Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. Millstone Power Station Rope Ferry Road Waterford, CT 06385



APR | 6 2001

Docket No. 50-336 50-423 B18384

RE: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3 Licensee Event Report 2001-002-00 Incomplete Post-Maintenance Testing <u>for Containment Isolation Valves</u>

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report (LER) 2001-002-00, documenting an event that was discovered at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 on February 15, 2001, and an event that was discovered at Unit No. 2 on February 23, 2001. This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

There are no commitments contained within this letter.

Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. David W. Dodson at (860) 447-1791, extension 2346.

Very truly yours,

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

Master Process Owner - Operate the Asset

Attachment (1): LER 2001-002-00

- cc: H. J. Miller, Region I Administrator
 - D. S. Collins, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2
 - S. R. Jones, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit No. 2
 - V. Nerses, NRC Senior Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3
 - A. C. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit No. 3



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Attachment 1

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Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3

LER 2001-002-00

NRC FORM 366 (1-2001) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)								APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 6-30-2001 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.							
FACILITY NAME (1) Millstone Nuclear Power Station - Unit 3								DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000423				PAGE (3) 1 OF 3			
TITLE (4) Incomplete Post-Maintenance Testing for Containment Isolation Valves															
							PORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)								
МО	DAY	YEAR	YEAR			мо	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME Millstone Unit		DOCKET NUMBER 05000336				
_ 01	10	2001	2001	- 002 -	00	04	16	2001	FACILITY NAME		DOCKET NUMBER				
OPERATING 1 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)															
MODE (9)			20.2	20.2201(b)			03(a)(3)(i	i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)				
POWE	POWER		20.2201(d)		20.220	03(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)					
LEVEL (10)			20.2	20.2203(a)(1)		50.36(c)(1)(i)(A	N)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)		73.71(a)(4)				
				2203(a)(2)(i)	_		c)(1)(ii)(/	4)	50.73(a)(2)(8.71(a			
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)		OTHER Specify in Abstract below or				
				2203(a)(2)(iii)	_	<u> </u>	a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(- I '	•			
				2203(a)(2)(iv) 2203(a)(2)(v)	T _x	+	(a)(2)(i)(A (a)(2)(i)(E		50.73(a)(2)(1 50.73(a)(2)(1)		in NRC Form 366A		<u>, </u>		
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						(a)(2)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(
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NAME									TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)						
David W. Dodson, Team Lead - Compliance								860-447-1791							
				1				ENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- F							
CAUSE SYSTEM			IPONENT			EPORTAB TO EPIX		CAUSE	SYSTEM COMPO		NENT MANU- FACTURER		REPORTABLE TO EPIX		
_	SU	PPLEME	NTAL REPORT EXPECTED			D (14)			EXPECTED		MON	нти	DAY	YEAR	
YES (If	ete EXPI	ECTED S	UBMISSION DATE		E).		NO	SUBMIS	SUBMISSION						
									DATE	(15)	İ				
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)															
On February 15, 2001, it was determined that incomplete post-maintenance testing had been performed for maintenance activities which occurred on January 10, 2001, for three Millstone Unit No. 3 (MP3) Main Steam Supply Motor-Operated Valves (MOVs) (3MSS*MOV74B, 3MSS*MOV74D, and 3RSS*MOV23B). These MOVs, which also function as Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs), did not receive a post-maintenance isolation time test as required by MP3 Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.3.1.															
On February 23, 2001, during the investigation of the extent of condition for the MP3 event, it was determined that a Millstone Unit No. 2 (MP2) CIV also did not receive post-maintenance testing as required by TSs. This CIV, a Steam Generator Blowdown Control Valve (2-MS-220A), also did not receive a post-maintenance isolation time test as required by MP2 TS 4.6.3.1.1.b. after maintenance activities which were completed on July 16, 1999. The cause of this event was an incomplete component database used in identifying post-maintenance testing requirements for CIVs.															
Corrective	actions ir dance on	nclude: Techni	ical Spe	ecification C	CIV t	esting	require	ements;	Isolation Valve and 3) Enhand irements.						

