



Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 756
Port Gibson, MS 39150
Tel 601 437 2800

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attention: Document Control Desk

Subject: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-416
License No. NPF-29
Technical Specification Bases Update to the NRC for Period February 15, 2001, through April 9, 2001 - Implementation of Technical Specification Amendment 145

GNRO-2001/00028

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) Technical Specification 5.5.11, Entergy Operations, Inc. hereby submits an update of all changes made to GGNS Technical Specification Bases since the last submittal (GNRO-2001/00013 letter dated February 15, 2001 to the NRC from GGNS). This submittal brings the Technical Bases up-to-date for the period February 15, 2001 through April 9, 2001. This update is consistent with update frequency listed in 10CFR50.71(e).

This letter also serves the purpose of notification to the NRC that Grand Gulf Technical Specification Amendment 145 has been implemented.

This letter does not contain any commitments.

Should you have any questions, please contact Mike Larson at (601) 437-6685.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "M. Larson".

CAB/MJL
attachment:
cc:

GGNS Technical Specification Bases Revised Pages
(See Next Page)

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cc:

Hoeg	T. L.	GGNS Senior Resident)	(w/a)
Levanway	D. E.	(Wise Carter)	(w/a)
Reynolds	N. S.		(w/a)
Smith	L. J.	(Wise Carter)	(w/a)
Thomas	H. L.		(w/o)

Mr. E. W. Merschoff (w/2)
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive,
Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011

Mr. S. P. Sekerak, NRR/DLPM/PD IV-1 (w/2)
ATTN: ADDRESSEE ONLY
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint North, Mail Stop O7-D1
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852-2378

ATTACHMENT TO GNRO-2001/00028

**GGNS Gulf Technical Specification Bases Revised Pages
for
Period February 15, 2001
Through
April 9, 2001**

LDC#	BASES PAGES AFFECTED	TOPIC of CHANGE
00070	B3.0-6, B3.0-6a, B3.1-37, B3.3-148, B3.3-177, B3.3-214, B3.3-215, B3.3-216, B3.3-217, B3.3-218, B3.3-219, B3.3-220, B3.3-221, B3.3-222, B3.3-223, B3.3-224, B3.6-2, B3.6-6, B3.6-15, B3.6-16, B3.6-25, B3.6-84, B3.6-85, B3.6-87, B3.6-89, B3.6-90, B3.6-90a, B3.6-97, B3.6-98, B3.7-11, B3.7-11a, B3.7-12, B3.7-13, B3.7-14, B3.7-15, B3.7-16, B3.7-17, B3.7-17a, B3.7-18, B3.7-19, B3.7-20, B3.7-21, B3.8-35, B3.8-35a, B3.8-37, B3.8-38, B3.8-39, B3.8-60, B3.8-60a, B3.8-61, B3.8-62, B3.8-63, B3.8-75, B3.8-80, B3.8-80a, B3.8-81, B3.8-82	Changes associated with Technical Specification Amendment 145 and one editorial correction

BASES

LCO 3.0.4
(continued)

provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown.

Exceptions to LCO 3.0.4 are stated in the individual Specifications. These exceptions allow entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated ACTIONS to be entered do not provide for continued operation for an unlimited period of time. Exceptions may apply to all the ACTIONS or to a specific Required Action of a Specification.

LCO 3.0.4 is only applicable when entering MODE 3 from MODE 4, MODE 2 from MODE 3 or 4, or MODE 1 from MODE 2. Furthermore, LCO 3.0.4 is applicable when entering any other specified condition in the Applicability only while operating in MODE 1, 2, or 3. The requirements of LCO 3.0.4 do not apply in MODES 4 and 5, or other specified conditions of the Applicability (unless in MODE 1, 2, or 3) because the ACTIONS of individual Specifications sufficiently define the remedial measure to be taken.

The ACTIONS for an inoperable required battery charger in LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources - Operating," and LCO 3.8.5, "DC Sources - Shutdown," include a Note explicitly precluding entry into specific MODEs or other specified conditions of the Applicability while relying on the ACTIONS. With an inoperable required battery charger this Note in LCO 3.8.4 prohibits entry in MODE 1, 2, or 3, except during power decrease and in LCO 3.8.5 prohibits starting movement of recently irradiated fuel, (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours), entering MODE 4 from MODE 5, or loading fuel into the vessel if the vessel is defueled.

Surveillances do not have to be performed on the associated inoperable equipment (or on variables outside the specified limits), as permitted by SR 3.0.1. Therefore, changing MODES or other specified conditions while in an ACTIONS Condition, either in compliance with LCO 3.0.4, or where an exception to LCO 3.0.4 is stated, is not a violation of SR 3.0.1 or SR 3.0.4 for those Surveillances that do not have to be performed due to the associated inoperable equipment. However, SRs must be met to ensure OPERABILITY

(continued)

BASES

LCO 3.0.4 (continued) prior to declaring the associated equipment OPERABLE (or variable within limits) and restoring compliance with the affected LCO.

