

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.4 Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The CREV System provides a radiologically controlled environment from which the unit can be safely operated following a Design Basis Accident (DBA). The control room emergency zone served by the CREV System consists of the main control room and the Train B Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) equipment room.

The safety related function of the CREV System consists of a single high efficiency air filtration train for emergency treatment of outside supply air. The filter train consists of an electric heater, a prefilter, a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, an activated charcoal adsorber section, a second HEPA filter, two 100% capacity booster fans in parallel, the Train B air handling unit (excluding the refrigeration condensing unit), and the associated ductwork and dampers. The electric heater is used to limit the relative humidity of the air entering the filter train. Prefilters and HEPA filters remove particulate matter, which may be radioactive. The charcoal adsorbers provide a holdup period for gaseous iodine, allowing time for decay.

The CREV System is a standby system, parts of which also operate during normal unit operations to maintain the control room emergency zone environment. Upon receipt of a reactor building ventilation system high-high radiation alarm (indicative of conditions that could result in radiation exposure to control room emergency zone personnel), operator action is required within 40 minutes to switch to the isolation/pressurization mode of operation and close the kitchen and locker room exhaust fan dampers to minimize infiltration of contaminated air into the control room emergency zone. A system of dampers isolates the control room emergency zone, and the air is recirculated. Outside air is taken in at the emergency outside air ventilation intake and is mixed with the recirculated air after the outside air has passed through the air filtration unit (AFU) for removal of airborne radioactive particles.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

The CREV System is designed to maintain the control room emergency zone environment for a 30 day continuous occupancy after a DBA without exceeding 5 rem whole body dose or its equivalent to any part of the body. The CREV System will pressurize the control room emergency zone to about 0.125 inches water gauge to minimize infiltration of air from adjacent zones. CREV System operation in maintaining control room habitability is discussed in the UFSAR, Sections 6.4, 9.4, and 15.6.5 (Refs. 1, 2, and 3, respectively).

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The ability of the CREV System to maintain the habitability of the control room emergency zone is an explicit assumption for the safety analyses presented in the UFSAR, Sections 6.4 and 15.6.5 (Refs. 1 and 3, respectively). The isolation/pressurization mode of the CREV System is assumed to operate following a DBA loss of coolant accident, fuel handling accident, main steam line break, and control rod drop accident. The radiological doses to control room personnel as a result of the DBA loss of coolant accident are summarized in Reference 3.

The CREV System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The CREV System is required to be OPERABLE. Total system failure could result in exceeding a dose of 5 rem to the control room operators in the event of a DBA.

The CREV System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control operator exposure are OPERABLE. The system is considered OPERABLE when its associated:

- a. AFU is OPERABLE,
- b. Train B air handling unit (fan portion only) is OPERABLE, including the ductwork, to maintain air circulation to and from the control room emergency zone; and
- c. Emergency outside air ventilation intake is OPERABLE.

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

The AFU is considered OPERABLE when a booster fan is OPERABLE; HEPA filter and charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and heater, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation through the filter train can be maintained.

In addition, the control room emergency zone boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors, such that the pressurization limit of SR 3.7.4.4 can be met. However, it is acceptable for access doors to be open for normal control room emergency zone entry and exit and not consider it to be a failure to meet the LCO.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the CREV System must be OPERABLE to control operator exposure during and following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission product release.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the CREV System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:

- a. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment;
 - b. During CORE ALTERATIONS; and
 - c. During operations with potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).
-

ACTIONS

A.1

With the CREV System inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the inoperable CREV System must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1 and B.2

In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable CREV System cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

C.1, C.2, and C.3

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 4 or 5. However, since irradiated fuel movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3 while in MODE 1, 2, or 3 would require the unit to be shutdown, but would not require immediate suspension of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The NOTE to the ACTIONS, "LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable," ensures that the actions for immediate suspension of irradiated fuel assembly movement are not postponed due to entry into LCO 3.0.3.

With the CREV System inoperable, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require the CREV System to be placed in the isolation/pressurization mode of operation. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be initiated

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1, C.2, and C.3 (continued)

immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Action must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.4.1

This SR verifies that the CREV System in a standby mode starts from the control room and continues to operate. This SR includes initiating flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers. Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they start and function properly. As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe, testing the system once every month provides an adequate check on this system. Monthly heater operation for ≥ 10 continuous hours, during system operation dries out any moisture that has accumulated in the charcoal as a result of humidity in the ambient air. Furthermore, the 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment.

SR 3.7.4.2

This SR verifies that the required CREV testing is performed in accordance with Specification 5.5.7, "Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP)." The CREV filter tests are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 4). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

SR 3.7.4.3

This SR verifies that on a manual initiation from the control room, the CREV System filter train starts and the isolation dampers close. Operating experience has shown that these components normally pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was found to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

(continued)

SR 3.7.4.4

This SR verifies the integrity of the control room emergency zone and the assumed inleakage rates of potentially contaminated air. The control room emergency zone positive pressure, with respect to potentially contaminated adjacent areas, is periodically tested to verify proper function of the CREV System. During the emergency isolation/pressurization mode of operation, the CREV System is designed to slightly pressurize the control room emergency zone ≥ 0.125 inches water gauge positive pressure with respect to the adjacent areas to minimize unfiltered inleakage. The CREV System is designed to maintain this positive pressure at a flow rate of ≤ 2000 scfm to the control room emergency zone in the isolation/pressurization mode. The Frequency of 24 months is consistent with industry practice and other filtration systems SRs.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.4.
 2. UFSAR, Section 9.4.
 3. UFSAR, Section 15.6.5.
 4. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978.
-
-

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.5 Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (AC) System

BASES

BACKGROUND The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC portion of the control room area Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System (hereafter referred to as the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System) provides temperature control for the control room emergency zone following isolation of the control room emergency zone.

The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is a single zone system that services only those rooms that are a part of the control room emergency zone. The system provides cooling of the recirculated and outside air makeup for the control room emergency zone. The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System, addressed by this Specification, consists of the Train B air handling unit (AHU), ductwork, dampers, refrigeration condensing unit, and instrumentation and controls to provide for control room emergency zone temperature control.

The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is designed to provide a controlled environment under both normal and accident conditions. The system provides the required temperature control to maintain a suitable control room emergency zone environment for a sustained occupancy of over 100 persons. The design conditions for habitability of the control room emergency zone environment are 70°F to 80°F and 40% to 50% relative humidity. The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System operation in maintaining the control room emergency zone temperature is discussed in the UFSAR, Section 6.4 (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The design basis of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is to maintain the control room emergency zone temperature for a 30 day continuous occupancy following isolation of the control room emergency zone.

During emergency operation, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System maintains a habitable environment and ensures the OPERABILITY of components in the control room emergency zone. The safety related Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System (Train B HVAC) is powered from diesel

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

generator supported switchgear. Train B Control Room HVAC is normally in the standby condition and is used for accident mitigation. Train A Control Room HVAC is nonsafety related and is in operation during normal conditions. The Train B refrigeration condensing unit, normally served by the Service Water System, can be provided with cooling water from the Unit 2 Containment Cooling Service Water (CCSW) System. The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is designed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements. The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is capable of removing sensible and latent heat loads from the control room emergency zone, including consideration of equipment heat loads and personnel occupancy requirements to ensure equipment OPERABILITY.

The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is required to be OPERABLE. Total system failure could result in the equipment operating temperature exceeding limits.

The Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to maintain the control room emergency zone temperature are OPERABLE. These components include the cooling coils, fans, chillers, compressors, ductwork, dampers, and associated instrumentation and controls. In addition, during conditions in MODES other than MODES 1, 2, and 3 when the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is required to be OPERABLE (e.g., during CORE ALTERATIONS), the necessary portions of the Unit 2 CCSW System and Ultimate Heat Sink capable of providing cooling to the refrigeration condensing unit are part of the OPERABILITY requirements covered by this LCO.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 1, 2, or 3, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control room emergency zone temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY limits following control room emergency zone isolation.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued) In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a Design Basis Accident are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:

- a. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment;
- b. During CORE ALTERATIONS; and
- c. During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS

A.1

With the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the system must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room emergency zone isolation and the availability of alternate nonsafety cooling methods.

B.1 and B.2

In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

C.1, C.2, and C.3

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 4 or 5. However, since irradiated fuel movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the Required Actions of Condition C are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3 while in MODE 1, 2, or 3 would require the unit to be shutdown, but would not require immediate suspension of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The Note to the ACTIONS, "LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable," ensures that the actions for immediate suspension of irradiated fuel assembly movement are not postponed due to entry into LCO 3.0.3.

With the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Action must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.5.1

This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to remove the control room emergency zone heat load assumed in the safety analyses. The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation. The 24 month Frequency is appropriate since significant degradation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System is not expected over this time period.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 6.4.

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.6 Main Condenser Offgas

BASES

BACKGROUND During unit operation, steam from the low pressure turbine is exhausted directly into the main condenser. Air and noncondensable gases are collected in the main condenser, then exhausted through the steam jet air ejectors (SJAEs) to the Main Condenser Offgas System. The offgas from the main condenser normally includes radioactive gases.

The Main Condenser Offgas System has been incorporated into the unit design to reduce the gaseous radwaste emission. This system uses a catalytic recombiner to recombine radiolytically dissociated hydrogen and oxygen. The gaseous mixture is cooled by the offgas condenser; the water and condensibles are stripped out by the offgas condenser and moisture separator. The radioactivity of the remaining gaseous mixture (i.e., the offgas recombiner effluent) is monitored downstream of the moisture separator prior to entering the holdup line.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The main condenser offgas gross gamma activity rate is an initial condition of the Main Condenser Offgas System failure event, discussed in Reference 1. The analysis assumes a gross failure in the Main Condenser Offgas System that results in the rupture of the Main Condenser Offgas System pressure boundary. The gross gamma activity rate is controlled to ensure that, during the event, the calculated offsite doses will be well within the limits of 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 2).

The main condenser offgas limits satisfy Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO To ensure compliance with the assumptions of the Main Condenser Offgas System failure event (Ref. 1), the fission product release rate should be consistent with a noble gas release to the reactor coolant of 100 $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{Mwt-second}$ after decay of 30 minutes. The LCO is established consistent with this requirement ($2527 \text{ Mwt} \times 100 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{Mwt-second} = 252,700 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{second}$).

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The LCO is applicable when steam is being exhausted to the main condenser and the resulting noncondensibles are being processed via the Main Condenser Offgas System. This occurs during MODE 1, and during MODES 2 and 3 with any main steam line not isolated and the SJAE in operation. In MODES 4 and 5, main steam is not being exhausted to the main condenser and the requirements are not applicable.

ACTIONS

A.1

If the offgas radioactivity rate limit is exceeded, 72 hours is allowed to restore the gross gamma activity rate to within the limit. The 72 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, the time required to complete the Required Action, the large margins associated with permissible dose and exposure limits, and the low probability of a Main Condenser Offgas System rupture.

B.1, B.2, B.3.1, and B.3.2

If the gross gamma activity rate is not restored to within the limits in the associated Completion Time, all main steam lines or the SJAE must be isolated. This isolates the Main Condenser Offgas System from significant sources of radioactive steam. The main steam lines are considered isolated if at least one main steam isolation valve in each main steam line is closed, and at least one main steam line drain valve in each drain line is closed. The 12 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to perform the actions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

An alternative to Required Actions B.1 and B.2 is to place the unit in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.6.1

This SR, on a 31 day Frequency, requires an isotopic analysis of a representative offgas sample (taken at the recombiner outlet or the SJAE outlet if the recombiner is bypassed) to ensure that the required limits are satisfied. The noble gases to be sampled are Xe-133, Xe-135, Xe-138, Kr-85M, Kr-87, and Kr-88. If the measured rate of radioactivity increases significantly as indicated by the main condenser air ejector noble gas activity monitor (by $\geq 50\%$ after correcting for expected increases due to changes in THERMAL POWER), an isotopic analysis is also performed within 4 hours after the increase is noted, to ensure that the increase is not indicative of a sustained increase in the radioactivity rate. The 31 day Frequency is adequate in view of other instrumentation that continuously monitor the offgas, and is acceptable, based on operating experience.

This SR is modified by a Note indicating that the SR is not required to be performed until 31 days after any main steam line is not isolated and the SJAE is in operation. Only in this condition can radioactive fission gases be in the Main Condenser Offgas System at significant rates.

REFERENCES

1. Letter E-DAS-015-00 from D.A. Studley (Sciotech-NUS) to T. Leffler (ComEd), dated January 24, 2000.
 2. 10 CFR 100.
-
-

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.7 Main Turbine Bypass System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The Main Turbine Bypass System is designed to control steam pressure when reactor steam generation exceeds turbine requirements during unit startup, sudden load reduction, and cooldown. It allows excess steam flow from the reactor to the condenser without going through the turbine. The bypass capacity of the system is 40% of the Nuclear Steam Supply System rated steam flow. Sudden load reductions within the capacity of the steam bypass can be accommodated without reactor scram. The Main Turbine Bypass System consists of a nine valve manifold connected to the main steam lines between the main steam isolation valves and the main turbine stop valves. Each of the nine valves is operated by hydraulic cylinders. The bypass valves are controlled by the pressure regulation function of the Turbine Electrohydraulic Control System, as discussed in the UFSAR, Section 7.7.4 (Ref. 1). The bypass valves are normally closed, and the pressure regulator controls the turbine control valves that direct all steam flow to the turbine. If the speed governor or the load limiter restricts steam flow to the turbine, the pressure regulator controls the system pressure by opening the bypass valves sequentially. When the bypass valves open, the steam flows from the main steam equalizing header to the bypass manifold through the bypass valve, to its bypass line, where an orifice further reduces the steam pressure before the steam enters the condenser.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The Main Turbine Bypass System is assumed to function during the turbine trip, turbine generator load rejection and feedwater controller failure transients, as discussed in the UFSAR, Sections 15.2.3.2, 15.2.2.2, and 15.1.2 (Refs. 2, 3, and 4, respectively). Opening the bypass valves during the pressurization event mitigates the increase in reactor vessel pressure, which affects the MCPR during the event. An inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System may result in an MCPR penalty.

The Main Turbine Bypass System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO The Main Turbine Bypass System is required to be OPERABLE to limit peak pressure in the main steam lines and maintain reactor pressure within acceptable limits during events that cause rapid pressurization, so that the Safety Limit MCPR is not exceeded. With the Main Turbine Bypass System inoperable, modifications to the MCPR limits (LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)") may be applied to allow this LCO to be met. The MCPR limit for the inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System is specified in the COLR. An OPERABLE Main Turbine Bypass System requires the bypass valves to open in response to increasing main steam line pressure. This response is within the assumptions of the applicable analyses (Refs. 2, 3, and 4).

APPLICABILITY The Main Turbine Bypass System is required to be OPERABLE at $\geq 25\%$ RTP to ensure that the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is not violated during the turbine generator load rejection, turbine trip, and feedwater controller failure transients. As discussed in the Bases for LCO 3.2.2, sufficient margin to these limits exists at $< 25\%$ RTP. Therefore, these requirements are only necessary when operating at or above this power level.

ACTIONS A.1

If the Main Turbine Bypass System is inoperable (one or more bypass valves inoperable), and the MCPR limits for an inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System, as specified in the COLR, are not applied, the assumptions of the design basis transient analysis may not be met. Under such circumstances, prompt action should be taken to restore the Main Turbine Bypass System to OPERABLE status or adjust the MCPR limits accordingly. The 2 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on the time to complete the Required Action and the low probability of an event occurring during this period requiring the Main Turbine Bypass System.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1

If the Main Turbine Bypass System cannot be restored to OPERABLE status and the MCPR limits for an inoperable Main Turbine Bypass System are not applied, THERMAL POWER must be reduced to < 25% RTP. As discussed in the Applicability section, operation at < 25% RTP results in sufficient margin to the required limits, and the Main Turbine Bypass System is not required to protect fuel integrity during the turbine generator load rejection, turbine trip, and feedwater controller failure transients. The 4 hour Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.7.1

Cycling each main turbine bypass valve through one complete cycle of full travel demonstrates that the valves are mechanically OPERABLE and will function when required. The 92 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 92 day Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.7.7.2

The Main Turbine Bypass System is required to actuate automatically to perform its design function. This SR demonstrates that, with the required system initiation signals, the valves will actuate to their required position. The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and because of the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.7.7.3

This SR ensures that the TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME, as defined in the transient analysis inputs for the cycle, is in compliance with the assumptions of the appropriate safety analyses. The response time limits are specified in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 5). The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and because the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 7.7.4.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.2.3.2.
 3. UFSAR, Section 15.2.2.2.
 4. UFSAR, Section 15.1.2.
 5. Technical Requirements Manual.
-
-

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.8 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level

BASES

BACKGROUND The minimum water level in the spent fuel storage pool meets the assumptions of iodine decontamination factors following a fuel handling accident.

A general description of the spent fuel storage pool design is found in the UFSAR, Section 9.1.2 (Ref. 1). The assumptions of the fuel handling accident are found in Reference 2.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The water level above the irradiated fuel assemblies is an explicit assumption of the fuel handling accident. A fuel handling accident is evaluated to ensure that the radiological consequences (calculated whole body and thyroid doses at the exclusion area and low population zone boundaries) are \leq 25% of 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 3) exposure guidelines NUREG-0800 (Refs. 4 and 5) and less than the 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19 limits (Ref. 6). A fuel handling accident could release a fraction of the fission product inventory by breaching the fuel rod cladding as discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 7).

The fuel handling accident is evaluated for the dropping of an irradiated fuel assembly onto the reactor core. The water level in the spent fuel storage pool provides for absorption of water soluble fission product gases and transport delays of soluble and insoluble gases that must pass through the water before being released to the secondary containment atmosphere. This absorption and transport delay reduces the potential radioactivity of the release during a fuel handling accident.

The spent fuel storage pool water level satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The specified water level preserves the assumptions of the fuel handling accident analysis (Ref. 2). As such, it is the minimum required for fuel movement within the spent fuel storage pool.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY This LCO applies during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool or whenever movement of new fuel assemblies occurs in the spent fuel storage pool with irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the spent fuel storage pool, since the potential for a release of fission products exists.

ACTIONS

A.1

Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of fuel assemblies is not a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

When the initial conditions for an accident cannot be met, action must be taken to preclude the accident from occurring. If the spent fuel storage pool level is less than required, the movement of fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool is suspended immediately. Suspension of this activity shall not preclude completion of movement of a fuel assembly to a safe position. This effectively precludes a spent fuel handling accident from occurring.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.8.1

This SR verifies that sufficient water is available in the event of a fuel handling accident. The water level in the spent fuel storage pool must be checked periodically. The 7 day Frequency is acceptable, based on operating experience, considering that the water volume in the pool is normally stable, and all water level changes are controlled by unit procedures.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

- REFERENCES
1. UFSAR, Section 9.1.2.
 2. Letter E-DAS-00-046 from D.A. Studley (Sciencetech) to Robert Tsai (ComEd), "Submittal of Calculation in Support of Improved Tech. Spec. Program," dated February 14, 2000.
 3. 10 CFR 100.
 4. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4, Revision 1, July 1981.
 5. NUREG-0800, Section 6.4 Revision 2, July 1981.
 6. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19.
 7. Regulatory Guide 1.25, March 1972.
-
-

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.1 AC Sources – Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The unit Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System AC sources consist of the offsite power sources, and the onsite standby power sources (diesel generators (DGs) 2, 3, and 2/3). As required by UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.2.8 (Ref. 1), the design of the AC electrical power system provides independence and redundancy to ensure an available source of power to the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems.

The Class 1E unit AC distribution system is, for the most part, divided into redundant load groups (Divisions 1 and 2), so loss of any one group does not prevent the minimum safety functions from being performed. The exception is that the opposite unit's Division 2 AC Electrical Power Distribution System powers shared Division 2 loads (i.e., standby gas treatment subsystem, Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System (Unit 3 only), and Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (AC) System (Unit 3 only)). Although shared by both units, the CREV System and Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System are single train systems that are powered only from a single Unit 2 motor control center. Each unit's load group has connections to two physically independent offsite power sources and a single DG.

Offsite power is supplied to each of the 138 kV and 345 kV switchyards from the transmission network by six and seven transmission lines, respectively. From the 138 kV switchyards, one qualified electrically and physically separated circuit normally provides AC power, through reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) 22, to 4160 V Essential Service System (ESS) bus 24-1 via ESS bus 24 to supply the Division 2 loads of Unit 2. From the 345 kV switchyard, another qualified, electrically and physically separated circuit normally provides AC power, through RAT 32, to 4160 V ESS bus 34-1 via ESS bus 34 to supply the Division 2 loads of Unit 3. Unit auxiliary transformer (UAT) 21, which is normally supplied by the Unit 2 main generator, is normally aligned to Unit 2 to supply Division 1 4160 V ESS bus 23-1 via ESS bus 23. Finally, UAT 31, which is normally supplied by the Unit 3 main generator, is normally aligned to Unit 3 to supply Division 1 4160 V ESS bus 33-1 via ESS bus 33.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

When a main generator is not operating, the loads fed from the UAT are automatically transferred to the RAT on a generator trip (RAT 22 will supply 4160 V ESS bus 23-1 via 4160 V ESS bus 23 and RAT 32 will supply 4160 V ESS bus 33-1 via 4160 V ESS bus 33). The given unit's RAT is the primary (normal) offsite source to the Division 1 and 2 load groups. The RAT of the opposite unit provides the second (alternate) qualified offsite source through bus ties provided between the corresponding ESS buses of the two units. Additionally, the UAT of either unit provides another source of offsite power to the ESS buses only when the unit is shutdown and the UAT is being backfed from the grid. Physical changes to the generator links are required to place the unit in an alignment to allow backfeed. The offsite AC electrical power sources are designed and located so as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions. A detailed description of the offsite power network and circuits to the onsite Class 1E ESS buses is found in the UFSAR, Section 8.2 (Ref. 2).

A qualified offsite circuit consists of all breakers, transformers, switches, interrupting devices, cabling, and controls required to transmit power from the offsite transmission network to the onsite Class 1E ESS bus or buses.

RATs 22 and 32 are sized to accommodate the simultaneous starting of all ESF loads on receipt of an accident signal without the need for load sequencing.

The onsite standby power source for 4160 V ESS 23-1, 24-1, 33-1, and 34-1 consists of three DGs. DGs 2 and 3 are dedicated to ESS buses 24-1 and 34-1, respectively. DG 2/3 is a shared power source and can supply either Unit 2 ESS bus 23-1 or Unit 3 ESS bus 33-1. A DG starts automatically on a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) signal (i.e., low reactor water level signal or high drywell pressure signal) (refer to LCO 3.3.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation") or on an ESS bus degraded voltage or undervoltage signal (refer to LCO 3.3.8.1, "Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation"). After the DG has started, it automatically ties to its respective bus after offsite power

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

is tripped as a consequence of ESS bus undervoltage or degraded voltage, independent of or coincident with a LOCA signal. The DGs also start and operate in the standby mode without tying to the ESS bus on a LOCA signal alone. In the event of a LOCA on a unit, DG 2/3 will start and supply the unit (bus 23-1 or 33-1) experiencing the accident if no offsite power is available. This is accomplished by using the accident signal to prevent the DG 2/3 output breaker from closing on the nonaccident unit. Following the trip of offsite power, buses 23-1, 24-1, 33-1, and 34-1 are automatically disconnected from their normal supply and all nonessential loads are disconnected from the ESS bus. When the DG is tied to the ESS bus, loads are then sequentially connected to their respective ESS bus, if a LOCA signal is present, by the sequence logic. The sequencing logic controls the starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading the DG.

