

Mr. John H. Mueller  
 Chief Nuclear Officer  
 Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation  
 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station  
 Operations Building, Second Floor  
 P.O. Box 63  
 Lycoming, NY 13093

May 23, 1998

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1 (TAC NO. MA1653)

Dear Mr. Mueller:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 161 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-63 for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1 (NMP1). The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated May 2, 1998, as supplemented May 21, and 23 (three letters), 1998.

This amendment changes TS 3/4.6.2, "Protective Instrumentation," and the associated TS Bases to reflect modifications to correct deficiencies in the initiation instrumentation for the Control Room Air Treatment System. The amendment also changes TS 3.2.4, "Reactor Coolant Activity," and its Bases to reduce the total iodine concentration in the reactor coolant. It also adds an additional condition to the NMP1 license. This amendment is issued on an emergency basis pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) inasmuch as the Commission finds that failure to act in a timely way would prevent resumption of operation.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register Notice.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by:

Darl S. Hood, Senior Project Manager  
 Project Directorate I-1  
 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-220

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 161 to  
 DRP-63  
 2. Safety Evaluation

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DATED: May 22, 1998

AMENDMENT NO. 161 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-63 NINE MILE POINT  
NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT NO. 1

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PUBLIC

PDI-1 Reading

J. Zwolinski

S. Bajwa

S. Little

D. Hood

OGC

G. Hill (2), T-5 C3

W. Beckner

ACRS

C. Hehl, Region I

T. Harris (e-mail only TLH3)

J. Hayes

C. Miller

J. Segala

L. Marsh

J. Cushing

cc: Plant Service list

DATED: May 22, 1998

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Sincerely,  
 Original Signed by:  
 Darl S. Hood, Senior Project Manager  
 Project Directorate I-1  
 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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DATE	05/23/98		05/23/98	05/23/98	05/23/98 <i>M/B</i>		05/ /98

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

May 23, 1998

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Chief Nuclear Officer  
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation  
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station  
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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Darl S. Hood".

Darl S. Hood, Senior Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-220

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 161 to  
DRP-63  
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

**John H. Mueller  
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation**

**Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station  
Unit No. 1**

**cc:**

**Regional Administrator, Region I  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406**

**Resident Inspector  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
P.O. Box 126  
Lycoming, NY 13093**

**Charles Donaldson, Esquire  
Assistant Attorney General  
New York Department of Law  
120 Broadway  
New York, NY 10271**

**Mr. Paul D. Eddy  
State of New York  
Department of Public Service  
Power Division, System Operations  
3 Empire State Plaza  
Albany, NY 12223**

**Mr. F. William Valentino, President  
New York State Energy, Research,  
and Development Authority  
Corporate Plaza West  
286 Washington Avenue Extension  
Albany, NY 12203-6399**

**Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire  
Winston & Strawn  
1400 L Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20005-3502**

**Gary D. Wilson, Esquire  
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation  
300 Erie Boulevard West  
Syracuse, NY 13202**

**Supervisor  
Town of Scriba  
Route 8, Box 382  
Oswego, NY 13126**



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-220

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 161  
License No. DPR-63

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) dated May 2, 1998, as supplemented by letters dated May 21, and 23 (three letters), 1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter 1;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-69 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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P PDR

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, as revised through Amendment No. 161 are hereby incorporated into this license. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

In addition, the license is amended to add new page 3B, containing paragraph C(4), to Facility Operating License No. DPR-63 as follows:

- C(4) The licensee shall submit an application for license amendment, including supporting analyses and evaluations by December 18, 1998. This amendment application shall contain the proposed methods for compliance with GDC 19 dose guidelines under accident conditions based upon system design and without reliance upon the use of potassium iodide.
3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented prior to resumption of power operation. This amendment is authorized contingent on compliance with commitments provided by the licensee to meet the dose limits associated with Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 19 by submitting a license amendment application including supporting analyses and evaluations by December 18, 1998, that contains the proposed methods for compliance with GDC 19 dose limits under accident conditions based on system design and without reliance on the use of potassium iodide.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



S. Singh Bajwa, Director  
Project Directorate I-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

- Attachment: 1. Page 3B of License  
DPR-63\*  
2. Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: May 23, 1998

\*Page 3B is attached for convenience, for the composite license to reflect this change.

