

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000

April 12, 2001

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of (a) (b) Docket No. 50-260<br>Terrasses Valley Authority (b) Tennessee Valley Authority

BROWNS FERRY **NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)** - UNIT 2 - SUBMITTAL OF EVALUATION OF INTERGRANULAR **STRESS** CORROSION CRACKING (IGSCC) INDICATION **ON** RESIDUAL **HEAT** REMOVAL SYSTEM PIPING WELDMENT

In accordance with guidance specified in NRC Generic Letter (GL) 88-01, TVA is submitting an evaluation of an IGSCC indication in a heat affected zone of a weld located on Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system piping. During performance of scheduled inservice inspection of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system piping, TVA identified an indication in weld DRHR-2-09 not previously identified as a flaw. In accordance with the GL, if any cracks are identified that do not meet the criteria for continued operation without evaluation given in Section XI of the Code, NRC approval of flaw evaluations and/or repairs in accordance with IWB-3640 and IWA-4130 is required before resumption of operation.

TVA completed a stress corrosion crack growth analysis in accordance with NUREG-0313, Revision 2, "Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping." Based on the conservative assumptions used, TVA's analysis demonstrates that weld DRHR-2-09 is acceptable for at least 2 additional 24-month operating cycles.

 $D^{o3o}$ 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 April 12, 2001

**BFN** Unit 2 is currently in the Cycle **11** refueling outage. Therefore, if NRC determines approval of this evaluation is required prior to Unit 2 restart, TVA requests approval on an expedited basis. This short review period is necessary to support the unit's return to service.

Enclosure 1 to this letter provides the evaluation of weld DRHR-2-09. To further aid NRC in their review of this issue, Enclosure 2 provides the staff with a copy of Calculation CD-Q2074-990016. Enclosure 3 provides isometric drawing 2-ISI-0221-C, Sheet **1,** which depicts the Unit 2 RHR System weld in question.

If you have any questions about this evaluation, please telephone me at (256) 729-2636.

Si*j*ncerel*y* T. E. Abney Manager of ticensing and Industry Affairs Enclosures cc: See page

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 April 12, 2001

 $\mathbb{R}^{2n}$ 

 $\sim 10^{11}$  m  $^{-1}$ 

cc (Enclosures): Mr. Paul E. Fredrickson, Branch Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, S.W., Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

> NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 10833 Shaw Road Athens, Alabama 35611

Mr. William **0.** Long, Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852

## **ENCLOSURE 1**

# **TENNESSEE** VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY **NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)**   $INTT<sub>2</sub>$ EVALUATION OF INTERGRANULAR **STRESS** CORROSION CRACKING (IGSCC) INDICATION FOR WELD DRHR-2-09

# Background

BFN Unit 2 is in the second Ten-Year Inservice Inspection Interval. The code of record for BFN Unit 2 is ASME Section XI,<br>1986 Edition (no addenda). Standards for ASME Section XI Class Standards for ASME Section XI Class 1 nondestructive examination evaluation are in accordance with IWB-3000 of the ASME Section XI Code, 1989 Edition (no addenda).

During the present Unit 2, Cycle **11** refueling outage, ultrasonic test (UT) inspections of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system pipe welds conducted in conjunction with the guidance of Generic Letter (GL) 88-01 revealed an IGSCC indication, not previously identified as a flaw, in the Heat Affected Zone (HAZ) of weld number DRHR-2-09. Weld DRHR-2-09 is in RHR System Loop 1 and is a 24-inch diameter, (A-358 Type 304 stainless steel, Schedule<br>80), pipe-to-tee (A-403 Type 304 stainless steel) weld. The weld 80), pipe-to-tee (A-403 Type 304 stainless steel) weld. filler metal is ER308 (Gas Tungsten Arc Weld) for the root and hot-pass and E308-16 (Shielded Metal Arc Weld) for the remaining portion of the weld. Manual UT examination of the weld was conducted with nondestructive examination (NDE) procedures and techniques that have been qualified in accordance with Appendix VIII of ASME Section XI Performance Demonstration Initiative (PDI) program at the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).

The UT results indicate a flaw located at approximately 161 to 170 degree azimuth or 34 to 36 inches clockwise from top dead center of the pipe. The pipe has a wall thickness of 1.20 inches<br>(t). The indication is 2 inches in length (l) with a maximum The indication is 2 inches in length (1) with a maximum depth of 0.25 inches (a). The UT data positions the indication in the HAZ of the type 304 stainless steel material of the pipe. The flaw is unacceptable per Table IWB-3514-2. The flaw aspect ratio (flaw depth versus length  $(a/l)$ ), is  $a/l = 0.125$  with an a/t of 20.83 percent. For an aspect ratio of 0.125 the maximum allowable surface flaw depth is 10.93 percent of the 1.20 inch pipe wall thickness which is 0.131 inches.

The indication was detected using manual UT examination with 45 degree and 70 degree shear wave search units. Scans were also performed with a 70 degree shear wave search unit in order to confirm both a previously identified indication being tracked near 23.5 to 27.0 inches and the indication (not previously

identified) at 34 to 36 inches. No scan was performed from the tee side due to component configuration.

The flaw located near 23.5 to 27.0 inches has not shown any growth since its initial inspection and sizing performed in 1989 and successive inspections. Further, TVA's experience with other IGSCC Category E welds (identified flaws and IHSI treatment) at **BFN** has not shown any indication growth. Therefore, TVA does not consider the flaw near 23.5 to 27.0 inches and the adjacent flaw at 34 to 36 inches to be active in nature.

## Inspection History **Of** Weld DRHR-2-09

In 1984, Induction Heat Stress Improvement (IHSI) was applied to the accessible, Unit 2, Residual Heat Removal System pipe welds to mitigate IGSCC. In conjunction with the IHSI process, weld<br>prim-2-09 was examined pre-IHSI using manual UT techniques. In DRHR-2-09 was examined pre-IHSI using manual UT techniques. 1989, post-IHSI examinations were conducted with a combination of manual and automated examination techniques. These examinations did not reveal the presence of an IGSCC indication at the 34 to<br>36 inch area from the top dead center location. Automated 36 inch area from the top dead center location. examination techniques were not performed in this region due to the close proximity of structural elements near the location; therefore, manual techniques were employed to provide additional coverage. Unit 2 was subsequently shutdown by TVA in 1985 as part of an extensive recovery program and restarted in May of 1991.

TVA conducted scheduled examinations in 1989 and 1994 using automated UT techniques, and in 1997 using manual techniques, and in April 2001 using manual techniques. The manual and automated techniques utilized during the 1983-1994 period were qualified under the "old" NDE Coordination Plan developed by EPRI.

A review of the 1994 automated data shows that the indication (34 to 36 inches) was present utilizing a 60 degree refracted longitudinal search unit but was masked by weld geometry when examining with the 45 degree primary qualified detection angle and therefore was not characterized as IGSCC due to limitations of the qualified UT techniques employed by the industry in the 1994 timeframe.

A detailed review of the 1989, 1994, and 1997 data was performed to assess the characterization activities and identify any differences between these data and the 2001 manual data as provided for in IWA-1400(h). The primary reason that the indication is now characterized as IGSCC is directly attributable to enhanced, qualified manual UT techniques which include additional detection angles. The procedure, personnel, and

equipment utilized during the current Cycle **11** outage were qualified in accordance with Appendix VIII. and characterization as IGSCC are directly attributable to the enhanced techniques required to successfully qualify to the more stringent Appendix VIII, Supplement 2 requirements. The primary attributes contained in the qualified procedure that enhance discrimination of UT indications when interrogating geometry and flaw features are:

The examinations for single-sided welds are performed using 45-degree, 60-degree, and 70-degree shear waves and 60-degree refracted longitudinal waves. Previous examinations did not incorporate the 60-degree and 70-degree shear wave that is now utilized during evaluation to ascertain indication characteristics.