In the event of a loss of offsite power, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the DGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) such as a LOCA.

Certain required plant loads are returned to service in a predetermined sequence in order to prevent overloading of the DGs in the process. Within 30 seconds after the initiating signal is received, all automatic and permanently connected loads needed to recover the unit or maintain it in a safe condition are returned to service.

DGs 2, 3, and 2/3 have the following ratings:

- a. 2600 kW - continuous,
- b. 2860 kW - 2000 hours.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 3) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 4), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Isolation Condenser (IC) System; and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power; and
- b. A worst case single failure.

AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution System, two separate and independent DGs, one qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the opposite unit's Division 2 onsite Class 1E AC Electrical Power Distribution subsystem capable of supporting equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas treatment (SGT) System," LCO 3.7.4, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System" (Unit 3 only), and LCO 3.7.5, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (AC) System" (Unit 3 only), and the opposite unit's DG capable of supporting the equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.3, LCO 3.7.4 (Unit 3 only), and LCO 3.7.5 (Unit 3 only), ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA.

Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the UFSAR, and are part of the licensing basis for the unit.

Each offsite circuit from the 138 kV and 345 kV switchyards must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the 4160 V ESS buses. An offsite circuit to

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

each unit consists of the incoming breakers and disconnects to the respective 22 and 32 RATs, RATs 22 and 32, and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to 4160 V ESS buses. A qualified circuit does not have to be connected to the ESS bus (i.e., the main generator can be connected to the ESS bus) as long as the capability to fast transfer to the qualified circuit exists. The other qualified offsite circuit for each unit is provided by a bus tie between the corresponding ESS buses of the two units. The breakers connecting the buses must be capable of closure. For Unit 2, LCO 3.8.1.a is met if RAT 22 is capable of supplying ESS buses 23-1 and 24-1 and if RAT 32 (or UAT 31 on backfeed) can supply ESS bus 23-1 via ESS bus 33 and 33-1 and the associated bus tie or ESS bus 24-1 via ESS bus 34 and 34-1 and the associated bus tie. For Unit 3, LCO 3.8.1.a is met if RAT 32 can supply ESS buses 33-1 and 34-1 and if RAT 22 (or UAT 21 on backfeed) can supply ESS bus 33-1 via ESS bus 23 and 23-1 and the associated bus tie or ESS bus 34-1 via ESS bus 24 and 24-1 and the associated bus tie. For Unit 2, LCO 3.8.1.c is met if RAT 32 (or UAT 31 on backfeed) is capable of supplying ESS bus 39 to support equipment required by LCO 3.6.4.3. For Unit 3, LCO 3.8.1.c is met if RAT 22 (or UAT 21 on backfeed) is capable of supplying ESS bus 29 to support equipment required by LCO 3.6.4.3, LCO 3.7.4, and LCO 3.7.5.

The respective unit DG and common DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective 4160 V ESS bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence must be accomplished within 13 seconds. Each respective unit DG and common DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the 4160 V ESS buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions, such as DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient condition. Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of non-essential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY.

The opposite unit's DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its Division 2 Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem on detection of bus undervoltage. This sequence

(continued)

BASES

LCO (continued) must be accomplished within 13 seconds and is required to be met from the same variety of initial conditions specified for the respective unit and shared DGs. For Unit 2 to meet LCO 3.8.1.d, DG 3 must be capable of supplying ESS bus 34-1 on a loss of power to the bus in order to supply ESS bus 39 to support equipment required by LCO 3.6.4.3. Similarly, for Unit 3 to meet LCO 3.8.1.d, DG 2 must be capable of supplying ESS bus 24-1 on a loss of power to the bus in order to supply ESS bus 29 to support equipment required by LCO 3.6.4.3, LCO 3.7.4, and LCO 3.7.5.

In addition, fuel oil storage and fuel oil transfer pump requirements must be met for each required DG.

The AC sources must be separate and independent (to the extent possible) of other AC sources. For the DGs, the separation and independence are complete. For the offsite AC sources, the separation and independence are to the extent practical. A qualified circuit may be connected to both divisions of either unit, with manual transfer capability to the other circuit OPERABLE, and not violate separation criteria. A qualified circuit that is not connected to the 4160 V ESS buses is required to have OPERABLE manual transfer capability to the 4160 V ESS buses to support OPERABILITY of that qualified circuit.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

A Note has been added taking exception to the Applicability requirements for the opposite unit's Division 2 AC electrical power sources in LCO 3.8.1.c and d, provided the associated required equipment (SGT subsystem, CREV System (Unit 3 only), and Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System (Unit 3 only)) is inoperable. This exception is

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY
(continued)

intended to allow declaring of the opposite unit's Division 2 supported equipment inoperable either in lieu of declaring the opposite unit's Division 2 source inoperable, or at any time subsequent to entering ACTIONS for an inoperable opposite unit Division 2 source. This exception is acceptable since, with the opposite unit powered Division 2 equipment inoperable and the associated ACTIONS entered, the opposite unit Division 2 AC sources provide no additional assurance of meeting the above criteria.

The AC power requirements for MODES 4 and 5 and other conditions in which AC sources are required are covered in LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources – Shutdown."

ACTIONS

A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to exclude the MODE change restriction of LCO 3.0.4 for the opposite unit's AC electrical power sources. This exception allows entry into the applicable MODE while relying on the ACTIONS even though the ACTIONS may eventually require a plant shutdown. This allowance is acceptable due to the low probability of an event requiring the opposite unit equipment.

A.1

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one offsite circuit inoperable, it is necessary to verify the availability of the remaining required offsite circuit on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action not met. However, if a second required circuit fails SR 3.8.1.1, the second offsite circuit is inoperable, and Condition C, for two offsite circuits inoperable, is entered.

A.2

Required Action A.2, which only applies if the division cannot be powered from an offsite source, is intended to provide assurance that an event with a coincident single failure of the associated DG does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions (i.e.,

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.2 (continued)

single division systems are not included). Redundant required features failures consist of inoperable features associated with a division redundant to the division that has no offsite power.

The Completion Time for Required Action A.2 is intended to allow time for the operator to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. The division has no offsite power supplying its loads; and
- b. A redundant required feature on the other division is inoperable.

If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (one offsite circuit inoperable) a redundant required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time would begin to be tracked.

Discovering no offsite power to one 4160 V ESS bus of the on-site Class 1E Power Distribution System coincident with one or more inoperable redundant required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with any other ESS bus that has offsite power, results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Twenty-four hours is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before the unit is subjected to transients associated with shutdown.

The remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the on-site Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection may have been lost for the required feature's function; however, function is not lost. The 24 hour Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 24 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

A.3

With one offsite circuit inoperable, the reliability of the offsite system is degraded, and the potential for a loss of offsite power is increased, with attendant potential for a challenge to the plant safety systems. In this condition, however, the remaining OPERABLE offsite circuit and DGs are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System.

The 7 day Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.3 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or b. If Condition A is entered while, for instance, a DG is inoperable, and that DG is subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 7 days. This situation could lead to a total of 14 days, since initial failure to meet the LCO, to restore the offsite circuit. At this time, a DG could again become inoperable, the circuit restored OPERABLE, and an additional 7 days (for a total of 21 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 14 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or b. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 7 day and 14 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive Completion Time must be met.

Similar to Required Action A.2, the Completion Time of Required Action A.3 allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This exception results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.1.a or b was initially not met, instead of at the time that Condition A was entered.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1

To ensure a highly reliable power source remains with one DG inoperable, it is necessary to verify the availability of the required offsite circuits on a more frequent basis. Since the Required Action only specifies "perform," a failure of SR 3.8.1.1 acceptance criteria does not result in a Required Action being not met. However, if a circuit fails to pass SR 3.8.1.1, it is inoperable. Upon offsite circuit inoperability, additional Conditions must then be entered.

B.2

Required Action B.2 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of offsite power, during the period that a DG is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions (i.e., single division systems are not included). Redundant required features failures consist of inoperable features associated with a division redundant to the division that has an inoperable DG.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. An inoperable DG exists; and
- b. A redundant required feature on the other division (Division 1 or 2) is inoperable.

If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (one DG inoperable), a redundant required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

Discovering one required DG inoperable coincident with one or more inoperable redundant required support or supported

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.2 (continued)

features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLE DG(s), results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown.

The remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. Thus, on a component basis, single failure protection for the required feature's function may have been lost; however, function has not been lost. The 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the component OPERABILITY of the redundant counterpart to the inoperable required feature. Additionally, the 4 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.3.1 and B.3.2

Required Action B.3.1 provides an allowance to avoid unnecessary testing of OPERABLE DGs. If it can be determined that the cause of the inoperable DG does not exist on the OPERABLE DG(s), SR 3.8.1.2 does not have to be performed. If the cause of inoperability exists on other DG(s), they are declared inoperable upon discovery, and Condition E or G of LCO 3.8.1 is entered, as applicable. Once the failure is repaired, and the common cause failure no longer exists, Required Action B.3.1 is satisfied. If the cause of the initial inoperable DG cannot be confirmed not to exist on the remaining DG(s), performance of SR 3.8.1.2 suffices to provide assurance of continued OPERABILITY of those DGs.

In the event the inoperable DG is restored to OPERABLE status prior to completing either B.3.1 or B.3.2, the station corrective action program will continue to evaluate the common cause possibility. This continued evaluation, however, is no longer under the 24 hour constraint imposed while in Condition B.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS B.3.1 and B.3.2 (continued)

According to Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 5), 24 hours is a reasonable time to confirm that the OPERABLE DG(s) are not affected by the same problem as the inoperable DG.

B.4

In Condition B, the remaining OPERABLE DGs and offsite circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the onsite Class 1E Distribution System. The 7 day Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.4 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required AC power sources to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or b. If Condition B is entered while, for instance, an offsite circuit is inoperable and that circuit is subsequently restored OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 7 days. This situation could lead to a total of 14 days, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the DG. At this time, an offsite circuit could again become inoperable, the DG restored OPERABLE, and an additional 7 days (for a total of 21 days) allowed prior to complete restoration of the LCO. The 14 day Completion Time provides a limit on the time allowed in a specified condition after discovery of failure to meet LCO 3.8.1.a or b. This limit is considered reasonable for situations in which Conditions A and B are entered concurrently. The "AND" connector between the 7 day and 14 day Completion Times means that both Completion Times apply simultaneously, and the more restrictive must be met.

Similar to Required Action B.2, the Completion Time of Required Action B.4 allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This exception results in establishing the "time zero" at the time that LCO 3.8.1.a or b was initially not met, instead of the time that Condition B was entered.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

C.1 and C.2

Required Action C.1 addresses actions to be taken in the event of inoperability of redundant required features concurrent with inoperability of two offsite circuits. Required Action C.1 reduces the vulnerability to a loss of function. The Completion Time for taking these actions is reduced to 12 hours from that allowed with one division without offsite power (Required Action A.2). The rationale for the reduction to 12 hours is that Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) allows a Completion Time of 24 hours for two required offsite circuits inoperable, based upon the assumption that two complete safety divisions are OPERABLE. When a concurrent redundant required feature failure exists, this assumption is not the case, and a shorter Completion Time of 12 hours is appropriate. These features are designed with redundant safety related divisions, (i.e., single division systems are not included in the list). Redundant required features failures consist of any of these features that are inoperable because any inoperability is on a division redundant to a division with inoperable offsite circuits.

The Completion Time for Required Action C.1 is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." In this Required Action, the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both:

- a. Two required offsite circuits are inoperable; and
- b. A redundant required feature is inoperable.

If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (two offsite circuits inoperable), a redundant required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition C for a period that should not exceed 24 hours. This level of degradation means that the offsite

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

electrical power system does not have the capability to effect a safe shutdown and to mitigate the effects of an accident; however, the onsite AC sources have not been degraded. This level of degradation generally corresponds to a total loss of the immediately accessible offsite power sources.

Because of the normally high availability of the offsite sources, this level of degradation may appear to be more severe than other combinations of two AC sources inoperable that involve one or more DGs inoperable. However, two factors tend to decrease the severity of this degradation level:

- a. The configuration of the redundant AC electrical power system that remains available is not susceptible to a single bus or switching failure; and
- b. The time required to detect and restore an unavailable offsite power source is generally much less than that required to detect and restore an unavailable onsite AC source.

With both of the required offsite circuits inoperable, sufficient onsite AC sources are available to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA or transient. In fact, a simultaneous loss of offsite AC sources, a LOCA, and a worst case single failure were postulated as a part of the design basis in the safety analysis. Thus, the 24 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to effect restoration of one of the offsite circuits commensurate with the importance of maintaining an AC electrical power system capable of meeting its design criteria.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), with the available offsite AC sources two less than required by the LCO, operation may continue for 24 hours. If two offsite sources are restored within 24 hours, unrestricted operation may continue. If only one required offsite source is restored within 24 hours, power operation continues in accordance with Condition A.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

D.1 and D.2

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it were inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition D is entered with no AC source to any 4160 V ESS bus (i.e., the bus is de-energized), ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems - Operating," must be immediately entered. This allows Condition D to provide requirements for the loss of the required offsite circuit and one required DG without regard to whether a division is de-energized. LCO 3.8.7 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de-energized division.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition D for a period that should not exceed 12 hours. In Condition D, individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical power system. Since power system redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power, however, the reliability of the power systems in this Condition may appear higher than that in Condition C (loss of both required offsite circuits). This difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure. The 12 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

E.1

With two required DGs inoperable, there is no more than one remaining standby AC source. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, sufficient standby AC sources may not be available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for the majority of ESF equipment at this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a very short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown. (The immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

E.1 (continued)

result in a total loss of AC power.) Since any inadvertent unit generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, however, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), with both DGs inoperable, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours. The Completion Time assumes complete loss of onsite (DG) AC capability to power the minimum loads needed to respond to analyzed events.

F.1 and F.2

If the inoperable AC electrical power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

G.1

Condition G corresponds to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been lost. At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The unit is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of all important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.2.9 (Ref. 7). Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages (under simulated accident conditions). The SRs for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the DGs are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8), Regulatory Guide 1.108 (Ref. 9), and Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 10), as addressed in the UFSAR.

The Surveillances are modified by two Notes to clearly identify how the Surveillances apply to the given unit and the opposite unit AC electrical power sources. Note 1 states that SR 3.8.1.1 through 3.8.1.20 are applicable only to the given unit AC electrical power sources and Note 2 states that SR 3.8.1.21 is applicable to the opposite unit AC electrical power sources. These Notes are necessary since the opposite unit AC electrical power sources are not required to meet all of the requirements of the given unit AC electrical power sources (e.g., the opposite unit's DG is not required to start on the opposite unit's ECCS initiation signal to support the OPERABILITY of the given unit).

Where the SRs discussed herein specify voltage and frequency tolerances, the following summary is applicable. The minimum steady state output voltage of 3952 V is 90% of the nominal 4160 V output voltage. This value, which is specified in ANSI C84.1 (Ref. 11), allows for voltage drop to the terminals of 4000 V motors whose minimum operating voltage is specified as 90% or 3600 V. It also allows for voltage drops to motors and other equipment down through the 120 V level where minimum operating voltage is also usually specified as 90% of name plate rating. The specified maximum steady state output voltage of 4368 V is equal to the maximum operating voltage specified for 4000 V motors. It ensures that for a lightly loaded distribution system, the voltage at the terminals of 4000 V motors is no more than the maximum rated operating voltages. The specified minimum and maximum frequencies of the DG are 58.8 Hz and 61.2 Hz, respectively. These values are equal to $\pm 2\%$ of the 60 Hz nominal frequency and are derived from the recommendations found in Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8).

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.1

This SR ensures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network and availability of offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its correct position to ensure that distribution buses and loads are connected to their preferred power source and that appropriate independence of offsite circuits is maintained. The 7 day Frequency is adequate since breaker position is not likely to change without the operator being aware of it and because its status is displayed in the control room.

SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.8

These SRs help to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition.

To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, these SRs have been modified by a Note (Note 1 for SR 3.8.1.2 and Note 1 for SR 3.8.1.8) to indicate that all DG starts for these Surveillances may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup prior to loading.

For the purposes of this testing, the DGs are started from standby conditions. Standby conditions for a DG mean that the diesel engine coolant and oil are being continuously circulated and temperature is being maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

In order to reduce stress and wear on diesel engines, the manufacturer has recommended a modified start in which the starting speed of DGs is limited, warmup is limited to this lower speed, and the DGs are gradually accelerated to synchronous speed prior to loading. These start procedures are the intent of Note 2 of SR 3.8.1.2.

SR 3.8.1.8 requires that, at a 184 day Frequency, the DG starts from standby conditions and achieves required voltage and frequency within 13 seconds. The 13 second start requirement supports the assumptions in the design basis

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.8 (continued)

LOCA analysis of UFSAR, Section 6.3 (Ref. 12). The 13 second start requirement is not applicable to SR 3.8.1.2 (see Note 2 of SR 3.8.1.2), when a modified start procedure as described above is used. If a modified start is not used, the 13 second start requirement of SR 3.8.1.8 applies.

Since SR 3.8.1.8 does require a 13 second start, it is more restrictive than SR 3.8.1.2, and it may be performed in lieu of SR 3.8.1.2.

In addition, the DG is required to maintain proper voltage and frequency limits after steady state is achieved. The voltage and frequency limits are normally achieved within 13 seconds. The time for the DG to reach steady state operation, unless the modified DG start method is employed, is periodically monitored and the trend evaluated to identify degradation of governor and voltage regulator performance.

To minimize testing of the common DG, Note 3 of SR 3.8.1.2 and Note 2 of SR 3.8.1.8 allow a single test of the common DG (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit. However, to the extent practicable, the tests should be alternated between units. If the DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

The 31 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.2 is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8). The 184 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.8 is a reduction in cold testing consistent with Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 5). These Frequencies provide adequate assurance of DG OPERABILITY, while minimizing degradation resulting from testing.

SR 3.8.1.3

This Surveillance verifies that the DGs are capable of synchronizing and accepting a load approximately equivalent to that corresponding to the continuous rating. A minimum

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.3 (continued)

run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source.

Although no power factor requirements are established by this SR, the DG is normally operated at a power factor between 0.8 lagging and 1.0 when running synchronized with the grid. The 0.8 power factor value is the design rating of the machine at a particular kVA. The 1.0 power factor value is an operational condition where the reactive power component is zero, which minimizes the reactive heating of the generator. Operating the generator at a power factor between 0.8 lagging and 1.0 avoids adverse conditions associated with underexciting the generator and more closely represents the generator operating requirements when performing its safety function (running isolated on its associated 4160 V ESS bus). The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

The 31 day Frequency for this Surveillance is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8).

Note 1 modifies this Surveillance to indicate that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized.

Note 2 modifies this Surveillance by stating that momentary transients because of changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test.

Note 3 indicates that this Surveillance should be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations.

Note 4 stipulates a prerequisite requirement for performance of this SR. A successful DG start must precede this test to credit satisfactory performance.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.3 (continued)

To minimize testing of the common DG, Note 5 allows a single test of the common DG (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit. However, to the extent practicable, the test should be alternated between units. If the DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

SR 3.8.1.4

This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is at or above the level at which fuel oil is automatically added. The level is expressed as an equivalent volume in gallons, and is selected to ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of 1 hour of DG operation at full load plus 10%.

This SR also provides verification that there is an adequate inventory of fuel oil in the storage tanks to support each DG's operation for approximately 2 days at full load. The approximate 2 day period is sufficient time to place the unit in a safe shutdown condition and to bring in replenishment fuel from an offsite location.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to ensure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and facility operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period.

SR 3.8.1.5 and SR 3.8.1.7

Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel oil day tank once every 31 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is accomplished by draining a portion of the contents from the bottom of the day tank to the top of the storage tank.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.5 and SR 3.8.1.7 (continued)

Checking for and removal of any accumulated water from the bulk storage tank once every 92 days also eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequencies are established by Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 10). This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR provided that accumulated water is removed during performance of this Surveillance.

SR 3.8.1.6

This Surveillance demonstrates that each fuel oil transfer pump operates and automatically transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank. It is required to support continuous operation of standby power sources. This Surveillance provides assurance that each fuel oil transfer pump is OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for automatic fuel transfer systems are OPERABLE.

The Frequency for this SR is consistent with the Frequency for testing the DGs in SR 3.8.1.3. DG operation for SR 3.8.1.3 is normally long enough that fuel oil level in the day tank will be reduced to the point where the fuel oil transfer pump automatically starts to restore fuel oil level by transferring oil from the storage tank.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.9

Transfer of each 4160 V ESS bus power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the shutdown loads. The 24 month Frequency of the Surveillance is based on engineering judgment taking into consideration the plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed on the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.8.1.10

Each DG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the DG load response characteristics and capability to reject the largest single load without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency and while maintaining a specified margin to the overspeed trip. The largest single load for each DG is a service water pump (686 kW). The specified load value conservatively bounds the expected kW rating of the single largest loads under accident conditions. This Surveillance may be accomplished by:

- a. Tripping the DG output breaker with the DG carrying greater than or equal to its associated single largest post-accident load while paralleled to offsite power, or while solely supplying the bus; or
- b. Tripping its associated single largest post-accident load with the DG solely supplying the bus.

Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8), the load rejection test is acceptable if the diesel speed does not

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.10 (continued)

exceed the nominal (synchronous) speed plus 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 115% of nominal speed, whichever is lower. This corresponds to 66.73 Hz, which is the nominal speed plus 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint.

The time, voltage and frequency tolerances specified in this SR are derived from Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8) recommendations for response during load sequence intervals. The 3 seconds specified in SR 3.8.1.10.b is equal to 60% of the 5 second load sequence interval associated with sequencing the ECCS low pressure pumps during an undervoltage on the bus concurrent with a LOCA. The 4 seconds specified in SR 3.8.1.10.c is equal to 80% of the 5 second load sequence interval associated with sequencing the ECCS low pressure pumps during an undervoltage on the bus concurrent with a LOCA. The voltage and frequency specified are consistent with the design range of the equipment powered by the DG. SR 3.8.1.10.a corresponds to the maximum frequency excursion, while SR 3.8.1.10.b and SR 3.8.1.10.c are steady state voltage and frequency values specified to which the system must recover following load rejection. The 24 month Frequency takes into consideration the plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize testing of the common DG and allow a single test of the common DG (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit. If the DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.11

Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8), paragraph C.2.2.8, this Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a full load without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits. The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping. This Surveillance ensures proper engine generator load response under the simulated test conditions. This test simulates the loss of the total connected load that the DG experiences following a full load rejection and verifies that the DG does not trip upon loss of the load.

These acceptance criteria provide DG damage protection. While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event, and continues to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, a load band (90% to 100%) has been specified based on Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8).

The 24 month Frequency takes into consideration the plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by two Notes. To minimize testing of the common DG, Note 1 allows a single test of the common DG (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit. If the DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit. Note 2 modifies this Surveillance by stating that momentary transients outside the voltage limit do not invalidate this test.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.12

Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8), paragraph C.2.2.4, this Surveillance demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source. This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG. It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time.

The DG auto-start and energization of permanently connected loads time of 13 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis for responding to a design basis large break LOCA (Ref. 12). The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability has been achieved.