- C(4) The licensee shall submit an application for license amendment, including supporting analyses and evaluations by December 18, 1998. This amendment application shall contain the proposed methods for compliance with GDC 19 dose guidelines under accident conditions based upon system design and without reliance upon the use of potassium iodide.

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 161

AMENDMENT NO. 161 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-63

DOCKET NO. 50-220

Replace the following page of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached page.

Remove

99  
100  
180  
246  
247  
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Insert

99  
100  
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247a (new)

**LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION**

**3.2.4 REACTOR COOLANT ACTIVITY**

**Applicability:**

Applies to the limits on reactor coolant activity at all operating conditions.

**Objective:**

To assure that in the event of a reactor coolant system line break outside the drywell permissible doses are not exceeded.

**Specification:**

- a. The reactor coolant system radioactivity concentration in water shall not exceed 9.47 microcuries of total iodine per gram of water.
- b. If Specification 3.2.4 a, above, cannot be met after a routine surveillance check, the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition within ten hours.

**SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT**

**4.2.4 REACTOR COOLANT ACTIVITY**

**Applicability:**

Applies to the periodic testing requirements of the reactor coolant activity.

**Objective:**

To assure that limits on coolant activity are not exceeded.

**Specification:**

- a. Samples shall be taken at least every 96 hours and analyzed for gross gamma activity.
- b. Isotopic analyses of samples shall be made at least once per month.

## **BASES FOR 3.2.4 AND 4.2.4 REACTOR COOLANT ACTIVITY**

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The primary coolant radioactivity concentration limit of 25  $\mu\text{Ci}$  total iodine per gram of water was calculated based on a steamline break accident which is isolated in 10.5 seconds. For this accident analysis, all the iodine in the mass of coolant released in this time period is assumed to be released to the atmosphere at the top of the turbine building (30 meters). By limiting the thyroid dose at the site boundary to a maximum of 30 Rem, the iodine concentration in the primary coolant is back-calculated assuming fumigation meteorology, Pasquill Type F at 1 m/sec. The iodine concentration in the primary coolant resulting from this analysis is 25  $\mu\text{Ci/gm}$ .

A radioactivity concentration limit of 25  $\mu\text{Ci/g}$  total iodine could only be reached if the gaseous effluents were near the limit based on the assumed effluent isotopic content (Table A-12 of the FSAR) and the fact that the primary coolant cleanup systems were inoperative. When the cleanup system is operating, it is expected that the primary coolant radioactivity would be about 12  $\mu\text{Ci/g}$  total iodine. The concentrations expected during operations with a gaseous effluent of about 0.1  $\mu\text{Ci/sec}$  would be about 1.5  $\mu\text{Ci/g}$  total iodine.

The reactor water sample will be used to assure that the limit of Specification 3.2.4 is not exceeded. The total radioactive iodine activity would not be expected to change rapidly over a period of 96 hours. In addition, the trend of the stack offgas release rate, which is continuously monitored, is a good indicator of the trend of the iodine activity in the reactor coolant.

Since the concentration of radioactivity in the reactor coolant is not continuously measured, coolant sampling would be ineffective as a means to rapidly detect gross fuel element failures. However, as discussed in the bases for Specification 3.6.2, some capability to detect gross fuel element failures is inherent in the radiation monitors in the offgas system and on the main steam lines.

A more restrictive reactor coolant total iodine limit has been imposed for Control Room habitability purposes only. A limit of 9.47  $\mu\text{Ci/g}$  is imposed based on the most limiting small break LOCA outside containment. Provided reactor coolant iodine is maintained at or below this value, the Control Room Air Treatment System would not be required to maintain the radiological effects of the line break below GDC19 dose limits.

## **BASES FOR 3.4.5 AND 4.4.5 CONTROL ROOM AIR TREATMENT SYSTEM**

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The control room air treatment system is designed to filter the control room atmosphere for intake air. A roughing filter is used for recirculation flow during normal control room air treatment operation. The control room air treatment system is designed to maintain the control room pressure to the design positive pressure (one-sixteenth inch water) so that all leakage should be out leakage. The control room air treatment system starts automatically upon receipt of a LOCA (high drywell pressure or low-low reactor water level) or Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) (high steam flow main-steam line or high temperature main-steam line tunnel) signal. The system can also be manually initiated.