LCO 3.0.5 LCO 3.0.5 establishes the allowance for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to

(continued)

B 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

B 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System

BASES

BACKGROUND The SLC System is designed to provide the capability of bringing the reactor, at any time in a fuel cycle, from full power and minimum control rod inventory (which is at the peak of the xenon transient) to a subcritical condition with the reactor in the most reactive xenon free state without taking credit for control rod movement. The SLC System satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62 (Ref. 1) on anticipated transient without scram (ATWS).

The SLC System consists of a boron solution storage tank, two positive displacement pumps, two explosive valves, which are provided in parallel for redundancy, and associated piping and valves used to transfer borated water from the storage tank to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The borated solution is discharged through the high pressure core spray system sparger.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The SLC System is manually initiated from the main control room, as directed by the emergency operating procedures, if the operator believes the reactor cannot be shut down, or kept shut down, with the control rods. The SLC System is used in the event that not enough control rods can be inserted to accomplish shutdown and cooldown in the normal manner. A SLC injection is also credited in the LOCA dose analysis to buffer the post-accident suppression pool chemistry and prevent iodine re-evolution. The SLC System injects borated water into the reactor core to compensate for all of the various reactivity effects that could occur during plant operation. To meet this objective, it is necessary to inject a quantity of boron that produces a concentration of at least 660 ppm of natural boron in the reactor core at 68°F. To allow for potential leakage and imperfect mixing in the reactor system, an additional amount of boron equal to 25% of the amount cited above is added (Ref. 2). The temperature versus concentration limits in Figure 3.1.7-1 are calculated such that the required concentration is achieved accounting for dilution in the RPV with normal water level and including the water volume in the residual heat removal shutdown cooling piping and in the recirculation loop piping. This quantity of borated solution is the amount

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES,
LCO, and
APPLICABILITY

2.g. Containment and Drywell Ventilation Exhaust
Radiation-High (continued)

Four channels of Containment and Drywell Ventilation Exhaust-High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. Two upscale-Hi Hi, one upscale-Hi Hi and one downscale, or two downscale signals from the same trip system actuate the trip system and initiate isolation of the associated containment and drywell isolation valves.

The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross failure of the fuel cladding and to ensure offsite doses remain below 10 CFR 20 and 10 CFR 100 limits.

The Function is required to be OPERABLE during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) and movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uncover or dropped fuel assemblies) must be provided to ensure offsite dose limits are not exceeded. Due to radioactive decay, this Function is only required to isolate primary containment during those fuel handling accidents involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours).

This Function isolates the Group 7 valves.

2.h. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the primary containment and drywell isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific UFSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for the isolation function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There are four push buttons for the logic, two manual initiation push buttons per trip system. There is no

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY

3, 4. Fuel Handling Area Ventilation and Pool Sweep Exhaust Radiation—High High (continued)

channels of Fuel Handling Area Ventilation Exhaust Radiation—High High Function and four channels of Fuel Handling Area Pool Sweep Exhaust Radiation—High High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are chosen to promptly detect gross failure of the fuel cladding.

The Exhaust Radiation—High High Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, these Functions are not required. In addition, the Functions are required to be OPERABLE during OPDRVs and movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uncover or dropped fuel assemblies) must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded. Due to radioactive decay, these Functions are only required to isolate secondary containment during those fuel handling accidents involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours).

5. Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the secondary containment isolation logic that are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation channels, and provide manual isolation capability. There is no specific UFSAR safety analysis that takes credit for this Function. It is retained for the secondary containment isolation instrumentation as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

(continued)

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

B 3.3.7.1 Control Room Fresh Air (CRFA) System Instrumentation

BASES

BACKGROUND

The CRFA System is designed to provide a radiologically controlled environment to ensure the habitability of the control room for the safety of control room operators under all plant conditions. Two independent CRFA subsystems are each capable of fulfilling the stated safety function. Safety analyses have shown that manual isolation satisfies the safety function. However, instrumentation and controls for the CRFA System have been provided to automatically initiate action to isolate the main control room (MCR) to minimize the consequences of radioactive material in the control room environment. The automatic initiation instruments are not required by Technical Specifications.

In the event of a Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2, Drywell Pressure—High, or Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor signal, the CRFA System is automatically started in the isolation mode. A portion of the MCR air is then recirculated through the filter train for cleanup of the control room atmosphere.

The CRFA System instrumentation has two trip systems: one trip system initiates one CRFA subsystem, while the second trip system initiates the other CRFA subsystem (Ref. 1). Each trip system receives input from the Functions listed above. The Functions are arranged as follows for each trip system. The Reactor Vessel Water Level—Low Low, Level 2 and Drywell Pressure—High are arranged together in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. The Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitors are arranged in a two-out-of-two logic. The channels include electronic equipment (e.g., trip units) that compares measured input signals with pre-established setpoints. When the setpoint is exceeded, the channel output relay actuates, which then outputs a CRFA System initiation signal to the initiation logic.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY

The ability of the CRFA System to maintain the habitability of the MCR is explicitly assumed for certain accidents as discussed in the UFSAR safety analyses (Refs. 2 and 3). CRFA System operation ensures that the radiation exposure of control room personnel, through the duration of any one of the postulated accidents, does not exceed the limits set by GDC 19 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A.

CRFA system instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

The OPERABILITY of the CRFA System instrumentation is dependent upon the OPERABILITY of only the manual initiation function.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below.

