Distribution:

Docket	OELD
NRC PDR	OI&E (5)
Local PDR	B. Jones (4)
ORB #2 Reading	B. Scharf (10)
D. Eisenhut	J. Wetmore
R. Purple	ACRS (16)
T. Novak	Clare Miles (OPA)
R. Tedesco	R. Diggs
G. Lainas	H. Denton
J. Roe	J. Heltemes, AEOD
S. Norris	NSIC
P. Polk	TERA
	Chairman, ASLAB

Docket No. 50-220

Mr. Donald P. Dise
Vice President - Engineering
c/o Miss Catherine R. Seibert
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
300 Erie Boulevard West
Syracuse, New York 13202

Dear Mr. Dise:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 39 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-63 for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your submittal dated September 25, 1979, as supplemented October 22, 1980.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifications to allow plant operation at reduced power with three primary coolant recirculation loops operable; i.e., N-2 loop operation. Nine Mile Point will be allowed to operate with two recirculation loops either idle or isolated. Please be advised that this approval has been forthcoming since the assumption of uniform flow for reactor safety analyses remains valid for Nine Mile Point, Unit 1.

A copy of the Safety Evaluation and Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 39 to DPR-63
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

8101200278

Concurrence as to Form and Amdt and F.R. Notice only

*~~SEE PREVIOUS YELLOW FOR CONCURRENCE~~

OFFICE	ORB #2	ORB #2	ORB #2	DL:OR	OELD	
SURNAME	SNorris	PPolk:kf	TIppolito	TNovak	BScharf	
DATE	12/10/80	12/8/80	12/10/80	12/10/80	12/11/80	

cc:
Eugene B. Thomas, Jr., Esquire
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.
Suite 1100
Washington, D. C. 20036

T. K. BeBoer, Director
Technological Development Programs
State of New York
Energy Office
Swan Street Building
CORE 1 - Second Floor
Empire State Plaza
Albany, New York 12223

Mr. Robert P. Jones, Supervisor
Town of Scriba
R. D. #4
Oswego, New York 13126

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
ATTN: Mr. Thomas Perkins
Plant Superintendent
Nine Mile Point Plant
300 Erie Boulevard West
Syracuse, New York 13202

Director, Criteria and Standards
Division
Office of Radiation Programs (ANR-460)
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Washington, D. C. 20460

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
Region II Office
ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR
26 Federal Plaza
New York, New York 10007

State University at Oswego
Penfield Library - Documents
Oswego, New York 13126

Resident Inspector
c/o U. S. NRC
P. O. Box 126
Lycoming, New York 13093

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-220

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 39
License No. DPR-63

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) dated September 25, 1979, as supplemented October 22, 1980, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-63 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 39 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 12, 1980

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 39

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-63

DOCKET NO. 50-220

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove	Insert
63	63
64a	64a
64b	64b
64c	64c, d, e
70a	70a
70b	70b
70c	70c,d

Marginal lines indicate area of change.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.7 FUEL RODS

Applicability:

The Limiting Conditions for Operation associated with the fuel rods apply to those parameters which monitor the fuel rod operating conditions.

Objective:

The objective of the Limiting Conditions for Operation is to assure the performance of the fuel rods.

Specification:

a. Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR)

During power operation, the APLHGR for each type of fuel as a function of average planar exposure shall not exceed the limiting value shown in Figures 3.1.7a, 3.1.7b, and 3.1.7c. If at any time during power operation it is determined by normal surveillance that the limiting value for APLHGR is being exceeded at any node in the core, action shall be initiated within 15 minutes to restore operation to within the prescribed limits. If the APLHGR at all nodes in the core is not returned to within the prescribed limits within two (2) hours, reactor power reductions shall be initiated at a rate not less than 10% per hour until APLHGR at all nodes is within the prescribed limits.

Amendment No. 5, 16, 24, 34, 39

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

4.1.7 FUEL RODS

Applicability:

The Surveillance Requirements apply to the parameters which monitor the fuel rod operating conditions.

Objective:

The objective of the Surveillance Requirements is to specify the type and frequency of surveillance to be applied to the fuel rods.

Specification:

a. Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR)

The APLHGR for each type of fuel as a function of average planar exposure shall be determined daily during reactor operation at $\geq$ 25% rated thermal power.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

c. Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)

During power operation MCPR shall be $\geq$ 1.41 for 8x8 fuel and $\geq$ 1.38 for 8x8R fuel at rated power and flow. If at any time during power operation it is determined by normal surveillance that these limits are no longer met, action shall be initiated within 15 minutes to restore operation to within the prescribed limits. If all the operating MCPRs are not returned to within the prescribed limits within two (2) hours, reactor power reductions shall be initiated at a rate not less than 10% per hour until MCPR is within the prescribed limits.

