

April 18, 2001

MEMORANDUM TO: James W. Clifford, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

FROM: Daniel S. Collins, Project Manager **/RAI/**
Project Directorate I, Section 2
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 2, FACSIMILE
TRANSMISSION, DRAFT REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
(RAI) TO BE DISCUSSED IN AN UPCOMING CONFERENCE CALL
(TAC NO. MB0866)

The attached draft RAI was transmitted by facsimile on April 17, 2001, to Mr. Ravi Joshi of Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC). This draft RAI was transmitted to facilitate an upcoming conference call in order to clarify the licensee's application dated December 21, 2000, regarding revisions of the Millstone Unit 2 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis. Review of the RAI would allow DNC to determine and agree upon a schedule to respond to the RAI. This memorandum and the attachment do not convey a formal request for information or represent an NRC staff position.

Docket No. 50-336

Enclosure: Draft Request for Additional Information

April 18, 2001

MEMORANDUM TO: James W. Clifford, Chief, Section 2
Project Directorate I
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

FROM: Daniel S. Collins, Project Manager **/RAI**
Project Directorate I, Section 2
Division of Licensing Project Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 2, FACSIMILE
TRANSMISSION, DRAFT REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
(RAI) TO BE DISCUSSED IN AN UPCOMING CONFERENCE CALL
(TAC NO. MB0866)

The attached draft RAI was transmitted by facsimile on April 17, 2001, to Mr. Ravi Joshi of Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC). This draft RAI was transmitted to facilitate an upcoming conference call in order to clarify the licensee's application dated December 21, 2000, regarding revisions of the Millstone Unit 2 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis. Review of the RAI would allow DNC to determine and agree upon a schedule to respond to the RAI. This memorandum and the attachment do not convey a formal request for information or represent an NRC staff position.

Docket No. 50-336

Enclosure: Draft Request for Additional Information

DISTRIBUTION:

PDI-2 Rdg
FAkstulewicz

CLiang, SRXB
DCollins

PUBLIC

MBlumberg, SPSB

Accession No.: ML011080584

OFFICE	PDI-2/PM
NAME	DCollins
DATE	4/17/01

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

DRAFT

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
CONCERNING LICENSE AMENDMENT REGARDING
RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 2

- 1) The proposed changes to FSAR Section 14.0.11 indicates that a concurrent loss of offsite power (LOOP) is assumed in the analysis of a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) at Millstone Unit 2. A concurrent LOOP is a LOOP occurred at the time of event initiation. However, Section 14.6.3.5 indicates that a LOOP is assumed following the reactor trip and turbine trip which will occur more than ten minutes after the event initiation in accordance with the current FSAR Table 14.6.3-4. Please provide the following:
 - a. Provide discussions for this discrepancy in light of radiological consequences.
 - b. Describe the LOOP scenario assumed in the confirmatory analysis submitted on November 8, 1985.
- 2) The updated sequence of event for a SGTR indicates that a reactor trip occurs at the same time as a SGTR initiation. (The current FSAR Table 14.6.3-4 indicates that a reactor trip occurs more than ten minutes after the SGTR initiation. Please justify this discrepancy in light of the thermal hydraulic transient following a SGTR that generates a reactor trip signal and the assumed reactor trip delay.
- 3) It is stated in your submittal that there are changes in the assumptions and methods used in the updated thermal hydraulic analysis of the SGTR accident. Please confirm that the computer codes used in the updated analysis are consistent with that for the current analysis and they have been previously approved by the staff, also, all changes of assumptions not addressed in your submittal will not lead to non-conservative results.
- 4) It is stated in your submittal that the ADVs are assumed to be not available for 30 minutes from the time of reactor trip due to loss of instrument air. Are there any safety grade nitrogen bottles installed to support the operation of ADVs ? Please discuss the effects of an early opening of ADVs per the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) at Millstone Unit 2.
- 5) Please confirm that the event scenario of the updated SGTR analysis are consistent with the operator actions per EOPs at Millstone Unit 2.
- 6) Please expand the sequence of event for the SGTR accident to include all major information contained in the current FSAR Table 14.6.3-4.

DRAFT

Enclosure