The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanently connected loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, a component or system may be out-of-service and closure of its associated breaker during this test may damage the component or system. In lieu of actual demonstration of the connection and loading of these loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs shall be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and lube oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.13

Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 9), paragraph C.2.2.5, this Surveillance demonstrates that the DG automatically starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time (13 seconds) from the design basis actuation signal (LOCA signal). In addition, the DG is required to maintain proper voltage and frequency limits after steady state is achieved. The time for the DG to reach the steady state voltage and frequency limits is periodically monitored and the trend evaluated to identify degradation of governor and voltage regulator performance. The DG is required to operate for ≥ 5 minutes. The 5 minute period provides sufficient time to demonstrate stability.

The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with the expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

SR 3.8.1.14

Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8) paragraph C.2.2.12, this Surveillance demonstrates that DG non-critical protective functions (e.g., high jacket water temperature) are bypassed on an ECCS initiation test signal and critical protective functions (engine overspeed and generator differential current) trip the DG to avert substantial damage to the DG unit. The non-critical trips are bypassed during DBAs and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react appropriately. The DG availability to mitigate the DBA is more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems that are not immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the DG.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.14 (continued)

The 24 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment, takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

SR 3.8.1.15

Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8), paragraph C.2.2.9, requires demonstration that the DGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours, 22 hours of which is at a load equivalent to 90% to 100% of the continuous rating of the DG and 2 hours of which is at a load equivalent to 105% to 110% of the continuous rating of the DG. The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from standby or hot conditions. The provisions for prelube and warmup, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.3, are applicable to this SR.

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design conditions as possible, testing must be performed at a power factor as close to the accident load power factor as practicable. When synchronized with offsite power, the power factor limit is ≤ 0.85 . This power factor is chosen to bound the actual worst case inductive loading that the DG could experience under design basis accident conditions.

The 24 month Frequency takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This Surveillance is modified by three Notes. Note 1 states that momentary transients do not invalidate this test. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY. Similarly, momentary power factor transients above the limit do not invalidate the test. Note 2 is provided in recognition that under certain conditions, it is necessary

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.15 (continued)

to allow the surveillance to be conducted at a power factor other than the specified limit. During the Surveillance, the DG is normally operated paralleled to the grid, which is not the configuration when the DG is performing its safety function following a loss of offsite power (with or without a LOCA). Given the parallel configuration to the grid during the Surveillance, the grid voltage may be such that the DG field excitation level needed to obtain the specified power factor could result in a transient voltage within the DG windings higher than the recommended values if the DG output breaker were to trip during the Surveillance. Therefore, the power factor shall be maintained as close as practicable to the specified limit while still ensuring that if the DG output breaker were to trip during the Surveillance that the maximum DG winding voltage would not be exceeded. To minimize testing of the common DG, Note 3 allows a single test of the common DG (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit. If the DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

SR 3.8.1.16

This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 13 seconds. The 13 second time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis for responding to a design basis large break LOCA (Ref. 12). In addition, the DG is required to maintain proper voltage and frequency limits after steady state is achieved. The time for the DG to reach the steady state voltage and frequency limits is periodically monitored and the trend evaluated to identify degradation of governor and voltage regulator performance.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.16 (continued)

The 24 month Frequency takes into consideration the plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with the expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by three Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The requirement that the diesel has operated for at least 2 hours at approximately full load conditions prior to performance of this Surveillance is based on manufacturer recommendations for achieving hot conditions. Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 2 allows all DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing. To minimize testing of the common DG, Note 3 allows a single test of the common DG (instead of two tests, one for each unit) to satisfy the requirements for both units. This is allowed since the main purpose of the Surveillance can be met by performing the test on either unit. If the DG fails one of these Surveillances, the DG should be considered inoperable on both units, unless the cause of the failure can be directly related to only one unit.

SR 3.8.1.17

Consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8), paragraph C.2.2.11, this Surveillance ensures that the manual synchronization and load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and that the DG can be returned to ready-to-load status when offsite power is restored. It also ensures that the auto-start logic is reset to allow the DG to reload if a subsequent loss of offsite power occurs. The DG is considered to be in ready-to-load status when the DG is at rated speed and voltage, the output breaker is open and can receive an auto-close signal on bus undervoltage, and the individual load timers are reset.

The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.18

Under accident conditions with loss of offsite power loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load sequence time delay relays. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents. The -10% load sequence time interval limit ensures that a sufficient time interval exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load. There is no upper limit for the load sequence time interval since, for a single load interval (i.e., the time between two load blocks), the capability of the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the second load is not negatively affected by a longer than designed load interval, and if there are additional load blocks (i.e., the design includes multiple load intervals), then the lower limit requirements (-10%) will ensure that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the remaining load blocks (i.e., all load intervals must be $\geq 90\%$ of the design interval). Reference 14 provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESS buses.

The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

SR 3.8.1.19

In the event of a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

This Surveillance demonstrates DG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.12, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ECCS initiation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.19 (continued)

The Frequency of 24 months takes into consideration plant conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil being continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

SR 3.8.1.20

This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised. Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can achieve proper frequency and voltage within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously.

The 10 year Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 8).

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to minimize wear on the DG during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

SR 3.8.1.21

With the exception of this Surveillance, all other Surveillances of this Specification (SR 3.8.1.1 through SR 3.8.1.20) are applied only to the given unit AC sources. This Surveillance is provided to direct that appropriate Surveillances for the required opposite unit AC sources are governed by the applicable opposite unit Technical Specifications. Performance of the applicable opposite unit Surveillances will satisfy the opposite unit requirements, as well as satisfying the given unit Surveillance

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.21 (continued)

Requirement. Exceptions are noted to the opposite unit SRs of LCO 3.8.1. SR 3.8.1.9 and SR 3.8.1.20 are excepted since only one opposite unit offsite circuit and DG is required by the given unit's Specification. SR 3.8.1.13, SR 3.8.1.18, and SR 3.8.1.19 are excepted since these SRs test the opposite unit's ECCS initiation signal, which is not needed for the AC electrical power sources to be OPERABLE on the given unit.

The Frequency required by the applicable opposite unit SR also governs performance of that SR for the given unit.

As Noted, if the opposite unit is in MODE 4 or 5, or moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, the following opposite unit SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.1.3, SR 3.8.1.10 through SR 3.8.1.12, and SR 3.8.1.14 through SR 3.8.1.17. This ensures that a given unit SR will not require an opposite unit SR to be performed, when the opposite unit Technical Specifications exempts performance of an opposite unit SR (however, as stated in the opposite unit SR 3.8.2.1 Note 1, while performance of an SR is exempted, the SR must still be met).

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.2.8.
2. UFSAR, Section 8.2.
3. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
4. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
5. Generic Letter 84-15, July 2, 1984.
6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, Revision 0, December 1974.
7. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.2.9.
8. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 3, July 1993.
9. Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977.

(continued)

BASES

- REFERENCES
(continued)
10. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Revision 1, October 1979.
 11. ANSI C84.1, 1982.
 12. UFSAR, Section 6.3.
 13. UFSAR, Section 8.3.1.5.1.
-
-

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.2 AC Sources – Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND	A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources – Operating."
------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 4 and 5, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:
----------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

- a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

In general, when the unit is shutdown the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or loss of all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrences significantly reduced or eliminated, and minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

During MODES 1, 2, and 3, various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed within the ACTIONS. This allowance is in recognition that

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

certain testing and maintenance activities must be conducted, provided an acceptable level of risk is not exceeded. During MODES 4 and 5, performance of a significant number of required testing and maintenance activities is also required. In MODES 4 and 5, the activities are generally planned and administratively controlled. Relaxations from typical MODES 1, 2, and 3 LCO requirements are acceptable during shutdown MODES, based on:

- a. The fact that time in an outage is limited. This is a risk prudent goal as well as a utility economic consideration.
- b. Requiring appropriate compensatory measures for certain conditions. These may include administrative controls, reliance on systems that do not necessarily meet typical design requirements applied to systems credited in operation MODE analyses, or both.
- c. Prudent utility consideration of the risk associated with multiple activities that could affect multiple systems.
- d. Maintaining, to the extent practical, the ability to perform required functions (even if not meeting MODES 1, 2, and 3 OPERABILITY requirements) with systems assumed to function during an event.

In the event of an accident during shutdown, this LCO ensures the capability of supporting systems necessary for avoiding immediate difficulty, assuming either a loss of all offsite power or a loss of all onsite (diesel generator (DG)) power.

The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

One offsite circuit supplying the onsite Class 1E power distribution subsystem(s) of LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems – Shutdown," ensures that all required loads are powered from offsite power. An OPERABLE DG, associated with a Distribution System Essential Service System (ESS) bus required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8, ensures that a diverse power source is available for providing electrical power support

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

assuming a loss of the offsite circuit. Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit and DG ensures the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and reactor vessel draindown).

The qualified offsite circuit(s) must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage while connected to their respective ESS bus(es), and of accepting required loads during an accident. Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the UFSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. The offsite circuit from the 138 kV or 345 kV switchyard consists of the incoming breakers and disconnects to the 22 or 32 reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT), associated 22 or 32 RAT, and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to 4160 kV ESS buses required by LCO 3.8.8. Another qualified circuit is provided by the bus tie between the corresponding ESS buses of the two units.

The required DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, connecting to its respective 4160 V ESS bus on detection of bus undervoltage, and accepting required loads. This sequence must be accomplished within 13 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the 4160 V ESS buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with engine hot and DG in standby with engine at ambient conditions. Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillances. Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY. The necessary portions of the DG Cooling Water and Ultimate Heat Sink System capable of providing cooling to the required DG is also required.

It is acceptable for divisions to be cross tied during shutdown conditions, permitting a single offsite power circuit to supply all required divisions.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment to provide assurance that:

- a. Systems providing adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;
- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.1.

ACTIONS LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 4 or 5. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3 while in MODE 1, 2, or 3 would require the unit to be shutdown, but would not require immediate suspension of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The Note to the ACTIONS, "LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable," ensures that the actions for immediate suspension of irradiated fuel assembly movement are not postponed due to entry into LCO 3.0.3.

A.1

An offsite circuit is considered inoperable if it is not available to one required 4160 V ESS bus. If two or more 4160 V ESS buses are required per LCO 3.8.8, one division

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

with offsite power available may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable that are not powered from offsite power, appropriate restrictions can be implemented in accordance with the required feature(s) LCOs' ACTIONS. Required features remaining powered from a qualified offsite circuit, even if that circuit is considered inoperable because it is not powering other required features, are not declared inoperable by this Required Action. For example, if both Division 1 and 2 ESS buses are required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8, and only the Division 1 ESS buses are not capable of being powered from offsite power, then only the required features powered from Division 1 ESS buses are required to be declared inoperable.

A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4

With the required offsite circuit not available to all required divisions, the option still exists to declare all required features inoperable per Required Action A.1. Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With the required DG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4
(continued)

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A have been modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to any required ESS bus, ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.8 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit whether or not a division is de-energized. LCO 3.8.8 provides the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de-energized division.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.2.1

SR 3.8.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.8.1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in other than MODES 1, 2, and 3 to be applicable. SR 3.8.1.9 is not required to be met since only one offsite circuit is required to be OPERABLE. SR 3.8.1.20 is excepted because starting independence is not required with the DG(s) that is not required to be OPERABLE. SR 3.8.1.21 is not required to be met because the opposite unit's DG is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment. Refer to the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.1 for a discussion of each SR.

This SR is modified by two Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DG(s) from being paralleled with the offsite power network or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs, and to preclude de-energizing a required 4160 V ESS bus or disconnecting a required offsite circuit during performance of SRs. With limited AC sources available, a single event

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.2.1 (continued)

could compromise both the required circuit and the DG. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required during periods when the DG and offsite circuit are required to be OPERABLE. Note 2 states that SRs 3.8.1.13 and 3.8.1.19 are not required to be met when its associated ECCS subsystem(s) are not required to be OPERABLE. These SRs demonstrate the DG response to an ECCS initiation signal (either alone or in conjunction with a loss of offsite power signal). This is consistent with the ECCS instrumentation requirements that do not require the ECCS initiation signals when the associated ECCS subsystem is not required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - Shutdown."

REFERENCES

None.

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil and Starting Air

BASES

BACKGROUND For proper operation of the standby DGs, it is necessary to ensure the proper quality of the fuel oil. Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 1) addresses the recommended fuel oil practices as supplemented by ANSI N195 (Ref. 2). The fuel oil properties governed by these SRs are the water and sediment content, the flashpoint and kinematic viscosity, specific gravity (or API gravity), and impurity level.

Each DG has a starting air system that includes two pair of air receivers. Each pair has adequate capacity for three successive starts without recharging the air start receivers.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 3), and Chapter 15 (Ref. 4), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The DGs are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Isolation Condenser (IC) System; and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

Since diesel fuel oil and starting air subsystem support the operation of the standby AC power sources, they satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO Stored diesel fuel oil is required to meet specific standards for quality. This requirement supports the availability of DGs required to shut down the reactor and to maintain it in a safe condition for an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA with loss of offsite power.

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued) The starting air system is required to have a minimum capacity for three successive DG starts without recharging the air start receivers.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources (LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2) are required to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an AOO or a postulated DBA. Because stored diesel fuel oil and starting air subsystems support LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2, stored diesel fuel oil and starting air are required to be within limits when the associated DG is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS Table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each DG. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable DG subsystem. Complying with the Required Actions for one inoperable DG subsystem may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable DG subsystem(s) are governed by separate Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

A.1

This Condition is entered as a result of a failure to meet the acceptance criterion for particulates. Normally, trending of particulate levels allows sufficient time to correct high particulate levels prior to reaching the limit of acceptability. Poor sample procedures, contaminated sampling equipment, and errors in laboratory analysis can produce failures that do not follow a trend. Since the presence of particulates does not mean failure of the fuel oil to burn properly in the diesel engine, since particulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly between Surveillance Frequency intervals, and since proper engine performance has been recently demonstrated (within 31 days), it is prudent to allow a brief period prior to declaring the associated DG inoperable. The 7 day Completion Time allows for further evaluation, resampling, and re-analysis of the DG fuel oil.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1

With the new fuel oil properties defined in the Bases for SR 3.8.3.1 not within the required limits, a period of 30 days is allowed for restoring the stored fuel oil properties. This period provides sufficient time to test the stored fuel oil to determine that the new fuel oil, when mixed with previously stored fuel oil, remains acceptable, or to restore the stored fuel oil properties. This restoration may involve feed and bleed procedures, filtering, or combination of these procedures. Even if a DG start and load was required during this time interval and the fuel oil properties were outside limits, there is high likelihood that the DG would still be capable of performing its intended function.

C.1

With the required starting air receiver pressure < 220 psig, sufficient capacity for three successive DG starts does not exist. However, as long as the receiver pressure is ≥ 175 psig, there is adequate capacity for at least one start, and the DG can be considered OPERABLE while the air receiver pressure is restored to the required limit. A period of 48 hours is considered sufficient to complete restoration to the required pressure prior to declaring the DG inoperable. This period is acceptable based on the remaining air start capacity, the fact that most DG starts are accomplished on the first attempt, and the low probability of an event during this brief period.

D.1

With a Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met, or the stored diesel fuel oil or starting air subsystem not within limits for reasons other than addressed by Condition A, B, or C, the associated DG may be incapable of performing its intended function and must be immediately declared inoperable.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.1

The tests of new fuel oil prior to addition to the storage tanks are a means of determining whether new fuel oil is of the appropriate grade and has not been contaminated with substances that would have an immediate detrimental impact on diesel engine combustion. If results from these tests are within acceptable limits, the fuel oil may be added to the storage tanks without concern for contaminating the entire volume of fuel oil in the storage tanks. These tests are to be conducted prior to adding the new fuel to the storage tank(s). The tests, limits, and applicable ASTM Standards are as follows:

- a. Sample the new fuel oil in accordance with ASTM D4057-95 (Ref. 5);
- b. Verify that the new fuel oil sample has: (1) an absolute specific gravity at 60°F of ≥ 0.83 and ≤ 0.89 or an API gravity at 60°F of ≥ 27 and ≤ 39 when tested in accordance with ASTM D1298-99 (Ref. 5); (2) a kinematic viscosity at 40°C of ≥ 1.9 centistokes and ≤ 4.1 centistokes when tested in accordance with ASTM D445-97 (Ref. 5); and (3) a flash point of $\geq 125^\circ\text{F}$ when tested in accordance with ASTM D93-99c (Ref. 5); and
- c. Verify that the new fuel oil has a clear and bright appearance with proper color when tested in accordance with ASTM D4176-93 (Ref. 5) or a water and sediment content within limits when tested in accordance with ASTM D2709-96e (Ref. 5). The clear and bright appearance with proper color test is only applicable to fuels that meet the ASTM color requirements (i.e., ASTM color 5 or less).

Failure to meet any of the above limits is cause for rejecting the new fuel oil, but does not represent a failure to meet the LCO concern since the fuel oil is not added to the storage tanks.

Following the initial new fuel oil sample, the fuel oil is analyzed within 31 days following addition of the new fuel oil to the fuel oil storage tank(s) to establish that the other properties specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-98b (Ref. 5) are met for new fuel oil when tested in accordance

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.1 (continued)

with ASTM D975-98b (Ref. 5), except that the analysis for sulfur may be performed in accordance with ASTM D1552-95 (Ref. 5), ASTM D2622-98 (Ref. 5), or ASTM D4294-98 (Ref. 5). The 31 day period is acceptable because the fuel oil properties of interest, even if they were not within stated limits, would not have an immediate effect on DG operation. This Surveillance ensures the availability of high quality fuel oil for the DGs.

Fuel oil degradation during long term storage shows up as an increase in particulate, mostly due to oxidation. The presence of particulate does not mean that the fuel oil will not burn properly in a diesel engine. The particulate can cause fouling of filters and fuel oil injection equipment, however, which can cause engine failure.

Particulate concentrations should be determined in accordance with ASTM D5452-98 (Ref. 5). This method involves a gravimetric determination of total particulate concentration in the fuel oil and has a limit of 10 mg/l. It is acceptable to obtain a field sample for subsequent laboratory testing in lieu of field testing.

The Frequency of this test takes into consideration fuel oil degradation trends that indicate that particulate concentration is unlikely to change significantly between Frequency intervals.

SR 3.8.3.2

This Surveillance ensures that, without the aid of the refill compressor, sufficient air start capacity for each DG is available. The system design requirements provide for a minimum of three engine starts without recharging. The pressure specified in this SR is intended to support the lowest value at which the three starts can be accomplished.

The 31 day Frequency takes into account the capacity, capability, redundancy, and diversity of the AC sources and other indications available in the control room, including alarms, to alert the operator to below normal air start pressure.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

- REFERENCES
1. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Rev. 1, October 1979.
 2. ANSI N195, 1976.
 3. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
 4. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
 5. ASTM Standards: D4057-95; D1298-99; D445-97; D93-99c;
D4176-93; D2709-96e; D975-98b; D1552-95; D2622-98;
D4294-98; and D5452-98.
-
-

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.4 DC Sources – Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND The DC electrical power systems provide the AC emergency power system with control power. They also provide both motive and control power to selected safety related equipment. Also, these DC subsystems provide DC electrical power to inverters, which in turn power the AC essential service buses. As required by UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.2.8 (Ref. 1), the DC electrical power system is designed to have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform its safety functions, assuming a single failure. The DC electrical power system is consistent with the recommendations of Safety Guide 6 (Ref. 2) and IEEE-308 (Ref. 3).

The 250 VDC power sources provide motive power to selected safety related larger DC loads such as DC motor-driven pumps and valves. Each unit includes a 250 VDC source consisting of a 250 VDC battery and an associated 250 VDC full capacity battery charger. An additional 250 VDC full capacity (swing) charger is available for use between the units. The swing charger can only be aligned to one battery at a time. Each 250 VDC battery and charger supplies power to both Unit 2 and Unit 3 loads. Therefore, for the purposes of this Specification, each unit has two 250 VDC electrical power subsystems. One 250 VDC electrical power subsystem includes the associated unit 250 VDC battery and full capacity battery charger while the other 250 VDC electrical power subsystem includes the opposite unit 250 VDC battery and the full capacity charger. The normal and swing full capacity chargers are normally supplied from an associated unit AC loadgroup bus. These AC buses are arranged so they can be aligned to any viable available plant AC source. The loads between the redundant 250 VDC subsystem are not transferable.

The Division 1 and Division 2 125 VDC power sources provide both motive and control power to selected safety related equipment, as well as circuit breaker control power for the nonsafety related 4160 V switchgear, and all 480 V load centers. Each unit includes a 125 VDC source consisting of

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

a 125 VDC battery and two 125 VDC full capacity chargers (normal and spare). Each 125 VDC unit source (125 VDC battery and associated chargers) supplies power to the associated unit Division 1 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystem and the opposite unit Division 2 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystem. The Division 1 and 2 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystems provide power to redundant loads, therefore both unit 125 VDC sources are needed to support the operation of both units. These sources are referred to as the Division 1 and 2 125 VDC electrical power sources since they supply the associated units Division 1 and 2 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystems, respectively. In addition, the Division 2 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystems provide control power to safety related loads common to both units such as the Standby Gas Treatment System. Therefore, the opposite unit Division 2 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystem is needed to support the operations of the given unit. This source is referred to as the opposite unit's 125 VDC electrical power subsystem; however it receives power from the given units battery and full capacity chargers. The design also includes an alternate battery for each 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystem. However, the design configuration of the alternate battery is susceptible to single failure and therefore is not reliable as a normal 125 VDC source. The chargers are supplied from a 480 VAC bus. These AC buses are arranged so they can be aligned to any viable available plant AC source. The loads between the redundant 125 VDC subsystems are not automatically transferable except for the diesel generator (DG) (i.e., 2/3 DG control circuit), High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System, and Automatic Depressurization System, the logic circuits and valves of which are normally fed from the Division 1 125 VDC system.

During normal operation, the DC loads are powered from the battery chargers with the batteries floating on the system. In case of loss of normal power to the battery charger, the DC loads are automatically powered from the associated batteries.

The DC power distribution system is described in more detail in Bases for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution System—Operating," and LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution System—Shutdown."

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

Each battery has adequate storage capacity to carry the normal loads plus all loads required for safe shutdown on one unit and operational loads required to limit the consequences of a design basis event on the other unit for a period of 4 hours (Ref. 4).

Each DC battery is separately housed in a ventilated room apart from its charger and distribution centers. Each subsystem is located in an area separated physically and electrically from the other subsystems to ensure that a single failure in one subsystem does not cause a failure in a redundant subsystem. There is no sharing between redundant Class 1E subsystems such as batteries, battery chargers, or distribution panels.

The batteries for DC electrical power subsystems are sized to produce required capacity at 80% of nameplate rating, corresponding to warranted capacity at end of life cycles and the 100% design demand. The minimum design voltage limit is 105/210 V.

Each DC electrical power subsystem battery charger has ample power output capacity for the steady state operation of connected loads required during normal operation, while at the same time maintaining its battery bank fully charged. Each battery charger has sufficient capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge to its fully charged state within 24 hours while supplying normal steady state loads (Ref. 4).

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 5) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 6), assume that Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the DGs, emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining DC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite AC power or all onsite AC power; and
- b. A worst case single failure.