For core flows other than rated the MCPR limits shall be the limits identified above times K_f where K_f is as shown in Figure 3.1.7-1.

d. Power Flow Relationship During Power Operation

The power/flow relationship shall not exceed the limiting values shown in Figure 3.1.7.aa.

Amendment No. 34, 39

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

c. Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)

MCPR shall be determined daily during reactor power operation at >25% rated thermal power.

d. Power Flow Relationship

Compliance with the power flow relationship in Section 3.1.7.d shall be determined daily during reactor operation.

e. Partial Loop Operation

Under partial loop operation, surveillance requirements 4.1.7a, b, c, and d above are applicable.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT
If at any time during power operation it is determined by normal surveillance that the limiting value for the power/flow relationship is being exceeded, action shall be initiated within 15 minutes to restore operation to within the prescribed limits. If the power/flow relationship is not returned to within the prescribed limits within two (2) hours, reactor power reductions shall be initiated at a rate not less than 10% per hour until the power/flow relationship is within the prescribed limits.	
e. Partial Loop Operation During power operation, partial loop operation is permitted provided the following conditions are met. When operating with three or more recirculation loops in operation and the remaining loops unisolated, the reactor may operate at 100 percent of full licensed power level in accordance with Figure 3.1.7aa. No reduction in the APLHGR for each fuel type is required. When operating with four recirculation loops in operation and one loop isolated, or with three recirculation loops in operation and one loop isolated and the remaining loop unisolated, the reactor may operate at 100 percent of full licensed power in accordance with Figure 3.1.7aa and an APLHGR not to exceed 98 percent of the limiting values shown in Figures 3.1.7a, 3.1.7b, and 3.1.7c, provided the following conditions are met for the isolated loop. 1. Suction valve, discharge valve and discharge bypass valve in the isolated loop shall be in the closed position and the associated motor breakers shall be locked in the open position.	

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT
2. Associated pump motor circuit breaker shall be opened and the breaker removed. If these conditions are not met, core power shall be restricted to 90.5 percent of full licensed power. When operating with three recirculation loops in operation and the two remaining loops isolated, the reactor may operate at 100 percent of full licensed power in accordance with Figure 3.1.7aa and an APLHGR not to exceed 96 percent of the limiting values shown in Figures 3.1.7a, 3.1.7b, and 3.1.7c, provided conditions 1 and 2 above are met for the isolated loops. If these conditions are not met, core power shall be restricted to 90.5 percent of full licensed power. Power operation is not permitted with less than three recirculation loops in operation. If at any time during power operation it is determined by normal surveillance that the limiting value for APLHGR under one and two isolated loop operation is being exceeded at any node in the core, action shall be initiated within 15 minutes to restore operation to within the prescribed limits. If the APLHGR at all nodes in the core is not returned to within the prescribed limits for one and two isolated loop operation within two (2) hours, reactor power reduction shall be initiated at a rate not less than 10 percent per hour until APLHGR at all nodes is within the prescribed limits.	

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

f. Recirculation Loops

During all operating conditions with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, at least two (2) recirculation loop suction valves and their associated discharge valves will be in the full open position except when the reactor vessel is flooded to.a level above the main steam nozzles or when the steam separators and dryer are removed.

g. Reporting Requirements

If any of the limiting values identified in Specification 3.1.7.a, b, c, d, and e are exceeded, a Reportable Occurrence Report shall be submitted. If the corrective action is taken, as described, a thirty-day written report will meet the requirements of this Specification.

Figure 3.1.7.

NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1

LIMITING POWER FLOW LINE



of the plant, a MCPR evaluation will be made at the 25% thermal power level with minimum recirculation pump speed. The MCPR margin will thus be demonstrated such that future MCPR evaluations below this power level will be shown to be unnecessary. The daily requirement for calculating MCPR above 25% rated thermal power is sufficient since power distribution shifts are very slow when there have not been significant power or control rod changes. The requirement for calculating MCPR when a limiting control rod pattern is approached ensures that MCPR will be known following a change in power or power shape (regardless of magnitude) that could place operation at a thermal limit.

Figure 3.1.7-1 is used for calculating MCPR during operation at other than rated conditions. For the case of automatic flow control the K_f factor is determined such that any automatic increase in power (due to flow control) will always result in arriving at the nominal required MCPR at 100% power. For manual flow control, the K_f is determined such that an inadvertent increase in core flow (i.e., operator error or recirculation pump speed controller failure) would result in arriving at the 99.9% limit MCPR when core flow reaches the maximum possible core flow corresponding to a particular setting of the recirculation pump MG set scoop tube maximum speed control limiting set screws. These screws are to be calibrated and set to a particular value and whenever the plant is operating in manual flow control the K_f defined by that setting of the screws is to be used in the determination of required MCPR. This will assure that the reduction in MCPR associated with an inadvertent flow increase always satisfies the 99.9% requirement. Irrespective of the scoop tube setting, the required MCPR is never allowed to be less than the nominal MCPR (i.e., K_f is never less than unity).