High efficiency particulate absolute (HEPA) filters are installed before the charcoal adsorbers to prevent clogging of the iodine adsorber. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to reduce the potential intake of radioiodine to the control room. The in-place test results should indicate a system leak tightness of less than 1 percent bypass leakage for the charcoal adsorbers and a HEPA efficiency of at least 99 percent removal of DOP particulates. The laboratory carbon sample test results should indicate a radioactive methyl iodide removal efficiency of at least 90 percent for expected accident conditions. If the efficiencies of the HEPA filter and charcoal adsorbers are as specified, adequate radiation protection will be provided such that resulting doses will be less than the allowable levels stated in Criterion 19 of the General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, Appendix A to 10CFR Part 50. Operation of the fans significantly different from the design flow will change the removal efficiency of the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

If the system is found to be inoperable, there is no immediate threat to the control room and reactor operation or refueling operation may continue for a limited period of time while repairs are being made. If the makeup system cannot be repaired within seven days, the reactor is shutdown and brought to cold shutdown within 36 hours or refueling operations are terminated.

Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers of less than six inches of water at the system design flow rate will indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter. Pressure drop should be determined at least once per operating cycle to show system performance capability.

The frequency of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. The charcoal adsorber efficiency test procedures should allow for the removal of one adsorber tray, emptying of one bed from the tray, mixing the adsorbent thoroughly and obtaining at least two samples. Each sample should be at least two inches in diameter and a length equal to the thickness of the bed. If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the system shall be replaced with an adsorbent qualified according to Table 5-1 of ANSI 509-1980. The replacement charcoal for the adsorber tray removed for the test should meet the same adsorbent quality. Any HEPA filters found defective shall be replaced with filters qualified pursuant to ANSI 509-1980.

TABLE 3.6.2I

CONTROL ROOM AIR TREATMENT SYSTEM INITIATION

Limiting Condition for Operation

<u>Parameter</u>	<u>Minimum No. of Tripped or Operable Trip Systems</u>	<u>Minimum No. of Operable Instrument Channels per Operable Trip System</u>	<u>Set Point</u>	<u>Reactor Mode Switch Position in Which Function Must Be Operable</u>			
				<u>Shutdown</u>	<u>Refuel</u>	<u>Startup</u>	<u>Run</u>
(1) Low-Low Reactor Water Level	2	2	$\geq 5$ inches (Indicator Scale)			x	x
(2) High Steam Flow Main-Steam Line	2	2	$\leq 105$ psid			x	x
(3) High Temperature Main-Steam Line Tunnel	2	2	$\leq 200^\circ\text{F}$			x	x
(4) High Drywell Pressure	2	2	$\leq 3.5$ psig			(a)	(a)

TABLE 4.6.2I

CONTROL ROOM AIR TREATMENT SYSTEM INITIATION

Surveillance Requirement

	<u>Parameter</u>	<u>Sensor Check</u>	<u>Instrument Channel Test</u>	<u>Instrument Channel Calibration</u>
(1)	Low-Low Reactor Water Level	Once/day	Once per quarter <sup>(b)</sup>	Once per quarter <sup>(b)</sup>
(2)	High Steam Flow Main-Steam Line	Once/day	Once per quarter <sup>(b)</sup>	Once per quarter <sup>(b)</sup>
(3)	High Temperature Main-Steam Line Tunnel	---	Once each operating cycle not to exceed 24 months	Once each operating cycle not to exceed 24 months
(4)	High Drywell Pressure	Once/day	Once per quarter <sup>(b)</sup>	Once per quarter <sup>(b)</sup>

**NOTES FOR TABLES 3.6.2I AND 4.6.2I**

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- (a) May be bypassed when necessary for containment inerting.
- (b) Only the trip circuit will be calibrated and tested at the frequencies specified; the primary sensor will be calibrated and tested once per operating cycle.



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 161 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-63

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-220

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated May 2, 1998, as supplemented by letters dated May 21, and 23 (three letters), 1998, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC or the licensee) proposed a license amendment to change the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (NMP1). The proposed amendment would change TS 3/4.6.2, "Protective Instrumentation," to reflect modifications to the initiation instrumentation for the Control Room Air Treatment System. It would also change TS 3.2.4a, "Reactor Coolant Activity," and its Bases.

