methods for determining the drywell floor drain tank fill rate. An addition would be made to Bases Section 3/4.4.3.2, "Operational Leakage," to explain why the increase in unidentified leakage is limited to 2 gpm within a 24-hour period in Mode 1. The NRC staff has no objections to the proposed Bases changes.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 8774). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor:
John E. Menning

Date: July 21, 1993

Docket No. 50-410 July 21, 1993

Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia
Executive Vice President, Nuclear
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
301 Plainfield Road
Syracuse, New York 13212

Dear Mr. Sylvia:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 2 (TAC NO. M85322)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 44 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated December 30, 1992, as supplemented May 19, 1993.

The amendment revises TS 3.4.3.1, 3.4.3.2, and 4.4.3.2.1.b. and associated Bases to incorporate the NRC staff positions on reactor coolant system leakage detection delineated in Generic Letter 88-01, "NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping."

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,
Original signed by:

John E. Menning, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 44 to NPF-69
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

OFFICE	PDI-1:LA	PDI-1:PM	NRR/DE	OGC	PDI-1:D
NAME	CVogan	JMenning:avl	JStrosnider	EHOLLER	RACapra ROC
DATE	6/17/93	6/17/93	7/1/93	7/9/93	7/21/93

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
FILENAME: G:\NMP2\NM285322.AMD