50-220

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

September 9, 1994

Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia
Executive Vice President, Nuclear
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
P.O. Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT NO. 1 (TAC NO. M88538)

Dear Mr. Sylvia:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 149 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-63 for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit No. 1 (NMP-1). The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated January 6, 1994.

The amendment revises TS Tables 3.2.7, 3.6.2a, 4.6.2a, 3.6.2b, and 4.6.2b to delete the automatic reactor scram and main steam line isolation functions of the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor (MSLRM). Conforming changes are also being made to the Bases for these TSs and to the Bases for TS 2.1.2. The changes are consistent with the NRC's Improved Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-1433) and with NRC-approved Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group Licensing Topical Report, NEDO-31400A, dated July 9, 1987 (safety evaluation dated May 15, 1991).

Your application for this amendment requested implementation of these changes upon completion of the modification to physically remove the reactor scram and main steam line isolation functions due to the MSLRM. You requested this delay in implementation to preclude an inadvertent reactor scram or main steam line isolation which could occur if the modifications were to be performed during plant operations. Your request has been granted. Please notify the NRC in writing when this modification has been implemented.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Donald S. Brinkman

Donald S. Brinkman, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-220

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 149 to DPR-63
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

Donald S. Brinkman, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-220

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 149 to DPR-63
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Distribution:
See attached sheet

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\NMP1\NM188538.AMD

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy

OFFICE	LA:PDI-1	E	PM:PDI-1	E	OGC		D:PDI-1		
NAME	CVogan		DBrinkman:smm		I. Moore		MCase		
DATE	08/24/94		08/24/94		08/ 6/94		08/ /94	08/ /94	

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 09/9/94

DATED: September 9, 1994

AMENDMENT NO. 149 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-63-NINE MILE POINT UNIT NO. 1

Docket File
PUBLIC
PDI-1 Reading
S. Varga, 14/E/4
C. Miller, 14/A/4
M. J. Case
C. Vogan
D. Brinkman
OGC
D. Hagan, 3302 MNBB
G. Hill (2), P1-22
C. Grimes, 11/F/23
R. Frahm, 08/E/23
R. Jones, 08/E/23
J. Minns, 010/D/4
L. Cunningham, 010/D/4
ACRS (10)
OPA
OC/LFDCB
PD plant-specific file
C. Cowgill, Region I

cc: Plant Service list

Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
Unit No. 1

cc:

Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire
Winston & Strawn
1400 L Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005-3502

Supervisor
Town of Scriba
Route 8, Box 382
Oswego, NY 13126

Mr. Louis F. Storz
Vice President - Nuclear Generation
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
P.O. Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093

Resident Inspector
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.O. Box 126
Lycoming, NY 13093

Gary D. Wilson, Esquire
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
300 Erie Boulevard West
Syracuse, NY 13202

Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Ms. Donna Ross
New York State Energy Office
2 Empire State Plaza
16th Floor
Albany, NY 12223

Mr. Richard B. Abbott
Unit 1 Plant Manager
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
P.O. Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093

Mr. David K. Greene
Manager Licensing
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
P.O. Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093

Charles Donaldson, Esquire
Assistant Attorney General
New York Department of Law
120 Broadway
New York, NY 10271

Mr. Paul D. Eddy
State of New York
Department of Public Service
Power Division, System Operations
3 Empire State Plaza
Albany, NY 12223

Mr. Martin J. McCormick, Jr.
Vice President
Nuclear Safety Assessment
and Support
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
P.O. Box 63
Lycoming, NY 13093

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-220

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 149
License No. DPR-63

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) dated January 6, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-63 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 149, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented upon completion of the modification which physically removes the automatic reactor scram and main steam line isolation functions of the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Michael J. Case, Acting Director
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: September 9, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 149 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-63