Specifically, TS Tables 3.6.2I and 4.6.2I, "Control Room Air Treatment System Initiation," would be changed to delete the high radiation signal and substitute the following initiating signals from the Reactor Protection System: (1) low-low reactor water level in the reactor vessel, (2) high steam flow in the main steam line, (3) high temperature in the main steam line tunnel, and (4) high pressure in the reactor drywell. TS Table 3.6.2I would specify setpoints for each of these four initiating parameters ( $\geq 5$  inches-indicator scale,  $\leq 105$  psid,  $\leq 200$  degrees F, and  $\leq 3.5$  psig, respectively). TS Table 3.6.2I would indicate for each of the four parameters that the minimum number of tripped or operable trip systems and the minimum number of operable instrument channels per operable trip system are two, and that the four parameters are required to be operable when the reactor mode switch is in the "startup" or "run" positions (but not if in the "shutdown" or "refuel" positions), except that the high drywell pressure signal may be bypassed when necessary for containment inerting. For three of the parameters (low-low reactor water level, high steam flow in the main steam line, and high drywell pressure), TS Table 4.6.2I would require daily sensor checks, quarterly instrument channel tests, and quarterly instrument channel calibrations (except that only the trip circuit need be calibrated and tested at these quarterly frequencies; the primary sensor would be calibrated and tested each operating cycle). For the parameter high temperature in the main steam line tunnel, TS Table 4.6.2I would require an instrument channel test and an instrument channel calibration each operating cycle, not to exceed 24 months. Associated TS "Bases for 3.4.5 and 4.4.5 Control Room Air Treatment System" would also be changed to update the system descriptions consistent with these proposed changes to the automatic initiation circuitry, and to reflect the system's manual start capability. These changes to the TS Bases would include deletion of the statements that (1) the Control Room Air Treatment System is designed "to automatically start upon a receipt of a high radiation signal from one of the two radiation monitors located on the ventilation intake" and that (2) "...air intake radiation monitors will be calibrated and functionally tested each operating cycle, not to exceed 24 months, to verify system performance." TS 3.2.4a would be changed to state that the reactor coolant system radioactivity concentration in water shall not exceed 9.47 (rather than 25) microcuries of total iodine per gram of water. TS Bases 3/4.2.4 would be supplemented

to state that "A more restrictive reactor coolant total iodine limit has been imposed for Control Room habitability purposes only. A limit of 9.47 microcuries per gram is imposed based on the most limiting small break loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) outside containment. Provided reactor coolant iodine is maintained at or below this value, the Control Room Air Treatment System would not be required to maintain the radiological effects of the line break below [General Design Criterion] GDC 19 dose limits."

By letter dated May 21, 1998, the licensee responded to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff requests for additional information and provided other supplemental information in support of the initial application for amendment, including a discussion of the deficiencies in the existing system design that are being corrected and the emergency circumstances for which the licensee requests the NRC to take prompt action. By letter dated May 23, 1998, the licensee proposed changes to TS 3.2.4a as described above to impose more restrictive limits on reactor coolant iodine concentrations based upon the licensee's analysis of Control Room exposure due to a small break LOCA outside containment. In a second letter dated May 23, 1998, the licensee responded to NRC staff requests for additional information. In a third letter dated May 23, 1998, the licensee addressed use of potassium-iodide (KI) tablets as a compensatory action and provided a commitment to submit new analyses and evaluations for complying with GDC 19 without reliance on KI tablets.

As discussed in Section 4.0 below, the licensee has recently discovered that the existing initiation circuitry for the Control Room Ventilation System does not ensure adequate protection to the control room operators and has shut NMP1 down until the design is modified, noncompliance conditions are corrected, and the NRC issues a license amendment to change the TSs. Accordingly, this amendment is issued on an emergency basis as provided by 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5).