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The DC electrical power subsystems—with: a) each 250 VDC subsystem consisting of one 250 VDC battery, one battery charger and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated unit bus, b) the Division 1 125 VDC subsystem consisting of the unit 125 VDC battery, one full capacity battery charger, a unit bus, and the corresponding control equipment, and interconnecting cabling up to the associated unit 125 VDC Division 1 bus, c) the Division 2 125 VDC subsystem consisting of the opposite unit 125 VDC battery, one full capacity battery charger, opposite unit buses, and all the corresponding control equipment, interconnecting cabling, and bus ties up to the unit 125 VDC Division 2 bus, and d) the opposite unit Division 2 125 VDC subsystem consisting of the unit 125 VDC battery, one full capacity battery charger, unit buses, and the corresponding control equipment, interconnecting cabling and bus ties up to the associated opposite unit 125 VDC Division 2 bus are required to be OPERABLE to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA. Loss of any DC electrical power subsystem does not prevent the minimum safety function from being performed (Ref. 4).

APPLICABILITY

The DC electrical power sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure safe unit operation and to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued) b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 4 and 5 and other conditions in which the DC electrical power sources are required are addressed in LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources - Shutdown."

ACTIONS

A.1

Condition A, 250 VDC battery inoperable as a result of maintenance or testing, represents one subsystem with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event. It is therefore imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of 250 VDC power to the affected subsystem. Operation in this Condition is needed during the operating cycle to ensure the battery is maintained OPERABLE.

If one of the 250 VDC batteries is inoperable, the remaining 250 VDC electrical power subsystem has the capacity to support a safe shutdown of one unit and to mitigate an accident condition in the other unit. Since a subsequent worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a worst case accident, continued power operation is limited. Required Action A.1 limits the time the unit can operate in this condition to 7 cumulative days per operating cycle, for any one battery. Therefore, each 250 VDC battery can be removed from service to perform maintenance or testing as long as the cumulative time is not exceeded for that battery.

The 7 day cumulative Completion Time is based on the capacity and capability of the remaining DC sources to supply the required loads.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1

Condition B, 250 VDC battery inoperable due to the need to replace the battery as determined by maintenance or testing, represents one subsystem with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event. It is therefore imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of 250 VDC power to the affected subsystem. Operation in this Condition may be needed during the operating cycle to completely replace a battery to maintain the 250 VDC subsystem OPERABLE for the remainder of the cycle.

If one of the 250 VDC batteries is inoperable, the remaining 250 VDC electrical power subsystem has the capacity to support a safe shutdown of one unit and to mitigate an accident condition in the other unit. Since a subsequent worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a worst case accident, continued power operation is limited. Required Action B.1 limits the time the unit can operate in this condition to 7 days. Therefore, each 250 VDC battery can be removed from service to completely replace a battery.

The 7 day Completion Time to restore the 250 VDC battery is based on the capacity and capability of the remaining DC sources to supply the required loads.

C.1

With one 250 VDC electrical power subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition B or C, Condition C represents one 250 VDC electrical power subsystem with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event and a potential loss of ability to remain energized during normal operation. It is therefore imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of 250 VDC power to the affected buses. The 2 hour limit is consistent with the allowed time for an inoperable DC Distribution System subsystem.

If one 250 VDC electrical power subsystem is inoperable (e.g., inoperable battery, inoperable required battery charger(s), or inoperable required battery charger and

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 (continued)

associated inoperable battery), the remaining DC electrical power subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown of one unit and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a worst case accident, continued power operation should not exceed 2 hours. The 2 hour Completion Time is based on Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7) and reflects a reasonable time to assess unit status as a function of the inoperable DC electrical power subsystem and, if the DC electrical power subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status, to prepare to effect an orderly and safe unit shutdown.

D.1 and D.2

Condition D, Division 1 or 2 125 VDC battery inoperable as a result of maintenance or testing, represents one division with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event. It is therefore imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of DC power to the affected division. Operation in this Condition is needed during the operating cycle to ensure the battery is maintained OPERABLE. Condition D is modified by a Note indicating that the Condition is only applicable when the opposite unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

If one of the 125 VDC batteries is inoperable, the remaining 125 VDC electrical power subsystem has the capacity to support a safe shutdown of one unit and to mitigate an accident condition in the other unit. Since a subsequent worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a worst case accident, continued power operation is limited. Required Action D.2 limits the time the unit can operate in this condition to 7 cumulative days per operating cycle, for any one battery. Therefore, each 125 VDC battery can be removed from service to perform maintenance or testing as long as the cumulative time is not exceeded for that battery. In addition, Required Action D.1 requires the

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 and D.2 (continued)

associated OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem to be placed in service. An OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem consists of the alternate 125 VDC battery and one full capacity battery charger. For the alternate 125 VDC battery to be considered OPERABLE, all SR requirements associated with the alternate 125 VDC battery must be met. Therefore, placement of the OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem in service will help ensure that the design basis can be met. (The full capacity battery charger is the same battery charger (normal or spare) associated with the normal 125 VDC electrical power subsystem.) However, the design configuration of the alternate battery is susceptible to single failure and hence, is not as reliable as the normal battery. Therefore, only a limited time of operation is allowed in this condition.

The 2 hour Completion Time to place the associated OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem in service provides sufficient time to safely remove the Division 1 or 2 125 VDC electrical power subsystem from service and place the alternate supply in service. The 7 day cumulative Completion Time is based on the capacity and capability of the remaining DC Sources, including the enhanced capability afforded by the capability of the alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem to supply the required loads.

E.1 and E.2

Condition E, Division 1 or 2 125 VDC battery inoperable due to the need to replace the battery as determined by maintenance or testing, represents one division with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event. It is therefore imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of DC power to the affected division. Operation in this Condition may be needed during the operating cycle to completely replace a battery to maintain the Division 1 or 2 VDC subsystem OPERABLE for the remainder of the cycle. Condition E is modified by a Note indicating that the Condition is only applicable when the opposite unit is in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

E.1 and E.2 (continued)

If one of the 125 VDC batteries is inoperable, the remaining 125 VDC electrical power subsystem has the capacity to support a safe shutdown of one unit and to mitigate an accident condition in the other unit. Since a subsequent worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a worst case accident, continued power operation is limited. Required Action E.2 limits the time the unit can operate in this condition to 7 days. Therefore, each 125 VDC battery can be removed from service to completely replace a battery. In addition, Required Action E.1 requires the associated OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem to be placed in service. An OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem consists of the alternate 125 VDC battery and one full capacity battery charger. For the alternate 125 VDC battery to be considered OPERABLE, all SR requirements associated with the alternate 125 VDC battery must be met. Therefore, placement of the OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem in service will help ensure that the design basis can be met. (The full capacity battery charger is the same battery charger (normal or space) associated with the normal 125 VDC electrical power subsystem.) However, the design configuration of the alternate battery is susceptible to single failure and hence, is not as reliable as the normal battery. Therefore, only a limited time of operation is allowed in this condition.

The 2 hour Completion Time to place the associated OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem in service provides sufficient time to safely remove the Division 1 or 2 125 VDC electrical power subsystem from service and place the alternate supply in service. The 7 day Completion Time to restore the 125 VDC battery is based on the capacity and capability of the remaining DC Sources, including the enhanced capability afforded by the capability of the alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem to supply the required loads.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

F.1 and F.2

With one Division 1 or Division 2 125 VDC electrical power subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Conditions D or E, Condition F represents one division with a loss of ability to completely respond to an event, and a potential loss of ability to remain energized during normal operation. It is therefore imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of DC power to the affected division. The 2 hour limit is consistent with the allowed time for an inoperable DC Distribution System division.

If one 125 VDC electrical power subsystem is inoperable (e.g., inoperable battery, inoperable required battery charger, or inoperable required battery charger and associated inoperable battery), the remaining DC electrical power subsystems have the capacity to support a safe shutdown and to mitigate an accident condition. Since a subsequent worst case single failure could, however, result in the loss of minimum necessary DC electrical subsystems to mitigate a worst case accident, continued power operation should not exceed 2 hours. The 2 hour Completion Time is based on Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7) and reflects a reasonable time to assess unit status as a function of the inoperable DC electrical power subsystem and, if the DC electrical power subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status, to prepare to effect an orderly and safe unit shutdown.

Required Action F.2 is modified by a Note indicating that the action is only applicable if the opposite unit is not in MODE 1, 2, or 3. In this condition, the shutdown unit is under maintenance and a complete test of at least one 125 VDC subsystem may be necessary. Required Action F.2 requires the OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem to be placed in service in 2 hours. The 2 hour Completion Time to place associated OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem in service provides sufficient time to safely remove the Division 1 and 2 125 VDC electrical power subsystem from service and place the alternate supply in service. An OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem consists of the alternate 125 VDC battery and one full capacity battery charger. For

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

F.1 and F.2 (continued)

the alternate 125 VDC battery to be considered OPERABLE all SR requirements associated with the 125 VDC battery must be met. (The full capacity battery charger is the same battery charger (normal or spare) associated with the normal 125 VDC electrical power subsystem.) Upon completing this Required Action continuous operation is allowed, since if the opposite unit associated OPERABLE alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem is placed in service supplying the unit Division 2 loads, the design configuration will not be susceptible to single failure and hence, the reliability is consistent with the normal battery.

G.1

With the opposite unit Division 2 125 VDC electrical power system inoperable, certain redundant Division 2 features (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment System) will not function if a design basis event were to occur. With a standby gas treatment subsystem inoperable, LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment System" requires restoration of the inoperable SGT subsystem to OPERABLE status in 7 days. Therefore, a 7 day Completion Time is provided to restore the opposite unit Division 2 125 VDC electrical power subsystem to OPERABLE status. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant system(s) and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

H.1 and H.2

If the DC electrical power subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems. The Completion Time to bring the unit to MODE 4 is consistent with the time required in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 7).

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.1

Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge for the batteries helps to ensure the effectiveness of the charging system and the ability of the batteries to perform their intended function. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery and maintain the battery in a fully charged state. The voltage requirements are based on the nominal design voltage of the battery and are consistent with the initial voltages assumed in the battery sizing calculations. The 7 day Frequency is conservative when compared with manufacturers recommendations and IEEE-450 (Ref. 8). SR 3.8.4.1.c is modified by a Note. The Note requires the Unit 2 alternate battery to meet the specified voltage limit only when it is required to be OPERABLE. This battery is required to be OPERABLE when it is being used to meet Required Actions D.1, E.1, or F.2.

SR 3.8.4.2

Visual inspection to detect corrosion of the battery cells and connections, or measurement of the resistance of each intercell and terminal connection, provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance.

The connection resistance limits established for this SR are within the values established by industry practice. The connection resistance limits of this SR are related to the resistance of individual bolted connections, and do not include the resistance of conductive components (e.g., cables or conductors located between cells, racks, or tiers).

The Frequency for these inspections, which can detect conditions that can cause power losses due to resistance heating, is 92 days. This Frequency is considered acceptable based on operating experience related to detecting corrosion trends.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.8.4.3 and SR 3.8.4.7

Battery charger capability requirements are based on the design capacity of the chargers (Ref. 4). According to Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 9), the battery charger supply is required to be based on the largest combined demands of the various steady state loads and the charging capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge state to the fully charged state, irrespective of the status of the unit during these demand occurrences. The minimum required amperes and duration ensures that these requirements can be satisfied.

The 18 month Frequency for SR 3.8.4.3 is acceptable based on engineering judgement. Operating experience has shown that the 250 V battery chargers usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

The 24 Frequency for SR 3.8.4.7 is acceptable given the administrative controls existing to ensure adequate charger performance during these 24 month intervals. In addition, this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

SR 3.8.4.4

Visual inspection of the battery cells, cell plates, and battery racks provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance. The presence of physical damage or deterioration does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR, provided an evaluation determines that the physical damage or deterioration does not affect the OPERABILITY of the battery (its ability to perform its design function).

The 24 month Frequency for the Surveillance is based on engineering judgement. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.8.4.5 and SR 3.8.4.6

Visual inspection and resistance measurements of intercell and terminal connections provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could indicate degraded battery condition. The anti-corrosion material is used to help ensure good electrical connections and to reduce terminal deterioration. The visual inspection for corrosion is not intended to require removal of and inspection under each terminal connection.

The removal of visible corrosion is a preventive maintenance SR. The presence of visible corrosion does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR, provided visible corrosion is removed during performance of this Surveillance.

The connection resistance limits are within the values established by industry practice. The connection resistance limits of this SR are related to the resistance of individual bolted connections, and do not include the resistance of conductive components (e.g., cables or conductors located between cells, racks, or tiers).

The 24 month Frequency for the Surveillance is based on engineering judgement. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 24 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.8.4.8

A battery service test is a special test of the battery's capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The test can be performed using simulated or actual loads. The discharge rate and test length corresponds to the design duty cycle requirements as specified in Reference 4.

The Frequency of 24 months is acceptable, given unit conditions required to perform the test and the other requirements existing to ensure adequate battery performance during these 24 month intervals. In addition, this Frequency is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.8 (continued)

This SR is modified by a Note. The Note allows the performance of a modified performance discharge test in lieu of a service test provided the modified performance discharge test completely envelopes the service test. This substitution is acceptable because a modified performance discharge test represents a more severe test of battery capacity than SR 3.8.4.8.

SR 3.8.4.9

A battery performance discharge test is a test of constant current capacity of a battery, normally done in the as found condition, after having been in service, to detect any change in the capacity determined by the acceptance test. The test is intended to determine overall battery degradation due to age and usage.

A battery modified performance discharge test is a simulated duty cycle normally consisting of just two rates; the one minute rate published for the battery or the largest current load of the duty cycle, followed by the test rate employed for the performance discharge test, both of which envelope the duty cycle of the service test. (The test can consist of a single rate if the test rate employed for the performance discharge test exceeds the 1 minute rate and continues to envelope the duty cycle of the service test.) Since the ampere-hours removed by a rated one minute discharge represents a very small portion of the battery capacity, the test rate can be changed to that for the performance test without compromising the results of the performance discharge test. The battery terminal voltage for the modified performance discharge test should remain above the minimum battery terminal voltage specified in the battery service test for the duration of time equal to that of the service test.

A modified performance discharge test is a test of the battery capacity and its ability to provide a high rate, short duration load (usually the highest rate of the duty cycle). This will often confirm the battery's ability to meet the critical period of the load duty cycle, in addition

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.4.9 (continued)

to determining its percentage of rated capacity. Initial conditions for the modified performance discharge test should be identical to those specified for a service test when the modified performance discharge test is performed in lieu of a service test. Either the battery performance discharge test or the modified performance discharge test is acceptable for satisfying SR 3.8.4.9; however, only the modified performance discharge test may be used to satisfy SR 3.8.4.9 while satisfying the requirements of SR 3.8.4.8 at the same time.

The acceptance criteria for this Surveillance is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 8) and IEEE-485 (Ref. 10). These references recommend that the battery be replaced if its capacity is below 80% of the manufacturer's rating, since IEEE-485 (Ref. 10) recommends using an aging factor of 125% in the battery size calculation. A capacity of 80% shows that the battery rate of deterioration is increasing, even if there is ample capacity to meet the load requirements.

The Frequency for this test is normally 60 months. If the battery shows degradation, or if the battery has reached 85% of its expected life and capacity is < 100% of the manufacturer's rating, the Surveillance Frequency is reduced to 12 months. However, if the battery shows no degradation but has reached 85% of its expected life, the Surveillance Frequency is only reduced to 24 months for batteries that retain capacity \geq 100% of the manufacturer's rating. Degradation is indicated, consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 8), when the battery capacity drops by more than 10% relative to its capacity on the previous performance test or when it is \geq 10% below the manufacturer's rating. The 12 month and 60 month Frequencies are consistent with the recommendations in IEEE-450 (Ref. 8). The 24 month Frequency is derived from the recommendations of IEEE-450 (Ref. 8).

(continued)

BASES (continued)

- REFERENCES
1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.2.8.
 2. Safety Guide 6, March 10, 1971.
 3. IEEE Standard 308, 1974.
 4. UFSAR, Section 8.3.2.
 5. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
 6. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
 7. Regulatory Guide 1.93, Revision 0, December 1974.
 8. IEEE Standard 450, 1995.
 9. Regulatory Guide 1.32, Revision 2, February 1977.
 10. IEEE Standard 485, 1978.
-
-

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.5 DC Sources – Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources – Operating."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators (DGs), emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

- a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

In general, when the unit is shut down, the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrence being significantly reduced or eliminated, and in minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

The shutdown Technical Specification requirements are designed to ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of certain postulated accidents. Worst case Design Basis Accidents which are analyzed for operating MODES are generally viewed not to be a significant concern during shutdown MODES due to the lower energies involved. The Technical Specifications therefore require a lesser complement of electrical equipment to be available during shutdown than is required during operating MODES. More recent work completed on the potential risks associated with shutdown, however, have found significant risk associated with certain shutdown evolutions. As a result, in addition to the requirements established in the Technical Specifications, the Industry has adopted NUMARC 91-06, "Guidelines for industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management," as an industry initiative to manage shutdown tasks and associated electrical support to maintain risk at an acceptable low level. This may require the availability of additional equipment beyond that required by the shutdown Technical Specifications.

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of
10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

The DC electrical power subsystems—with: a) the required 250 VDC subsystem consisting of one 250 VDC battery, one battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated bus; and b) the required 125 VDC subsystem consisting of one battery, one battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated bus—are required to be OPERABLE to support some of the required DC distribution subsystems required OPERABLE

(continued)

BASES

LCO (continued) by LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown." This requirement ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown). The associated alternate 125 VDC electrical power subsystem may be used to satisfy the requirements of the 125 VDC subsystems.

APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide assurance that:

- a. Required features to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;
- b. Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
- c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.4.

ACTIONS LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 4 or 5. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3 while in MODE 1, 2, or 3

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

would require the unit to be shutdown, but would not require immediate suspension of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The Note to the ACTIONS, "LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable," ensures that the actions for immediate suspension of irradiated fuel assembly movement are not postponed due to entry into LCO 3.0.3.

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, and A.2.4

By allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with associated DC electrical power subsystem(s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected system LCOs' ACTIONS. However, in many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.5.1

SR 3.8.5.1 requires all Surveillances required by SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.9 to be applicable. Therefore, see the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.4 for a discussion of each SR.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.5.1 (continued)

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE 250 VDC source from being discharged below their capability to provide the required power supply or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
 2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
-
-

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters

BASES

BACKGROUND This LCO delineates the limits on electrolyte temperature, level, float voltage, and specific gravity for the DC electrical power subsystems batteries. A discussion of these batteries and their OPERABILITY requirements is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources – Operating," and LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources – Shutdown."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power subsystems provide normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators (DGs), emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit as discussed in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4 and LCO 3.8.5.

Since battery cell parameters support the operation of the DC electrical power subsystems, they satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO Battery cell parameters must remain within acceptable limits to ensure availability of the required DC power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence or a postulated DBA. Electrolyte limits are conservatively established, allowing continued DC electrical system function even with Category A and B limits not met.

APPLICABILITY The battery cell parameters are required solely for the support of the associated DC electrical power subsystem. Therefore, these cell parameters are only required when the associated DC electrical power subsystem is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to the Applicability discussions in Bases for LCO 3.8.4 and LCO 3.8.5.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS Table is modified by a Note which indicates that separate Condition entry is allowed for each battery. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable DC electrical power subsystem. Complying with the Required Actions for one inoperable DC electrical power subsystem may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable DC electrical power subsystem(s) are governed by separate Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

A.1, A.2, and A.3

With parameters of one or more cells in one or more batteries not within Table 3.8.6-1 limits (i.e., Category A limits not met or Category B limits not met, or Category A and B limits not met) but within the Category C limits specified in Table 3.8.6-1, the battery is degraded but there is still sufficient capacity to perform the intended function. Therefore, the affected battery is not required to be considered inoperable solely as a result of Category A or B limits not met, and continued operation is permitted for a limited period.

The pilot cell(s) electrolyte level and float voltage are required to be verified to meet the Category C limits within 1 hour (Required Action A.1). This check provides a quick indication of the status of the remainder of the battery cells. One hour provides time to inspect the electrolyte level and to confirm the float voltage of the pilot cell(s). One hour is considered a reasonable amount of time to perform the required verification.

Verification that the Category C limits are met (Required Action A.2) provides assurance that during the time needed to restore the parameters to the Category A and B limits, the battery is still capable of performing its intended function. A period of 24 hours is allowed to complete the initial verification because specific gravity measurements must be obtained for each connected cell. Taking into consideration both the time required to perform the required verification and the assurance that the battery cell parameters are not severely degraded, this time is

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2, and A.3 (continued)

considered reasonable. The verification is repeated at 7 day intervals until the parameters are restored to Category A and B limits. This periodic verification is consistent with the normal Frequency of pilot cell Surveillances.

Continued operation is only permitted for 31 days before battery cell parameters must be restored to within Category A and B limits. Taking into consideration that, while battery capacity is degraded, sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and to allow time to fully restore the battery cell parameters to normal limits, this time is acceptable for operation prior to declaring the associated DC batteries inoperable.

B.1

When any battery parameter is outside the Table 3.8.6-1 Category C limit for any connected cell, sufficient capacity to supply the maximum expected load requirement is not ensured and the corresponding DC electrical power subsystem must be declared inoperable. Additionally, other potentially extreme conditions, such as any Required Actions of Condition A and associated Completion Time not met or average electrolyte temperature of representative cells $\leq 65^{\circ}\text{F}$, also are cause for immediately declaring the associated DC electrical power subsystem inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.6.1

This SR verifies that Table 3.8.6-1 Category A battery cell parameters are consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which recommends regular battery inspections (at least one per month) including voltage, specific gravity, and electrolyte level of pilot cells.

SR 3.8.6.2

The quarterly inspection of specific gravity, voltage, and electrolyte level for each connected cell is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3). In addition, within 7 days of a battery

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.6.2 (continued)

discharge < 105 V for a 125 V battery and < 210 V for a 250 V battery, or a battery overcharge > 150 V for a 125 V battery and > 300 V for a 250 V battery, the battery must be demonstrated to meet Table 3.8.6-1 Category B limits. Transients, such as motor starting transients, which may momentarily cause battery voltage to drop to < 105 V or < 210 V, as applicable, do not constitute a battery discharge provided the battery terminal voltage and float current return to pre-transient values. This inspection is also consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which recommends special inspections following a severe discharge or overcharge, to ensure that no significant degradation of the battery occurs as a consequence of such discharge or overcharge. The 7 day requirement is based on engineering judgement.

SR 3.8.6.3

This Surveillance verification that the average temperature of representative cells is within limits is consistent with a recommendation of IEEE-450 (Ref. 3) that states that the temperature of electrolytes in representative cells should be determined on a quarterly basis. For this SR, a check of 10% of the connected cells is considered representative.

Lower than normal temperatures act to inhibit or reduce battery capacity. This SR ensures that the operating temperatures remain within an acceptable operating range. This limit is based on manufacturer's recommendations and the battery sizing calculation.

Table 3.8.6-1

This Table delineates the limits on electrolyte level, float voltage, and specific gravity for three different categories. The meaning of each category is discussed below.

Category A defines the normal parameter limit for each designed pilot cell in each battery. The cells selected as pilot cells are those whose temperature, voltage, and

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

Table 3.8.6-1 (continued)

electrolyte specific gravity approximate the state of charge of the entire battery.