Power/Flow Relationship

The power/flow curve is the locus of critical power as a function of flow from which the occurrence of abnormal operating transients will yield results within defined plant safety limits. Each transient and postulated accident applicable to operation of the plant was analyzed along the power/flow line. The analysis[7] justifies the operating envelope bounded by the power/flow curve as long as other operating limits are satisfied. Operation under the power/flow line is designed to enable the direct ascension to full power within the design basis for the plant.

Partial Loop Operation

The requirements of Specification 3.1.7e for partial loop operation in which the idle loop is isolated precludes the inadvertent startup of a recirculation pump with a cold leg. However, if these conditions cannot be met, power level is restricted to 90.5 percent power based on current transient analysis (Reference 9).

The results of the ECCS calculation are not affected by one or more recirculation loops being unisolated and out of service. This is due to the fact that no credit is taken for extended nucleate boiling caused by flow coastdown in the unbroken loops (Reference 10).

The results of the ECCS calculations are affected by one or more recirculation loops being isolated and out of service. The mass of water in the isolated loops unavailable during blowdown results in a slightly earlier uncovery time for the hot node. This results in an increase in the peak clad temperature. To assure peak clad temperatures remain below 2200 F during steady state power operation with one or two recirculation loops isolated, analysis has shown that the average linear heat generation rate for each fuel type shall be reduced 2 percent and 4 percent respectively.

Partial loop operation and its effect on lower plenum flow distribution is summarized in Reference 11. Since the lower plenum hydraulic design in a non-jet pump reactor is virtually identical to a jet pump reactor, application of these results is justified. Additionally, non-jet pump plants contain a cylindrical baffle plate which surrounds the guide tubes and distributes the impinging water jet and forces flow in a circumferential direction around the outside of the baffle.

Recirculation Loops

Requiring the suction and discharge for at least two (2) recirculation loops to be full open assures that an adequate flow path exists from the annular region between the pressure vessel wall and the core shroud, to the core region. This provides for communication between those areas thus assuring that reactor water level instrument readings are indicative of the water level in the core region.

When the reactor vessel is flooded to the level of the main steam line nozzle, communication between the core region and annulus exists above the core to ensure that indicative water level monitoring in the core region exists. When the steam separators and dryer are removed, safety limit 2.1.1d and e requires water level to be higher than 9 feet below minimum normal water level (Elevation 302'9"). This level is above the core shroud elevation which would ensure communication between the core region and annulus thus ensuring indicative water level monitoring in the core region. Therefore, maintaining a recirculation loop in the full open position in these two instances are not necessary to ensure indicative water level monitoring.

Reporting Requirements

The LCO's associated with monitoring the fuel rod operating conditions are required to be met at all times, i.e., there is no allowable time in which the plant can knowingly exceed the limiting values of MAPLHGR, LHGR, MCPR, or Power/Flow Ratio. It is a requirement, as stated in Specifications 3.1.7a, b, c and d that if at any time during power operation, it is determined that the limiting values for MAPLHGR, LHGR, MCPR, or Power/Flow Ratio are exceeded, action is then initiated to restore operation to within the prescribed limits. This action is initiated as soon as normal surveillance indicates that an operating limit has been reached. Each event involving operation beyond a specified limit shall be reported as a Reportable Occurrence. If the specified corrective action described in the LCO's was taken, a thirty-day written report is acceptable.

(1) "Fuel Densification Effects on General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Fuel," Supplements 6, 7 and 8, NEDM-10735, August 1973.

(2) Supplement 1 to Technical Report on Densifications of General Electric Reactor Fuels, December 14, 1974 (USA Regulatory Staff).

(3) Communication: V. A. Moore to I. S. Mitchell, "Modified GE Model for Fuel Densification," Docket 50-321, March 27, 1974.

(4) "General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Generic Reload Application for 8 x 8 Fuel," NEDO-20360, Supplement 1 to Revision 1, December 1974.

(5) "General Electric Company Analytical Model for Loss of Coolant Analysis in Accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix K," NEDO-20566.

(6) General Electric Refill Reflood Calculation (Supplement to SAFE Code Description) transmitted to the USAEC by letter, G. L. Gyorey to Victor Stello Jr., dated December 20, 1974.

(7) "Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, Load Line Limit Analysis," NEDO-24012.

(8) Licensing Topical Report General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Generic Reload Fuel Application, NEDE-24011-P-A, August, 1978.

(9) Final Safety Analysis Report, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, June 1967.

(10) NRC Safety Evaluation, Amendment No. 24 to DPR-63 contained in a letter from George Lear, NRC, to D. P. Dise dated May 15, 1978.