## **2.0 DESIGN DESCRIPTIONS**

### **2.1 Existing Design**

The Control Room Ventilation System at NMP1 provides general air circulation, heating, and cooling to the main and auxiliary control rooms (control complex). If airborne radiation contamination is detected in the outside air supply, a Control Room Air Treatment System (also known as the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System) will provide filtered air to the control complex. A detailed description of the Control Room Ventilation System may be found in Section III.B of the NMP1 Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR), including USAR Figure III-14 which is a schematic representation of the system. A brief summary of the system design follows:

The Control Room Ventilation System provides outside air to the control complex. Outside air enters the system through a louvered intake; then passes through redundant air-operated blocking valves in the normal outside air intake duct. Two continuous radiation monitors are located in the outside air intake duct upstream of the blocking valves and provide initiation signals to the Control Room Air Treatment System if radiation levels exceed their setpoint.

After passing through the normal supply blocking valves, the air then passes through the outside air mixing plenum where it is mixed with recirculated air from the control complex. Outside air is for ventilation purposes and to provide makeup for leakage from the control complex. The Control Room Ventilation System maintains a positive pressure in the control complex to prevent the infiltration of radioactive contaminants. After the outside air and recirculated air are mixed,

the mixed air passes through a two-element dust filter and then through redundant cooling coils where it is cooled, as necessary. The control room circulation fan takes suction from the mixed air leaving the cooling coils and discharges the air to the control room complex through ducts. The air then circulates through the control complex before it enters the return ductwork for recirculation and mixes with the incoming outside air.

If high radiation is detected in the outside air intake duct by one or both of the continuous radiation monitors, the normal supply blocking valves will automatically close and one of the two channels of the Control Room Air Treatment System will be initiated. One channel of the system is normally in "Auto" (standby) and the other channel is normally "Off." The emergency supply blocking valve for the initiated channel will automatically open and, when the supply valve is fully open, the associated (same channel) full capacity Control Room Emergency Ventilation fan will automatically start. The fan supplies flow through a high efficiency particulate absolute (HEPA) filter and then through an activated charcoal filter unit. After being filtered, the air is routed to the normal supply duct just upstream of the mixing plenum and is circulated by the control room circulation fan.

Currently, TS Table 3.6.2I, "Control Room Air Treatment System Initiation," specifies a setpoint of " $\leq 1000$  CPM" for Parameter (1), "High Radiation Ventilation Intake." This requires the continuous radiation monitors located in the outside air intake duct of the Control Room Ventilation System to initiate the Control Room Air Treatment System at a detector count rate of " $\leq 1000$  CPM." The licensee established this setpoint to comply with the radiation dose limits specified in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 19 and NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan [SRP]," Section 6.4 for control room habitability during an accident, including a LOCA. The dose limits for an individual in the control room for any postulated design basis accident are 5 rem gamma to the whole body, 30 rem to the thyroid, and 30 rem beta to the skin. In the event of an accident, timely initiation and proper operation of the Control Room Air Treatment System would minimize the amount of airborne radioactivity entering the control room.

## 2.2 Proposed Design

The licensee proposes to modify the initiation circuitry of the Control Room Air Treatment System so as to automatically initiate upon either a main steam line break (MSLB) or LOCA signal. Spare contacts from the Reactor Protection System (RPS) logic circuits would be used to provide the initiation signals. Specifically, automatic initiation of the system in the event of an MSLB would be based upon high flow in the main steam line or high temperature in the main steam line tunnel, while automatic initiation of the system in the event of an LOCA would be based upon high pressure in the drywell or low-low water level in the reactor vessel. The licensee states that automatic initiation based upon high radiation would be retained; however, the setpoint would be significantly reduced and the initiation function and associated surveillance requirements would be removed from the TSs.

## 3.0 EVALUATION

The licensee evaluated the radiological doses to the NMP1 control room operators based upon postulated accidents which might occur at NMP1, NMP2, and the adjacent James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick). The accidents which the licensee analyzed included the LOCA, MSLB, the fuel handling accident (FHA), and the rod drop for NMP1 and NMP2, the small break LOCA for NMP1, the instrument line break for NMP2 and the LOCA, FHA, rod drop and MSLB for FitzPatrick. The purpose of the licensee's dose assessment was to

demonstrate (1) that the removal of the radiation monitor from the TS would not result in the doses to the control room operators exceeding the guidelines of GDC 19 and (2) that the addition of the MSLB and LOCA signals to initiate operation of the control room emergency ventilation system would provide protection to the control room operators to limit the dose to GDC 19 guidelines. The results of the licensee's calculations showed that, for some accidents, the control room operators would not receive a dose that would exceed the guidelines of GDC 19, even if the NMP1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System were not activated. For some other accidents, the licensee's calculations showed that the initiation of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System was required in order to limit the doses to be within the guidelines of GDC 19.