Manual Initiation

The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the CRFA logic to provide manual initiation capability. The Required Channels per trip system is two.

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the UFSAR. However, the Function is retained as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channel is mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to CRFA System instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable CRFA System instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable CRFA System instrumentation channel.

A.1

Required Action A.1 directs the channel be placed in trip. Each time an inoperable channel is discovered, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

Because of the redundancy of the CRFA System design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours has been shown to be acceptable to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. However, this out of service time is only acceptable provided the associated Function is still maintaining CRFA System initiation capability. A Function is considered to be maintaining CRFA System initiation capability when sufficient channels are OPERABLE or in trip, such that one trip system will generate an initiation signal from the given Function on a valid signal. This would require one trip system to have two channels, each OPERABLE or in trip.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1

With the required action and completion time not met, the associated isolation dampers must be closed. This effectively establishes the isolation made of CRFA operation.

The 1-hour completion time is intended to allow the operator time to establish this mode of operation. It is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time to establish the CRFA subsystem in operation.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

The Surveillance is also modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours, provided the associated Function maintains CRFA System initiation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.

SR 3.3.7.1.1

The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.7.3, "Control Room Fresh Air (CRFA) System," overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.

The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

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BASES (continued)

- REFERENCES
1. UFSAR, Section 7.3.1.1.10.
 2. UFSAR, Section 6.4.
 3. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
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BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued) This Specification ensures that the performance of the primary containment, in the event of a DBA, meets the assumptions used in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2. SR 3.6.1.1.1 leakage rate requirements are in conformance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix J (Ref. 3), as modified by approved exemptions.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES The safety design basis for the primary containment is that it must withstand the pressures and temperatures of the limiting DBA without exceeding the design leakage rate.

The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary containment is OPERABLE such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled by the rate of primary containment leakage.

Analytical methods and assumptions involving the primary containment are presented in References 1 and 2. The safety analyses assume a nonmechanistic fission product release following a DBA, which forms the basis for determination of offsite doses. The fission product release is, in turn, based on an assumed leakage rate from the primary containment. OPERABILITY of the primary containment ensures that the leakage rate assumed in the safety analyses is not exceeded.

The maximum allowable leakage rate for the primary containment (L_a) is 0.682% by weight of the containment and drywell air per 24 hours at the maximum peak containment pressure (P_a) of 11.5 psig (Ref. 4).

Primary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Primary containment OPERABILITY is maintained by limiting leakage to $\leq 1.0 L_a$, except prior to the first unit startup after performing a required 10 CFR 50, Appendix J leakage test. At this time, the combined Type B and Type C leakage must be $< 0.6 L_a$, and the overall Type A leakage must be $< 0.75 L_a$. Compliance with this LCO will ensure a primary containment configuration, including equipment hatches, that is structurally sound and that will limit leakage to those

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND DBA. Not maintaining air lock integrity or leak tightness
(continued) may result in a leakage rate in excess of that assumed in
the unit safety analysis.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The DBA that postulates the maximum release of radioactive
material within primary containment is a LOCA. In the
analysis of this accident, it is assumed that primary
containment is OPERABLE, such that release of fission
products to the environment is controlled by the rate of
primary containment leakage. The primary containment is
designed with a maximum allowable leakage rate (L_a) of
0.682% by weight of the containment and drywell air per
24 hours at the calculated maximum peak containment pressure
(P_a) of 11.5 psig. This allowable leakage rate forms the
basis for the acceptance criteria imposed on the SRs
associated with the air locks.

Primary containment air lock OPERABILITY is also required to
minimize the amount of fission product gases that may escape
primary containment through the air lock and contaminate and
pressurize the secondary containment.

Primary containment air locks satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC
Policy Statement.

LCO As part of the primary containment, the air lock's safety
function is related to control of containment leakage rates
following a DBA. Thus, the air lock's structural integrity
and leak tightness are essential to the successful
mitigation of such an event.

The primary containment air locks are required to be
OPERABLE. For each air lock to be considered OPERABLE, the
air lock interlock mechanism must be OPERABLE, the air lock
must be in compliance with the Type B air lock leakage test,
both air lock doors must be OPERABLE, and the test
connection valves must be OPERABLE in accordance with LCO
3.6.1.3. These normally closed manual isolation valves are
considered OPERABLE when closed or when intermittently
opened under administrative controls. The interlock allows
only one air lock door to be open at a time. This provision
ensures that a gross breach of primary containment does not
exist when primary containment is required to be OPERABLE.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The PCIVs LCO was derived from the assumptions related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establishing the primary containment boundary during major accidents. As part of the primary containment boundary, PCIV OPERABILITY supports leak tightness of primary containment. Therefore, the safety analysis of any event requiring isolation of primary containment is applicable to this LCO.