The qualified Appendix VIII approach coupled with the shallow flaw characteristics explains the changes between the previous inspections and the 2001 inspection results. Based on the ultrasonic data review, the subject weld flaw did not initiate<br>after the post-IHSI UT examinations performed in 1989. The after the post-IHSI UT examinations performed in 1989. data indicates that the flaw previously existed and appears to have experienced no growth during the same period.

In addition, TVA has performed a review of seven BFN Unit 2 Category E welds with IGSCC flaws (16 Category E welds total, seven with IHSI mitigation) and concluded that no flaw growth has occurred since IHSI mitigation, (i.e., six operating cycles). Attachment B (sheets 1-7) provides the weld flaw size comparisons for the seven Category E welds with IGSCC flaws from the time of original detection and demonstrate that no flaw growth has occurred since IHSI mitigation.

TVA also performed a review of the IHSI process control parameters and the actual IHSI data recorded for weld DRHR-2-09. This review has determined that the IHSI process control specification (General Electric Procedure PSOYP214, Revision 4, Table **1)** parameters were met.

# Expansion **Of** Inspection Sample

 $\mathcal{O}(\mathbb{R}^3) \times \mathbb{R}^3$ 

Weld DRHR-2-09 is presently classified as a Category E weld. Examination of seven category E welds has been conducted during the current Unit 2 Cycle **11** outage. Since no "significant" growth or additional indications were found, no sample expansion is required per the guidance provided in GL 88-01. Significant indication growth for IHSI mitigated Category E welds is defined in NUREG 0313 as growth to length or depth exceeding criteria for IHSI mitigation **(10** percent of circumference or 30 percent in Since the indication is not new and does not meet the definition of significant growth, no expanded sample is required.

## Structural Evaluation **Of** The DRHR-2-09 Indication

 $\sim 10^4$ 

Volumetric and surface examinations of ASME Code Class 1 components are required to be evaluated by comparing the examination results with the acceptance standard specified in Table IWB-3410-1, to determine if the component is acceptable for continued service. Table IWB-3410-1 requires that weld DRHR-2-09 meet the acceptance standard of IWB-3514 for exam category B-J. IWB-3514.3 ("Allowable Flaw Standards for Austenitic Piping") states in part, "The acceptance of these flaws shall be governed by the allowable flaw standards for the volumetric examination method in Table IWB-3514-2."

Attachment A to this enclosure contains the IWB-3500 flaw evaluation. As concluded in Attachment A, the flaw does not meet the acceptance criteria of Table IWB-3514-2. A flaw that exceeds the size of allowable flaws defined in IWB-3500 may be evaluated by analytical procedures, such as those described in ASME Section XI, IWB-3640, Appendix A, to calculate its growth until the next inspection or the end of service life of the component.

Enclosure 2 provides a structural evaluation of the indication that was performed to determine the ability of the pipe to support continued unit operation. Crack growth analysis was conducted using the computer program pc-CRACK. The crack growth rate parameters specified in GL 88-01 were utilized in the evaluation. For evaluation purposes the indication was assumed to have an initial depth of 0.27 inches and was conservatively assumed to extend 360 degrees around the circumference of the pipe. Since the weld had been stress improved using IHSI, the residual stress was assumed to be zero. A fatigue growth analysis was also performed which conservatively assumed the initial flaw size was equal to the end of period flaw size calculated in IGSCC growth analysis. The crack growth evaluation indicates that a depth of 0.301 inches is predicted following four calendar years of continued operation. Using the ASME Section XI acceptable flaw size, the predicted size is well<br>within the maximum allowable for continued operation. Thus, TVA within the maximum allowable for continued operation. considers that continued operation in the current "as-is" condition is acceptable for a minimum of 2 additional 24-month operating cycles. Additionally, inspection of weld DRHR-2-09 will be conducted per GL 88-01 guidance which will insure that any possible flaw growth will remain within acceptable values.

## Conclusion

 $\mathbb{R}^2$ 

Weld DRHR-2-09 is classified as an IGSCC Category E weld. IGSCC Category E welds are those with known cracks but have been reinforced by an acceptable weld overlay or have been mitigated by a stress improvement treatment, with subsequent examination by qualified examiners and procedures to verify the extent of cracking. IGSCC Category E welds are required to be inspected at least once every two refueling cycles after repair or acceptance by analytical evaluation. TVA does not consider the flaw in weld DRHR-2-09 an active flaw with significance to<br>warrant reclassification to an IGSCC Category F weld. The warrant reclassification to an IGSCC Category F weld. adjacent flaw and similar welds with flaws and stress improvement (Category E per GL 88-01) have been reviewed for past BFN Unit 2 operating cycles and no growth was found. Therefore, since the flaw was pre-existing and there has been a history of no growth for welds with IHSI, this weld should maintain its current classification of Category E.

TVA completed a stress corrosion crack growth analysis in accordance with NUREG-0313, Revision 2, "Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping." Based on the conservative assumptions used, TVA's analysis demonstrates that weld DRHR-2-09 is acceptable for at least 2 additional 24-month operating cycles.

#### Future Inspections

Consistent with GL 88-01 guidance, weld DRHR-2-09 will remain classified as a Category E weld (crack reinforced by weld overlay or mitigated by IHSI). Future inspections will be conducted per the schedule listed in Table 1 of GL 88-01. As previously stated in TVA's reply to GL 88-01 (Reference), TVA will provide future inspection information only in the event of changes in the current indication or the discovery of new indications.

#### **REFERENCE**

TVA letter to NRC dated August **1,** 1988, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Response to Bulletin 88-01, IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping

# **ASME** SECTION XI IWB-3500 EVALUATION OF WELD DRHR-2-09

**1)** Determine Region and Orientation of Flaw. The weld region should be identified by the nearest weld. The orientation is either [A]xial or [C] ircumferential.

> Region: Weld DRHR-2-09 Orientation: C

- 2) Sketch Flaw Geometry. c calculated =  $\Pi$ d =  $(\Pi)$  (24") =75.4 inches c measured = 76 inches Flaw start =  $(34/76)$  X  $(360^{\circ})$  = 161<sup>o</sup> Flaw end =  $(36/76)$  X  $(360^{\circ})$  = 170.5° - **900**  -Flaw identified from Unit 2 Cycle 5B - [Flaw start 23.25 inches (113.3°) to flaw end 27 inches  $(128^{\circ})$ ], length of flaw = 3.75 inches, depth of  $flaw = 0.27$  inches]  $180^\circ$ **"S"** Dimension between indications = 7", which is greater than  $2d_1$ or  $2d_2$  in Figure IWA 3330-1. The two flaws are not considered to be a single planar flaw. Previous indication, identified as a flaw during Unit 2 Cycle **11** refueling outage- [Flaw start 34 inches (1610) to flaw end 36 inches  $(170.5^{\circ})$ , length of flaw =  $2.0$  inches, depth of  $flaw = 0.25$  inches] 3) Classify Flaw. Combine flaws in close proximity to other flaws and to the surface per the proximity rule of IWA-3300, ASME Section XI, 1989 edition with no addenda. Classify flaw as either: Inside Surface: **<sup>E</sup>** Outside Surface: **01**  Subsurface: **0**  4) Size Flaw. Calculate flaw depth. Subsurface Flaws: Surface Flaws: Flaw Depth, a = **0.25** (in) Flaw Depth, a **=** N/A (in)  $= 2.0 (in)$ Half Depth, a **= N/A** (in) Flaw Length, L Flaw Length, L **= N/A** (in) **5)** Calculate Aspect Ratio of Flaw.
	- Flaw Aspect Ratio,  $a/L = (0.25)/(2.0) = 0.125$

# **ATTACHMENT A**

# **ASME** SECTION XI IWB-3500 EVALUATION OF WELD DRHR-2-09

**6)** IWB-3500 Flaw Evaluation. For the given a/L aspect ratio, determine the allowable flaw depth, a (surface) and 2a (subsurface), in accordance with IWB-3510 of the Code and record the value below. If the flaw depth recorded in step 4 is below the allowable value, check the box "Acceptable per IWB-3500" below. Otherwise, Check box "Unacceptable per IWB-3500" and continue to step 7.