The NRC staff performed confirmatory calculations to determine the efficacy of the licensee's conclusions. The NRC staff calculations and review of the licensee's assumptions identified areas that called into question the licensee's conclusions. Areas of concern involved the licensee's analytical assumptions versus information contained in the USAR, TS, and NUREG-0737 (TMI Action Item) III.D.3.4 requirements. The staff concluded that the degree of these differences was of such magnitude that, for certain accidents, the guidelines of GDC 19 could not be met without the utilization of compensatory actions on the part of the control room operators. In a letter dated May 23, 1998, the licensee agreed to implement, through their operational procedures, the use of KI tablets for the control room operators in the event of a radiological accident. These compensatory actions would be utilized pending resolution of the NRC staff's concerns. In addition, the licensee committed to submit an application for license amendment, including supporting analyses and evaluations within 6 months. This amendment application would contain the proposed methods for compliance with GDC 19 dose guidelines under accident conditions based upon system design and without reliance upon the use of KI. The licensee has indicated that procedural controls currently exist to provide direction in the determination of need and administration of KI to NMP1 control room operators. Thus, the availability of KI to control room operators is currently and will continue to be assured. Based upon the licensee's commitment, the NRC staff has reasonable assurance that the NMP1 control room operators will be protected in accordance with GDC 19 dose limits.

#### 4.0 EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES

On March 28, 1998, following a partial loss of offsite power at NMP2, the licensee discovered that a time delay feature in the design of the NMP2 ventilation filters actuation circuitry had not been analyzed to determine its effect upon the response of radiation detectors and initiated a design review of the NMP1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System to determine if a similar condition existed at NMP1. During the course of this review, the licensee determined that (1) contrary to a commitment in letters to the NRC dated January 31 and March 19, 1984, the NMP1 Control Room Air Treatment System would not automatically initiate during an MSLB or an LOCA, and (2) initiation of the NMP1 Control Room Air Treatment System at the current radiation monitor setpoint of  $\leq 1000$  CPM, as required by TS Table 3.6.2i, is not sufficient for compliance with GDC 19 limits for radiological protection of the control room operators. Consequently, on April 21, 1998, the licensee declared the Control Room Air Treatment System inoperable and notified the NRC that a 7-day limiting condition for operation had been entered as specified by TS 3.4.5. On April 27, 1998, the licensee informed the NRC that resolution of the inoperability condition would involve modifications more extensive than mere setpoint adjustments, that these modifications should not be implemented while NMP1 is operating, and that the licensee was considering filing an application for an emergency license amendment, as provided by 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5), to allow the modifications to be implemented and the plant restarted after a 7-day

outage. NMP1 was shut down on April 28, 1998, in accordance with TS 3.4.5. On May 2, 1998, the licensee filed an application requesting that the NRC amend the NMP1 license by May 8, 1998, on an emergency basis because "resumption of operation cannot occur until NRC approval of the proposed change."

As of May 8, 1998, the licensee had not completed the modifications and on May 11, 1998, called the NRC staff to explain why. The licensee explained that since the application for amendment was issued, a project team, consisting of licensee engineers and engineers from Sergeant & Lundy, had completed an independent design review to determine compliance of plant activities (operations, maintenance, testing, and engineering) with the Control Room Air Treatment System's design and licensing bases. The project team identified noncompliances with the system's design and licensing bases, mostly involving the lack of system redundancy and lack of documentation regarding the system's ability to maintain a habitable control room environment after an accident concurrent with a single failure in the system. The licensee said that modifications to correct these deficiencies, although not affecting the TS changes requested in the proposed license amendment, had been added to the scope of work to be completed before the system would be declared operable. Consequently, the earlier estimate of 7 days had changed and the licensee estimated that the modifications would be completed in about 2 to 3 weeks. Based on the revised schedule for the expanded scope of work, the NRC staff determined that the emergency circumstances discussed in the application for amendment should be considered exigent circumstances.

