May 16, 1989

Docket No. 50-220

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GThomas	ACRS (10)	

Mr. Lawrence Burkhardt III
Executive Vice President, Nuclear Operations
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
301 Plainfield Road
Syracuse, New York 13212

Dear Mr. Burkhardt:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT (TAC NO. 71927)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 105 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-63 for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit No. 1 (NMP-1). The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated January 13, 1989.

This amendment revises Sections 3.1.4 and 4.1.4 Core Spray System; Section 3.3.7, Containment Spray, and the associated Bases for Sections 3.1.4, 4.1.4, and 3.3.7. In addition, the proposed amendment provides new limiting conditions for operation for the Core Spray system in the cold shutdown and refueling conditions and with the suppression pool inoperable.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular bi-weekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by

Marylee M. Slosson, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects, I/II

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 105 to DPR-63
2. Safety Evaluation

cc: w/enclosures
See next page

DF01

[AMEND 220 - TAC 71927]

*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFC	:PDI-1	:PDI-1	:PDI-1	:OGC	:PDI-1	:	:
NAME	:CVogan	:VMcCree:vm	:MSlosson	:SHLewis	:RCapra	:	:
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Docket No. 50-220

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Syracuse, New York 13212

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This amendment revises Sections 3.1.4 and 4.1.4 Core Spray System; Section 3.3.7, Containment Spray, and the associated Bases for Sections 3.1.4, 4.1.4, and 3.3.7. In addition, the proposed amendment provides new limiting conditions for operation for the Core Spray system in the cold shutdown refueling conditions and with the suppression pool inoperable.

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Sincerely,

Marylee M. Slosson, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects, I/II

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See next page

[AMEND 220 - TAC 71927]

OFC	:PDI-1	:PDI-1	:PDI-1	:OGC	:PDI-1	:	:
NAME	:CVogan	:VMcCree	:MSlosson	:SHLewis	:RCapra	:	:
DATE	:5/12/89	:5/14/89	:5/14/89	:5/12/89	:5/ /89	:	:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-220

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 105
License No. DPR-63

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) dated January 13, 1989, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-63 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 105, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Robert A. Capra

Robert A. Capra, Director
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects, I/II

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 16, 1989

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 105 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-63

DOCKET NO. 50-220

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
51	51
52	52
53	53
53a	--
54	54
55	55
56	56
160	--
161	--
163	163
164	--

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.4 CORE SPRAY SYSTEM

Applicability:

Applies to the operating status of the core spray systems.

Objective:

To assure the capability of the core spray systems to cool reactor fuel in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.

Specification:

a. Whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor coolant temperature is greater than 212°F, each of the two core spray systems shall be operable except as specified in Specifications b and c below.

b. If a redundant component of a core spray system becomes inoperable, that system shall be considered operable provided that the component is returned to an operable condition within 7 days and the additional surveillance required is performed.

c. If a redundant component in each of the core spray systems becomes inoperable, both systems shall be considered operable provided that the component is returned to an operable condition within 7 days and the additional surveillance required is performed.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

4.1.4 CORE SPRAY SYSTEM

Applicability:

Applies to the periodic testing requirements for the core spray systems.

Objective:

To verify the operability of the core spray systems.

Specification:

The core spray system surveillance shall be performed as indicated below.

a. At each major refueling outage automatic actuation of each subsystem in each core spray system shall be demonstrated.

b. At least once per quarter pump operability shall be checked.

c. At least once per quarter the operability of power-operated valves required for proper system operation shall be checked.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

d. If Specifications a, b and c are not met, a normal orderly shutdown shall be initiated within one hour and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within ten hours.

e. During reactor operation, except during core spray system surveillance testing, core spray isolation valves 40-02 and 40-12 shall be in the open position and the associated valve motor starter circuit breakers for these valves shall be locked in the off position. In addition, redundant valve position indication shall be available in the control room.

f. Whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and the reactor coolant temperature is less than or equal to 212°F, two core spray subsystems shall be operable except as specified in g and h below.

g. If one of the above required subsystems becomes inoperable, restore at least two subsystems to an operable status within 4 hours or suspend all operations that have a potential for draining the reactor vessel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

d. Core spray header ΔP instrumentation

check	Once/day
calibrate	Once/3 months
test	Once/3 months

e. Surveillance with Inoperable Components

When a component becomes inoperable its redundant component or system shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.

f. With a core spray subsystem suction from the CST, CST level shall be checked once per day.

g. At least once per month when the reactor coolant temperature is greater than 212°F, verify that the piping system between valves 40-03, 13 and 40-01, 09, 10, 11 is filled with water.

h. If both of the above required subsystems become inoperable, suspend core alterations and all operations that have a potential for draining the reactor vessel. Restore at least one subsystem to operable status within 4 hours or establish secondary containment integrity within the next 12 hours.

i. With the downcomers in the suppression chamber having less than 3 ft. submergence, two core spray subsystems and the associated raw water pumps shall be operable with the core spray suction from the condensate storage tanks (CST), and the CST inventory shall not be less than 300,000 gallons.