The DBAs that result in a release of radioactive material for which the consequences are mitigated by PCIVs are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), a main steam line break (MSLB), and a fuel handling accident involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours) inside primary containment (Refs. 1 and 2). In the analysis for each of these accidents, it is assumed that PCIVs are either closed or function to close within the required isolation time following event initiation. This ensures that potential paths to the environment through PCIVs are minimized. Of the events analyzed in Reference 1, the LOCA is the most limiting event due to radiological consequences. An analysis of the affect of the purge valves being open at the initiation of a LOCA has been performed. This condition was found to result in dose contributions of a small fraction of 10 CFR 100. It is assumed that the primary containment is isolated such that release of fission products to the environment is controlled.

PCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

PCIVs form a part of the primary containment boundary and some also form a part of the RCPB. The PCIV safety function is related to minimizing the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establishing the primary containment boundary during a DBA.

The power operated isolation valves are required to have isolation times within limits. Additionally, power operated automatic valves are required to actuate on an automatic isolation signal.

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

are listed with their associated stroke times in the applicable plant procedures. Purge valves with resilient seals, MSIVs, and hydrostatically tested valves must meet additional leakage rate requirements. Other PCIV leakage rates are addressed by LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," as Type B or C testing.

Valves on the containment airlock bulkhead have a design function as a primary containment isolation when the airlock inner door is inoperable per LCO 3.6.1.2 or during performance of airlock barrel testing or pneumatic tubing testing or at any time the inner airlock door/bulkhead is breached. However, these valves are Primary Containment Isolation Valves as required by LCO 3.6.1.3 at all times.

This LCO provides assurance that the PCIVs will perform their designed safety functions to minimize the loss of reactor coolant inventory, and establish the primary containment boundary during accidents.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could cause a release of radioactive material to primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Therefore, most PCIVs are not required to be OPERABLE. Certain valves are required to be OPERABLE, however, to prevent a potential flow path (the RHR Shutdown Cooling System suction from the reactor vessel) from lowering reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel. These valves are those whose associated isolation instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE according to LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment and Drywell Isolation Instrumentation," Function 5.b. Additional valves are required to be OPERABLE to prevent release of radioactive material during a postulated fuel handling accident involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours). These valves are those whose associated isolation instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE according to LCO 3.3.6.1, "Function 2.g." (This does not include the valves that isolate the associated instrumentation.)

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by a Note allowing penetration flow path(s) to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.1.3.7 (continued)

each automatic PCIV will actuate to its isolation position on a primary containment isolation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.1.7 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass this Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.1.3.8

The analyses in Reference 2 is based on leakage that is less than the specified leakage rate. Leakage through any single main steam line must be ≤ 100 scfh when tested at a pressure of 11.5 psig. Leakage through all four steam lines must be ≤ 250 scfh when tested at P_a (11.5 psig). The MSIV leakage rate must be verified to be in accordance with the leakage test requirements of Reference 3, as modified by approved exemptions. A Note is added to this SR which states that these valves are only required to meet this leakage limit in MODES 1, 2 and 3. In the other conditions, the Reactor Coolant System is not pressurized and specific primary containment leakage limits are not required.

SR 3.6.1.3.9

Surveillance of hydrostatically tested lines provides assurance that the calculation assumptions of Reference 2 is met.

This SR is modified by a Note that states these valves are only required to meet the combined leakage rate in MODES 1, 2, and 3 since this is when the Reactor Coolant System is

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BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

2. closed by a manual valve, blind flange, rupture disk, or de-activated automatic valve or damper secured in a closed position, except as provided in LCO 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)";
 - b. All auxiliary building and enclosure building equipment hatches and blowout panels are closed and sealed;
 - c. The door in each access to the auxiliary building and enclosure building is closed, except for normal entry and exit;
 - d. The sealing mechanism, e.g., welds, bellows, or O-rings, associated with each secondary containment penetration is OPERABLE; and
 - e. The standby gas treatment system is OPERABLE, except as provided in LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment System."
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APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

There are three principal accidents for which credit is taken for secondary containment OPERABILITY. These are a LOCA (Ref. 1), a fuel handling accident involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours) (Ref. 2). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to each of these limiting events; however, its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis, and that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structure will be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued) to the environment. For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum can be established and maintained.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) or during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment. Due to radioactive decay, secondary containment is required to be OPERABLE only during that fuel movement involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours).

ACTIONS

A.1

If secondary containment is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours. The 4 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal.

B.1 and B.2

If the secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4

The SGT System exhausts the secondary containment atmosphere to the environment through appropriate treatment equipment. To ensure that all fission products are treated, SR 3.6.4.1.3 verifies that the SGT System will rapidly establish and maintain a pressure in the secondary containment that is less than the lowest postulated pressure external to the secondary containment boundary. This is confirmed by demonstrating that one OPERABLE SGT subsystem will draw down the secondary containment to ≥ 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge in ≤ 180 seconds. This cannot be accomplished if the secondary containment boundary is not intact. SR 3.6.4.1.4 demonstrates that each OPERABLE SGT subsystem can maintain ≥ 0.266 inches of vacuum water gauge for 1 hour at a flow rate ≤ 4000 cfm. The 1 hour test period allows secondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state conditions. Therefore, these two tests are used to ensure secondary containment boundary integrity. Since these SRs are secondary containment tests, they need not be performed with each SGT subsystem. The SGT subsystems are tested on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, however, to ensure that in addition to the requirements of LCO 3.6.4.3, either SGT subsystem will perform this test. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 15.6.5.
 2. UFSAR, Section 15.7.4.
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BASES