#### Inside Surface Flaws:

 $\sim 10^6$ 

 $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A})$  and  $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A})$ 

Actual flaw information: t = 1.2"; a/t = (0.25)/(1.2) x **100=** 20.83% ASME Section XI, 1989 edition with no addenda, a/t allowable interpolated from Table IWB-3514-2 "Inservice Examination" = 10.93%



IWB-3500 Allowable Depth = a = 10.93 % of 1.2 inches = **0.131 (in)**

```
Outside Surface Flaws
```
IWB-3500 Allowable Depth =  $a = N/A$  (in

```
Subsurface Flaws:
```
IWB-3500 Allowable Depth = 2a = **N/A** (in)

## IWB-3500 ACCEPTABILITY:

0.25 inch flaw depth exceeds 0.131 inch IWB-3500 Allowable Depth.

**0]** Acceptable per IWB-3500 Unacceptable per IWB-3500

A flaw that exceeds the size of allowable flaws defined in IWB-3500 may be evaluated by analytical procedures to calculate its growth until the next inspection or the end of service lifetime of the component. The component containing the flaw is acceptable for continued service during the evaluated time period if conditions noted in IWB-3600 are satisfied.

#### IWB-3600 ACCEPTABILITY:

- **<sup>M</sup>**Acceptable per IWB-3600 Refer to TVA document calculation CD- Q2074-990016 (EDMS accession number R14 010410 106)
- **<sup>01</sup>**Unacceptable per IWB-3600

# **ASME** SECTION XI IWB-3500 EVALUATION OF WELD DRHR-2-09

#### Material Reference Information

 $\mathcal{O}(\mathcal{O}(\log n))$ 

Pipe: A 358 type 304 stainless steel<br>Tee: A 403 type 304 stainless steel A 403 type 304 stainless steel Weld filler material: ER-308 for GTAW process on root and hot pass, E308-16 for SMAW process remainder of weld.

Prepared by: K. L. Groom, reviewed by: R. L. Phillips

 $\sim 10^{11}$  and  $\sim 10^{11}$ 





 $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{E})$  and  $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{E})$ 

 $\sim 10^7$ 



# WELD KR-2-41

 $\Delta\lambda$  and  $\Delta\lambda$ 

# WELD KR-2-36



# Attachment **B,** Sheet 4

 $\Delta \mathbf{r} = \mathbf{r} \times \mathbf{r}$ 

# WELD GR-2-53



 $\sim 10^{11}$  and  $\sim 10^{11}$ 



# WELD DRHR-2-09

Attachment **B,** Sheet **<sup>6</sup>**

 $\mathcal{L}^{\text{max}}_{\text{max}}$  and  $\mathcal{L}^{\text{max}}_{\text{max}}$ 

# WELD DRHR-2-22



\_\_\_\_\_

 $\Delta\sigma$  and  $\Delta\sigma$ 

# WELD KR-2-37



# ENCLOSURE 2

 $\Delta \mathcal{F} = 0.0122$ 

 $\hat{\boldsymbol{\cdot} }$ 

 $\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}$ 

# TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 2

# TVA CALCULATION CD-Q2074-990016, EVALUATION OF IGSCC INDICATION AT WELD DRHR-2-09

(SEE ATTACHED)

# **TVAN** CALCULATION COVERSHEET **/** CCRIS UPDATE



Page: i.1



 $\sim$ 

 $\sim 12$ 

 $\mathbb{R}^4$ 

# **TVAN CALCULATION COVERSHEET / CCRIS UPDATE**



 $- -$ 

 $\Delta \sigma$  and  $\Delta \sigma$ 

 $\overline{\phantom{a}}$ 

# QA Record

 $\sim 12$ 

 $\mathcal{L}^{(1)}$ 

۸

![](_page_21_Picture_338.jpeg)

 $\frac{1}{2}$ 

page 1 of 23 ORIGINAL TVA 10697 DNE45-86) **DNE** CALCULATIONS **DA** Record  $BFW2$   $TG$   $Scc$   $F$ *law*  $E$ *valantion* of Weld DRHR-2-9  $B$  $FW$   $U_{1}$ ,  $T$  2 k BRANCH/PROJECT IDENTIFIERS Each time these calculations are issued, preparers must ensure that the original RO) RIMS accession -number is filled in. Rev (for RIMS' use)  $\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)$  RIMS accession number **3F** 4,.-T1' o **-0 2-0** Ro 890317E0029 **16 .'89** 0310 **599**  APPLICABLE DESIGN DOCUMENT(S) | R **YURE SECTION THE RANGE SECTION THE RANGE RANGE POWER CONTROL Particle 2 & Safety-related Property R2 R3**  $\sim$  2008. The same control of the sa **ECN No. (or indicate Not Applicable) R1 R2 R3 Safety-related?** Yes  $R<sub>2</sub>$ R<sub>3</sub> No  $\square$ **Statement of Problem Prared** *CMN (ir viae* **p** Not \*4 TcSee ikal/,cJ64o" 5ApOp(licableWC)t was found in weld Chéb∎ed Father and DRHR-2-9 of the Inin Dae MAR *10* **198g' P**  List all pages added  $\geq$   $\geq$   $\geq$   $\geq$   $\geq$  by this revision. **E** E List all pages deleted  $\frac{5}{2}$  $\frac{2}{3}$  by this revision. န္တြဲ နွ List all pages changed by this revision. Abstract These calculations contain an unverified assumption(s) that must be verified later. Yes  $\Box$  No that must be verified later. *This calculation provides an assessment of leaving* the IGSCC *indication* unrepaired. This calculation utilizes the pe-CRACK<br>Computer program to calculate stable flaw<br>sizes, I GSCC growth rates, and fatigue crack growth rates.<br>Appendix A, Fracture Mechanics Analysis - 2 pages<br>Appendix B, IGScc Crack Growth Evaluation-5 pages Appendix  $c'_1$  Fatigue Crack Growth Evaluation -5 pages This calculations in BIMS Service Center.<br>In Microfilm and destroy.  $\square$ **E** Microfilm and store calculations in RIMS Service Center. Microfilm and return calculations to: *Mare Dunaway* Address:wt /00226 #K FINS SL 26 C.K railer # 7, BFN

![](_page_23_Picture_129.jpeg)

 $\mathcal{A}^{\text{max}}_{\text{max}}$ 

TVA 40709 **(01-1999] NEDP-2-2 [01-08-19991**

÷

 $\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}$ 

![](_page_24_Picture_101.jpeg)

 $\sim 12$ 

 $\mathcal{L}^{(1)}$ 

# Page **3**

![](_page_25_Picture_127.jpeg)

 $\mathcal{O}(\mathcal{O}(\log n))$ 

 $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{A}}$ 

**C-: ;7 4 -~Q 9 30**Prepared **By:** ýe-:a-=:~ Page 5 *Of* 

 $\Delta \mathcal{F} = 0.0000$ 

 $\mathcal{L}$ 

i<br>Seri

![](_page_26_Picture_96.jpeg)

 $\mathcal{L}$ 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

![](_page_26_Picture_97.jpeg)

Page 6 of<br>This Page Replaced By R1

CD-Q2074-990016 **Prepared By: <u>7</u>/2** Date: 2/10/19 Checked By: 21 Date:  $\frac{2}{4}$ 

## 1.0 PURPOSE

The purpose **6f** this calculation is to determine whether or not DRHR-2-09, a girth butt weld in the Reactor Water Recirculation (RECIRC) System, is acceptable for continued operation for a period of two BFN Unit 2 fuel cycles considering the initial flaws size identified in Section 6.1 below. Although this weld is numbered as a Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System weld, per the inservice inspection weld map (ref 4.15), it is located in an unisolable portion of the pipe connecting the RHR supply to the RECIRC pump discharge line and is therefore exposed to RECIRC operating conditions. Revision 1 of this calculation was made to address the following considerations:

- The duration of a fuel cycle is increased from 18 to 24 months (see reference 4.17).
- "• Design / Operating temperatures and pressures are changed to reflect the reference 4.13 modes of operation which includes power uprate of the Unit 2 nuclear steam supply system (see reference 4.16).
- Application of sustained pipe loads (deadweight, thermal expansion, etc.) for prediction of subcritical crack growth due to IGSCC.