DOCKET NO. 50-220

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
21	21
199	199
201	201
206	206
209	209
250	250

f-g. The low pressure isolation of the main steam lines at 850 psig was provided to give protection against fast reactor depressurization and the resulting rapid cooldown of the vessel. Advantage was taken of the scram feature which occurs when the main steam line isolation valves are closed, to provide for reactor shutdown so that high power operation at low reactor pressure does not occur, thus providing protection for the fuel cladding integrity safety limit. Operation of the reactor at pressures lower than 850 psig requires that the reactor mode switch be in the startup position where protection of the fuel cladding integrity safety limit is provided by the IRM high neutron flux scram. Thus, the combination of main steam line isolation on reactor low pressure and isolation valve closure scram assures the availability of neutron flux scram protection over the entire range of applicability of the fuel cladding integrity safety limit. In addition, the isolation valve closure scram anticipates the pressure and flux transients which occur during normal or inadvertent isolation valve closure. With the scrams set at ≤10% valve closure, there is no increase in neutron flux and peak pressure if the vessel dome is limited to 1141 psig. [8, 9, 10].

The operator will set the pressure trip at greater than or equal to 850 psig and the isolation valve stem position scram setting at less than or equal to 10% of valve stem position from full open. However, the actual pressure set point can be as much as 15.8 psi lower than the indicated 850 psig and the valve position set point can be as much as 2.5% of stem position greater. These allowable deviations are due to instrument error, operator setting error and drift with time.

In addition to the above mentioned Limiting Safety System Setting, the scram dump volume high level scram trip (LCO 3.6.2) serves as a secondary backup to the Limiting Safety System Setting chosen. This high level scram trip assures that scram capability will not be impaired because of insufficient scram dump volume to accommodate the water discharged from the control rod drive hydraulic system as a result of a reactor scram (Section X-C.2.10)*.

h. The generator load rejection scram is provided to anticipate the rapid increase in pressure and neutron flux resulting from fast closure of the turbine control valves due to the worst case transient of a load rejection and subsequent failure of the bypass. In fact, analysis [9,10] shows that heat flux does not increase from its initial value at all because of the fast action of the load rejection scram; thus, no significant change in MCPR occurs.

i. The turbine stop valve closure scram is provided for the same reasons as discussed in h above. With a scram setting of ≤10% valve closure, the resultant transients are nearly the same as for those described in h above; and, thus, adequate margin exists.

*UFSAR

TABLE 3.6.2a (cont'd)

INSTRUMENTATION THAT INITIATES SCRAM

Limiting Condition for Operation

	Parameter	Minimum No. of Tripped or Operable Trip Systems	Minimum No. of Operable Instrument Channels per Operable Trip System	Set Point	Reactor Mode Switch Position in Which Function Must Be Operable			
					Shutdown	Refuel	Startup	Run
(6)	Main-Steam-Line Isolation Valve Position	2	4(h)(o)	≤ 10 percent valve closure from full open		(c)	(c)	x
(7)	Deleted							
(8)	Shutdown Position of Reactor Mode Switch	2	1	---		(k)	x	x
(9)	Neutron Flux (a) IRM (i) Upscale	2	3(d)(o)	≤ 96 percent of full scale		(g)	(g)	(g)

TABLE 4.6.2a

INSTRUMENTATION THAT INITIATES SCRAM

Surveillance Requirement

	Parameter	Sensor Check	Instrument Channel Test	Instrument Channel Calibration
(1)	Manual Scram	None	Once per week	None
(2)	High Reactor Pressure	None	Once per 3 months[1]	Once per 3 months[1]
(3)	High Drywell Pressure	None	Once per 3 months[1]	Once per 3 months[1]
(4)	Low Reactor Water Level	Once/day	Once per 3 months[1]	Once per 3 months[1]
(5)	High Water Level Scram Discharge Volume	None	Once per 3 months	Once per 3 months
(6)	Main-Steam-Line Isolation Valve Position	None	Once per 3 months	Once per operating cycle
(7)	Deleted			

TABLE 3.6.2b (cont'd)