The Category A limits specified for electrolyte level are based on manufacturer's recommendations and are consistent with the guidance in IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), with the extra $\frac{1}{4}$ inch allowance above the high water level indication for operating margin to account for temperature and charge effects. In addition to this allowance, footnote (a) to Table 3.8.6-1 permits the electrolyte level to be temporarily above the specified maximum level during and, for a limited time, following an equalizing charge (normally up to 3 days following the completion of an equalize charge to allow electrolyte stabilization), provided it is not overflowing. These limits ensure that the plates suffer no physical damage, and that adequate electron transfer capability is maintained in the event of transient conditions. IEEE-450 (Ref. 3) recommends that electrolyte level readings should be made only after the battery has been at float charge for at least 72 hours.

The Category A limit specified for float voltage is ≥ 2.13 V per cell. This value is based on the recommendation of IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which states that prolonged operation of cells below 2.13 V can reduce the life expectancy of cells.

The Category A limit specified for specific gravity for each pilot cell is ≥ 1.200 (0.015 below the manufacturer's fully charged nominal specific gravity or a battery charging current that had stabilized at a low value). This value is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. According to IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), the specific gravity readings are based on a temperature of 77°F (25°C).

The specific gravity readings are corrected for actual electrolyte temperature and level. For each 3°F (1.67°C) above 77°F (25°C), 1 point (0.001) is added to the reading; 1 point is subtracted for each 3°F below 77°F. The specific gravity of the electrolyte in a cell increases with a loss of water due to electrolysis or evaporation. Level correction will be in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

Table 3.8.6-1 (continued)

Category B defines the normal parameter limits for each connected cell. The term "connected cell" excludes any battery cell that may be jumpered out.

The Category B limits specified for electrolyte level and float voltage are the same as those specified for Category A and have been discussed above. The Category B limit specified for specific gravity for each connected cell is ≥ 1.195 (0.020 below the manufacturer's fully charged, nominal specific gravity) with the average of all connected cells 1.205 (0.010 below the manufacturer's fully charged, nominal specific gravity). These values are based on manufacturer's recommendations. The minimum specific gravity value required for each cell ensures that a cell with a marginal or unacceptable specific gravity is not masked by averaging with cells having higher specific gravities.

Category C defines the limits for each connected cell. These values, although reduced, provide assurance that sufficient capacity exists to perform the intended function and maintain a margin of safety. When any battery parameter is outside the Category C limits, the assurance of sufficient capacity described above no longer exists, and the battery must be declared inoperable.

The Category C limit specified for electrolyte level (above the top of the plates and not overflowing) ensures that the plates suffer no physical damage and maintain adequate electron transfer capability. The Category C limit for voltage is based on IEEE-450 (Ref. 3), which states that a cell voltage of 2.07 V or below, under float conditions and not caused by elevated temperature of the cell, indicates internal cell problems and may require cell replacement.

The Category C limit on average specific gravity ≥ 1.195 , is based on manufacturer's recommendations (0.020 below the manufacturer's recommended fully charged, nominal specific gravity). In addition to that limit, it is required that the specific gravity for each connected cell must be no more than 0.020 below the average of all connected cells. This limit ensures that a cell with a marginal or unacceptable specific gravity is not masked by averaging with cells having higher specific gravities.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

Table 3.8.6-1 (continued)

The footnotes to Table 3.8.6-1 that apply to specific gravity are applicable to Category A, B, and C specific gravity. Footnote (b) requires the above mentioned correction for electrolyte level and temperature.

Because of specific gravity gradients that are produced during the recharging process, delays of several days may occur while waiting for the specific gravity to stabilize. A stabilized charging current is an acceptable alternative to specific gravity measurement for determining the state of charge of the designated pilot cell. This phenomenon is discussed in IEEE-450 (Ref. 3). Footnote (c) allows the float charge current to be used as an alternate to specific gravity for up to 7 days following a battery recharge. Within 7 days, each connected cell's specific gravity must be measured to confirm the state of charge. Following a minor battery recharge (such as equalizing charge that does not follow a deep discharge) specific gravity gradients are not significant, and confirming measurements may be made in less than 7 days.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
 2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
 3. IEEE Standard 450, 1995.
-
-

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.7 Distribution Systems – Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND The onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution system for each unit is, for the most part, divided into redundant and independent AC electrical power distribution subsystems (Divisions 1 and 2).

Each AC distribution subsystem consists of two 4160 V Essential Service System (ESS) buses having an offsite source of power as well as an onsite diesel generator (DG) source. During normal operation, each subsystem's ESS buses are connected such that power is supplied to the Division 1 4160 V loads from the unit's main generator through a unit auxiliary transformer (UAT) and from the offsite circuit (via the 138 kV switchyard for Unit 2 and the 345 kV switchyard for Unit 3) through the reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) to supply the Division 2 4160 V loads. The RAT is the primary (normal) offsite power source to the ESS buses of a given unit. The RAT of the opposite unit provides the alternate qualified offsite source through bus ties provided between the corresponding ESS buses of the two units. During a loss of the normal offsite power source to the 4160 V ESS buses, the alternate supply breaker attempts to close. If all offsite sources are unavailable, the onsite emergency unit DGs supply power to the 4160 V ESS buses.

Each AC distribution subsystem also includes 480 VAC ESS buses 28 and 29 (Unit 2) and buses 38 and 39 (Unit 3), associated motor control centers, transformers, and distribution panels.

The 120 VAC instrument bus is normally powered from 480 VAC bus 28-2 for Unit 2 and 480 VAC bus 38-2 for Unit 3. The alternate power supply for the Unit 2 120 VAC instrument bus is supplied from 480 VAC MCC 25-2 and the Unit 3 120 VAC instrument bus is supplied from 480 VAC MCC 35-2. On a loss of normal power to the instrument bus an automatic bus transfer (ABT) switches to the alternate supply and automatically switches back to the normal supply when the normal supply is restored. However, the instrument bus ABT

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued) is only provided for reliability and is not required to be OPERABLE (i.e., only one power source to the instrument bus is required).

The 120 VAC essential service bus is normally supplied by a static uninterruptible power supply (UPS). Power to the UPS is supplied in order of preference; for Unit 2 by 480 VAC bus 29, 250 VDC bus 2, or 480 VAC bus 25; and for Unit 3 by 480 VAC bus 39, 250 VDC bus 3, or 480 VAC bus 36. An alternate supply via an ABT for the Unit 2 120 VAC essential service bus is supplied from 480 VAC bus 28-2 and the Unit 3 120 VAC essential service bus is supplied from 480 VAC bus 38-2. However, similar to the instrument bus ABT, the essential service bus ABT is not required to be OPERABLE.

There is one 250 VDC station service electrical power distribution subsystem (i.e., the 250 VDC system consists of one subsystem) and two independent 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystems that support the necessary power for ESF functions. The 250 VDC electrical power distribution subsystem provides motive power to the larger Division 2 DC loads such as DC motor-driven pumps and valves. The power source for the reactor building 250 VDC buses (2A/2B and 3A/3B) is the opposite unit's battery. Division 1 and 2 125 VDC electrical power distribution subsystems provide control power to selected safety related equipment as well as circuit breaker control power for 4160 V, 480 V, control relays, and annunciators. The Division 2 125 VDC subsystem for each unit is provided power by the opposite unit's battery and provides control power to a shared standby gas treatment subsystem.

The list of required distribution buses for Unit 2 and Unit 3 is presented in Tables B 3.8.7-1 and B 3.8.7-2, respectively.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2,

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.5, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Isolation Condenser (IC) System; and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC electrical power; and
- b. A worst case single failure.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution system satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO The required electrical power distribution subsystems listed in Table B 3.8.7-1 for Unit 2 and Table B 3.8.7-2 for Unit 3 ensure the availability of AC and DC electrical power for the systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA. The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE. As noted in Table B 3.8.7-1 and Table B 3.8.7-2 (Footnote a), each division of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems is a subsystem.

Maintaining the Division 1 and 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems OPERABLE, as well as portions of the opposite unit's Division 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems necessary to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," LCO 3.7.4, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) System" (Unit 3 only), LCO 3.7.5, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (AC) System" (Unit 3 only), and LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources—Operating," ensures that the redundancy incorporated into the design of ESF is not defeated. Therefore, a single failure within any system or within the electrical power distribution subsystems will not prevent safe shutdown of the reactor.

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

The AC electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses and electrical circuits to be energized to their proper voltages. OPERABLE DC electrical power distribution subsystems require the associated buses to be energized to their proper voltage from either the associated battery or charger.

Based on the number of safety significant electrical loads associated with each bus listed in Table B 3.8.7-1 for Unit 2 and Table B 3.8.7-2 for Unit 3, if one or more of the buses becomes inoperable, entry into the appropriate ACTIONS of LCO 3.8.7 is required. Some buses, such as distribution panels, which help comprise the AC and DC distribution systems are not listed in Table B 3.8.7-1 for Unit 2 and Table B 3.8.7-2 for Unit 3. The loss of electrical loads associated with these buses may not result in a complete loss of a redundant safety function necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition. Therefore, should one or more of these buses become inoperable due to a failure not affecting the OPERABILITY of a bus listed in Table B 3.8.7-1 for Unit 2 and Table B 3.8.7-2 for Unit 3 (e.g., a breaker supplying a single distribution panel fails open), the individual loads on the bus would be considered inoperable, and the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCOs governing the individual loads would be entered. However, if one or more of these buses is inoperable due to a failure also affecting the OPERABILITY of a bus listed in Table B 3.8.7-1 for Unit 2 and Table B 3.8.7-2 for Unit 3 (e.g., loss of 4160 V ESS bus, which results in de-energization of all buses powered from the 4160 V ESS bus), then although the individual loads are still considered inoperable, the Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO for the individual loads are not required to be entered, since LCO 3.0.6 allows this exception (i.e., the loads are inoperable due to the inoperability of a support system governed by a Technical Specification; the 4160 V ESS bus).

In addition, tie breakers between redundant safety related AC and DC power distribution subsystems must be open. This prevents any electrical malfunction in any power distribution subsystem from propagating to the redundant subsystem, which could cause the failure of a redundant subsystem and a loss of essential safety function(s). If

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued) any tie breakers between redundant safety related AC or DC power distribution subsystems are closed, the electrical power distribution subsystem that is not being powered from its normal source (i.e., it is being powered from its redundant electrical power distribution subsystem) is considered inoperable. This applies to the onsite, safety related, redundant electrical power distribution subsystems. It does not, however, preclude redundant Class 1E 4160 V ESS buses from being powered from the same offsite circuit.

APPLICABILITY The electrical power distribution subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

Electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 4 and 5 and other conditions in which AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems are required are covered in the Bases for LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems – Shutdown."

ACTIONS

A.1

With one or more required AC buses, motor control centers, or distribution panels inoperable and a loss of function has not yet occurred, the remaining AC electrical power distribution subsystems are capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining electrical power distribution subsystems could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required AC buses, motor control centers, and distribution panels must be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

The Condition A worst scenario is one division without AC power (i.e., no offsite power to the division and the associated DG inoperable). In this situation, the unit is more vulnerable to a complete loss of AC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the unit operators' attention be focused on minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining division by stabilizing the unit and restoring power to the affected division. The 8 hour time limit before requiring a unit shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because of:

- a. The potential for decreased safety if the unit operators' attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected division to the actions associated with taking the unit to shutdown within this time limit.
- b. The low potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component in the division with AC power. (The redundant component is verified OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 5.5.11, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP).")

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.7.a. If Condition A is entered while, for instance, a DC electrical power distribution subsystem is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, LCO 3.8.7.a may already have been not met for up to 2 hours. This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 hours, since initial failure of LCO 3.8.7.a to restore the AC electrical power distribution subsystem. At this time a DC electrical power distribution subsystem could again become inoperable, and the AC electrical power distribution subsystem could be restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.7.a was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential to fail to meet LCO 3.8.7.a indefinitely.

B.1

With one or more DC buses inoperable and a loss of safety function has not yet occurred, the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystem (which may be the opposite unit's subsystem for a loss of the 250 VDC turbine building bus) is capable of supporting the minimum safety functions necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, assuming no single failure. The overall reliability is reduced, however, because a single failure in the remaining DC electrical power distribution subsystem could result in the minimum required ESF functions not being supported. Therefore, the required DC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) must be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours by powering the bus from the associated battery or charger.

Condition B worst scenario is one subsystem without adequate DC power, potentially with both the battery significantly degraded and the associated charger nonfunctioning. In this situation the plant is significantly more vulnerable to a complete loss of all DC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the plant, minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining subsystem, and restoring power to the affected subsystem.

This 2 hour limit is more conservative than Completion Times allowed for the majority of components that would be without power. Taking exception to LCO 3.0.2 for components without adequate DC power, which would have Required Action Completion Times shorter than 2 hours, is acceptable because of:

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1 (continued)

- a. The potential for decreased safety when requiring a change in plant conditions (i.e., requiring a shutdown) while not allowing stable operations to continue;
- b. The potential for decreased safety when requiring entry into numerous applicable Conditions and Required Actions for components without DC power, while not providing sufficient time for the operators to perform the necessary evaluations and actions for restoring power to the affected division;
- c. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component.

The 2 hour Completion Time for DC electrical power distribution subsystems is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 3).

The second Completion Time for Required Action B.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet LCO 3.8.7.a. If Condition B is entered while, for instance, an AC electrical power distribution subsystem is inoperable and subsequently restored OPERABLE, LCO 3.8.7.a may already have been not met for up to 8 hours. This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 hours, since initial failure of LCO 3.8.7.a, to restore the DC electrical power distribution subsystem. At this time, an AC electrical power distribution subsystem could again become inoperable, and DC electrical power distribution could be restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This allowance results in establishing the "time zero" at the time LCO 3.8.7.a was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition B was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an acceptable limitation on this potential of failing to meet LCO 3.8.7.a indefinitely.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

C.1

With one or more required opposite unit Division 2 AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable, the redundant required features of the standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem may not function if a design basis event were to occur. In addition, Unit 2 and Unit 3 share the single train Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) and the associated Air Conditioning (AC) System. Since these systems are powered only from Unit 2, an inoperable Unit 2 Division 2 AC electrical power distribution subsystem could result in a loss of the CREV System and Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System functions (for both units).

With a standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem inoperable, LCO 3.6.4.3 requires restoration of the inoperable SGT subsystem to OPERABLE status in 7 days. Similarly, with the CREV System inoperable, LCO 3.7.4 requires restoration of the inoperable CREV System to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System inoperable, LCO 3.7.5 requires restoration of the inoperable Control Room Emergency Ventilation AC System to OPERABLE status in 30 days. Therefore, a 7 day Completion Time is provided to restore the required opposite unit Division 2 AC and DC electrical power subsystems to OPERABLE status. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant system(s) and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period.

The Required Action is modified by a Note indicating that the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.8.1 be entered and Required Actions taken if the inoperable opposite unit AC electrical power distribution subsystem results in an inoperable required offsite circuit. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.

D.1 and D.2

If the inoperable distribution subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

D.1 and D.2 (continued)

at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

E.1

Condition E corresponds to a level of degradation in the electrical distribution system that causes a required safety function to be lost. When the inoperability of two or more AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystems, in combination, results in the loss of a required function, the plant is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately to commence a controlled shutdown. The term "in combination" means that the loss of function must result from the inoperability of two or more AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems; a loss of function solely due to a single AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperability even with another AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystem concurrently inoperable, does not require entry into Condition E.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.7.1

This Surveillance verifies that the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence of the electrical divisions are maintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each required bus. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required voltage is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems, redundant power

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.7.1 (continued)

supplies available to the essential service and instrument
120 VAC buses, and other indications available in the
control room that alert the operator to bus and subsystem
malfunctions.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
 2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
 3. Regulatory Guide 1.93, December 1974.
-
-

Table B 3.8.7-1 (page 1 of 1)
Unit 2 AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution Systems

TYPE	VOLTAGE	DIVISION 1 ^(a)	DIVISION 2 ^{(a)(b)}
AC safety bus	4160 V	ESS buses 23, 23-1	ESS buses 24, 24-1
	480 V	ESS bus 28	ESS bus 29
	120 V	Unit instrument bus	Unit essential service bus
250 VDC buses	250 V	NA	TB MCC 2, RB MCC 2A, RB MCC 2B
125 VDC buses	125 V	TB main buses 2, 2A-1; RB distribution panel 2	TB reserve buses 2, 2B, 2B-1

- (a) Each division of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems is a subsystem. The 250 VDC buses constitute a single subsystem (Division 2).
- (b) OPERABILITY requirements of the opposite unit's Division 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem require OPERABILITY of the opposite unit's Division 2 4160 VAC, 480 VAC, essential services 120 VAC, and 125 VDC buses.

Table B 3.8.7-2 (page 1 of 1)
Unit 3 AC and DC Electrical Power Distribution Systems

TYPE	VOLTAGE	DIVISION 1 ^(a)	DIVISION 2 ^{(a)(b)}
AC safety bus	4160 V	ESS buses 33, 33-1	ESS buses 34, 34-1
	480 V	ESS bus 38	ESS bus 39
	120 V	Unit instrument bus	Unit essential service bus
250 VDC buses	250 V	NA	TB MCC 3, RB MCC 3A, RB MCC 3B
125 VDC buses	125 V	TB main buses 3, 3A, 3A-1; RB distribution panel 3	TB reserve buses 3B, 3B-1

- (a) Each division of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems is a subsystem. The 250 VDC buses constitute a single subsystem (Division 2).
- (b) OPERABILITY requirements of the opposite unit's Division 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem require OPERABILITY of the opposite unit's Division 2 4160 VAC, 480 VAC, essential services 120 VAC, and 125 VDC buses.

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.8 Distribution Systems – Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND	A description of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems – Operating."
------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.
-------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC and DC electrical power sources and associated power distribution subsystems during MODES 4 and 5, and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

- a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support features. This LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the electrical distribution system, including the opposite unit Division 2 electrical distribution subsystem, necessary to support OPERABILITY of Technical Specifications required systems, equipment, and components—both specifically addressed by their own LCO, and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY.

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

APPLICABILITY The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide assurance that:

- a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;
- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable while in MODE 4 or 5. However, since irradiated fuel assembly movement can occur in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the ACTIONS have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Entering LCO 3.0.3 while in MODE 1, 2, or 3 would require the unit to be shutdown, but would not require immediate suspension of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. The Note to the ACTIONS, "LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable," ensures that the actions for immediate suspension of irradiated fuel assembly movement are not postponed due to entry into LCO 3.0.3.

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, and A.2.5

Although redundant required features may require redundant divisions of electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem division may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare required features associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made, (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the plant safety systems.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, and A.2.5 (continued)

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required shutdown cooling (SDC) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the SDC ACTIONS would not be entered. Therefore, Required Action A.2.5 is provided to direct declaring SDC inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate SDC ACTIONS.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required distribution subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the plant safety systems may be without power.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.8.1

This Surveillance verifies that the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems are functioning properly, with the buses energized. The verification of proper voltage availability on the buses ensures that the required power is readily available for motive as well as control functions for critical system loads connected to these buses. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the electrical power distribution subsystems, as well as other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to subsystem malfunctions.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks

BASES

BACKGROUND Refueling equipment interlocks restrict the operation of the refueling equipment or the withdrawal of control rods to reinforce unit procedures that prevent the reactor from achieving criticality during refueling. The refueling interlock circuitry senses the conditions of the refueling equipment and the control rods. Depending on the sensed conditions, interlocks are actuated to prevent the operation of the refueling equipment or the withdrawal of control rods.

UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods, when fully inserted, serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions during all fuel movement activities and accidents.

Two channels of instrumentation are provided to sense the position of the refueling platform and the full insertion of all control rods. Additionally, inputs are provided for the loading of the refueling platform main hoist fuel grapple, the loading of the refueling platform trolley frame mounted hoist, the loading of the refueling platform monorail mounted hoist, the full retraction of the fuel grapple, and the loading of the service platform hoist. With the reactor mode switch in the shutdown or refuel position, the indicated conditions are combined in logic circuits to determine if all restrictions on refueling equipment operations and control rod insertion are satisfied.

A control rod not at its full-in position interrupts power to the refueling equipment to prevent operating the equipment over the reactor core when loaded with a fuel assembly. Conversely, the refueling equipment located over the core and loaded with fuel inserts a control rod withdrawal block in the Reactor Manual Control System to prevent withdrawing a control rod.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

The refueling platform has two mechanical switches that open before the platform or any of its hoists are physically located over the reactor vessel. Each hoist load is sensed by an electronic load cell. The service platform uses relay logic to perform the interlock and load functions. The fuel grapple main hoist load signals input via a signal conditioning unit (SCU) to a programmable logic controller (PLC). The PLC performs the associated interlock and load functions. The monorail and frame-mounted hoist load cells input via SCUs to electronic setpoint modules that perform their associated interlock and load functions. The PLC opens the associated fuel-loaded circuits at a load lighter than the combined weight of a single fuel assembly and inner-most mast section assembly in water. The electronic setpoint modules open the associated fuel-loaded circuits at a load lighter than the weight of a single fuel assembly in water.

The refueling interlocks use these indications to prevent operation of the refueling equipment with fuel loaded over the core whenever any control rod is withdrawn, or to prevent control rod withdrawal whenever fuel loaded refueling equipment is over the core (Ref. 2).

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The refueling interlocks are explicitly assumed in the UFSAR analysis for the control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 3). This analysis evaluates the consequences of control rod withdrawal during refueling. A prompt reactivity excursion during refueling could potentially result in fuel failure with subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment.

Criticality and, therefore, subsequent prompt reactivity excursions are prevented during the insertion of fuel, provided all control rods are fully inserted during the fuel insertion. The refueling interlocks accomplish this by preventing loading of fuel into the core with any control rod withdrawn or by preventing withdrawal of a rod from the core during fuel loading.

The refueling platform location switches activate at a point outside of the reactor core, such that, with a fuel assembly loaded and a control rod withdrawn, the fuel is not over the core.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) Refueling equipment interlocks satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO To prevent criticality during refueling, the refueling interlocks associated with the reactor mode switch refuel position ensure that fuel assemblies are not loaded into the core with any control rod withdrawn.

To prevent these conditions from developing, the all-rods-in, the refueling platform position, the refueling platform fuel grapple fuel loaded, the refueling platform trolley frame mounted hoist fuel loaded, the refueling platform monorail mounted hoist fuel loaded, the refueling platform fuel grapple fully retracted position, and the service platform hoist fuel loaded inputs are required to be OPERABLE when the associated equipment is in use for in-vessel fuel movement. These inputs are combined in logic circuits, which provide refueling equipment or control rod blocks to prevent operations that could result in criticality during refueling operations.

APPLICABILITY In MODE 5, a prompt reactivity excursion could cause fuel damage and subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment. The refueling equipment interlocks protect against prompt reactivity excursions during MODE 5. The interlocks are required to be OPERABLE during in-vessel fuel movement with refueling equipment associated with the interlocks when the reactor mode switch is in the refuel position. The interlocks are not required when the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position since a control rod block (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation") ensures control rod withdrawals can not occur simultaneously with in-vessel fuel movements.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the reactor pressure vessel head is on, and CORE ALTERATIONS are not possible. Therefore, the refueling interlocks are not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2

With one or more of the required refueling equipment interlocks inoperable (does not include the one-rod-out interlock addressed in LCO 3.9.2), the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply or is not necessary. This can be performed by ensuring fuel assemblies are not moved in the reactor vessel or by ensuring that the control rods are inserted and cannot be withdrawn. Therefore, Required Action A.1 requires that in-vessel fuel movement with the affected refueling equipment must be immediately suspended. This action ensures that operations are not performed with equipment that would potentially not be blocked from unacceptable operations (e.g., loading fuel into a cell with a control rod withdrawn). Suspension of in-vessel fuel movement shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Alternately, Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 require that a control rod withdrawal block be inserted and that all control rods are subsequently verified to be fully inserted. Required Action A.2.1 ensures that no control rods can be withdrawn. This action ensures that control rods cannot be inappropriately withdrawn since an electrical or hydraulic block to control rod withdrawal is in place. Required Action A.2.2 is normally performed after placing the rod withdrawal block in effect and provides a verification that all control rods are fully inserted. Like Required Action A.1, Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 ensure that unacceptable operations are prohibited (e.g., loading fuel into a core cell with the control rod withdrawn).