BACKGROUND
(continued)

Analyses have shown that in addition to building leakage paths, the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) has the capacity to maintain secondary containment negative pressure assuming the failure of all nonqualified lines 2 inches and smaller. In the absence of other active failures, analyses have shown that the required negative pressure can be maintained given the additional failure of a single nonisolated line as large as 4 inches. As a result, the following lines which penetrate the secondary containment and terminate there (i.e., they do not continue through the secondary containment and also penetrate the primary containment) are provided with a single isolation valve, rather than two, at the secondary penetration:

- a. 4-inch makeup water supply line
- b. 3-inch domestic water supply line
- c. 4-inch RHR backwash line
- d. 3-inch backwash transfer pump discharge line
- e. 3-inch floor and equipment drain line

The single isolation valve for each of the above lines is an air-operated valve which fails closed; in addition, each operator is provided with redundant solenoid valves which receive actuation signals from redundant sources. In this manner, it is ensured that, given any single failure, only one of the above lines will be nonisolated, which as stated above is within the capacity of the SGTS.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The SCIVs must be OPERABLE to ensure the secondary containment barrier to fission product releases is established. The principal accidents for which the secondary containment boundary is required are a loss of coolant accident (Ref. 1), a fuel handling accident involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours) (Ref. 3). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to each of these limiting

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued) Maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE with isolation times within limits ensures that fission products will remain trapped inside secondary containment so that they can be treated by the SGT System prior to discharge to the environment.

SCIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO SCIVs form a part of the secondary containment boundary. The SCIV safety function is related to control of offsite radiation releases resulting from DBAs.

The power operated isolation dampers and valves are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits. Additionally, power operated automatic dampers and valves are required to actuate on an automatic isolation signal.

The normally closed isolation dampers and valves, rupture disks, or blind flanges are considered OPERABLE when manual dampers and valves are closed or open in accordance with appropriate administrative controls, automatic dampers and valves are de-activated and secured in their closed position, rupture disks or blind flanges are in place. The SCIVs covered by this LCO, along with their associated stroke times, if applicable, are listed in the applicable plant procedures.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to the primary containment that leaks to the secondary containment. Therefore, OPERABILITY of SCIVs is required.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining SCIVs OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) or during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours). Moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY Due to radioactive decay, the SCIVs are required to be
 (continued) OPERABLE only during that fuel movement involving the
 handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has
 occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous
 24 hours).

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued) humidity of the airstream to less than 70% (Ref. 2). The prefilter removes large particulate matter, while the HEPA filter is provided to remove fine particulate matter and protect the charcoal from fouling. The charcoal adsorber removes gaseous elemental iodine and organic iodides, and the final HEPA filter is provided to collect any carbon fines exhausted from the charcoal adsorber.

The SGT System automatically starts and operates in response to actuation signals indicative of conditions or an accident that could require operation of the system. Following initiation, both enclosure building recirculation fans and both charcoal filter train fans start. SGT System flows are controlled by modulating inlet vanes installed on the charcoal filter train exhaust fans and two position volume control dampers installed in branch ducts to individual regions of the secondary containment.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The design basis for the SGT System is to mitigate the consequences of a loss of coolant accident and fuel handling accidents. Due to radioactive decay, the SGT System is required to be OPERABLE to mitigate only those fuel handling accidents involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours) (Ref. 2). For all events analyzed, the SGT System is shown to be automatically initiated to reduce, via filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material released to the environment.

The SGT System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO Following a DBA, a minimum of one SGT subsystem is required to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases. Meeting the LCO requirements for two operable subsystems ensures operation of at least one SGT subsystem in the event of a single active failure.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required during these MODES.

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABILITY (continued) In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) or during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment. Due to radioactive decay, the SGT System is required to be OPERABLE only during fuel movement involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours).

ACTIONS

A.1

With one SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem is adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function. However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time is based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT subsystem and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 and B.2

If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

(continued)

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.3 Control Room Fresh Air (CRFA) System

BASES

BACKGROUND

The CRFA System provides a radiologically controlled environment from which the unit can be safely operated following a Design Basis Accident (DBA).

The safety related function of the CRFA System used to control radiation exposure consists of redundant isolation dampers in each inlet and exhaust flow path. The system also includes two independent and redundant high efficiency air filtration subsystems for treatment of recirculated air or outside supply air. Each subsystem consists of a demister, an electric heater, a prefilter, a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, an activated charcoal adsorber section (optional), a second HEPA filter, a fan, and the associated ductwork and dampers. Demisters remove water droplets from the airstream. Prefilters and HEPA filters remove particulate matter that may be radioactive. The charcoal adsorbers, if utilized, provide a holdup period for gaseous iodine, allowing time for decay.

With the implementation of the alternative source term (Reference 7), the filtration of elemental and organic iodine is no longer credited in the accident analyses and is not a safety-related function. Parts of the CRFA System are operated to maintain the control room environment during normal operation. Upon receipt of the initiation signal(s) (indicative of conditions that could result in radiation exposure to control room personnel), the CRFA System automatically switches to the isolation mode of operation to prevent infiltration of contaminated air into the control room. A system of dampers isolates the control room. Control room air flow may be recirculated and processed through either of the two filter subsystems.