#### 2.0 BACKGROUND

During the Post-IHSI Examination of IGSCC susceptible welds, a circumferential intergranular stress corrosion crack (IGSCC) indication was detected by UT inspection in weld DRHR-2-09. This indication was in excess of the allowable flaw standard of Table IWB-3514-3 of the ASME Code Section XI 1977 Edition with Addenda through Summer 1978. This calculation was then initiated to help provide final disposition of CAQR BFP890172. Subsequently, during the

3.0 ASSUMPTIONS

This analysis utilizes the procedures described in NRC Generic Letter 88-01 (ref 4.1) and NUREG 0313 rev. 2 (ref 4.2) to evaluate the effect of the flawson the structural integrity of weld DRHR-2-09. Since the procedures are closely followed, there are no assumptions as to the method of analysis. The residual stress field used for computation of subcritical crack growth due to IGSCC is noted in Section 6.1 and justified by data given in Attachment B. Any other assumptions for the purpose of conservative analytical simplification are noted and justified in the body of the calculation.

- 4.0 SOURCES OF DESIGN INPUT INFORMATION (REFERENCES)
- 4.1 NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping (Generic Letter 88-01).

![](_page_27_Picture_13.jpeg)

R3

183.

 $|R3|$ 

![](_page_28_Picture_178.jpeg)

![](_page_28_Picture_179.jpeg)

Page 8 of<br>This Page Replaced By R1

 $\mathbb{R}^2$ 

 $\sim 10^{-11}$ 

::- **7** 4 --94900 **16** =.. .. By -Da-e: This Page Replaced By R1 Checked By: 216

5.3 Operating Pressure and Temperature (Ref 4.13)

Normal Pressure =  $1273$  psig<br>Normal Temp =  $552^{\circ}$  F Normal Temp Upset Pressure  $= 1558 \text{ psig}$ <br>Upset Temp  $= 532 \text{°F}$ Upset Temp

5.4 Pipe Material (Ref 4.14 & Ref 4.15)

A-358 TP304 CL 1

5.5 Pipe Allowable Stresses (Ref 4.4)

Sm = 16.8 ksi @ 562°F (Design)  $Sm = 16.9$  ksi @ 552°F (Max Operating)

5.6 Pipe Loads (Ref 4.14)

Based on comparison of ref 4.14 (piping stress summary calculation) with ref 4.15 (ISI weld map)and ref 4.6 (mechanical layout drawing 47W452-10), the weld in question connects the 24 inch RHR supply to the 28 inch RECIRC pump discharge line. The closest node that is representative of this point is 281 which ÷. per the analysis isometric of ref 4.14, lies between node 269 representing the center of the Tee and node 280A representing a spring hanger that is 2'-7" from node 269. Actual piping moments and stresses are taken from the computer outputs generated by Revision 5 of ref 4.14. Although the calculation package has been revised a number of times since rev 5, these changes / conditions have not resulted in significant changes in piping loads at the location in question. A copy of the postprccessor stress summary for node 281 is included as Attachment A to this calculation.

6.0 COMPUTATIONS/ANALYSIS

Following the procedures of ASME Section XI, IWB-3640, Code Case N-436 and EPRI NP-4690-SR, the flaw in the subject weld will be evaluated by:

**1.** Computing subcritical flaw growth considering growth mechanisms due to both continued IGSCC and fatigue over a period of 2 fuel cycles. Following the Cycle  $4\theta$ <sup>1</sup>refueling outage, BFN Unit 2 will operate for a period of 24 months between subsequent refuelings. Therefore the period of service is  $2 \times 2 = 4$  years. Although any subcritical crack growth due to fatigue and IGSCC will be concurrent over the 4 year evaluation period, to address this with reasonable analytic simplicity, the IGSCC growth analysis will be executed first with the resulting final crack size utilized by a fatigue crack growth analysis. To ensure conservatism, a

![](_page_29_Picture_13.jpeg)

 $R<sub>3</sub>$ 

Page 9 of<br>This Page Replaced By R1

CD-Q2074-990016 Prepared By: 2020 This Page Replaced By R1 Checked By: 2008

case where fatigue crack growth is considered first followed by an IGSCC growth will be addressed.

- 2. Comparing the predicted end of period flaw size with allowable flaw depth as permitted by ASME Section XI for the loading conditions at DRHR-2-09.
- 6.1 IGSCC Crack Growth Analysis

IGSCC occurs as a result of the application of sustained stress at the flaw location over a period of time. The time dependent model of IGSCC is reflected by the following differential equation which is recommended by the NRC in ref 4.2:

$$
\frac{da}{dt} = 3.590 \times 10^{3} \cdot (K_{L})^{2.161}
$$

where:  $d\mathbf{a}$ <sup>/dt</sup> = *growth rate* (in/hour)  $K_t$ = crack stress intensity factor due to sustained stress  $(ksi \cdot \sqrt{in})$ 

Sustained stresses include not only those due to pressure, deadweight and thermal expansion but also those due to residual stresses. Residual welding stresses are considered a major factor in initiating and propagating IGSCC since the typical residual stress field is highly tensile on the inside pipe surface where exposure to the undesirable environment (i.e., oxygenated BWR primary water) occurs. To mitigate the potential for IGSCC at BFN Unit 2, most reactor coolant system girth butt welds, including DRHR-2-09 have been subjected to Induction Heating Stress Improvement (IHSI). As indicated by ref 4.9, IHSI has been demonstrated to alter the residual stress field to produce substantial compressive residual stresses at the pipe inside surface.

To project subcritical crack growth at DRHR-2-09 due to IGSCC, the Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics Module of the reference 4.5 software (pc-CRACK") is used to solve the growth rate equation with:

- cracks are<br>• a conservative assumption that the existing arack is constant depth extending completely around (i.e.,  $360^{\circ}$ ) the pipe circumference,
- the applied stresses at node 281 due to sustained conditions (i.e., pressure, deadweight and thermal expansion) assumed to be constant through the wall thickness:

![](_page_30_Picture_13.jpeg)

R3

 $CD - Q2074 - 990016$ Page 10 of This Page Replaced By R1

J.

$$
\sigma_{\text{PRESSURE}} = 5.555 \text{ksi} \cdot \frac{1273}{1326} = 5.333 \text{ksi}
$$

 $\sigma_{\text{Deadweight}} = 0.860$  ksi

 $\sigma_{\text{THERMAL}} = 7.736$  ksi

$$
\sigma_{\text{APPLIED}} = 5.333 \text{ksi} + 0.860 \text{ksi} + 7.736 \text{ksi} = 13.929 \text{ksi} ,
$$

• residual stress field based on reference 4.9 as derived in Attachment B of this calculation:

$$
\sigma_{\text{RESIDUAL}} = -14\text{ksi} + 22.97 \frac{\text{ksi}}{\text{in}} \cdot \text{X}
$$

depth<br>**A**-6 an initial crack<sup>1</sup>size based on most recent nondestructive<br>**A**-6 an initial crack<sup>1</sup>size based on most recent nondestructive  $evolution$  (examination summary sheets given in Attachment C):

$$
a_i = 0.27
$$
 in = flaw depth ~~-and~~  
 $1 = 3.75$  in = flaw-length (not used-in-create-growth-  
~~projection)~~

• the evaluation period is taken as 4 calendar years  $(2 - 2$  year fuel cycles or:

 $4 \text{ years} \cdot 365 \frac{\text{days}}{\text{year}} \cdot 24 \frac{\text{hours}}{\text{day}} = 35040 \text{ hours} \Rightarrow \text{use } 35000 \text{ hours}$ 

pc-CRACK" output for this case is reflected by Table 8.1 which indicates about .031 inches growth due to IGSCC over 2 fuel cycles to reach a final size of 0.301 inches.