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.1.1

Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates each required refueling equipment interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.1.1 (continued)

single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.

The 7 day Frequency is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of other indications of refueling interlocks and their associated input status that are available to unit operations personnel.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7.
 2. UFSAR, Section 7.7.1.2.2.
 3. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.
-
-

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock

BASES

BACKGROUND

The refuel position one-rod-out interlock restricts the movement of control rods to reinforce unit procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical during refueling operations. During refueling operations, no more than one control rod is permitted to be withdrawn.

UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

The refuel position one-rod-out interlock prevents the selection of a second control rod for movement when any other control rod is not fully inserted (Ref. 2). It is a logic circuit that has redundant channels. It uses the all-rods-in signal (from the control rod full-in position indicators discussed in LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication") and a rod selection signal (from the Reactor Manual Control System).

This Specification ensures that the performance of the refuel position one-rod-out interlock in the event of a Design Basis Accident meets the assumptions used in the safety analysis of Reference 3.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The refueling position one-rod-out interlock is explicitly assumed in the UFSAR analysis for the control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 3). This analysis evaluates the consequences of control rod withdrawal during refueling. A prompt reactivity excursion during refueling could potentially result in fuel failure with subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment.

The refuel position one-rod-out interlock and adequate SDM (LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)") prevent criticality by preventing withdrawal of more than one control rod. With

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

one control rod withdrawn, the core will remain subcritical, thereby preventing any prompt critical excursion.

The refuel position one-rod-out interlock satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO

To prevent criticality during MODE 5, the refuel position one-rod-out interlock ensures no more than one control rod may be withdrawn. Both channels of the refuel position one-rod-out interlock are required to be OPERABLE and the reactor mode switch must be locked in the refuel position to support the OPERABILITY of these channels.

APPLICABILITY

In MODE 5, with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the OPERABLE refuel position one-rod-out interlock provides protection against prompt reactivity excursions.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the refuel position one-rod-out interlock is not required to be OPERABLE and is bypassed. In MODES 1 and 2, the Reactor Protection System (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation") and the control rods (LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY") provide mitigation of potential reactivity excursions. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, a control rod block (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation") ensures all control rods are inserted, thereby preventing criticality during shutdown conditions.

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

With the refueling position one-rod-out interlock inoperable, the refueling interlocks may not be capable of preventing more than one control rod from being withdrawn. This condition may lead to criticality.

Control rod withdrawal must be immediately suspended, and action must be immediately initiated to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Action must continue until all such

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

control rods are fully inserted. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and, therefore, do not have to be inserted.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.2.1

Proper functioning of the refueling position one-rod-out interlock requires the reactor mode switch to be in Refuel. During control rod withdrawal in MODE 5, improper positioning of the reactor mode switch could, in some instances, allow improper bypassing of required interlocks. Therefore, this Surveillance imposes an additional level of assurance that the refueling position one-rod-out interlock will be OPERABLE when required. By "locking" the reactor mode switch in the proper position (i.e., removing the reactor mode switch key from the console while the reactor mode switch is positioned in refuel), an additional administrative control is in place to preclude operator errors from resulting in unanalyzed operation.

The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other administrative controls utilized during refueling operations to ensure safe operation.

SR 3.9.2.2

Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on each channel demonstrates the associated refuel position one-rod-out interlock will function properly when a simulated or actual signal indicative of a required condition is injected into the logic. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The 7 day Frequency is considered adequate because of demonstrated circuit reliability, procedural

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.2.2 (continued)

controls on control rod withdrawals, and visual indications available in the control room to alert the operator to control rods not fully inserted. To perform the required testing, the applicable condition must be entered (i.e., a control rod must be withdrawn from its full-in position). Therefore, SR 3.9.2.2 has been modified by a Note that states the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is not required to be performed until 1 hour after any control rod is withdrawn.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7.
 2. UFSAR, Section 7.7.1.2.2.
 3. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.
-
-

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.3 Control Rod Position

BASES

BACKGROUND

Control rods provide the capability to maintain the reactor subcritical under all conditions and to limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase caused by a malfunction in the Control Rod Drive System. During refueling, movement of control rods is limited by the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks," and LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock") or the control rod block with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation").

UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

The refueling interlocks allow a single control rod to be withdrawn at any time unless fuel is being loaded into the core. To preclude loading fuel assemblies into the core with a control rod withdrawn, all control rods must be fully inserted. This prevents the reactor from achieving criticality during refueling operations.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling are provided by the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1 and LCO 3.9.2), the SDM (LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)"), the intermediate range monitor neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"), and the control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1).

The safety analysis for the control rod removal error during refueling in the UFSAR (Ref. 2) assumes the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) Thus, prior to fuel reload, all control rods must be fully inserted to minimize the probability of an inadvertent criticality.

Control rod position satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO All control rods must be fully inserted during applicable refueling conditions to minimize the probability of an inadvertent criticality during refueling.

APPLICABILITY During MODE 5, loading fuel into core cells with control rods withdrawn may result in inadvertent criticality. Therefore, the control rods must be inserted before loading fuel into a core cell. All control rods must be inserted before loading fuel to ensure that a fuel loading error does not result in loading fuel into a core cell with the control rod withdrawn.

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the reactor pressure vessel head is on, and no fuel loading activities are possible. Therefore, this Specification is not applicable in these MODES.

ACTIONS

A.1

With all control rods not fully inserted during the applicable conditions, an inadvertent criticality could occur that is not analyzed in the UFSAR. All fuel loading operations must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.3.1

During refueling, to ensure that the reactor remains subcritical, all control rods must be fully inserted prior to and during fuel loading. Periodic checks of the control rod position ensure this condition is maintained.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.3.1 (continued)

The 12 hour Frequency takes into consideration the procedural controls on control rod movement during refueling as well as the redundant functions of the refueling interlocks.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.
-
-

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication

BASES

BACKGROUND The full-in position indication channel for each control rod provides necessary information to the refueling interlocks to prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling operations. During refueling, the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks," and LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock") use the full-in position indication channel to limit the operation of the refueling equipment and the movement of the control rods. Two full-in position indication switches (S51 and S52) provide input to the all-rods-in logic for each control rod. Switch S51 provides full core display beyond full-in (scram) position indication (green dashes - no readout) and switch S52 provides full core display normal green full-in position indication. Switch S52 is set slightly beyond switch S00, which provides the digital "00" full-in position readout (switch S00 does not provide input to the all-rods-in logic and is not considered a full-in channel). When switch S52 is actuated, the color of the full core display "00" readout is changed from amber to green, indicating the control rod is full-in and latched. Switches S51 and S52 are wired in parallel, such that, if either switch indicates full-in, the all-rods-in logic will receive a full-in signal for that control rod. Therefore, each control rod is considered to have only one "full-in" position indication channel. The absence of the full-in position indication channel signal for any control rod removes the all-rods-in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks and prevents fuel loading. Also, this condition causes the refuel position one-rod-out interlock to not allow the selection of any other control rod. The all-rods-in logic provides two signals, one to each of the two Reactor Manual Control System rod block circuits.

UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The control rods serve as the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling are provided by the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1 and LCO 3.9.2), the SDM (LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)"), the intermediate range monitor neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"), and the control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation").

The safety analysis for the control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 2) assumes the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM. The full-in position indication channel is required to be OPERABLE so that the refueling interlocks can ensure that fuel cannot be loaded with any control rod withdrawn and that no more than one control rod can be withdrawn at a time.

Control rod position indication satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO The control rod full-in position indication channel for each control rod must be OPERABLE to provide the required input to the refueling interlocks. A channel is OPERABLE if it provides correct position indication to the refueling equipment interlock all-rods-in logic (LCO 3.9.1) and the refuel position one-rod-out interlock logic (LCO 3.9.2).

APPLICABILITY During MODE 5, the control rods must have OPERABLE full-in position indication channels to ensure the applicable refueling interlocks will be OPERABLE.

In MODES 1 and 2, requirements for control rod position are specified in LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY." In MODES 3 and 4, with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position, a control rod block (LCO 3.3.2.1) ensures all control rods are inserted, thereby preventing criticality during shutdown conditions.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to control rod position indication channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable control rod position indication channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, this Note has been provided, which allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable control rod position indication channel.

A.1.1, A.1.2, A.1.3, A.2.1 and A.2.2

With one or more full-in position indication channels inoperable, compensating actions must be taken to protect against potential reactivity excursions from fuel assembly insertions or control rod withdrawals. This may be accomplished by immediately suspending in-vessel fuel movement and control rod withdrawal, and immediately initiating action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Actions must continue until all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and, therefore, do not have to be inserted. Suspension of in-vessel fuel movements and control rod withdrawal shall not preclude moving a component to a safe position.

Alternatively, actions must be immediately initiated to fully insert the control rod(s) associated with the inoperable full-in position indicator(s) and disarm (electrically or hydraulically) the drive(s) to ensure that the control rod is not withdrawn. A control rod can be hydraulically disarmed by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves. A control rod can be electrically disarmed by disconnecting power from all four directional control valve solenoids. Actions must continue

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1.1, A.1.2, A.1.3, A.2.1 and A.2.2 (continued)

until all associated control rods are fully inserted and drives are disarmed. Under these conditions (control rod fully inserted and disarmed), an inoperable full-in channel may be bypassed to allow refueling operations to proceed. An alternate method must be used to ensure the control rod is fully inserted (e.g., use the "00" notch position indication).

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.4.1

The full-in position indication channels provide input to the one-rod-out interlock and other refueling interlocks that require an all-rods-in permissive. The interlocks are actuated when the full-in position indication for any control rod is not present, since this indicates that all rods are not fully inserted. Therefore, testing of the full-in position indication channels is performed to ensure that when a control rod is withdrawn, the full-in position indication is not present. This is performed by verifying the absence of full-in position indication (green dashes or green "00") at the full core display digital display module, when the control rod is not full-in. The full-in position indication channel is considered inoperable even with the control rod fully inserted, if it would continue to indicate full-in with the control rod withdrawn. Performing the SR each time a control rod is withdrawn from the full-in position is considered adequate because of the procedural controls on control rod withdrawals and the visual indications available in the control room to alert the operator to control rods not fully inserted.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.
-
-

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY – Refueling

BASES

BACKGROUND Control rods are components of the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System, the primary reactivity control system for the reactor. In conjunction with the Reactor Protection System, the CRD System provides the means for the reliable control of reactivity changes during refueling operation. In addition, the control rods provide the capability to maintain the reactor subcritical under all conditions and to limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase caused by a malfunction in the CRD System.

UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7, requires that one of the two required independent reactivity control systems be capable of holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions (Ref. 1). The CRD System is the system capable of maintaining the reactor subcritical in cold conditions.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Prevention and mitigation of prompt reactivity excursions during refueling are provided by refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks," and LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One Rod-Out Interlock"), the SDM (LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)"), the intermediate range monitor neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"), and the control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation").

The safety analysis for the control rod removal error during refueling (Ref. 2) evaluates the consequences of control rod withdrawal during refueling and also fuel assembly insertion with a control rod withdrawn. A prompt reactivity excursion during refueling could potentially result in fuel failure with subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment. Control rod scram provides protection should a prompt reactivity excursion occur.

Control rod OPERABILITY during refueling satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO Each withdrawn control rod must be OPERABLE. The withdrawn control rod is considered OPERABLE if the scram accumulator pressure is ≥ 940 psig and the control rod is capable of being automatically inserted upon receipt of a scram signal. Inserted control rods have already completed their reactivity control function, and therefore are not required to be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY During MODE 5, withdrawn control rods must be OPERABLE to ensure that when a scram occurs the control rods will insert and provide the required negative reactivity to maintain the reactor subcritical.

For MODES 1 and 2, control rod requirements are found in LCO 3.1.2, "Reactivity Anomalies," LCO 3.1.3, "Control Rod OPERABILITY," LCO 3.1.4, "Control Rod Scram Times," and LCO 3.1.5, "Control Rod Scram Accumulators." During MODES 3 and 4, control rods are not able to be withdrawn since the reactor mode switch is in shutdown and a control rod block is applied. This provides adequate requirements for control rod OPERABILITY during these conditions.

ACTIONS

A.1

With one or more withdrawn control rods inoperable, action must be immediately initiated to fully insert the inoperable control rod(s). Inserting the control rod(s) ensures the shutdown and scram capabilities are not adversely affected. Actions must continue until the inoperable control rod(s) is fully inserted.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.5.1 and SR 3.9.5.2

During MODE 5, the OPERABILITY of control rods is primarily required to ensure a withdrawn control rod will automatically insert if a signal requiring a reactor shutdown occurs. Because no explicit analysis exists for automatic shutdown during refueling, the shutdown function is satisfied if the withdrawn control rod is capable of automatic insertion and the associated CRD scram accumulator pressure is ≥ 940 psig.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.5.1 and SR 3.9.5.2 (continued)

The 7 day Frequency takes into consideration equipment reliability, procedural controls over the scram accumulators, and control room alarms and indicating lights that indicate low accumulator charge pressures.

SR 3.9.5.1 is modified by a Note that allows 7 days after withdrawal of the control rod to perform the Surveillance. This acknowledges that the control rod must first be withdrawn before performance of the Surveillance, and therefore avoids potential conflicts with SR 3.0.1.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.2.3.7.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.
-
-

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level - Irradiated Fuel

BASES

BACKGROUND The movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the RPV requires a minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of the RPV flange. During refueling, this maintains a sufficient water level in the reactor vessel cavity and spent fuel pool. Sufficient water is necessary to retain iodine fission product activity in the water in the event of a fuel handling accident (Refs. 1 and 2). Sufficient iodine activity would be retained to limit offsite doses from the accident to $\leq 25\%$ of 10 CFR 100 limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 3.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, the water level in the RPV is an initial condition design parameter in the analysis of a fuel handling accident in containment postulated by Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 1). A minimum water level of 23 ft (Regulatory Position C.1.c of Ref. 1) allows a decontamination factor of 100 (Regulatory Position C.1.g of Ref. 1) to be used in the accident analysis for iodine. This relates to the assumption that 99% of the total iodine released from the pellet to cladding gap of all the dropped fuel assembly rods is retained by the water. The fuel pellet to cladding gap is assumed to contain 10% of the total fuel rod iodine inventory (Ref. 1).

Analysis of the fuel handling accident inside containment is described in Reference 2. With a minimum water level of 23 ft and a minimum decay time of 24 hours prior to fuel handling, the analysis and test programs demonstrate that the iodine release due to a postulated fuel handling accident is adequately captured by the water and that offsite doses are maintained within allowable limits (Ref. 4). While the worst case assumptions include the dropping of the irradiated fuel assembly being handled onto the reactor core, the possibility exists of the dropped assembly striking the RPV flange and releasing fission products. Therefore, the minimum depth for water coverage to ensure acceptable radiological consequences is specified from the RPV flange. Since the worst case event results in

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) failed fuel assemblies seated in the core, as well as the dropped assembly, dropping an assembly on the RPV flange will result in reduced releases of fission gases.

RPV water level satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO A minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of the RPV flange is required to ensure that the radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident are within acceptable limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 3.

APPLICABILITY LCO 3.9.6 is applicable when moving irradiated fuel assemblies within the RPV. The LCO minimizes the possibility of a fuel handling accident in containment that is beyond the assumptions of the safety analysis. If irradiated fuel is not present within the RPV, there can be no significant radioactivity release as a result of a postulated fuel handling accident. Requirements for handling of new fuel assemblies or control rods (where water depth to the RPV flange is not of concern) are covered by LCO 3.9.7, "RPV Water Level - New Fuel or Control Rods." Requirements for fuel handling accidents in the spent fuel storage pool are covered by LCO 3.7.8, "Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level."

ACTIONS A.1

If the water level is < 23 ft above the top of the RPV flange, all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within the RPV shall be suspended immediately to ensure that a fuel handling accident cannot occur. The suspension of irradiated fuel movement shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.6.1

Verification of a minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of the RPV flange ensures that the design basis for the postulated fuel handling accident analysis during refueling operations is met. Water at the required level limits the consequences of damaged fuel rods, which are postulated to result from a fuel handling accident in containment (Ref. 2).

The Frequency of 24 hours is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the large volume of water and the normal procedural controls on valve positions, which make significant unplanned level changes unlikely.

REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.25, March 23, 1972.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.7.3.
 3. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4.
 4. 10 CFR 100.11.
-
-

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.7 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level - New Fuel or Control Rods

BASES

BACKGROUND The movement of new fuel assemblies or handling of control rods within the RPV when fuel assemblies seated within the reactor vessel are irradiated requires a minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV. During refueling, this maintains a sufficient water level above the irradiated fuel. Sufficient water is necessary to retain iodine fission product activity in the water in the event of a fuel handling accident (Refs. 1 and 2). Sufficient iodine activity would be retained to limit offsite doses from the accident to $\leq 25\%$ of 10 CFR 100 limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 3.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES During movement of new fuel assemblies or handling of control rods over irradiated fuel assemblies, the water level in the RPV is an initial condition design parameter in the analysis of a fuel handling accident in containment postulated by Regulatory Guide 1.25 (Ref. 1). A minimum water level of 23 ft (Regulatory Position C.1.c of Ref. 1) allows a decontamination factor of 100 (Regulatory Position C.1.g of Ref. 1) to be used in the accident analysis for iodine. This relates to the assumption that 99% of the total iodine released from the pellet to cladding gap of all the dropped fuel assembly rods is retained by the water. The fuel pellet to cladding gap is assumed to contain 10% of the total fuel rod iodine inventory (Ref. 1).

Analysis of the fuel handling accident inside containment is described in Reference 2. With a minimum water level of 23 ft and a minimum decay time of 24 hours prior to fuel handling, the analysis and test programs demonstrate that the iodine release due to a postulated fuel handling accident is adequately captured by the water and that offsite doses are maintained within allowable limits (Ref. 4). The related assumptions include the worst case dropping of an irradiated fuel assembly onto the reactor core loaded with irradiated fuel assemblies.

RPV water level satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO A minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV is required to ensure that the radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident are within acceptable limits, as provided by the guidance of Reference 3.

APPLICABILITY LCO 3.9.7 is applicable when moving new fuel assemblies or handling control rods (i.e., movement with other than the normal control rod drive) when irradiated fuel assemblies are seated within the RPV. The LCO minimizes the possibility of a fuel handling accident in containment that is beyond the assumptions of the safety analysis. If irradiated fuel is not present within the RPV, there can be no significant radioactivity release as a result of a postulated fuel handling accident. Requirements for fuel handling accidents in the spent fuel storage pool are covered by LCO 3.7.8, "Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level." Requirements for handling irradiated fuel over the RPV are covered by LCO 3.9.6, "Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level - Irradiated Fuel."

ACTIONS A.1

If the water level is < 23 ft above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV, all operations involving movement of new fuel assemblies and handling of control rods within the RPV shall be suspended immediately to ensure that a fuel handling accident cannot occur. The suspension of fuel movement and control rod handling shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.9.7.1
REQUIREMENTS

Verification of a minimum water level of 23 ft above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the RPV ensures that the design basis for the postulated fuel handling accident analysis during refueling operations is met. Water at the required level limits the consequences of damaged fuel rods, which are postulated to result from a fuel handling accident in containment (Ref. 2).

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.7.1 (continued)

The Frequency of 24 hours is based on engineering judgment and is considered adequate in view of the large volume of water and the normal procedural controls on valve positions, which make significant unplanned level changes unlikely.

REFERENCES

1. Regulatory Guide 1.25, March 23, 1972.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.7.3.
 3. NUREG-0800, Section 15.7.4.
 4. 10 CFR 100.11.
-
-

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.8 Shutdown Cooling (SDC) - High Water Level

BASES

BACKGROUND The purpose of the SDC System in MODE 5 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor coolant, as described by UFSAR, Section 5.4.7 (Ref. 1). Two of the three shutdown cooling loops of the SDC System can provide the required decay heat removal. Each loop consists of a motor driven pump, a heat exchanger, and associated piping and valves. The loops can take suction from either recirculation loop. Each pump discharges the reactor coolant, after it has been cooled by circulation through the respective heat exchanger, to the reactor via either low pressure coolant injection path and the associated recirculation loop. The SDC heat exchangers transfer heat to the Service Water System via the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System. The SDC mode is manually controlled.

In addition to the SDC subsystems, the volume of water above the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) flange provides a heat sink for decay heat removal.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES With the unit in MODE 5, the SDC System is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. The SDC System is required for removing decay heat to maintain the temperature of the reactor coolant.

The SDC System satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO Only one SDC subsystem is required to be OPERABLE and in operation in MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the RPV and the water level \geq 23 ft above the RPV flange. Only one subsystem is required to be OPERABLE because the volume of water above the RPV flange provides backup decay heat removal capability.

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

An OPERABLE SDC subsystem consists of a SDC pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. In addition, the necessary portions of the RBCCW System must be capable of providing cooling water to the SDC heat exchanger, the SDC pump seal cooler.

Additionally, the SDC subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. Operation (either continuous or intermittent) of one subsystem can maintain and reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. However, to ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required. A Note is provided to allow a 2 hour exception for the operating subsystem to not be in operation every 8 hours. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the SDC subsystem or other operations requiring SDC flow interruption.

APPLICABILITY

One SDC subsystem must be OPERABLE and in operation in MODE 5, with irradiated fuel in the RPV and with the water level \geq 23 feet above the top of the RPV flange, to provide decay heat removal. SDC subsystem requirements in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS). SDC subsystem requirements in MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the RPV and with the water level $<$ 23 ft above the RPV flange are given in LCO 3.9.9, "Shutdown Cooling (SDC) - Low Water Level."

ACTIONS

A.1

With no SDC subsystem OPERABLE, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided within 1 hour. In this condition, the volume of water above the RPV flange provides adequate capability to remove decay heat from the reactor core. However, the overall reliability is reduced because loss of water level could result in reduced decay heat removal capability. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on decay heat removal function and the probability of a loss of the available decay heat removal capabilities. Furthermore,

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

verification of the functional availability of the alternate method must be reconfirmed every 24 hours thereafter. This will ensure continued heat removal capability.

Alternate decay heat removal methods are available to the operators for review and preplanning in the unit operating procedures. The required cooling capacity of the alternate method should be ensured by verifying (by calculation or demonstration) its capability to maintain or reduce temperature. For example, this may include the use of the Fuel Pool Cooling or Reactor Water Cleanup System operating with the regenerative heat exchanger bypassed or in combination with the Control Rod Drive System or Condensate/Feed System. The method used to remove the decay heat should be the most prudent choice based on unit conditions.