The CRFA System is designed to maintain the control room environment for a 30 day continuous occupancy after a DBA, per the requirements of GDC 19. CRFA System operation in maintaining the control room habitability is discussed in the UFSAR, Sections 6.5.1 and 9.4.1 (Refs. 1 and 2, respectively).

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The ability of the CRFA System to maintain the habitability of the control room is an explicit assumption for the safety analyses presented in the UFSAR, Chapters 6 and 15 (Refs. 3 and 4, respectively).

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

The CRFA System is assumed to isolate the control room in response to manual initiation following a loss of coolant accident, main steam line break, or control rod drop accident. Analyses of these events have assumed the control room would be isolated for at least three days. At that time, isolation was terminated and the control room was again ventilated with filtered (i.e., HEPA) outside air. Safety analysis of the fuel handling accident has demonstrated that control room isolation is not required for this accident. The radiological doses to control room personnel as a result of the various DBAs are summarized in Reference 4. No single active or passive failure will cause the loss of outside or recirculated air from the control room.

The CRFA System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

Two redundant subsystems of the CRFA System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other subsystem. Total system failure could result in a failure to meet the dose requirements of GDC 19 in the event of a DBA.

The CRFA System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to control operator exposure are OPERABLE in both subsystems. A subsystem is considered OPERABLE when its associated:

- a. Fan is OPERABLE;
- b. HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber, if utilized, are not excessively restricting flow and are capable of performing their filtration functions; and
- c. Heater, demister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are OPERABLE, and air circulation can be maintained.

In addition, the control room boundary must be maintained, including the integrity of the walls, floors, ceilings, ductwork, and access doors. The control room boundary is maintained when the boundary can be rapidly isolated and established to meet in-leakage limits as outlined in Ref. 6.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the CRFA System must be OPERABLE to control operator exposure during and following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission product release.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the CRFA System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS

A.1

With one CRFA subsystem inoperable, the inoperable CRFA subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE CRFA subsystem is adequate to perform control room radiation protection. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of CRFA System function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining subsystem can provide the required capabilities.

B.1 and B.2

In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable CRFA subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

C.1 and C.2

During OPDRVs, if the inoperable CRFA subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE CRFA subsystem may be placed in the isolation mode. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action C.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

D.1

If both CRFA subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the CRFA System may not be capable of performing the intended function and the unit is in a condition outside of the accident analyses. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

E.1

During OPDRVs, with two CRFA subsystems inoperable, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.3.1

This SR verifies that a subsystem in a standby mode starts from the control room on demand and continues to operate. Standby systems should be checked periodically to ensure that they start and function properly. As the environmental and normal operating conditions of this system are not severe, testing each subsystem once every month provides an adequate check on this system. Monthly heater operation dries out any moisture accumulated in the charcoal, if present, from humidity in the ambient air. Systems with heaters must be operated for ≥ 10 continuous hours with the heaters energized. Furthermore, the 31 day Frequency is based on the known reliability of the equipment and the two subsystem redundancy available.

SR 3.7.3.2

This SR verifies that the required CRFA testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, and minimum system flow rate. Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS
(continued)

SR 3.7.3.3

This SR verifies that each CRFA subsystem starts and operates and that the isolation valves close in ≤ 4 seconds on an actual or simulated initiation signal. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.7.1.1 overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety function. While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power, operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.5.1.
 2. UFSAR, Section 9.4.1.
 3. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
 4. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
 5. Deleted
 6. Engineering Evaluation Request 95/6213, Engineering Evaluation Request Response Partial Response dated 12/18/95.
 7. Amendment 145 to GGNS Operating License.
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B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

B 3.7.4 Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System

BASES

BACKGROUND The Control Room AC System provides temperature control for the control room.

 The Control Room AC System consists of two independent, redundant subsystems that provide cooling and heating of recirculated control room air. Each subsystem consists of heating coils, cooling coils, fans, chillers, compressors, ductwork, dampers, and instrumentation and controls to provide for control room temperature control.

 The Control Room AC System is designed to provide a controlled environment under both normal and accident conditions. The Control Room AC System operation in maintaining the control room temperature is discussed in the UFSAR, Sections 6.4 and 9.4.1 (Refs. 1 and 2, respectively).

APPLICABLE The design basis of the Control Room AC System is to
SAFETY ANALYSES maintain the control room temperature for a 30 day
 continuous occupancy.

 The Control Room AC System components are arranged in redundant safety related subsystems. During emergency operation, the Control Room AC System maintains a habitable environment and ensures the OPERABILITY of components in the control room. A single active failure of a component of the Control Room AC System, assuming a loss of offsite power, does not impair the ability of the system to perform its design function. Redundant detectors and controls are provided for control room temperature control. The Control Room AC System is designed in accordance with Seismic Category I requirements. The Control Room AC System is capable of removing sensible and latent heat loads from the control room, including consideration of equipment heat loads and personnel occupancy requirements to ensure equipment OPERABILITY.