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The core spray system consists of two automatically actuated, independent systems capable of cooling reactor fuel for a range of loss-of-coolant accidents. Each of the two independent systems consists of 2 subsystems having one pump set of a core spray pump and core spray topping pump. Both systems (at least one subsystem in each system) are required to operate to limit peak clad temperatures below 2200°F (10 CFR 50 Appendix K model) for the worst case line break (recirculation line break at the point where the emergency condenser return line connects to the recirculation loop). When a component/subsystem is in a LCO state, additional surveillance requirements are imposed for the redundant component/subsystem. Consequently, application of the single failure criteria to the redundant component/subsystem is not a design requirement during the LCO period.

Allowable outage time is specified to account for redundant components that become inoperable.

Both core spray systems contain redundant supply pump sets and blocking valves. Operation of one pump set and blocking valve is sufficient to establish required delivery rate and flow path. Therefore, even with the loss of one of the redundant components, the system is still capable of performing its intended function. If a redundant component is found to have failed, corrective maintenance will begin promptly. Nearly all maintenance can be completed within a few days. Infrequently, however, major maintenance might be required. Replacement of principal system components could necessitate outages in excess of those specified. In spite of the best efforts of the operator to return equipment to service, some maintenance could require up to 6 months.

In determining the operability of a core spray system the required performance capability of its various components shall be considered. For example:

1. Periodic tests will demonstrate that adequate core cooling is provided to satisfy the core spray flow requirements used in the 10CFR 50 Appendix K analysis.

2. The pump shall be capable of automatic initiation from a low-low water level signal in the reactor vessel or a high containment pressure signal. The blocking valves shall be capable of automatically opening from either a low-low water signal or high containment pressure signal simultaneous with low reactor pressure permissive signal. (Section VII)*

*FSAR 105

Instrumentation has been installed to monitor the integrity of the core spray piping within the reactor pressure vessel.

The testing specified for each major refueling outage will demonstrate component response upon automatic system initiation. For example, pump set starting (low-low level or high drywell pressure) and valve opening (low-low level or high drywell pressure and low reactor pressure) must function, under simulated conditions, in the same manner as the systems are required to operate under actual conditions. The only differences will be that demineralized water rather than suppression chamber water will be pumped to the reactor vessel and the reactor will be at atmospheric pressure. The core spray systems are designed such that demineralized water is available to the suction of one set of pumps in each system. (Section VII-Figure VII-1)*

The system test interval between operating cycles results in a system failure probability of 1.1×10^{-6} (Fifth Supplement, page 115) and is consistent with practical considerations. The more frequent component testing results in a more reliable system.

At quarterly intervals, startup of core spray pumps will demonstrate pump starting and operability. No flow will take place to the reactor vessel due to the lack of a low-pressure permissive signal required for opening of the blocking valves. A flow restricting device has been provided in the test loop which will create a low pressure loss for testing of the system. In addition, the normally closed power operated blocking valves will be manually opened and re-closed to demonstrate operability.

The intent of Specification 3.1.4i is to allow core spray operability at the time that the suppression chamber is dewatered which will allow normal refueling activities to be performed. With a core spray pump taking suction from the CST, sufficient time is available to manually initiate one of the two raw water pumps that provide an alternate core spray supply using lake water. Both raw water pumps shall be operable in the event the suppression chamber was dewatered.

*FSAR

Based on the limited time involved in performance of the concurrent refueling maintenance tasks, procedural controls to minimize the potential and duration of leakage and available coolant makeup (CST) provides adequate protection against drainage of the vessel while the suppression chamber is drained.

Specification 3.1.4e establishes provisions to eliminate a potential single failure mode of core spray isolation valves 40-02 and 40-12. These provisions are necessary to ensure that the core spray system safety function is single failure proof. During system testing, when the isolation valve(s) are required to be in the closed condition, automatic opening signals to the valve(s) are operable if the core spray system safety function is required.