INSTRUMENTATION THAT INITIATES
PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM OR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

Limiting Condition for Operation

	Parameter	Minimum No. of Tripped or Operable Trip Systems	Minimum No. of Operable Instrument Channels per Operable Trip System	Set Point	Reactor Mode Switch Position in Which Function Must Be Operable			
					Shutdown	Refuel	Startup	Run
(4)	Deleted							
(5)	Low Reactor Pressure	2	2(f)	≥ 850 psig				x
(6)	Low-Low-Low Condenser Vacuum	2	2(f)	≥ 7 in. mercury vacuum			(a)	x
(7)	High Temperature Main Steam Line Tunnel	2	2(f)	≤ 200°F			x	x

TABLE 4.6.2b

INSTRUMENTATION THAT INITIATES
PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM OR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

Parameter	Surveillance Requirement: Sensor Check	Surveillance Requirement: Instrument Channel Test	Surveillance Requirement: Instrument Channel Calibration
PRIMARY COOLANT ISOLATION (Main Steam, Cleanup and Shutdown)			
(1) Low-Low Reactor Water Level	Once/day	Once per 3 months[d]	Once per 3 months[d]
(2) Manual	---	Once during each major refueling outage	---
MAIN-STEAM-LINE ISOLATION			
(3) High Steam Flow Main-Steam Line	Once/day	Once per 3 months[d]	Once per 3 months[d]
(4) Deleted			
(5) Low Reactor Pressure	Once/day	Once per 3 months[d]	Once per 3 months[d]

a. The set points included in the tables are those used in the transient analysis and the accident analysis. The high flow set point for the main steam line is 105 psi differential. This represents a flow of approximately 4.4×10^6 lb/hr. The high flow set point for the emergency cooling system supply line is $\leq$ 11.5 psi differential. This represents a flow of approximately 9.8×10^5 lb/hr at rated conditions.

The automatic initiation signals for the emergency cooling systems have to be sustained for more than 12 seconds to cause opening of the return valves. If the signals last for less than 12 seconds, the emergency cooling system operating will not be automatically initiated.

The high level in the scram discharge volume is provided to assure that there is still sufficient free volume in the discharge system to receive the control rod drives discharge. Following a scram, bypassing is permitted to allow draining of the discharge volume and resetting of the reactor protection system relays. Since all control rods are completely inserted following a scram and since the bypass of this particular scram initiates a control rod block, it is permissible to bypass this scram function. The scram trip associated with the shutdown position of the mode switch can be reset after 10 seconds.

The condenser low vacuum, low-low vacuum and the main steam line isolation valve position signals are bypassed in the startup and refuel positions of the reactor mode switch when the reactor pressure is less than 600 psig. These are bypassed to allow warmup of the main steam lines and a heat sink during startup.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 149 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-63

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-220

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated January 6, 1994, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee or NMPC) submitted a request for changes to the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit No. 1 (NMP-1), Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would revise TS Tables 3.2.7, 3.6.2a, 4.6.2a, 3.6.2b, and 4.6.2b to delete the automatic reactor scram and main steam line isolation functions of the Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor (MSLRM). Conforming changes would also be made to the Bases for these TSs and to the Bases for TS 2.1.2. This request was submitted as the plant specific portion which, in conjunction with the General Electric (GE) Licensing Topical Report, NEDO-31400A, and the NRC's May 15, 1991, safety evaluation (SE) on this topical report, formed the basis for the package to be evaluated.

NMPC stated that elimination of this trip function would result in reduced potential for unnecessary reactor shutdowns caused by spurious MSLRM actuation trips and would increase plant operational flexibility without compromising plant safety. The licensee's proposed changes are based on the May 1987 BWR Owners Group Licensing Topical Report, NEDO-31400[1] and NUREG-0800[2].