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NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 05000423 2 OF 3 NUMBER NUMBER 2001 --002 --00

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

1. Event Description

On February 15, 2001, with Millstone Unit No. 3 (MP3) in Mode 6, it was determined that incomplete postmaintenance testing had been performed for maintenance activities which occurred on January 10, 2001, for three Main Steam [SB] Supply Motor-Operated Valves (MOVs) [ISV] (3MSS*MOV74B, 3MSS*MOV74D, and 3RSS*MOV23B). These MOVs, which also function as Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs), did not receive a post-maintenance isolation time test as required by MP3 Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.3.1.

On February 23, 2001, with Millstone Unit No. 2 in Mode 1 at approximately 100% power, during the investigation of the extent of condition for the MP3 event, it was determined that a Millstone Unit No. 2 (MP2) CIV also did not receive adequate post-maintenance testing as required by TSs. This CIV, a Steam Generator Blowdown [WI] Control Valve (2-MS-220A) [FCV], also did not receive a post-maintenance isolation time test as required by MP2 TS 4.6.3.1.1.b. after maintenance activities which were completed on July 16, 1999.

MP3 TS 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves," Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.6.3.1 and MP2 TS 3.6.3.1, "Containment Isolation Valves," SR 4.6.3.1.1.b both require in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4 that each isolation valve be demonstrated operable prior to returning the valve from service after maintenance, repair, or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control, or power circuit [JX] by performance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time. At the time of the events, both units were operating in Mode 1 at approximately 100% power.

Each of the three MP3 CIVs was cycled after Motor [MO] Control Center (MCC) breaker [BKR] preventative maintenance had been completed, but an isolation time test was not performed. Compliance with SR 4.6.3.1 requires that the valves are stroked and timed after post-maintenance testing is completed. For the MP2 CIV, an isolation time test was not performed after a packing adjustment was performed on the CIV. For both the MP2 and the MP3 CIVs, it was not identified in the post-maintenance testing documentation that the applicable TS required verification and documentation of each valve's isolation time.

Therefore, both the MP2 and MP3 events are being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

2. Cause

The cause of this event was an incomplete component database used in identifying post-maintenance testing requirements for CIVs. The facility component database does not list all Technical Specification post-maintenance testing for equipment governed by Technical Specifications.

3. Assessment of Safety Consequences

Validating primary containment integrity ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the accident analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during accident conditions.

Retest of the three MP3 CIVs and the one MP2 CIV indicates that each CIV would have closed within the required time to satisfy accident analysis assumptions, indicating that each valve was capable of performing its required safety function. Therefore, these events were not safety significant.

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION 05000423 3 OF 3 Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 NUMBER NUMBER 2001 002 --00 --NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) **Corrective Action** 4. As a result of these events, the following actions have been, or will be, performed. 1. Isolation time testing was performed and verified acceptable for the identified MP2 and MP3 Containment Isolation Valves. 2. Interim guidance on the requirements of TS 4.6.3.1 for MP3 and TS 4.6.3.1.1.b for MP2 was given to individuals involved in processing work orders for stroke time testing of Containment Isolation Valves. The component database utilized for work planning will be upgraded to include additional information on TS CIV test requirements for post-maintenance activities. An investigation was conducted and corrective actions are being addressed in accordance with the Millstone Corrective Action Program. 5. **Previous Occurrences** LER 1999-010: This LER identified that during a routine review of Inservice Test (IST) quarterly surveillance results, it was determined that inadequate post-maintenance testing had been performed on a Pressurizer Relief Line Flow Control Sample Air Operated Valve (AOV). By replacing the valve operator air supply solenoid, which is an auxiliary to the parent AOV (2-RC-003), the valve closing stroke time performance characteristics were affected, necessitating a retest of the valve stroke time in accordance with the facility Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements. A retest of the valve stroke time was not performed in a timely manner. The cause of this event was an inadequate man-machine interface and a lack of training on post-maintenance test requirements which led to the development of a deficient work package. To correct this deficiency training was performed on both identification of post-maintenance test requirements and on expectations for review and approval of work package post-maintenance test requirements. Additionally, upgrades to the facility electronic database system were planned to help ensure the work order development process reflects quality controlled program indicators. Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].