Therefore, the Commission noticed the licensee's May 2, 1998, application for amendment in the Federal Register on May 19, 1998 (63 FR 27601), at which time the Commission stated that exigent circumstances exist, as provided by 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6), in that the full 30 days normally provided for public comment was not available before NMP1 would be ready to resume power operation. In the notice, the Commission also made a proposed finding that the amendment involved no significant hazards consideration.

On May 22, 1998, the licensee informed the Commission of improvements in its schedule for completing the modifications and that NMP1 would be ready to resume operation by May 24, 1998. Accordingly, the NRC staff finds that an emergency situation exists in that failure to issue the proposed amendment consistent with the licensee's modification schedule would prevent resumption of operation. The existing deficiencies in the ventilation system design that were the basis for the licensee's application for license amendment were discovered as a result of the licensee's design review and the licensee could not reasonably have anticipated those deficiencies in advance of that review. The licensee filed an application for license amendment in a timely fashion, and therefore, did not create the emergency circumstances by failing to file in a timely manner. The additional system deficiencies, discovered by the licensee after the application for amendment was filed, resulted from a project team review that was initiated and conducted expeditiously by the licensee. The NRC staff determined during its review that an additional change for TS 3.2.4a and a license condition were required in order to approve the amendment. Considering the corrective nature of the proposed changes which will ensure that the control room would remain habitable in the event of an accident, and since the proposed changes do not involve significant hazards considerations, the NRC concludes that prompt action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(5) is warranted.

## 5.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the proposed amendment, will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

...The proposed modification and associated TS changes involve a system that is intended to detect the symptoms of certain events or accidents and initiate mitigative actions (i.e., the Control Room Air Treatment System). Accordingly, the proposed changes do not affect the probability of any accident initiators previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed changes will not result in a significant increase in the probability of any accidents previously evaluated.

Currently, TS Table 3.6.2I, "Control Room Air Treatment System Initiation," specifies a setpoint of " $\leq 1000$  CPM" for Parameter (1), "High Radiation Ventilation Intake." This requires the continuous radiation monitors located in the outside air intake duct of the Control Room Ventilation System to initiate the Control Room Air Treatment System at a detector count rate of " $\leq 1000$  CPM." The setpoint was established to comply with the radiation dose limits specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 19 and NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan [SRP]," Section 6.4 for control room habitability during an accident, including a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). In the event of an accident, timely initiation and proper operation of the Control Room Air Treatment System minimizes the amount of airborne radioactivity entering the control room. However, based on the results of a current study, initiation of the Control Room Air Treatment System at this setpoint does not provide assurance that personnel occupying the control room under the most limiting Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) accident assumptions would not receive radiation exposures in excess of the GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits. It was further determined that, contrary to a 1984 commitment, the Control Room Air Treatment System would not automatically initiate during a LOCA.

To correct this condition, a modification is proposed that will automatically initiate the Control Room Air Treatment System on either a MSLB or LOCA signal. Spare contacts from the RPS logic circuits will be used to provide the initiation signals. Specifically, MSLB automatic initiation of the system will be on main steam line high flow or main steam line tunnel high temperature, and LOCA automatic initiation of the system will be on high drywell pressure or low-low reactor vessel water level. Implementation of this modification will provide automatic initiation of the Control Room Air Treatment System at the onset of both a MSLB and a LOCA, as previously committed.

The MSLB accident has been evaluated for full power operating conditions where radioactive gases released from the turbine building could be drawn into the Control Room Ventilation System and accumulate in the control room. Engineering calculations show that the Control Room Air Treatment System would maintain the dose to the control room operators below the GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits during these releases, and the addition of an anticipatory automatic initiation on a MSLB signal (main steam line high flow or main steam line tunnel high temperature) provides assurance that the consequences of the MSLB accident are bounded by the analysis.

