

**From:** Mark Rubin *NR*  
**To:** David Diec *NR*  
**Date:** Thursday, January 25, 2001 03:30 PM  
**Subject:** Re: NCWarren Press Release

David:

This is a non trivial request. It would require reassessing risk for plants that have different configurations than assumed in the TWG report. With our state of knowlege, we are certainly in a much better position to assess such issues, than before the SFP decommissioning study was completed. Still, it would require assessments in a number of areas, some from people who are fully committed now on other projects.

Glenn could certainly give you some insights and perspectives. But any conclusions anywhere near the level of understanding from the TWG report would take considerable resources for a relook (but nothing like what was originally done for the TWG work.) If we need to look at new accident sequences, or timing issues for operating plants, this would require Mike Cheok, who currently has no time available.

One perspective I can give you is that the dominate seismic sequences from the TWG report also apply to operating plants, plus you can have an at power core melt to add to the SFP fire, so the risk is greater.

With respect to heavy load drop, no lifts of the very heavy fuel transfer casks might reduce the possibility of failing the poor floor. Still the actual movements, likelihood of pool floor or wall failure and use of non single failure cranes might have to be looked at for complete understanding, and our crane guy, Ed Thom, is fully committed on AP1000.

The loss of cooling and loss and of inventory sequences were very low in the TWG report and would be even lower for operating plants because of the increased systems available and higher staffing levels.

The thing missing from these assessments is the Harris issues (not accepted by the licensing borad) of a operating plant core melt leading to failure of SPF cooling and releases from pool. I'm not sure consideration of this adds additional insights and should be considered within the scope of your questions.

Anyway just my 2 cents. If you need more than just a few hours of Glenn, your boss probably needs to talk to Rich Barrett.

>>> David Diec 01/25 11:15 AM >>>  
Glenn,

We need to have a feel for what the risk implications maybe for the currently decommissioning plants, if they do not meet the IDCs and SDAs assumed in the TWG report. What are the most important parameters (i.e., decay heat level,...) that would significantly impact the level of risk?

Also, is there any importance ranking associated with those IDCs and SDAs (i.e., water level instrumentation (SDA #3) is more important than SFP walkdowns)?

List those features that are available for the four visited plants that ensure adequate cooling of spent fuel.

**CC:** Glenn Kelly, Richard Barrett

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