 The ability of the Control Room AC System to maintain the control room temperature during Modes 1, 2, and 3 is implicitly assumed in the analyses of the design basis

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

accidents (e.g., LOCA, main steam line break). Of the events which can occur in Modes 4 or 5, however, only the potential to drain the reactor vessel is postulated to result in significant radioactive releases.

The Control Room AC System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO Two independent and redundant subsystems of the Control Room AC System are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that at least one is available, assuming a single failure disables the other subsystem. Total system failure could result in the equipment operating temperature exceeding limits.

The Control Room AC System is considered OPERABLE when the individual components necessary to maintain the control room temperature are OPERABLE in both subsystems. These components include the cooling coils, fans, chillers, compressors, ductwork, dampers, and associated instrumentation and controls. The heating coils are not required for Control Room AC System OPERABILITY.

APPLICABILITY In MODE 1, 2, or 3, the Control Room AC System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the control room temperature will not exceed equipment OPERABILITY limits.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a Design Basis Accident are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the Control Room AC System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS

A.1

With one control room AC subsystem inoperable, the inoperable control room AC subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE control room AC subsystem is adequate to perform the control room air conditioning function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of the control room air conditioning

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

function. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation, the consideration that the remaining subsystem can provide the required protection, and the availability of alternate cooling methods.

B.1 and B.2

If both control room AC subsystems are inoperable, the Control Room AC System may not be capable of performing its intended function. Therefore, the control room area temperature is required to be monitored to ensure that temperature is being maintained low enough that equipment in the control room is not adversely affected. With the control room temperature being maintained within the temperature limit, 7 days is allowed to restore a control room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status. This Completion Time is reasonable considering that the control room temperature is being maintained within limits, the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation, and the availability of alternate cooling methods.

C.1 and C.2

In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the control room area temperature cannot be maintained less than or equal to 90°F or if the inoperable control room AC subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes risk. To achieve this status the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and in MODE 4 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

D.1 and D.2

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During OPDRVs, if Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE control room AC subsystem may be placed immediately in operation. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

E.1

During OPDRVs if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B is not met, action must be taken to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, actions must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.7.4.1

This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to remove the control room heat load assumed in the safety analysis. The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation. The 18 month Frequency is appropriate since significant degradation of the Control Room AC System is not expected over this time period.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 6.4.
 2. UFSAR, Section 9.4.1.
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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.2 AC Sources – Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND	A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources – Operating."
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES	<p>The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment ensures that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">a. The unit can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; andc. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident involving recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, AC electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours).
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In general, when the unit is shut down the Technical Specifications (TS) requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or loss of all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs), which are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3, have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and the corresponding stresses

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

result in the probabilities of occurrence significantly reduced or eliminated, and minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCOs for required systems.

During MODES 1, 2, and 3, various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed within the ACTIONS. This allowance is in recognition that

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

support, assuming a loss of the offsite circuit. Similarly, when the high pressure core spray (HPCS) is required to be OPERABLE, a separate offsite circuit to the Division 3 Class 1E onsite electrical power distribution subsystem, or an OPERABLE Division 3 DG, ensure an additional source of power for the HPCS. This additional source for Division 3 is not necessarily required to be connected to be OPERABLE. Either the circuit required by LCO Item a, or a circuit required to meet LCO Item c may be connected, with the second source available for connection. Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuit(s) and DG(s) ensures the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents involving recently irradiated fuel, reactor vessel draindown).

The qualified offsite circuit(s) must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage while connected to their respective ESF bus(es), and accepting required loads during an accident. Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the UFSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the plant. The offsite circuit consists of incoming breakers and disconnects to the ESF transformers and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to all 4.16 kV ESF buses required by LCO 3.8.8.

The required DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage, and accepting required loads. This sequence must be accomplished within 10 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as: DG in standby with the engine hot and DG in standby with the engine at ambient conditions. Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillances, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode.

Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY. In addition, proper load sequence operation is

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued) an integral part of offsite circuit and DG OPERABILITY since its inoperability impacts the ability to start and maintain energized loads required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8.

It is acceptable for divisions to be cross tied during shutdown conditions, permitting a single offsite power circuit to supply all required AC electrical power distribution subsystems.

As described in Applicable Safety Analyses, in the event of an accident during shutdown, the TS are designed to maintain the plant in a condition such that, even with a single failure, the plant will not be in immediate difficulty.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment provide assurance that:

- a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;
- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident involving recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours) are available;
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.1.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving recently irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

A.1

An offsite circuit is considered inoperable if it is not available to one required ESF division. If two or more ESF 4.16 kV buses are required per LCO 3.8.8, division(s) with offsite power available may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, recently irradiated fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with no offsite power available, appropriate restrictions can be implemented in accordance with the affected required feature(s) LCOs' ACTIONS.

A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, B.1, B.2, B.3, and B.4

With the offsite circuit not available to all required divisions, the option still exists to declare all required features inoperable. Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With the required DG inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment, and activities that could potentially result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to initiate action immediately to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

(continued)

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.5 DC Sources – Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources – Operating."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE. The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators, emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment ensures that:

- a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident involving recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, DC electrical power is only required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours).