The LOCA analysis assumes that radioactive gases are released from the elevated stack and are then drawn back down into the Control Room Ventilation System intake duct. Analysis shows that for the bounding condition, the accumulated dose in the control room for a minimum of 30 days would not be detected by the Control Room Air Treatment System radiation monitors, even at a significantly reduced setpoint. Consequently, the radiation monitors cannot be relied upon to initiate the Control Room Air Treatment System in the event of a LOCA. As a result, an anticipatory automatic initiation of the Control Room Air Treatment System on a LOCA signal (high drywell pressure or low-low reactor vessel water level) is proposed to be added to provide assurance that personnel occupying the control room under the most limiting LOCA assumptions will not receive radiation exposures in excess of the GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits.

NMPC has also proposed to delete the requirement to have the Control Room Air Treatment System automatically initiate on a high radiation signal when the reactor mode switch is in the "Refuel" position. This change is acceptable based on 1) neither a LOCA or MSLB is assumed to occur in refuel; 2) for accidents assumed to occur during refueling (fuel handling accident), GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits are met without the Control Room Air Treatment System; and 3) the Control Room Air Treatment System can be manually initiated.

In summary, the proposed changes for the Control Room Air Treatment System initiation channels will assure that the NMP1 control room operators will not receive radiation exposures in excess of the limits delineated in GDC 19 and SRP 6.4. Accordingly, the operators will be able to respond to and mitigate the consequences of anticipated accident scenarios. Therefore, the proposed changes will not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the proposed amendment, will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

...The proposed changes do not introduce any new accident initiators and do not involve any alterations to plant configurations which could initiate a new or different kind of accident. The actuation circuit of the Control Room Air Treatment System actuation logic does not control or interface with any primary reactor processes. Addition of the MSLB logic and the LOCA logic will ensure that the Control Room Air Treatment System initiates such that habitability of the control room is not compromised. No new failure modes to existing systems or equipment important to safety are created by this change. Post-installation testing will confirm that the new logic will have no effect on other safety-related circuits and TS required surveillance testing will routinely confirm operability of the Control Room Air Treatment System. Therefore, the changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 1, in accordance with the proposed amendment, will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes to Sections 3.6.2 and 4.6.2 incorporate modifications to the initiation instrumentation for the Control Room Air Treatment System.... As a result of these changes, the requirement to have the Control Room Air Treatment System

automatically initiate on a high radiation signal when the reactor mode switch is in the "Refuel" position has been deleted....

The addition of the trip circuit logic from the MSLB accident as well as from the LOCA circuits assures that the control room operator will not be exposed to radiation limits in excess of GDC 19 or SRP 6.4 limits. Additionally, the initiation signal will be automatic at the onset of both accidents, which improves the response time of the Control Room Air Treatment System to the MSLB accident and the LOCA. NMPC has proposed to delete the requirement to have the Control Room Air Treatment System automatically initiate on a high radiation signal when the reactor mode switch is in the "Refuel" position. This change is acceptable based on 1) neither a LOCA nor MSLB is assumed to occur in refuel; 2) for accidents assumed to occur during refueling (fuel handling accident) GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 limits are met without the Control Room Air Treatment System; and 3) the Control Room Air Treatment System can be manually initiated.

In summary, the proposed changes will assure that the Control Room dose established in GDC 19 and SRP 6.4 will not be exceeded. Therefore, the proposed activity does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis, including the licensee's conclusion in a letter dated May 23, 1998, that the change to TS 3.2.4a to impose a more restrictive limit on reactor coolant iodine concentration satisfies the above criteria and does not change the above findings. Based on this review and NRC staff conclusions in Section 3.0 above, the NRC staff concludes that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

## 6.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official (Mr. J. Dunkelburger) commented on May 20, 1998, that the licensee's application of May 2, 1998, failed to address the consequences to NMP1 operators that could result from a radiological release at NMP2. The NRC Project Manager replied that the NRC staff was reviewing additional information from the licensee to this end and would address these consequences in the staff's safety evaluation that accompanies the amendment. As discussed in Section 3.0 above, the NRC staff finds that NMP1 operators will not receive doses in excess of 10 CFR 50.19 limits in the event of a radiological release at NMP2.

## 7.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment. The Commission has made a final no significant hazards finding with respect to the amendment.

## 8.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) the amendment does not (a) significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (b) increase the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated, or (c) significantly reduce a safety margin and, therefore, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration;(2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (4) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: J. Hayes  
J. Segala  
D. Hood

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