6.2 Fatigue Crack Growth Analysis

There is also potential that the subject crack will undergo additional subcritical crack growth as a result of fatigue (i.e., repetitive load cycles). The cycle dependent model of fatigue crack growth is expressed by the following differential equation taken from reference 4.11:

$$
\frac{da}{dN} = C \cdot E \cdot S \cdot (\Delta K_1)^n
$$

where:  $d\mathbf{a}_{dN} = \text{cyclic growth rate (in/cycle)}$  $\Delta K_i = K_{\text{MAX}} - K_{\text{MIN}}$  = crack stress intensity factor due to one load cycle (ksi $\cdot\sqrt{in}$ )

![](_page_31_Picture_18.jpeg)

 $R<sub>3</sub>$ 

CD-02074-990016 Page **I I** of\_\_\_\_ */*  This Page Replaced By R1

 $\mathbb{Z}^{\times}$ 

$$
\frac{3 \text{repared By: } \mathcal{L}/2 \text{ Date}: } \frac{2099}{27} \text{ Checked By: } \mathcal{L}/2 \text{ Date}: } \frac{209}{27}
$$

C = 1.589 × 10<sup>-9</sup> for K<sub>1</sub> in ksi
$$
\sqrt{in}
$$
  
n = 3.3  
E = 10 = factor for BWR environments  
S =  $(1 - 0.5 \cdot R^2)^{-4}$  = 1.0  $\Rightarrow$  for R = 0  
R =  $\frac{K_{MIN}}{K_{MAX}}$  = 0 if K<sub>MIN</sub> = 0

 $rac{da}{dN} = 1.589 \times 10^{-8} \cdot (\Delta K_1)^{3.3}$ 

Cyclic stresses considered in this analysis are those resulting from typical plant startup to full power and return to cold shutdown.

To project subcritical crack growth at DRHR-2-09 due to fatigue, the Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics Module of the reference 4.5 software (pc-CRACK<sup>\*\*</sup>) is again used to solve the growth rate equation with:

- craths are<br>• a conservative assumption that the existing aconstant (i.e., constant) depth extending completely around  $(i.e., 360^{\circ})$  the pipe circumference,
- the cyclic stresses at node 281 is due to design pressure and thermal expansion (i.e., piping analysis equation **10)** assumed to be constant through the wall thickness:

 $\sigma_{\text{pressure}} = 5.555$  ksi

 $\sigma_{\text{THERMAL}} = 7.736$  ksi

 $\sigma_{\text{cyclic}} = 5.555 \text{ ksi} + 7.736 \text{ ksi} = +13.291 \text{ ksi}$ ,

depth<br>The most recent nondestructive<br>an initial crack<sup>4</sup>size based on most recent nondestructive evaluation (examination summary sheets given in Attachment **C):** 

 $a_i = 0.301$  in = initial flaw depth from Section 6.1 above, 1 - 3.75 in + Al<sub>usa</sub> = initial flaw length (not used infatique crack growth projection)

the number of startup-shutdown cycles is conservatively taken as twice the number of hydrotests plus startup cycles defined for 4 years (i.e., 2 fuel cycles) out of the 40 year life of the plant per reference 4.12:

![](_page_32_Picture_194.jpeg)

 $R<sub>3</sub>$ 

R3

 $R3$ 

 $CD - Q2074 - 990016$ This Page Replaced By R1

Pace 12 of *1* 

$$
2 \cdot (\frac{130 \text{ cycles}}{40 \text{ years}} + \frac{120 \text{ cycles}}{40 \text{ years}}) \cdot 4 \text{ years} = 50 \text{ cycles}
$$

pc-CRACK<sup>IM</sup> output for this case is reflected by Table 8.2 which indicates about .009 inches growth due to fatigue over  $\frac{1}{2}$  fuel cycles to reach a final size of 0.310 inches.

Reversing the order of the IGSCC and fatigue analysis, a second IGSCC crack growth analysis is executed using an initial crack size of:

a, = 0.270 in + 0.009 in **= 0.279** in

pc-CRACK<sup>™</sup> output is shown by Table 8.3 which indicates a final crack size (a,) of 0.315 in which is slightly greater than the 0.309 in depth indicated from Table 8.2. As such, a depth of 0.315 in will be utilized as the end-of-period flaw depth.

Consistent with reference 4.2, at each flaw location the end-of period flaw length will be calculated by assuming the flaw length increases by 2 times the percentage increase in flaw depth.

![](_page_33_Figure_8.jpeg)

Since the two cracks will remain less than 20% of the circumference in total length after crack growth, they may be treated as one crack with length equal to the sum of the lengths.

 $1_f = 8.04 \cdot \text{in}$ <br> $1_f = 8.04 \cdot \text{in}$ 

## 6.3 Allowable Flaw Size

Allowable size for a circumferential flaw in austenitic stainless steel pipe can be computed using the procedure of ASME Section XI, Code Case N-436 which considers either plastic collapse or ductile tearing failure modes as appropriate. The reference 4.5 pc-CRACK'" software provides capability to execute this procedure through its Codes and Standards Module. Input for this procedure includes membrane bending and expansion stresses, material design stress intensity and weld fabrication technique (i.e., either gas tungsten arc weld (GTAW), shielded metal arc weld (SMAW) or submerged arc weld (SAW)). The worst case is SAW (i.e., ductile tearing failure mode) which will be conservatively assumed in this analysis. The procedure requires consideration of the worst of either normal/upset or emergency/faulted plant conditions. Input stresses are as follows:

![](_page_33_Picture_14.jpeg)

 $R<sub>3</sub>$ 

 $CD - C2074 - 390016$ Page 13 of <u>compared</u> By R1

![](_page_34_Figure_1.jpeg)

 $R<sub>3</sub>$ 

R3

Primary Membrane (Pressure) - **All** Conditions

$$
Pm = 5.555 \text{ksi} \cdot \frac{1558 \text{psi}}{1373 \text{psi}} = 6.303 \text{ksi}
$$
  
336

Primary Bending (Deadweight **+** OBE) - Upset Condition

 $Pb<sub>unset</sub> = 0.860$  ksi + 4.611 ksi = 5.471 ksi = primary bending

Primary Bending (Deadweight **+** SSE) - Emergency Condition

**Pbem=g=0.860** ksi **+ 9.223** ksi **= 10.083** ksi

Secondary Bending (Thermal Expansion) - All Conditions

**Pe=7.736ksi** 

pc-CRACK•' output for upset and emergency conditions is shown by Table 8.4. AS can be seen, for projected end-of-period flaw determined in Section 6.2 above and the applied loads for either upset or emergency conditions, the allowable flaw depth-to-wall thickness ratio (i.e.,  $a/t$ ) is controlled by the upset condition. *o.***4519** at a value of 0.5372 which is significantly greater than the

actual  $a_f/t$  of  $\theta$ . 2584).  $O.242C$ 

7.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Based on the numerical results determined in Section 6 above, the R, existing flawsin weld DRHR-2-09 satisfies the structural acceptance criteria of reference 4.8. As such, DRHR-2-09 is acceptable for continued service for a period of up to 2 fuel cycles (4 years plant operation) from the refueling cycle  $9$  <sup>11</sup>  $|R2|$ inservice inspection and additional 2 fuel cycle periods (24 | R3 months per cycle) as long as crack growth relative to the cycle  $9\,\%$ inspection is not detected in subsequent periodic inspections.