In the cold shutdown and refuel conditions, the potential for a LOCA due to a line break is much less than during operation. In addition, the potential consequences of the LOCA on the fuel and containment is less due to the lower reactor coolant temperature and pressures. Therefore, one subsystem of a core spray system is sufficient to provide adequate cooling for the fuel during the cold shutdown or refueling conditions. Therefore, requiring two core spray subsystems to be operable in the cold shutdown and refuel conditions provides sufficient redundancy.

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suppression chamber pool. Taking into account the reduced steam condensation capability and increased suppression chamber vapor pressure, the raw water cooling would not be required for more than 20 minutes for initial suppression chamber temperatures up to 110F. This assumes that all core spray systems fail. Therefore, manual initiation of the raw water system is acceptable.

Nearly all maintenance can be completed within a few days. Infrequently, however, major maintenance might be required. Replacement of principal system components could necessitate outages of more than 15 days. In spite of the best efforts of the operator to return equipment to service, some maintenance could require up to 6 months.

In conjunction with containment spray pump operation during each operating cycle, the raw water pumps and associated cooling system performance will be observed. The containment spray system shall be capable of automatic initiation from simultaneous low-low reactor water level and high containment pressure. The associated raw water cooling system shall be capable of manual actuation. Operation of the containment spray system involves spraying water into the atmosphere of the containment. Therefore, periodic system tests are not practical. Instead separate testing of automatic containment spray pump startup will be performed during each operating cycle. During pump operation, water will be recycled to the suppression chamber. Also, air tests to verify that the drywell and torus spray nozzles and associated piping are free from obstructions will be performed each operating cycle. Design features are discussed in Volume I, Section VII-B.2.0 (page VII-19*). The valves in the containment spray system are normally open and are not required to operate when the system is called upon to operate.

The test interval between operating cycle results in a system failure probability of 1.1×10^{-6} (Fifth Supplement, page 115*) and is consistent with practical considerations. Pump operability will be demonstrated on a more frequent basis and will provide a more reliable system.

*FSAR

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 105 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-63

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-220

INTRODUCTION

The licensee, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC), by letter dated January 13, 1989, proposed Technical Specification (TS) changes which require two core spray systems (two spargers) to be operable when irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and reactor coolant temperature is greater than 212°F. The Technical Specification change is proposed to comply with the assumption of two sparger operability used in the 10 CFR 50.46, Appendix K, analyses. In addition, the proposed TS provides new limiting conditions of operation for the core spray system in the cold shutdown condition. The proposed TS change provides surveillance requirements for water hammer in hot shutdown and power operation conditions. The proposed TS changes include new surveillance requirements when core spray is lined up to take suction from the condensate storage tank. The proposed TS proposes a new LCO action statement requiring suspension of operations that might drain the vessel with the core spray system inoperable. The proposed Technical Specification changes contain revisions to Sections 3.1.4 and 4.1.4 Core Spray System; Section 3.3.7 Containment Spray; and associated Bases for Sections 3.1.4, 3.3.7, and 4.1.4.

EVALUATION

The NMP-1 core spray system consists of two automatically actuated, independent systems capable of cooling reactor fuel for a range of loss-of-coolant accidents. Each of the two independent systems consists of a sparger in the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) with 2 subsystems having one pump set of a core spray pump and core spray topping pump. Both spargers are assumed to be operable in the 10 CFR 50.46, Appendix K, analyses. The present Specification, LCO 3.1.4.d, allows plant operation with only one sparger. The proposed Technical Specifications will implement correctly the assumed conditions in the 10 CFR 50.46, Appendix K, analyses and hence the proposed changes are acceptable.

The core spray Technical Specifications are being revised to include less stringent Core Spray system operability requirements during Cold Shutdown and

Refueling conditions. Only one core spray system consisting of its two subsystems of pumps is required to be operable during cold shutdown. This is consistent with Standard Technical Specification requirements for emergency core cooling system operation, and also with the fact that the probability and consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident are less during cold shutdown and refuel conditions. During Cold Shutdown and Refueling conditions, only one of the subsystems, though its single sparger, is required to provide sufficient water to adequately cool the core. Therefore the proposed change is acceptable.