In NEDO-31400A, a reevaluation of the role of the MSLRM in the control rod drive accident (CRDA) analysis was performed, confirming that removal of the MSLRM scram/isolation features would not compromise CRDA consequences. The topical report also evaluated the potential effect on occupational exposure in the event of a sudden release of radioactive material from the fuel and concluded that the elimination of the scram/isolation features would have no adverse effect. NMPC stated that the analyses in NEDO-31400A are bounding for NMP-1.

---

[1] NEDO-31400A, "Safety Evaluation for Eliminating the Boiling Water Reactor Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure Function and Scram Function of the Main Steam Radiation Monitor."

[2] NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan (SRP) 15.4.9, Rev.2, July 1981.

Specifically, the licensee proposed the following changes for NMP-1:

1. All references to the MSLRM automatic shutdown features would be deleted from TS Tables 3.6.2a and 4.6.2a.

2. All references to the MSLRM isolation function of the main steam lines would be deleted from TS Tables 3.2.7, 3.6.2b, and 4.6.2b. However, since TS Table 3.2.7 was deleted by License Amendment No. 145 (issued March 7, 1994, subsequent to submittal of this proposed amendment), no further action is required on this portion of the proposed amendment.

3. The Bases for TS 2.1.2, "Fuel Cladding-Limiting Safety System Setting," would be changed to reflect the deletion of the Main Steam Line Radiation automatic reactor shutdown function and closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs).

4. The Bases for TSs 3.6.2 and 4.6.2, "Protective Instrumentation," would be changed to reflect the deletion of the Main Steam Line Radiation automatic reactor shutdown and closure of the MSIVs.

2.0 EVALUATION

The MSLRM consists of four redundant radiation detectors located on the outside of the main steam lines and external to the primary containment. The MSLRM was designed to provide an early indication of gross fuel failures. The original intent of this monitor was to mitigate the releases of the detected fuel failure by providing a scram signal to terminate the initiating event and a MSIV closure signal to assure containment of the release. However, as indicated in the NMP-1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), no credit is taken for these signals in any design basis event for terminating the initiating event or assuring the radioactive release remains within accepted limits.

The UFSAR assumes that the MSIVs, on the MSLRM trip close only in the CRDA. To be consistent with Section 15.4.9 of the Standard Review Plan, all of the postulated radioactive material is assumed to be released to the condenser and turbine before the isolation occurs. Hence, the automatic isolation resulting from the MSLRM provides no benefits, since the resultant dose consequences from the CRDA will remain unchanged. Furthermore, NMPC stated that all the conditions specified in the NRC SE approving NEDO-31400A are to be carried out by NMP-1. These conditions are that NMPC include sufficient evidence to provide reasonable assurance that increased levels of radioactivity in the steam lines will be controlled expeditiously to limit both occupational and environmental releases. NMPC has provided assurance that any increased levels of activity will be detected by the offgas monitor located between the steam jet air ejector and the offgas treatment system. Abnormal operating procedures also control plant response. The other condition that NMPC committed to involves setting the MSLRM alarm setpoints at less than or equal

to 1.5 times the full power N-16 background dose rate and prompt sampling of the reactor coolant to determine the need for corrective action if the MSLRM or offgas radiation monitors exceed their alarm setpoints. This is acceptable. Additionally, upon a main steam line high radiation signal, the mechanical vacuum pumps will trip and isolate.

In the May 15, 1991, SE on NEDO-31400, the NRC staff concluded that removal of the MSLRM trips that automatically shutdown the reactor and close the MSIVs was acceptable and that Topical Report, NEDO-31400A, may be referenced in support of an amendment request as long as the following three conditions were met:

1. the applicant demonstrates that the assumptions with regard to input values (including power per assembly, X/Q, and decay times) that are made in generic analysis bound those for the plant,

NMPC, in response to condition 1, has provided two tables showing: a comparison of key input parameters, and a comparison of the dose assessment between NMP-1 design basis and NEDO-31400A analysis assumptions. The specific power level is used to determine the source term. This factor is offset by the lower calculated power for the failed fuel rods. The licensee also considered the 2 hour Exclusion Area Boundary dose, i.e., atmospheric dispersion factor X/Q, which was approximately a factor of 10 less than the NEDO-31400A values. The other parameters are the same or more conservative than the NEDO-31400A values. Based on the above, the NRC staff agrees that the generic analysis of the NEDO-31400A is bounding for NMP-1. The NRC staff finds that the NMPC's analysis has met the applicable requirements of Condition 1, and is therefore acceptable.