B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4

If no shutdown cooling subsystem is OPERABLE and an alternate method of decay heat removal is not available in accordance with Required Action A.1, actions shall be taken immediately to suspend operations involving an increase in reactor decay heat load by suspending loading of irradiated fuel assemblies into the RPV.

Additional actions are required to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes ensuring secondary containment is OPERABLE; one standby gas treatment subsystem is OPERABLE; and secondary containment isolation capability is available in each associated penetration flow path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioactive releases (i.e., one secondary containment isolation valve and associated instrumentation are OPERABLE or other acceptable administrative controls to assure isolation capability. These administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated). This may be performed as an administrative check, by

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4 (continued)

examining logs or other information to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, a surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

C.1 and C.2

If no SDC subsystem is in operation, an alternate method of coolant circulation is required to be established within 1 hour. The Completion Time is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required SDC subsystem), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper functioning of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.8.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that the required SDC subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other visual and audible indications available to the operator for monitoring the SDC subsystem in the control room.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 5.4.7.

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.9 Shutdown Cooling (SDC) – Low Water Level

BASES

BACKGROUND The purpose of the SDC System in MODE 5 is to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor coolant, as described by UFSAR, Section 5.4.7 (Ref. 1). Two of the three shutdown cooling loops of the SDC System can provide the required decay heat removal. Each loop consists of a motor driven pump, a heat exchanger, and associated piping and valves. The loops can take suction from either recirculation loop. Each pump discharges the reactor coolant, after it has been cooled by circulation through the respective heat exchanger, to the reactor via either low pressure coolant injection path and the associated recirculation loop. The SDC heat exchangers transfer heat to the Service Water System via the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) System. The SDC mode is manually controlled.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES With the unit in MODE 5, the SDC System is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. The SDC System is required for removing decay heat to maintain the temperature of the reactor coolant.

The SDC System satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO In MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the water level < 23 ft above the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) flange two SDC subsystems must be OPERABLE and one SDC subsystem must be in operation.

An OPERABLE SDC subsystem consists of a SDC pump, a heat exchanger, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. To meet the LCO, one pump in each of the two required loops must be OPERABLE. In addition the necessary portions of the RBCCW System must be capable of providing cooling water to the SDC heat exchanger and the SDC pump seal cooler.

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued) Additionally, each SDC subsystem is considered OPERABLE if it can be manually aligned (remote or local) in the shutdown cooling mode for removal of decay heat. Operation (either continuous or intermittent) of one subsystem can maintain and reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required. However, to ensure adequate core flow to allow for accurate average reactor coolant temperature monitoring, nearly continuous operation is required. A Note is provided to allow a 2 hour exception for the operating subsystem to not be in operation every 8 hours. This is permitted because the core heat generation can be low enough and the heatup rate slow enough to allow some changes to the SDC subsystem or other operations requiring SDC flow interruption.

APPLICABILITY Two SDC subsystems are required to be OPERABLE, and one SDC subsystem must be in operation in MODE 5, with irradiated fuel in the RPV and with the water level < 23 ft above the top of the RPV flange, to provide decay heat removal. SDC subsystem requirements in other MODES are covered by LCOs in Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS). SDC subsystem requirements in MODE 5 with irradiated fuel in the RPV and with the water level \geq 23 ft above the RPV flange are given in LCO 3.9.8, "Shutdown Cooling (SDC) - High Water Level."

ACTIONS A.1

With one of the two required SDC subsystems inoperable, the remaining subsystem is capable of providing the required decay heat removal. However, the overall reliability is reduced. Therefore, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided. With both required SDC subsystems inoperable, an alternate method of decay heat removal must be provided in addition to that provided for the initial SDC subsystem inoperability. This re-establishes backup decay heat removal capabilities, similar to the requirements of the LCO. The 1 hour Completion Time is based on the decay heat removal function and the probability of a loss of the available decay heat removal capabilities. Furthermore, verification of the functional availability of the alternate method(s) must be reconfirmed every 24 hours thereafter. This will ensure continued heat removal capability.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

Alternate decay heat removal methods are available to the operators for review and preplanning in the unit operating procedures. The required cooling capacity of the alternate method should be ensured by verifying (by calculation or demonstration) its capability to maintain or reduce temperature. For example, this may include the use of the Fuel Pool Cooling or Reactor Water Cleanup System operating with the regenerative heat exchanger bypassed or in combination with the Control Rod Drive System or Condensate/Feed System. The method used to remove decay heat should be the most prudent choice based on unit conditions.

Condition A is modified by a Note allowing separate Condition entry for each inoperable SDC subsystem. This is acceptable since the Required Actions for this Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable SDC subsystem. Complying with the Required Actions allow for continued operation. A subsequent inoperable subsystem is governed by subsequent entry into the Condition and application of the Required Actions

B.1, B.2, and B.3

With the required decay heat removal subsystem(s) inoperable and the required alternate method(s) of decay heat removal not available in accordance with Required Action A.1, additional actions are required to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes ensuring secondary containment is OPERABLE; one standby gas treatment subsystem is OPERABLE; and secondary containment isolation capability is available in each associated penetration flow path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioactive releases (i.e., one secondary containment isolation valve and associated instrumentation are OPERABLE or other acceptable administrative controls to assure isolation capability. These administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

need for secondary containment isolation is indicated). This may be performed as an administrative check, by examining logs or other information to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, the surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

C.1 and C.2

If no SDC subsystem is in operation, an alternate method of coolant circulation is required to be established within 1 hour. The Completion Time is modified such that the 1 hour is applicable separately for each occurrence involving a loss of coolant circulation.

During the period when the reactor coolant is being circulated by an alternate method (other than by the required SDC subsystem), the reactor coolant temperature must be periodically monitored to ensure proper functioning of the alternate method. The once per hour Completion Time is deemed appropriate.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.9.9.1

This Surveillance demonstrates that one SDC subsystem is in operation and circulating reactor coolant. The required flow rate is determined by the flow rate necessary to provide sufficient decay heat removal capability. The Frequency of 12 hours is sufficient in view of other visual and audible indications available to the operator for monitoring the SDC subsystems in the control room

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 5.4.7.
-

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.1 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to permit operation of the reactor mode switch from one position to another to confirm certain aspects of associated interlocks during periodic tests and calibrations in MODES 3, 4, and 5.

The reactor mode switch is a conveniently located, multiposition, keylock switch provided to select the necessary scram functions for various plant conditions (Ref. 1). The reactor mode switch selects the appropriate trip relays for scram functions and provides appropriate bypasses. The mode switch positions and related scram interlock functions are summarized as follows:

- a. Shutdown—Initiates a reactor scram; bypasses main steam line isolation and low turbine condenser vacuum scrams;
- b. Refuel—Selects Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) scram function for low neutron flux level operation (but does not disable the average power range monitor scram); bypasses main steam line isolation and low turbine condenser vacuum scrams;
- c. Startup/Hot Standby—Selects NMS scram function for low neutron flux level operation (intermediate range monitors and average power range monitors); bypasses main steam line isolation and low turbine condenser vacuum scrams; and
- d. Run—Selects NMS scram function for power range operation.

The reactor mode switch also provides interlocks for such functions as control rod blocks, scram discharge volume trip bypass, refueling interlocks, and main steam isolation valve isolations.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The purpose for reactor mode switch interlock testing is to prevent fuel failure by precluding reactivity excursions or core criticality. The interlock functions of the shutdown

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

and refuel positions normally maintained for the reactor mode switch in MODES 3, 4, and 5 are provided to preclude reactivity excursions that could potentially result in fuel failure. Interlock testing that requires moving the reactor mode switch to other positions (run, startup/hot standby, or refuel) while in MODE 3, 4, or 5, requires administratively maintaining all control rods inserted and no CORE ALTERATIONS in progress. With all control rods inserted in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies, and no CORE ALTERATIONS in progress, there are no credible mechanisms for unacceptable reactivity excursions during the planned interlock testing.

For postulated accidents, such as control rod removal error during refueling, the accident analysis demonstrates that fuel failure will not occur (Ref. 2). The withdrawal of a single control rod will not result in criticality when adequate SDM is maintained. Also, loading fuel assemblies into the core with a single control rod withdrawn will not result in criticality, thereby preventing fuel failure.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. MODES 3, 4, and 5 operations not specified in Table 1.1-1 can be performed in accordance with other Special Operations LCOs (i.e., LCO 3.10.2, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal-Hot Shutdown," LCO 3.10.3, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal-Cold Shutdown," and LCO 3.10.7, "SDM Test-Refueling") without meeting this LCO or its ACTIONS. If any testing is performed that involves the reactor mode switch interlocks and requires repositioning beyond that specified in Table 1.1-1 for the current MODE of operation, the testing can be performed, provided all interlock functions potentially defeated are administratively controlled. In MODES 3, 4, and 5 with the reactor mode switch in shutdown as specified in Table 1.1-1,

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

all control rods are fully inserted and a control rod block is initiated. Therefore, all control rods in core cells that contain one or more fuel assemblies must be verified fully inserted while in MODES 3, 4, and 5, with the reactor mode switch in other than the shutdown position. The additional LCO requirement to preclude CORE ALTERATIONS is appropriate for MODE 5 operations, as discussed below, and is inherently met in MODES 3 and 4 by the definition of CORE ALTERATIONS, which cannot be performed with the vessel head in place.

In MODE 5, with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, only one control rod can be withdrawn under the refuel position one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock"). The refueling equipment interlocks (LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks") appropriately control other CORE ALTERATIONS. Due to the increased potential for error in controlling these multiple interlocks, and the limited duration of tests involving the reactor mode switch position, conservative controls are required, consistent with MODES 3 and 4. The additional controls of administratively not permitting other CORE ALTERATIONS will adequately ensure that the reactor does not become critical during these tests.

APPLICABILITY

Any required periodic interlock testing involving the reactor mode switch, while in MODES 1 and 2, can be performed without the need for Special Operations exceptions. Mode switch manipulations in these MODES would likely result in unit trips. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, this Special Operations LCO is only permitted to be used to allow reactor mode switch interlock testing that cannot conveniently be performed without this allowance or testing that must be performed prior to entering another MODE. Such interlock testing may consist of required Surveillances, or may be the result of maintenance, repair, or troubleshooting activities. In MODES 3, 4, and 5, the interlock functions provided by the reactor mode switch in shutdown (i.e., all control rods inserted and incapable of withdrawal) and refueling (i.e., refueling interlocks to prevent inadvertent criticality during CORE ALTERATIONS) positions can be administratively controlled adequately during the performance of certain tests.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A.1, A.2, A.3.1, and A.3.2

These Required Actions are provided to restore compliance with the Technical Specifications overridden by this Special Operations LCO. Restoring compliance will also result in exiting the Applicability of this Special Operations LCO.

All CORE ALTERATIONS, except control rod insertion, if in progress, are immediately suspended in accordance with Required Action A.1, and all insertable control rods in core cells that contain one or more fuel assemblies are fully inserted within 1 hour, in accordance with Required Action A.2. This will preclude potential mechanisms that could lead to criticality. Control rods in core cells containing no fuel assemblies do not affect the reactivity of the core and, therefore, do not have to be inserted. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude the completion of movement of a component to a safe condition. Placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position will ensure that all inserted control rods remain inserted and result in operating in accordance with Table 1.1-1. Alternatively, if in MODE 5, the reactor mode switch may be placed in the refuel position, which will also result in operating in accordance with Table 1.1-1. A Note is added to Required Action A.3.2 to indicate that this Required Action is not applicable in MODES 3 and 4, since only the shutdown position is allowed in these MODES. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour for Required Action A.2, Required Action A.3.1, and Required Action A.3.2 provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods and place the reactor mode switch in the required position, based on operating experience, and is acceptable given that all operations that could increase core reactivity have been suspended.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.10.1.1 and SR 3.10.1.2

Meeting the requirements of this Special Operations LCO maintains operation consistent with or conservative to operating with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position (or the refuel position for MODE 5). The functions of the reactor mode switch interlocks that are not in effect, due to the testing in progress, are adequately compensated for by the Special Operations LCO requirements.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.1.1 and SR 3.10.1.2 (continued)

The administrative controls are to be periodically verified to ensure that the operational requirements continue to be met. In addition, the all rods fully inserted Surveillance (SR 3.10.1.1) must be verified by a second licensed operator (Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator) or other task qualified member of the technical staff (e.g., a shift technical advisor or reactor engineer). The Surveillances performed at the 12 hour and 24 hour Frequencies are intended to provide appropriate assurance that each operating shift is aware of and verifies compliance with these Special Operations LCO requirements.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Chapter 7.2.2.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.
-
-

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.2 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Hot Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND The purpose of this MODE 3 Special Operations LCO is to permit the withdrawal of a single control rod for testing while in hot shutdown, by imposing certain restrictions. In MODE 3, the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, and all control rods are inserted and blocked from withdrawal. Many systems and functions are not required in these conditions, due to the other installed interlocks that are actuated when the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position. However, circumstances may arise while in MODE 3 that present the need to withdraw a single control rod for various tests (e.g., rod exercising, friction tests, scram timing, and coupling integrity checks). These single control rod withdrawals are normally accomplished by selecting the refuel position for the reactor mode switch. This Special Operations LCO provides the appropriate additional controls to allow a single control rod withdrawal in MODE 3.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES With the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the analyses for control rod removal error during refueling are applicable and, provided the assumptions of these analyses are satisfied in MODE 3, these analyses will bound the consequences of an accident. Explicit safety analyses in the UFSAR (Ref. 1) demonstrate that the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM will preclude unacceptable reactivity excursions.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod. Under these conditions, since only one control rod can be withdrawn, the core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod withdrawn if adequate SDM exists.

The control rod scram function provides backup protection to normal refueling procedures and the refueling interlocks, which prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

Alternate backup protection can be obtained by ensuring that a five by five array of control rods, centered on the withdrawn control rod, are inserted and incapable of withdrawal.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 3 with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position can be performed in accordance with other Special Operations LCOs (i.e., LCO 3.10.1, "Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing," without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. However, if a single control rod withdrawal is desired in MODE 3, controls consistent with those required during refueling must be implemented and this Special Operations LCO applied. "Withdrawal" in this application includes the actual withdrawal of the control rod as well as maintaining the control rod in a position other than the full-in position, and reinserting the control rod. The refueling interlocks of LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock," required by this Special Operations LCO, will ensure that only one control rod can be withdrawn.

To back up the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.2), the ability to scram the withdrawn control rod in the event of an inadvertent criticality is provided by this Special Operations LCO's requirements in Item d.1. Alternately, provided a sufficient number of control rods in the vicinity of the withdrawn control rod are known to be inserted and incapable of withdrawal (Item d.2), the possibility of criticality on withdrawal of this control rod is sufficiently precluded, so as not to require the scram capability of the withdrawn control rod. Also, once this alternate (Item d.2) is completed, the SDM requirement to account for both the withdrawn-untrippable control rod and the highest worth control rod may be changed to allow the withdrawn-untrippable control rod to be the single highest worth control rod.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY Control rod withdrawals are adequately controlled in MODES 1, 2, and 5 by existing LCOs. In MODES 3 and 4, control rod withdrawal is only allowed if performed in accordance with this Special Operations LCO or Special Operations LCO 3.10.3, and if limited to one control rod. This allowance is only provided with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position. For these conditions, the one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2), control rod position indication (LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication"), full insertion requirements for all other control rods and scram functions (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," LCO 3.3.8.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring," and LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling"), or the added administrative controls in Item d.2 of this Special Operations LCO, minimize potential reactivity excursions.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to a single control rod withdrawal while in MODE 3. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for each requirement of the LCO not met provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate requirements that are not met. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each requirement of the LCO.

A.1

If one or more of the requirements specified in this Special Operations LCO are not met, the ACTIONS applicable to the stated requirements of the affected LCOs are immediately entered as directed by Required Action A.1. Required Action A.1 has been modified by a Note that clarifies the intent of any other LCO's Required Action, to insert all control rods. This Required Action includes exiting this Special Operations Applicability by returning the reactor mode switch to the shutdown position. A second Note has

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

been added, which clarifies that this Required Action is only applicable if the requirements not met are for an affected LCO.

A.2.1 and A.2.2

Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 are alternate Required Actions that can be taken instead of Required Action A.1 to restore compliance with the normal MODE 3 requirements, thereby exiting this Special Operations LCO's Applicability. Actions must be initiated immediately to insert all insertable control rods. Actions must continue until all such control rods are fully inserted. Placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position will ensure all inserted rods remain inserted and restore operation in accordance with Table 1.1-1. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour to place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.2.1, SR 3.10.2.2, and SR 3.10.2.3

The other LCOs made applicable in this Special Operations LCO are required to have their Surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. If the local array of control rods is inserted and disarmed while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, periodic verification in accordance with SR 3.10.2.2 is required to preclude the possibility of criticality. The control rods can be hydraulically disarmed by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves. Electrically, the control rods can be disarmed by disconnecting power from all four directional control valve solenoids. SR 3.10.2.2 has been modified by a Note, which clarifies that this SR is not required to be met if SR 3.10.2.1 is satisfied for LCO 3.10.2.d.1 requirements, since SR 3.10.2.2 demonstrates that the alternative LCO 3.10.2.d.2 requirements are satisfied. Also, SR 3.10.2.3 verifies that all control rods other than the control rod being withdrawn are fully inserted. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable because of the administrative

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS SR 3.10.2.1, SR 3.10.2.2, and SR 3.10.2.3 (continued)

controls on control rod withdrawal, the protection afforded by the LCOs involved, and hardwire interlocks that preclude additional control rod withdrawals.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Cold Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND The purpose of this MODE 4 Special Operations LCO is to permit the withdrawal of a single control rod for testing or maintenance, while in cold shutdown, by imposing certain restrictions. In MODE 4, the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, and all control rods are inserted and blocked from withdrawal. Many systems and functions are not required in these conditions, due to the installed interlocks associated with the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. Circumstances may arise while in MODE 4, however, that present the need to withdraw a single control rod for various tests (e.g., rod exercising, friction tests, scram time testing, and coupling integrity checks). Certain situations may also require the removal of the associated control rod drive (CRD). These single control rod withdrawals and possible subsequent removals are normally accomplished by selecting the refuel position for the reactor mode switch.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES With the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the analyses for control rod removal error during refueling are applicable and, provided the assumptions of these analyses are satisfied in MODE 4, these analyses will bound the consequences of an accident. Explicit safety analyses in the UFSAR (Ref. 1) demonstrate that the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM will preclude unacceptable reactivity excursions.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod. Under these conditions, since only one control rod can be withdrawn, the core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod withdrawn if adequate SDM exists.

The control rod scram function provides backup protection in the event normal refueling procedures and the refueling interlocks fail to prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling. Alternate backup protection can be obtained by

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

ensuring that a five by five array of control rods, centered on the withdrawn control rod, are inserted and incapable of withdrawal. This alternate backup protection is required when removing a CRD because this removal renders the withdrawn control rod incapable of being scrammed.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 4 with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position can be performed in accordance with other LCOs (i.e., Special Operations LCO 3.10.1, "Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing") without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. If a single control rod withdrawal is desired in MODE 4, controls consistent with those required during refueling must be implemented and this Special Operations LCO applied. "Withdrawal" in this application includes the actual withdrawal of the control rod as well as maintaining the control rod in a position other than the full-in position, and reinserting the control rod.

The refueling interlocks of LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock," required by this Special Operations LCO will ensure that only one control rod can be withdrawn. At the time CRD removal begins, the disconnection of the position indication probe will cause LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication," and therefore, LCO 3.9.2 to fail to be met. Therefore, prior to commencing CRD removal, a control rod withdrawal block is required to be inserted to ensure that no additional control rods can be withdrawn and that compliance with this Special Operations LCO is maintained.

To back up the refueling interlocks (LCO 3.9.2) or the control rod withdrawal block, the ability to scram the withdrawn control rod in the event of an inadvertent criticality is provided by the Special Operations LCO requirements in Item c.1. Alternatively, when the scram

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued) function is not OPERABLE, or when the CRD is to be removed, a sufficient number of rods in the vicinity of the withdrawn control rod are required to be inserted and made incapable of withdrawal by electrically or hydraulically disarming the CRD (Item c.2). This precludes the possibility of criticality upon withdrawal of this control rod. Also, once this alternate (Item c.2) is completed, the SDM requirement to account for both the withdrawn-untrippable control rod and the highest worth control rod may be changed to allow the withdrawn-untrippable control rod to be the single highest worth control rod.

APPLICABILITY Control rod withdrawals are adequately controlled in MODES 1, 2, and 5 by existing LCOs. In MODES 3 and 4, control rod withdrawal is only allowed if performed in accordance with Special Operations LCO 3.10.2, or this Special Operations LCO, and if limited to one control rod. This allowance is only provided with the reactor mode switch in the refuel position.

During these conditions, the full insertion requirements for all other control rods, the one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2), control rod position indication (LCO 3.9.4), and scram functions (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," LCO 3.3.8.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring," and LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling"), or the added administrative controls in Item b.2 and Item c.2 of this Special Operations LCO, provide mitigation of potential reactivity excursions.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to a single control rod withdrawal while in MODE 4. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for each requirement of the LCO not met provide appropriate

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

compensatory measures for separate requirements that are not met. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each requirement of the LCO.

A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met with the affected control rod insertable, these Required Actions restore operation consistent with normal MODE 4 conditions (i.e., all rods inserted) or with the exceptions allowed in this Special Operations LCO. Required Action A.1 has been modified by a Note that clarifies the intent of any other LCO's Required Action to insert all control rods. This Required Action includes exiting this Special Operations LCO Applicability by returning the reactor mode switch to the shutdown position. A second Note has been added to Required Action A.1 to clarify that this Required Action is only applicable if the requirements not met are for an affected LCO.

Required Actions A.2.1 and A.2.2 are specified, based on the assumption that the control rod is being withdrawn. If the control rod is still insertable, actions must be immediately initiated to fully insert all insertable control rods and within 1 hour place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position. Actions must continue until all such control rods are fully inserted. The allowed Completion Time of 1 hour for placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position provides sufficient time to normally insert the control rods.

B.1, B.2.1, and B.2.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met with the affected control rod not insertable, withdrawal of the control rod and removal of the associated CRD must be immediately suspended. If the CRD has been removed, such that the control rod is not insertable, the Required Actions require the most expeditious action be taken to either initiate action to restore the CRD and insert its control rod, or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.3.1, SR 3.10.3.2, SR 3.10.3.3, and SR 3.10.3.4

The other LCOs made applicable by this Special Operations LCO are required to have their associated surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. If the local array of control rods is inserted and disarmed while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, periodic verification is required to ensure that the possibility of criticality remains precluded. The control rods can be hydraulically disarmed by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves. Electrically, the control rods can be disarmed by disconnecting power from all four directional control valve solenoids. Verification that all the other control rods are fully inserted is required to meet the SDM requirements. Verification that a control rod withdrawal block has been inserted ensures that no other control rods can be inadvertently withdrawn under conditions when position indication instrumentation is inoperable for the affected control rod. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable because of the administrative controls on control rod withdrawals, the protection afforded by the LCOs involved, and hardwire interlocks to preclude an additional control rod withdrawal.