8.0 TABULAR AND GRAPHICAL RESULTS

Tabular results from this analysis are shown starting on the following page.

![](_page_34_Picture_195.jpeg)

-D-Q2074-990016 Page 14 of This Page Replaced By R1

 $\mathcal{L}^{(k)}$ 

 $\cdot$ 

 $\mathcal{L}^{\text{max}}_{\text{max}}$ 

Prepared By: *160* Date: 2/19 Checked By: All Date

**I**

 $\frac{1}{2}$ 

TABLE 8.1- IGSCC CRACK GROWTH AT DRHR-2-09

 $pc$ -CRACK<sup>en</sup> (C) COPYRIGHT 1984, 1990 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ASSOCIATES, INC. SAN JOSE, CA (408)978-8200 VERSION 2.1

Date: 9-Feb-1999 Time: 17:10:10.18

STRESS CORROSION CRACK GROWTH ANALYSIS

IGSCC CRACK GROWTH **@** DRHR-2-09

INITIAL CRACK SIZE= 0.2700 WALL THICKNESS= 1.2190 MAX CRACK SIZE FOR SCCG= 0.9752

 $\ddot{\phantom{a}}$ 

![](_page_35_Picture_401.jpeg)

![](_page_35_Picture_402.jpeg)

![](_page_35_Picture_403.jpeg)

![](_page_35_Picture_404.jpeg)

crack model:CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACK IN CYLINDER (T/R=0.1)

![](_page_35_Picture_405.jpeg)

CD-Q2074-990016 Page 15 of This Page Replaced By RI

 $\mathcal{L}^{\text{max}}_{\text{max}}$  and  $\mathcal{L}^{\text{max}}_{\text{max}}$ 

 $\hat{\mathbf{v}}$ 

Dreoare,- **3 :-:-** r-e *20* **'0-ý**  Checked By: 22 Date:

 $\ddot{\phantom{a}}$ 

 $\mathcal{G}^{\mathbb{C}}$ 

 $\mathcal{L}$ 

 $\mathcal{E}$ 

0.225 0.225 0.225

 $\sim 10^{11}$  km

0.226

## Table **8.1** (continued)

![](_page_36_Picture_830.jpeg)

 $CD - Q2074 - 990016$ Page **i6** of

 $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A})$  and  $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A})$ 

This Page Replaced By R1

Prepared By: 22 Date: Checked By:  $\cancel{\mathscr{L}}$  Date: 2

 $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{L})$  and  $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{L})$  and  $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{L})$ 

 $\label{eq:2.1} \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{$ 

 $\sim$ 

Table 8.1 (continued)

![](_page_37_Picture_874.jpeg)

CD-Q2074-990016 Page 17 of This Page Replaced By R1 Prepared By: Checked By: 21 Date: 2/16/9

OO

TABLE 8.2 - FATIGUE CRACK GROWTH AT DRHR-2-09

 $pc$ -CRAC $K^{\xi,\pi}$  $\mathbf{r}$ (C) COPYRIGHT 1984, 1990 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ASSOCIATES, INC. SAN JOSE, CA (408)978-8200 VERSION 2.1

Date: 9-Feb-1999 Time: 17:21: 8.46

#### FATIGUE CRACK GROWTH ANALYSIS

FATIGUE CRACK GROWTH @ DRHR-2-09

INITIAL CRACK SIZE= 0.3010 WALL THICKNESS= 1.2190 MAX CRACK SIZE FOR FCG= 0.9752

PARIS CRACK GROWTH LAW:  $da/dN = C$  \* (dK)^n where dK Kmax - Kmin dK dKthres Kmax < Klo

#### CURRENT

![](_page_38_Picture_318.jpeg)

#### STRESS COEFFICIENTS

![](_page_38_Picture_319.jpeg)

![](_page_38_Picture_320.jpeg)

![](_page_38_Picture_321.jpeg)

![](_page_38_Picture_322.jpeg)

crack model:CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACK IN CYLINDER (T/R=0.1)

![](_page_38_Picture_323.jpeg)

Page 18 of<br>This Page Replaced By R1

 $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{F})$  and  $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{F})$ 

CD-Q2074-990016 Prepared By: 2020 This Page Replaced By R1 Checked By: Date:

 $\pmb{\sharp}$ 

 $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{C}}$ 

 $\mathcal{A}$ 

## Table 8.2 (continued)

![](_page_39_Picture_186.jpeg)

CD-Q2074-990016 Page 19 of<br>This Page Replaced By R1

 $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{H})$  and  $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{H})$ 

 $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{F}}$ 

![](_page_40_Picture_2.jpeg)

 $\sim$ 

# Table 8.2 (continued)

![](_page_40_Picture_730.jpeg)

CD-Q2074-9900 **I**  Page 20 of This Page Replaced By R1

 $\mathcal{L}^{(1)}$ 

 $\sim 10^{11}$ 

Prepared By:  $\mathbb{Z}$ Checked By: $\mathscr{L}\!\!\mathscr{U}$  Date

×

 $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{L}}$ 

Table 8.3 - IGSCC CRACK GROWTH @ DRHR-2-09, CASE 2

pc-CRACK'  $\mathcal{A}$ (C) COPYRIGHT 1984, 1990 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ASSOCIATES, INC. SAN JOSE, CA (408)978-8200 VERSION 2.1

Date: 9-Feb-1999 Time: 17:28:30.72

STRESS CORROSION CRACK GROWTH ANALYSIS

IGSCC CRACK GROWTH **@** DRHR-2-09, CASE 2

INITIAL CRACK SIZE= 0.2790 WALL THICKNESS= 1.2190 MAX CRACK SIZE FOR SCCG= 0.9752

![](_page_41_Picture_388.jpeg)

![](_page_41_Picture_389.jpeg)

![](_page_41_Picture_390.jpeg)

![](_page_41_Picture_391.jpeg)

crack model:CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACK IN CYLINDER (T/R=0.1)

![](_page_41_Picture_392.jpeg)

CD-Q2074-990016 Page 21 of This Page Replaced By R1

> 15.2 **75**  16.109

**-11.655**  -12.001

 $0.2536$ 0.2731

 $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{F})$  and  $\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{F})$ 

 $\overline{a}$ 

 $\mathcal{A}$ 

Prepared By: *LA* Date: R1 Checked By: 21 Date: 216/99

 $\mathcal{E}$ 

 $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$ 

# Table 8.3 (continued)

14.574 15.370

![](_page_42_Picture_819.jpeg)

CD-Q2074-9900106 Page<u>\_22</u>\_of This Page Replaced By R1

---------

 $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{F})$  and  $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{F})$ 

Prepared By: 112 Date:

Checked By: **41** Date:

**\***

 $\frac{1}{2}$  .