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO One DC electrical power subsystem consisting of one battery, one battery charger, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated bus within the division, associated with Division

(continued)

BASES

LCO
(continued)

1 or 2 onsite Class 1E DC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown" is required to be OPERABLE. Similarly, when the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System is required to be OPERABLE, the Division 3 DC electrical power subsystem associated with the Division 3 onsite Class 1E DC electrical power distribution subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8 is required to be OPERABLE. In addition to the preceding subsystems required to be OPERABLE, a Class 1E battery or battery charger and the associated control equipment and interconnecting cabling capable of supplying power to the remaining Division 1 or 2 onsite Class 1E DC electrical power distribution subsystem(s), when portions of both Division 1 and 2 DC electrical power distribution subsystem are required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8. This ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents involving recently irradiated fuel and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

APPLICABILITY

The DC electrical power sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment provide assurance that:

- a. Required features to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;
- b. Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident involving recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours) are available;
- c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.4.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

A.1

Condition A represents one division with a loss of ability to completely respond long term to an event, and a potential loss of ability to remain energized during normal operation. Since eventual failure of the battery to maintain the required battery cell parameters is highly probable, it is imperative that the operator's attention focus on stabilizing the unit, minimizing the potential for complete loss of DC power to the affected division. The additional time provided by the Completion Time is consistent with the capability of the battery to maintain its short term capability to respond to a design basis event.

A Note is added to take exception to the allowance of LCO 3.0.4 to enter MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability. Even though Condition A Required Actions do not in themselves require a plant shutdown, or require exiting the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability, the condition of the DC system is not such that extended operation is expected. Therefore, the Note would require restoration of an inoperable battery charger to OPERABLE status prior to starting up or commencing recently irradiated fuel movement. This exception is not intended to preclude the allowance of LCO 3.0.4 to always enter MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability as a result of a plant shutdown.

B.1

If the battery cell parameters cannot be maintained within the Category A limits, the short term capability of the battery is also degraded and the battery must be declared inoperable.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

(continued)

C.1, C.2.1, C.2.2, C.2.3, and C.2.4

If more than one DC distribution subsystem is required according to LCO 3.8.8, the DC subsystems remaining OPERABLE with one or more DC power sources inoperable for reasons other than an inoperable battery charger may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare required features inoperable with associated DC power source(s) inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected system LCOs' ACTIONS. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.5.1

SR 3.8.5.1 requires performance of all Surveillances required by SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8. Therefore, see the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.4 for a discussion of each SR.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DC sources from being discharged below their capability to provide the required

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

A.1 (continued)

The Condition A worst scenario is one division without AC power (i.e., no offsite power to the division and the associated DG inoperable). In this Condition, the unit is more vulnerable to a complete loss of AC power. It is, therefore, imperative that the unit operators' attention be focused on minimizing the potential for loss of power to the remaining division by stabilizing the unit, and on restoring power to the affected division. The 8 hour time limit before requiring a unit shutdown in this Condition is acceptable because:

- a. There is potential for decreased safety if the unit operators' attention is diverted from the evaluations and actions necessary to restore power to the affected division to the actions associated with taking the unit to shutdown within this time limit.
- b. The potential for an event in conjunction with a single failure of a redundant component in the division with AC power. (The redundant component is verified OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 5.7.10, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP).")

The second Completion Time for Required Action A.1 establishes a limit on the maximum time allowed for any combination of required distribution subsystems to be inoperable during any single contiguous occurrence of failing to meet the LCO. If Condition A is entered while, for instance, a DC bus is inoperable and subsequently returned OPERABLE, the LCO may already have been not met for up to 2 hours. This situation could lead to a total duration of 10 hours, since initial failure of the LCO, to restore the AC distribution system. At this time, a DC circuit could again become inoperable, and AC distribution could be restored OPERABLE. This could continue indefinitely.

This Completion Time allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." This results in establishing the "time zero" at the time the LCO was initially not met, instead of at the time Condition A was entered. The 16 hour Completion Time is an

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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.8 Distribution Systems – Shutdown

BASES

BACKGROUND A description of the AC and DC electrical power distribution systems is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems – Operating."

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC and DC electrical power sources and associated power distribution subsystems during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment ensures that:

- a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;
- b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and
- c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident involving recently irradiated fuel. Due to radioactive decay, AC and DC electrical power is only

(continued)

BASES

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)

required to mitigate fuel handling accidents involving the handling of recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours).

The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features. This LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of Technical Specifications' required systems, equipment, and components—both specifically addressed by their own LCOs, and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY.

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents involving recently irradiated fuel and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown).

APPLICABILITY The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary or secondary containment provide assurance that:

- a. Systems to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;
- b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident involving recently irradiated fuel (i.e., fuel that has occupied part of a critical reactor core within the previous 24 hours) are available;
- c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and
- d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown or refueling condition.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, and A.2.5

Although redundant required features may require redundant divisions of electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem division may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, recently irradiated fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare required features associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies in the primary and secondary containment and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the plant safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required residual heat removal – shutdown cooling (RHR-SDC) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the RHR-SDC ACTIONS

(continued)