A requirement is being added that the core spray pumps be lined up to take suction from the condensate storage tank (CST) with a minimum volume of 300,000 gallons available, in the event the normal core spray water source (torus) is not available. This would provide an approximate 60-minute supply of water for one core spray pump, during which time a raw water pump taking suction from Lake Ontario would be lined up and started. This would assure a continuous supply of make-up water for vessel inventory and is acceptable.

Specification 3.1.4f identified some of the potential methods of draining the reactor vessel when performing maintenance. This specification is replaced by Specifications 3.1.4g and 3.1.4h which require that all maintenance be suspended if it has the potential to cause reactor vessel drainage when a required core spray subsystem is inoperable. This is more restrictive than current specifications and is acceptable.

Because there is not a potential for a water hammer during Cold Shutdown or Refuel conditions, the change to require Surveillance Requirement 4.1.4g to be performed only when the reactor coolant temperature is greater than 212°F is acceptable.

A specific listing of the proposed changes is as follows:

1. T/S 3.1.4a is revised to indicate that this paragraph applies when the reactor coolant temperature is greater than 212°F. Paragraph d allowing for one core spray system to be out of service for seven days is deleted. Therefore reference to "d" is deleted. The proposed changes are acceptable.

2. T/S 3.1.4b is revised to reduce the period from 15 days to 7 days, a redundant component can be inoperable. This change is conservative and is in agreement with the Standard Technical Specifications Guidelines and hence is acceptable.

3. T/S 4.1.4a is revised to require both subsystems (not one) in each system to be tested for automatic actuation. This is a correction requiring all pumps to be tested during refueling outage. This is acceptable.

4. T/S 3.1.4d is deleted. This allowed plant operation with one core spray sparger out of service which was not in conformance with the assumption in the Appendix K analyses. The proposed deletion is acceptable.

5. T/S 3.1.4e has been redesignated as 3.1.4d. Reference to 3.1.4d is deleted as 3.1.4d was deleted. The change is editorial and is acceptable. The second paragraph of e is deleted because activities impacting on vessel water level are not allowed when core spray system is inoperable.

6. T/S 3.1.4f is deleted because activities impacting on vessel water level are not allowed when core spray system is inoperable.

7. T/S 4.1.4f requires surveillance during control rod drive maintenance simultaneous with suppression chamber empty condition. This required hourly checks listed in 3.1.4f. These conditions are now deleted and will still be implemented with procedures. The changes are acceptable.

   The revised 4.1.4f requires monitoring of condensate storage tank (CST) level once per day when a core spray subsystem takes suction from the CST. This is acceptable.

8. T/S 3.1.4f is deleted. The hourly checks listed will be performed by procedures. The changes are acceptable.

9. T/S 3.1.4g is 3.1.4e in the proposed version. The change is editorial and is acceptable.

10. T/S 4.1.4g is revised to require surveillance for water hammer only when coolant temperature is greater than 212°F.

11. T/S 3.1.4h is removed since its requirements are also included as a safety limit on specification 2.1.1e. 2.1.1e specifies the requirements during maintenance when the RPV level is lowered significantly. This is acceptable.

12. T/S 3.1.4i is a new specification requiring a minimum alternate core spray water inventory if the suppression chamber is dewatered. This is to assure a continuous supply of make-up water for vessel inventory. This is acceptable.

13. T/S Bases for 3.1.4 and 4.1.4 (P54) has been changed to define a core spray system and subsystem. The system design for core spray flow in both spray loops during a LOCA is identified. Application of single failure criteria is clarified. Surveillance of the core spray flow to meet 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K, is identified. The changes are acceptable.

14. T/S Bases in 3.1.4 and 4.1.4 (P55) for the alternate core spray water source have been added. This paragraph also identifies that the back up raw water pumps be available as an infinite water source. The changes are acceptable.

15. T/S Bases for 3.1.4 and 4.1.4 (P56) first paragraph identifies that condensate in the condensate storage tanks is available when the suppression chamber is dewatered. Reference to control rod drive

maintenance is deleted. The last paragraph is changed due to deletion of 3.1.4h and to justify that flow in one core spray sparger is required during cold shutdown or refueling. The proposed changes are acceptable.

16. T/S pages 160, 161, 163, 164 requirements for the core spray system were inadvertently placed in the containment spray section when the 1974 full term operating license Technical Specifications were issued. The proposed deletions are administrative and therefore acceptable.

SUMMARY

As a result of our review, which is described in the evaluation, we conclude that the proposed Technical Specification changes are acceptable.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of the facility components located within the restricted areas as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that this amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: May 16, 1989

PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTOR:

G. Thomas