# Table 8.3 (continued)

![](_page_43_Picture_726.jpeg)

 $\hat{\mathbf{r}}$ 

Table 8.4

Page 23 and 2012 and 201

 $\mathcal{I}$ 

 $\sim$   $\sim$ 

**CD-Q2074-990016 R3** Prepared by **CLACK** Date: '1/10/ This page replaced by revision 3 Checked by: <u>20</u> Date:  $\frac{4}{10}$ 

م

 $\mathcal{L}$ 

pc-CRACK (C) COPYRIGHT 1984, 1990 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY ASSOCIATES, INC. SAN JOSE, CA (408)978-8200 VERSION 2.1

Date: 10-Apr-2001 Time: 17:55: 2.63

# ALLOWABLE FLAW SIZE EVALUATIONS USING ASME SECTION **XI,** IWB-3640/50 PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACKS IN STAINLESS STEEL PIPING

MATERIAL IS SPECIFIED AS SUBMERGED ARC WELD DEFAULT PROPERTIES: DESIGN STRESS = 16.95 FLOW STRESS = 50.85

ALLOWABLE FLAW SIZE AT WELD DRHR-2-09: NORMAL/UPSET CONDITION

USER SUPPLIED MATERIAL PROPERTIES: DESIGN STRESS = 16.80 FLOW STRESS **=** 50.40

PIPE GEOMETRY: OUTER DIAMETER  $= 24.0000$ WALL THICKNESS = 1.2000 CRACK GEOMETRY: CRACK DEPTH = 0.3150 CRACK LENGTH = 8.0400

THE FLAWED PIPE IS ASSUMED TO FAIL DUE TO UNSTABLE DUCTILE TEARING (EPFM)

THE ALLOWABLE FLAW SIZE IS DETERMINED USING CODE TABLES AND DEFAULT SAFETY FACTORS FOR NORMAL OPERATING (INCL. UPSET & TEST) CONDITIONS

![](_page_44_Picture_189.jpeg)

I/circumference 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 ALLOWABLE a/t 0.6000 0.4663 0.2485 0.1792 0.1295 0.1197 Fable 3.4 (contra)

CD-Q2074-990016 R3 Page 24 This page replaced by revision 3

 $\sim$ 

Prepared by:  $\frac{e\sqrt{f}}{g}$  Date:  $\frac{4}{10}$ o/01 Checked by: 142 Date.

 $\mathcal{L}$ 

 $\frac{1}{2}$ 

ALLOWABLE FLAW SIZE AT WELD DRHR-2-09: EMERG/FAULTED CONDITION

USER SUPPLIED MATERIAL PROPERTIES:

![](_page_45_Picture_143.jpeg)

![](_page_45_Picture_144.jpeg)

THE FLAWED PIPE IS ASSUMED TO FAIL DUE TO UNSTABLE DUCTILE TEARING (EPFM)

THE ALLOWABLE FLAW SIZE IS DETERMINED USING CODE TABLES AND DEFAULT SAFETY FACTORS FOR EMERGENCY AND FAULTED CONDITIONS

![](_page_45_Picture_145.jpeg)

I/circumference 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 ALLOWABLE a/t 0.6000 0.6000 0.6000 0.5293 0.4272 0.3298 CD-Q2074-990016

Page 25 of

207

1999-02-01 10:06:22 PAGE

This Page Added By RI

CLASS 2 POST PROCESSOR PID = 19028<br>N1-268-1R BROWNS FERRY 2 REACTOR WATER RECIR SYS BROWNS FERRY \*\* \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* \*\*\*\* \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*  $\star$  . The set of the s ASME CODE CLASS 2  $\bullet$ STRESS EVALUATION \* \* \*\*\* \*\*\* \* \*\*\*\*\* \* \*\* \* \*\*\* STRESS STRESS **ALLOWABLE** SUSTAINED OCCASIONAL EXPANSION<br>STRESS STRESS STRESS EXPANSION I CODE MEMBER NODE SIF EQN<br>NAME NAME ID. NO. LOGIC PRESSURE RATIO DIFFERENCE **STRESS** STRESS STRESS<br>(PSI) (PSI) OR **STRESS** PATH STRESS NAME NAME (PSI) (P5.1) **U (PSI) (PSI)** (PSI) (PSI) (PSI) 0.451 7917. 14426. 5555. 954. 0. 0. I 6509. 1360 269 WTEE 8 12311. I 0.455 14733. 27044.  $\mathbf{0}$ . 0. 12311. **10 SAM**   $\mathbf{0}$ . 0.454 41470. 22650. 0. 12311. I 18820. 11 **SAM**  5555. 954. 0.704 5116. 17311. 5555. 954. 5686. **0.**  I 12195. 9U 44355. 12311. I 24506. **0.552**  19849. 5686. 9U+10 5555. 954. 25967. **0.689**  8086. 954. 11372. **0.**  I 17881. 9E 5555. 13310. **0.615**  8329. 21639. 6670. 954. 5686. **0.**  I **9El**  18996. 0.658 9856. 28852. 954. 11372. **0.**  I 9E2 6670. 34622. **0.**  U 18996. 0.549 15627. 954. 11372. 9F 6670. 21643. 1.160 -2987. 18656. 6670. 802. 9566. 4605. AV 12311. I 24506. 0.739 8670. 33176. 5686. PR9U+10 5555. 954. ------<br>12311. I 9324. 21635. 0.569 **0. 0.**  0. 12311. PRI0 SAM 14426. 0. 0. I 6415. 0.445 8011. 1360 281  $\frac{8}{10}$ 5555. 860. 7736. I 0.286 19308. 27044. 0. 7736. **10** SAM  $\mathbf{0}$ .  $\mathbf{0}$ . 7736. I 41470. 14151. 0.341 27319. **11 SAM**  5555. 860. 0. 0. I 17311. 0.637 6285. 5555. 860. 4611. 11027. 9U 7736. I 44355. 18763. 0.423 25593. 5555. 860. 4611. 9U+10 0. I 25967. 15638. 0.602 10329. 9223. 9E 5555. 860. **21639.**  9498. 4611. 0. I 12141. 0.561 9E1 6670. 860. 0.581 12100. 28852. 860. 9223. 0. I 16752. 9E2 6670. 0. I 16752. 0.484 17870. 34622. **9F**  6670. 860. 9223. 4910. I -3006. 18656. 1.161 9223. 21662. AV 6670. 860. 7736. I 0.566 14413. 33176. 860. 4611. 18763. PR9U+10 5555. 7736. I 7736. 0.358 13899. 21635. PRIO SAM  $0.$  $\mathbf{0}$ .  $0.$ 0.445 8011. 14426. 5555. 860. 0. 0. I 6415. 1365 281 8 27044. 7736. I 7736. 0.286 19308.  $\mathbf{0}$ . 0. **10 SAM**   $\mathbf{0}$ . 41470. 7736. I 0.341 27319. 0. 14151. **11 SAM**  5555. 860. **0.**  I 11027. 0.637 6285. 17311. 5555. 860. 4611. 9U 7736. I 0.423 25593. 44355. 4611. 18763. **9U+10**  5555. 860. 25967. **0.**  I 15638. 0.602 10329. 860. 9223. 9E 5555. **0.**  I 12141. **0.561**  9498. 21639. 6670. 860. 4611. **9E1 0.**  I 28852. 16752. **0.581**  12100. 860. 9223. 9E2 6670. 17870. 34622. **0.**  16752. 0.484 9F 6670. **860.**  9223. 4910. U 18656. 9223. 21662. **1.161**  -3006. AV 6670. 860. 7736. I 14413. 33176. 5555. **860.**  4611. 18763. 0.566 PR9U+10 ......<br>7736. I 7736. **0.358** 13899. 21635.PRI0 **SAM**  $\mathbf{0}$ . **0. 0.**

Page 26 of<br>This Page Added By R1

م

CD-Q2074-990016 Prepared By: 2022 Date:2/1<br>-This Page Added By R1 Checked By: 2/4

# ATTACHMENT B

RESIDUAL STRESS PREDICTION AT DRHR-2-09

EPRI NP-3375 provides the results of a laboratory test program sponsored by the BWR Owner's Group to demonstrate the benefit of performing IHSI on welds susceptible to IGSCC. Areas investigated included:

- . Process Effectiveness found to be very good with compressive residual stress on the inside surface at the weld fusion line on the order of material yield strength. Effective retention of the compressive residual stress was found to be reduced when the pipe was exposed to high (i.e., approaching material yield) applied stress subsequent to the treatment; however, this applied stress level is well above typical service stresses.
- Application in Operating Plants found that even when IHSI is applied to pipes containing IGSCC indications, the resulting compressive residual stress field remains substantial.