2. the applicant includes evidence (implemented or proposed operating procedures, or equivalent commitments) to provide reasonable assurance that increased significant levels of radioactive material in the main steam lines will be controlled expeditiously to limit both occupational doses and effluent releases, and

In the response to Condition 2, NMPC has in place the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), a Radiation Protection Program, including an ALARA program, and a Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program. NMP-1's radiation protection, chemistry, operating, emergency operating procedures, and the ODCM will be revised as necessary to incorporate specific considerations to change isolation of the main steam lines from an automatic to a manual function. Thus, any significant increase in the levels of radioactivity in the main steam lines will continue to be promptly controlled to limit effluent releases and onsite occupational exposure.

The MSLRM alarm setpoint of 1.5 times the normal full power background will be used to initiate sampling and surveillance actions. Confirmation of elevated activity will cause administrative controls to be implemented that ensure

offsite and onsite doses are maintained ALARA. Manual action to close the main steam lines and shutdown the reactor will occur when all the evidence has indicated the need for isolation and shutdown. Also, procedures will require immediate notification of Radiation Protection and Chemistry personnel upon annunciation in the control room of the high radiation alarm of the MSLRM or Offgas Radiation Monitor. The NRC staff concludes that NMPC's commitment is acceptable and responsive to Condition 2 which was addressed in Topical Report NEDO-31400A.

3. The applicant standardizes the MSLRM and offgas radiation monitor alarm setpoint at 1.5 times the nominal nitrogen-16 background dose rate at the monitor locations, and commits to promptly sample the reactor coolant to determine possible contamination levels in the plant reactor coolant and the need for additional corrective actions, if either the MSLRM or offgas radiation monitors or both exceed their alarm setpoint.

In response to Condition 3, the NMP-1 MSLRM alarm setpoint will be 1.5 times the normal full power N-16 background dose rate. This alarm will trigger entry into a procedure which will require a reactor coolant sample to be obtained and analyzed. The alarm setpoint accounts for the normal full power N-16 carryover, due to hydrogen water chemistry, at the monitor location. The offgas radiation monitor is a more sensitive monitor than the MSLRM because the nitrogen-16, dominating the radiation signal to the MSLRM, has decayed by the time the offgas radiation monitor can be affected by any increase levels of activity. Therefore, setting the offgas radiation monitor at 1.5 times the nitrogen-16 background dose rate can lead to spurious activations of the alarm. The offgas radiation monitor alarm is set to satisfy NMP-1 TS 3.6.15.c, which is based on the ODCM. The offgas monitor setpoint provides assurance that the total body exposure to an individual at the exclusion area boundary will not exceed the dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100. The licensee has proposed to set the offgas radiation monitor alarm at five (5) times the normal full power background. If the monitor alarms at this setpoint, the offgas will be immediately sampled and analyzed, followed by an analysis of reactor coolant sample. Based on a review of the licensee's commitment, the NRC staff has determined that Condition 3 has been satisfied.

3.0 SUMMARY

Based on a review of the NMPC's submittal and safety analysis, the NRC staff concludes that there are no adverse safety implications associated with removal of the MSLRM scram and MSIV closure function since the licensee has provided reasonable assurance that the offsite radiation exposure levels are within the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 and SRP 15.4.9. The NRC staff concludes that the proposed changes to eliminate the reactor scram and MSIV closure requirements associated with the MSLRMs are acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (59 FR 7692). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors:
R. Frahm
J. Minns

Date: September 9, 1994