SR 3.10.3.2 and SR 3.10.3.4 have been modified by Notes, which clarify that these SRs are not required to be met if the alternative requirements demonstrated by SR 3.10.3.1 are satisfied.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.
-

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.4 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD) Removal - Refueling

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this MODE 5 Special Operations LCO is to permit the removal of a single CRD during refueling operations by imposing certain administrative controls. Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical during refueling operations. During refueling operations, no more than one control rod, in a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies is permitted to be withdrawn. The refueling interlocks use the "full-in" position indicators to determine the position of all control rods. If the "full-in" position signal is not present for every control rod, then the all rods in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks is not present and fuel loading is prevented. Also, the refuel position one-rod-out interlock will not allow the withdrawal of a second control rod.

The control rod scram function provides backup protection in the event normal refueling procedures, and the refueling interlocks described above fail to prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling. The requirement for the refueling interlocks to be OPERABLE precludes the possibility of removing the CRD once a control rod is withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. This Special Operations LCO provides controls sufficient to ensure the possibility of an inadvertent criticality is precluded, while allowing a single CRD to be removed from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies. The removal of the CRD involves disconnecting the position indication probe, which causes noncompliance with LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication," and, therefore, LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks," and LCO 3.9.2, "Refueling Position One-Rod-Out Interlock." The CRD removal also requires isolation of the CRD from the CRD Hydraulic System, thereby causing inoperability of the control rod (LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling").

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

With the reactor mode switch in the refuel position, the analyses for control rod removal error during refueling are applicable and, provided the assumptions of these analyses are satisfied, these analyses will bound the consequences of accidents. Explicit safety analyses in the UFSAR (Ref. 1) demonstrate that proper operation of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM will preclude unacceptable reactivity excursions.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical. These interlocks prevent the withdrawal of more than one control rod. Under these conditions, since only one control rod can be withdrawn, the core will always be shut down even with the highest worth control rod withdrawn if adequate SDM exists. By requiring all other control rods to be inserted and a control rod withdrawal block initiated, the function of the inoperable one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2) is adequately maintained. This Special Operations LCO requirement that no other CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress adequately compensates for the inoperable all-rods-in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks (LCO 3.9.1).

The control rod scram function provides backup protection to normal refueling procedures and the refueling interlocks, which prevent inadvertent criticalities during refueling. Since the scram function and refueling interlocks may be suspended, alternate backup protection required by this Special Operations LCO is obtained by ensuring that a five by five array of control rods, centered on the withdrawn control rod, are inserted and are incapable of being withdrawn, and all other control rods are inserted and incapable of being withdrawn by insertion of a control rod block.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 5 with any of the following LCOs, LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," LCO 3.3.8.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring," LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, or LCO 3.9.5 not met, can be performed in accordance with the Required Actions of these LCOs without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. However, if a single CRD removal from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies is desired in MODE 5, controls consistent with those required by LCO 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.3.8.2, LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, and LCO 3.9.5 must be implemented, and this Special Operations LCO applied.

By requiring all other control rods to be inserted and a control rod withdrawal block initiated, the function of the inoperable one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2) is adequately maintained. This Special Operations LCO requirement that no other CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress adequately compensates for the inoperable all-rods-in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks (LCO 3.9.1). Ensuring that the five by five array of control rods, centered on the withdrawn control rod, are inserted and incapable of withdrawal (by electrically or hydraulically disarming the CRD) adequately satisfies the backup protection that LCO 3.3.1.1 and LCO 3.9.2 would have otherwise provided. Also, once these requirements (Items a, b, and c) are completed, the SDM requirement to account for both the withdrawn-untrippable control rod and the highest worth control rod may be changed to allow the withdrawn-untrippable control rod to be the single highest worth control rod.

APPLICABILITY Operation in MODE 5 is controlled by existing LCOs. The allowance to comply with this Special Operations LCO in lieu of the ACTIONS of LCO 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.3.8.2, LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, and LCO 3.9.5 is appropriately controlled with the additional administrative controls required by this Special Operations LCO, which reduce the potential for reactivity excursions.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A.1, A.2.1, and A.2.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met, the immediate implementation of these Required Actions restores operation consistent with the normal requirements for failure to meet LCO 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.9.1, LCO 3.9.2, LCO 3.9.4, and LCO 3.9.5 (i.e., all control rods inserted) or with the allowances of this Special Operations LCO. The Completion Times for Required Action A.1, Required Action A.2.1, and Required Action A.2.2 are intended to require that these Required Actions be implemented in a very short time and carried through in an expeditious manner to either initiate action to restore the CRD and insert its control rod, or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO. Actions must continue until either Required Action A.2.1 or Required Action A.2.2 is satisfied.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.4.1, SR 3.10.4.2, SR 3.10.4.3, SR 3.10.4.4,
and SR 3.10.4.5

Verification that all the control rods, other than the control rod withdrawn for the removal of the associated CRD, are fully inserted is required to ensure the SDM is within limits. Verification that the local five by five array of control rods, other than the control rod withdrawn for removal of the associated CRD, is inserted and disarmed, while the scram function for the withdrawn rod is not available, is required to ensure that the possibility of criticality remains precluded. The control rods can be hydraulically disarmed by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves. Electrically, the control rods can be disarmed by disconnecting power from all four directional control valve solenoids. Verification that a control rod withdrawal block has been inserted ensures that no other control rods can be inadvertently withdrawn under conditions when position indication instrumentation is inoperable for the withdrawn control rod. The Surveillance for LCO 3.1.1, which is made applicable by this Special Operations LCO, is required in order to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met. Verification that no other CORE ALTERATIONS are being made is required to ensure the assumptions of the safety analysis are satisfied.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.10.4.1, SR 3.10.4.2, SR 3.10.4.3, SR 3.10.4.4,
REQUIREMENTS and SR 3.10.4.5 (continued)

Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this Special Operations LCO is prudent to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable, given the administrative controls on control rod removal and hardwire interlock to block an additional control rod withdrawal.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.5 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal - Refueling

BASES

BACKGROUND The purpose of this MODE 5 Special Operations LCO is to permit multiple control rod withdrawal during refueling by imposing certain administrative controls.

Refueling interlocks restrict the movement of control rods and the operation of the refueling equipment to reinforce operational procedures that prevent the reactor from becoming critical during refueling operations. During refueling operations, no more than one control rod, in a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies is permitted to be withdrawn. When all four fuel assemblies are removed from a cell, the control rod may be withdrawn with no restrictions. Any number of control rods may be withdrawn and removed from the reactor vessel if their cells contain no fuel.

The refueling interlocks use the "full-in" position indicators to determine the position of all control rods. If the "full-in" position signal is not present for every control rod, then the all rods in permissive for the refueling equipment interlocks is not present and fuel loading is prevented. Also, the refuel position one-rod-out interlock will not allow the withdrawal of a second control rod.

To allow more than one control rod to be withdrawn during refueling, these interlocks must be defeated. This Special Operations LCO establishes the necessary administrative controls to allow bypassing the "full-in" position indicators.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Explicit safety analyses in the UFSAR (Ref. 1) demonstrate that the functioning of the refueling interlocks and adequate SDM will prevent unacceptable reactivity excursions during refueling. To allow multiple control rod withdrawals, control rod removals, associated control rod drive (CRD) removal, or any combination of these, the "full-in" position indication is allowed to be bypassed for each withdrawn control rod if all fuel has been removed from

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

the cell. With no fuel assemblies in the core cell, the associated control rod has no reactivity control function and is not required to remain inserted. Prior to reloading fuel into the cell, however, the associated control rod must be inserted to ensure that an inadvertent criticality does not occur, as evaluated in the Reference 1 analysis.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation in MODE 5 with either LCO 3.9.3, "Control Rod Position," LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication," or LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY - Refueling," not met, can be performed in accordance with the Required Actions of these LCOs without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. If multiple control rod withdrawal or removal, or CRD removal is desired, all four fuel assemblies are required to be removed from the associated cells. Prior to entering this LCO, any fuel remaining in a cell whose CRD was previously removed under the provisions of another LCO must be removed. "Withdrawal" in this application includes the actual withdrawal of the control rod as well as maintaining the control rod in a position other than the full-in position, and reinserting the control rod.

When fuel is loaded into the core with multiple control rods withdrawn, special spiral reload sequences are used to ensure that reactivity additions are minimized. Spiral reloading encompasses reloading a cell (four fuel locations immediately adjacent to a control rod) on the edge of a continuous fueled region (the cell can be loaded in any sequence). Otherwise, all control rods must be fully inserted before loading fuel.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY Operation in MODE 5 is controlled by existing LCOs. The exceptions from other LCO requirements (e.g., the ACTIONS of LCO 3.9.3, LCO 3.9.4, or LCO 3.9.5) allowed by this Special Operations LCO are appropriately controlled by requiring all fuel to be removed from cells whose "full-in" indicators are allowed to be bypassed.

ACTIONS A.1, A.2, A.3.1, and A.3.2

If one or more of the requirements of this Special Operations LCO are not met, the immediate implementation of these Required Actions restores operation consistent with the normal requirements for refueling (i.e., all control rods inserted in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies) or with the exceptions granted by this Special Operations LCO. The Completion Times for Required Action A.1, Required Action A.2, Required Action A.3.1, and Required Action A.3.2 are intended to require that these Required Actions be implemented in a very short time and carried through in an expeditious manner to either initiate action to restore the affected CRDs and insert their control rods, or initiate action to restore compliance with this Special Operations LCO.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS SR 3.10.5.1, SR 3.10.5.2, and SR 3.10.5.3

Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this Special Operations LCO is prudent to preclude the possibility of an inadvertent criticality. The 24 hour Frequency is acceptable, given the administrative controls on fuel assembly and control rod removal, and takes into account other indications of control rod status available in the control room.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 15.4.1.

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.6 Control Rod Testing – Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to permit control rod testing, while in MODES 1 and 2, by imposing certain administrative controls. Control rod patterns during startup conditions are controlled by the operator and the rod worth minimizer (RWM) (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation"), such that only the specified control rod sequences and relative positions required by LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control," are allowed over the operating range from all control rods inserted to the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the RWM. The sequences effectively limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase that could occur during a control rod drop accident (CRDA). During these conditions, control rod testing is sometimes required that may result in control rod patterns not in compliance with the prescribed sequences of LCO 3.1.6. These tests include SDM demonstrations, control rod scram time testing, and control rod friction testing. This Special Operations LCO provides the necessary exemption to the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 and provides additional administrative controls to allow the deviations in such tests from the prescribed sequences in LCO 3.1.6.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The analytical methods and assumptions used in evaluating the CRDA are summarized in References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. CRDA analyses assume the reactor operator follows prescribed withdrawal sequences. These sequences define the potential initial conditions for the CRDA analyses. The RWM provides backup to operator control of the withdrawal sequences to ensure the initial conditions of the CRDA analyses are not violated. For special sequences developed for control rod testing, the initial control rod patterns assumed in the safety analysis of References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 may not be preserved. Therefore special CRDA analyses are required to demonstrate that these special sequences will not result in unacceptable consequences, should a CRDA occur during the testing. These analyses, performed in accordance with an NRC approved methodology, are dependent on the specific test being performed.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Control rod testing may be performed in compliance with the prescribed sequences of LCO 3.1.6, and during these tests, no exceptions to the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 are necessary. For testing performed with a sequence not in compliance with LCO 3.1.6, the requirements of LCO 3.1.6 may be suspended, provided additional administrative controls are placed on the test to ensure that the assumptions of the special safety analysis for the test sequence are satisfied. Assurances that the test sequence is followed can be provided by either programming the test sequence into the RWM, with conformance verified as specified in SR 3.3.2.1.8 and allowing the RWM to monitor control rod withdrawal and provide appropriate control rod blocks if necessary, or by verifying conformance to the approved test sequence by a second licensed operator (Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator) or other task qualified member of the technical staff (e.g., shift technical advisor or reactor engineer). These controls are consistent with those normally applied to operation in the startup range as defined in the SRs and ACTIONS of LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation."

APPLICABILITY Control rod testing, while in MODES 1 and 2, with THERMAL POWER greater than 10% RTP is adequately controlled by the existing LCOs on power distribution limits and control rod block instrumentation. Control rod movement during these conditions is not restricted to prescribed sequences and can be performed within the constraints of LCO 3.2.1, "AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (APLHGR)," LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," LCO 3.2.3, "LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (LHGR)," and LCO 3.3.2.1. With THERMAL

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued) POWER less than or equal to 10% RTP, the provisions of this Special Operations LCO are necessary to perform special tests that are not in conformance with the prescribed sequences of LCO 3.1.6.

While in MODES 3 and 4, control rod withdrawal is only allowed if performed in accordance with Special Operations LCO 3.10.2, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal—Hot Shutdown," or Special Operations LCO 3.10.3, "Single Control Rod Withdrawal—Cold Shutdown," which provide adequate controls to ensure that the assumptions of the safety analysis of Reference 1 is satisfied. During these Special Operations and while in MODE 5, the one-rod-out interlock (LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock,") and scram functions (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITY—Refueling"), or the added administrative controls prescribed in the applicable Special Operations LCOs, provide mitigation of potential reactivity excursions.

ACTIONS A.1

With the requirements of the LCO not met (e.g., the control rod pattern is not in compliance with the special test sequence, the sequence is improperly loaded in the RWM) the testing is required to be immediately suspended. Upon suspension of the special test, the provisions of LCO 3.1.6 are no longer excepted, and appropriate actions are to be taken to restore the control rod sequence to the prescribed sequence of LCO 3.1.6, or to shut down the reactor, if required by LCO 3.1.6.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.10.6.1

With the special test sequence not programmed into the RWM, a second licensed operator (Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator) or other task qualified member of the technical staff (e.g., shift technical advisor or reactor engineer) is required to verify conformance with the approved sequence for the test. This verification must be performed during control rod movement to prevent deviations from the specified sequence. A Note is added to indicate that this Surveillance does not need to be met if SR 3.10.6.2 is satisfied.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.10.6.2

When the RWM provides conformance to the special test sequence, the test sequence must be verified to be correctly loaded into the RWM prior to control rod movement. This Surveillance demonstrates compliance with SR 3.3.2.1.8, thereby demonstrating that the RWM is OPERABLE. A Note has been added to indicate that this Surveillance does not need to be met if SR 3.10.6.1 is satisfied.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 15.4.10.
 2. XN-NF-80-19(P)(A), Volume 1, Supplement 2, Section 7.1, Exxon Nuclear Methodology for Boiling Water Reactor Neutronics Methods for Design Analysis, (as specified in Technical Specification 5.6.5).
 3. NEDE-24011-P-A-US, General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, (as specified in Technical Specification 5.6.5).
 4. Letter from T. Pickens (BWROG) to G.C. Lainas (NRC) "Amendment 17 to General Electric Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A," BWROG-8644, August 15, 1986.
 5. NFSR-0091, Benchmark of CASMO/MICROBURN BWR Nuclear Design Methods, Commonwealth Edison Topical Report, (as specified in Technical Specification 5.6.5).
-
-

B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

B 3.10.7 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test – Refueling

BASES

BACKGROUND The purpose of this MODE 5 Special Operations LCO is to permit SDM testing to be performed for those plant configurations in which the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head is either not in place or the head bolts are not fully tensioned.

LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)," requires that adequate SDM be demonstrated following fuel movements or control rod replacement within the RPV. The demonstration must be performed prior to or within 4 hours after criticality is reached. This SDM test may be performed prior to or during the first startup following the refueling. Performing the SDM test prior to startup requires the test to be performed while in MODE 5, with the vessel head bolts less than fully tensioned (and possibly with the vessel head removed). While in MODE 5, the reactor mode switch is required to be in the shutdown or refuel position, where the applicable control rod blocks ensure that the reactor will not become critical. The SDM test requires the reactor mode switch to be in the startup/hot standby position, since more than one control rod will be withdrawn for the purpose of demonstrating adequate SDM. This Special Operations LCO provides the appropriate additional controls to allow withdrawing more than one control rod from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies when the reactor vessel head bolts are less than fully tensioned.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES Prevention and mitigation of unacceptable reactivity excursions during control rod withdrawal, with the reactor mode switch in the startup/hot standby position while in MODE 5, is provided by the intermediate range monitor (IRM) neutron flux scram (LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"), and control rod block instrumentation (LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation"). The limiting reactivity excursion during startup conditions while in MODE 5 is the control rod drop accident (CRDA).

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

CRDA analyses assume that the reactor operator follows prescribed withdrawal sequences. For SDM tests performed within these defined sequences, the analyses of References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 is applicable. However, for some sequences developed for the SDM testing, the control rod patterns assumed in the safety analyses of References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 may not be met. Therefore, special CRDA analyses, performed in accordance with an NRC approved methodology, are required to demonstrate the SDM test sequence will not result in unacceptable consequences should a CRDA occur during the testing. For the purpose of this test, the protection provided by the normally required MODE 5 applicable LCOs, in addition to the requirements of this LCO, will maintain normal test operations as well as postulated accidents within the bounds of the appropriate safety analyses (Refs. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5). In addition to the added requirements for the RWM, APRM, and control rod coupling, the notch out mode is specified for out of sequence withdrawals. Requiring the notch out mode limits withdrawal steps to a single notch, which limits inserted reactivity, and allows adequate monitoring of changes in neutron flux, which may occur during the test.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs. A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. SDM tests may be performed while in MODE 2, in accordance with Table 1.1-1, without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. For SDM tests performed while in MODE 5, additional requirements must be met to ensure that adequate protection against potential reactivity excursions is available. To provide additional scram protection, beyond the normally required IRMs, the APRMs are also required to be OPERABLE (LCO 3.3.1.1, Functions 2.a and 2.d as though the reactor were in MODE 2. Because multiple control rods will be withdrawn and the reactor will potentially become critical, the approved control rod withdrawal sequence must be enforced by the RWM

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued) (LCO 3.3.2.1, Function 2, MODE 2), or must be verified by a second licensed operator (Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator) or other task qualified member of the technical staff (e.g., a shift technical advisor or reactor engineer). To provide additional protection against an inadvertent criticality, control rod withdrawals that do not conform to the analyzed rod position sequence specified in LCO 3.1.6, "Rod Pattern Control," (i.e., out of sequence control rod withdrawals) must be made in the individual notched withdrawal mode to minimize the potential reactivity insertion associated with each movement. Coupling integrity of withdrawn control rods is required to minimize the probability of a CRDA and ensure proper functioning of the withdrawn control rods, if they are required to scram. Because the reactor vessel head may be removed during these tests, no other CORE ALTERATIONS may be in progress. Furthermore, since the control rod scram function with the RCS at atmospheric pressure relies solely on the CRD accumulator, it is essential that the CRD charging water header remain pressurized. This Special Operations LCO then allows changing the Table 1.1-1 reactor mode switch position requirements to include the startup/hot standby position, such that the SDM tests may be performed while in MODE 5.

APPLICABILITY These SDM test Special Operations requirements are only applicable if the SDM tests are to be performed while in MODE 5 with the reactor vessel head removed or the head bolts not fully tensioned. Additional requirements during these tests to enforce control rod withdrawal sequences and restrict other CORE ALTERATIONS provide protection against potential reactivity excursions. Operations in all other MODES are unaffected by this LCO.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2

With one or more control rods discovered uncoupled during this Special Operation, a controlled insertion of each uncoupled control rod is required; either to attempt recoupling, or to preclude a control rod drop. This controlled insertion is preferred since, if the control rod fails to follow the drive as it is withdrawn (i.e., is "stuck" in an inserted position), placing the reactor mode

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2 (continued)

switch in the shutdown position per Required Action B.1 could cause substantial secondary damage. If recoupling is not accomplished, operation may continue, provided the control rods are fully inserted within 3 hours and disarmed (electrically or hydraulically) within 4 hours. Inserting a control rod ensures the shutdown and scram capabilities are not adversely affected. The control rod is disarmed to prevent inadvertent withdrawal during subsequent operations. The control rods can be hydraulically disarmed by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves. Electrically the control rods can be disarmed by disconnecting power from all four directional control valve solenoids. Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note that allows the RWM to be bypassed if required to allow insertion of the inoperable control rods and continued operation. LCO 3.3.2.1, "Control Rod Block Instrumentation," Actions provide additional requirements when the RWM is bypassed to ensure compliance with the CRDA analysis.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, considering the small number of allowed inoperable control rods, and provide time to insert and disarm the control rods in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

Condition A is modified by a Note allowing separate Condition entry for each uncoupled control rod. This is acceptable since the Required Actions for this Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each uncoupled control rod. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation. Subsequent uncoupled control rods are governed by subsequent entry into the Condition and application of the Required Actions.

B.1

With one or more of the requirements of this LCO not met for reasons other than an uncoupled control rod, the testing should be immediately stopped by placing the reactor mode switch in the shutdown or refuel position. This results in a condition that is consistent with the requirements for MODE 5 where the provisions of this Special Operations LCO are no longer required.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.10.7.1, SR 3.10.7.2, and SR 3.10.7.3

LCO 3.3.1.1, Functions 2.a and 2.d, made applicable in this Special Operations LCO, are required to have applicable Surveillances met to establish that this Special Operations LCO is being met (SR 3.10.7.1). However, the control rod withdrawal sequences during the SDM tests may be enforced by the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1, Function 2, MODE 2 requirements) or by a second licensed operator (Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator) or other task qualified member of the technical staff (e.g., a shift technical advisor or reactor engineer). As noted, either the applicable SRs for the RWM (LCO 3.3.2.1) must be satisfied according to the applicable Frequencies (SR 3.10.7.2), or the proper movement of control rods must be verified (SR 3.10.7.3). This latter verification (i.e., SR 3.10.7.3) must be performed during control rod movement to prevent deviations from the specified sequence. These surveillances provide adequate assurance that the specified test sequence is being followed.

SR 3.10.7.4

Periodic verification of the administrative controls established by this LCO will ensure that the reactor is operated within the bounds of the safety analysis. The 12 hour Frequency is intended to provide appropriate assurance that each operating shift is aware of and verifies compliance with these Special Operations LCO requirements.

SR 3.10.7.5

Coupling verification is performed to ensure the control rod is connected to the control rod drive mechanism and will perform its intended function when necessary. The verification is required to be performed any time a control rod is withdrawn to the "full-out" notch position, or prior to declaring the control rod OPERABLE after work on the control rod or CRD System that could affect coupling. This Frequency is acceptable, considering the low probability that a control rod will become uncoupled when it is not being moved as well as operating experience related to uncoupling events.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.10.7.6

CRD charging water header pressure verification is performed to ensure the motive force is available to scram the control rods in the event of a scram signal. Since the reactor is depressurized in MODE 5, there is insufficient reactor pressure to scram the control rods. Verification of charging water header pressure ensures that if a scram were required, capability for rapid control rod insertion would exist. The minimum pressure of 940 psig is well below the expected pressure of approximately 1500 psig while still ensuring sufficient pressure for rapid control rod insertion. The 7 day Frequency has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience and takes into account indications available in the control room.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 15.4.10.
 2. XN-NF-80-19(P)(A), Volume 1, Supplement 2, Section 7.1, Exxon Nuclear Methodology for Boiling Water Reactor Neutronics Methods for Design Analysis, (as specified in Technical Specification 5.6.5).
 3. NEDE-24011-P-A-US, General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel, (as specified in Technical Specification 5.6.5).
 4. Letter from T. Pickens (BWROG) to G.C. Lainas (NRC) "Amendment 17 to General Electric Licensing Topical Report NEDE-24011-P-A," BWROG-8644, August 15, 1986.
 5. NFSR-0091, Benchmark of CASMO/MICROBURN BWR Nuclear Design Methods, Commonwealth Edison Topical Report, (as specified in Technical Specification 5.6.5).
-