In Section 5.0 of the NP-3375, residual stress data for IHSI applications to pipes with pre-existing defects is provided. Figures  $5-2$  through  $5-6$  in that document reflect axial residual stress measurements in and near a pipe joint that contains a defect but has ' been subjected to IHSI. These figures reflect several azimuth positions and distances from the weld fusion line with the crack located 0.060 inches from the weld fusion line. The stress distribution follows a more or less linear profile through the thickness. As can be seen, compressive residual stress is the greatest at the fusion line with a magnitude of -44 ksi, reducing to  $-36$  ksi at the crack, then to  $-28$  ksi at 0.120 inches and finally to -16 ksi at 0.600 inches. To provide a conservative approximation for weld DRHR-2-09, a residual stress distribution similar to the one observed at 0.600 inches from the weld fusion line (Figure 5.5) can be applied. For analysis, the inside surface stresses will be taken as  $-$ 14 ksi with a linear variation to +14 ksi on the outside surface. The residual stress distribution over the 1.219 inch wall thickness at DRHR-2-09 can be expressed by the formula:

where:  $X =$  through-thickness dimension (in)  $C_0$  = inside surface stress (-14 ksi)  $C_1 = \frac{14-(-14)}{1.219} = 22.97 \cdot \frac{\text{ksi}}{\text{in}}$ 

 $\sigma_{\text{RESIDUAL}} = C_0 + C_1 \cdot X$ 

A graphical representation of this simplified but conservative residual stress distribution is shown overlaid on the residual stress field reflected by Figure 5-5 from NP-3375 on the following page.

 $\mathcal{B}$  $R$   $R$   $R$   $R$   $R$   $R$   $R$   $R$ Prepared By: <u>*/// Date: 2/10/99*</u> CD-Q2cv74-990016 Page 27 of Checked By:  $\frac{1}{2}$  Pate:  $\frac{1}{2}$ /6/99 This Page Added By R1

Figure 5-5 from NP-3375 with Conservative Linear Residual Stress Distribution Used For Analysis of DRHR-2-09

![](_page_48_Figure_2.jpeg)

**Figure 5-5.** Through Wall Axial Residual Stress Distribution for Specimen RS-06 Joint **E.** Pre-Cracked Plus **IHSI-312.5\*** Azimuth, 15.2 mm **(0.600** Inches) From Weld Fusion Line

CD-Q2074-990016 Page 28 of This Page Added By R1

INFORMATION ONLY

 $\mathcal{L}$ 

 $\mathcal{L}^{\mathcal{L}}$ 

# ATTACHMENT C

DRHR-2-09 INSERVICE INSPECTION DATA SHEETS

3 Information Only Pages Follow:

**1.** U2C7 Examination Summary and Resolution Sheet

2. U2C7 Data Analysis Report

 $\mathcal{L}$  $\ddot{\phantom{a}}$ 

3. U2C9 Examination Summary and Resolution Sheet

![](_page_50_Picture_216.jpeg)

 $\bigg)$  $\overline{\phantom{a}}$ 

 $\ddot{\mathbf{r}}$ 

 $\left( \cos \theta \right)$  $PAGE$ <sup>5c</sup>

OAJiL **-'-'**

**<sup>62</sup>***-* **(2** *o74- 7o/b*  المعادل أيناس والمتواطن  $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{A}}$ 

UT Data Analysis Report No. TV4-13

 $R$  c 3:5 Page 1

**I**

Examination Report Number: Calibration Report Number: Plant: BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLT Unit Number: 2 Weld Number: DRHR-2-9 Une: RHR Subassembly: PIPE TO TEE Notes: IGSCC SIZING

Evaluation performed to 1986 ASME Code, Code Class: B-F, B-J, or B-K-1 pipe support

All flaw data entered by system operator. Total indications evaluated in this report: 1

Indication Number: 1 Wall thickness: 1.220 Indication thruwall: 0.270 Indication depth: 0.950 L-1 **=** 23.250 L-2 **=** 27.000 Evaluated as a planar indication. Evaluated as a surface indication Flaw 'a' dimension *=* 0.270 Flaw 'I' dimension *=* 3.750 Flaw aspect ratio **=** 0.072 'Y' value is inapplicable Actual a/t(%) **=** 22.131 Acceptance Table used: IWB-3514-2 Allowed  $a/t$ <sup>(%)</sup> = 10.712 **This indication is unacceptable.** 

 $\cdot$ 

![](_page_51_Picture_213.jpeg)

FlawCaic86 3.0(a), ©HibiSCo, 1991-1994

÷

*CD-02074-990016*<br> *PAGE 31 OF*<br>
THIS PAGE ADDED BY R1 FRECAMENT iij -. 012 EXAMINATION **REPORT NO. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY** SUMMARY AND **R**  $R$  /  $\frac{1}{2}$ PROJECT.  $BENP$  UNIT:  $U2C9$  EXAMINER:  $SAMHEC$   $T$ .  $SMAP$  LV:  $T$ SYSTEM: <u>O74 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL</u> EXAMINER: DAVE ARMSTEONGLY: TT **WELD I.D.:**  $\frac{D}{\mathcal{L}} \frac{R N R}{2} - 2 - 0.9$  **EXAMINER:**  $\frac{N}{4}$   $\frac{N}{4}$ CONFIG: <del>PIPE</del> TO. TEE 18XAMINER TO. TEE 18XAMINER TO. FLOW  $\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$  CAL SHT NO'S:  $\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$ PROCEDURE:  $N = \frac{2i764}{100}$  REV.:  $\frac{1}{100}$  TC:  $\frac{1}{100}$ **NOE** mETrHOD: **U LT 0** PT **0 MT 0** VT THIS REPORT CONTAINS THE DATA ASSOCIATED WITH THE MANUAL ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION OF WELD DRUR. 2-09 TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF NURES 0313. A 45 DEGREE SHEAR WAVE AND GO DEGREE × LONGITUDINAL WAVE EXAMINATION WAS PERFORMED. A WSY 70 AND 70° SHEAR SUPPLEMENTAL EXAMINATION WAS ALSO PERFORMED. NO SCAN 4 WAS PERFORMED DUE TO PIPE  $\tau$ TEE CONFIGURATION A PREVIOUSLY RECORDED INDICATION WAS **VIERIFIED** t\P9,4%?t-A-rELMA *CkuIo* **C-ýFAF UJAS**  ACHIEUED. **AMI**  $EVALUATION = \frac{10}{9}$ CONCURRENCE: <u>MMMULLULU</u> DATE OF  $\varphi$ 

TVA IPROJECT: SYSTEM:\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ REPORT **NO.:**  Office of Nuclear Power Unit:- -WELD) **NO.:** ¶~(\2\*0 **U1 DICI0,16** *FA* **1-o, vbut** imli **vIK/ o, 0MI1 ýV**  B~ Y: **AEO** -bk.ILVE:DT VA (ON-601 **1966** 

 $\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \end{array} \end{array} \end{array}$ 

 $\frac{1}{2}$ 

 $\sim 10^5$ 

## ENCLOSURE 3

\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_\_

 $\mathcal{A}^{\text{max}}_{\text{max}}$  and  $\mathcal{A}^{\text{max}}_{\text{max}}$ 

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNIT 2 INSERVICE INSPECTION WELD ISOMETRIC DRAWING FOR WELD DRHR-2-09 2-ISI-0221-C, SHEET 1

(SEE ATTACHED)

![](_page_55_Figure_0.jpeg)