(11) "Core Flow Distribution in a General Electric Boiling Water Reactor as Measured in Quad Cities Unit 1," NEDO-10722A.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 39 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-63

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-220

I. INTRODUCTION

By letter dated September 25, 1979 and as supplemented by letter dated October 22, 1980, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, the licensee, proposed changes to the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 Technical Specifications. These changes specify allowable operating conditions with three or more operable recirculation loops and the inoperable loops either isolated, unisolated or a combination thereof. The impact of inoperable recirculation loops on reactor flow distribution and coolant inventory as related to reactor safety analyses is considered in this evaluation.

II. EVALUATION

Partial loop operation and its effect on core flow distribution has been experimentally quantified in Reference 1. The measurements show that for a jet pump reactor core flow remains uniform under partial loop operation. The lower plenum hydraulic design in a non-jet pump reactor (Nine Mile Point) is essentially identical to the jet pump reactor design. Additionally, Nine Mile Point 1 has baffle plates in the lower plenum to uniformly distribute the impinging water flow from recirculation pump discharge to the core. Therefore flow would be uniform under partial loop operations. The assumption of uniform flow for reactor safety analyses remains valid.

For four loop operation with the idle loop isolated, the previous accident analyses for five loop operation are bounding except for the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The unavailable mass of water in the isolated loop during blowdown results in a slightly earlier uncovery time for the hot node. This results in an increase in the peak clad temperature of approximately 30°F, which is approximately equivalent to a 1.5 percent reduction in Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (MAPLHGR). To assure that the peak clad temperature remains below the 10 CFR 50 Appendix K limits the Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR) for each fuel type as a function of average planar exposure shall not exceed 98 percent of the MAPLHGR applicable to five pump operation during steady state power operation with one recirculation line isolated.

For three loop operation with two idle loops isolated, further increases in peak clad temperature would result during a postulated LOCA since an additional mass of water is unavailable during blowdown due to the second isolated loop. During a postulated LOCA, a second isolated loop would result in a further increase in the peak clad temperature and requires an additional 2 percent reduction in MAPLHGR. To assure that the peak clad temperature remains below the Appendix K limits, the APLHGR for each fuel type as a function of average planar exposure shall not exceed 96 percent of the MAPLHGR applied to five pump operation during steady state power operation with two recirculation lines isolated.

For three loop operation with one loop isolated and one loop unisolated, previous analyses for four loop operation with one loop isolated is bounding since loops out of service but unisolated have no effect on ECCS calculation or transient analyses.

Previous core-wide transient analyses for five loop operation are bounding for four loop and three loop operation with the idle loops isolated, except for the idle loop startup transient analysis. To preclude idle loop startup the licensee will be required by Technical Specifications to use procedural controls identical to those currently utilized for four loop operation with the idle loop isolated. These requirements for idle loop operation preclude the inadvertent startup of recirculation pumps and therefore remove the need for a power level restriction under partial loop operation. If these administrative procedures are removed, power level shall be restricted to 90.5 percent of rated. This is the power level for which an inadvertent startup of an idle loop has been analyzed and the consequences found acceptable. The results of this analysis are for idle loop startup with four pumps operating and it is applicable to three loop operation.

For one or two loops out of service but not isolated, the core flow and fluid inventory distribution in the core are the same as would be present with all loops in service. Therefore, there would be no affect on the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) calculation due to the out-of-service loop(s). This is due to the fact that no credit is taken for extended nucleate boiling caused by flow coastdown in the unbroken loops. Therefore, operation at the full MAPLHGR limits is acceptable with one or two loops out of service but not isolated.

For transient analyses the effect of backflow through unisolated, inoperable loops has been taken into account. The Technical Specifications power/flow line will be administratively reduced to assure that allowable power corresponds to actual core flow. For example, core flow is generally measured from venturi fluid dynamic characteristics in each pump discharge line. However, given backflow through unisolated, inoperable loops, actual core flow would be less than measured. The reduced power/flow line accounts for the backflow and the assumed power/flow condition for transient analyses remain valid. The adjustment is less than 0.3% of APRM power and will not

significantly affect reactor operations, so that the use of administrative procedures for this operation is considered appropriate. (The idle loop startup transient is not as severe as for the isolated loop case since the backflow keeps the unisolated, inoperable loops close to reactor temperature thereby minimizing the reactivity insertion.)

In the evaluation of MCPR safety limit the licensee has concluded that increase TIP noise uncertainty under partial loop operating conditions may require an increase in safety limit MCPR. The licensee has committed to conservatively increase the MCPR safety limit by 0.01 during three loop operation to account for the potential increased uncertainty. This requirement shall be incorporated into the Technical Specifications to assure compliance.

On the above bases, the proposed modifications to plant Technical Specifications and operating procedures acceptably account and restrict operation with three or more operable loops.

III. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

We have determined that this amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that this amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact, and pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

IV. CONCLUSION

We have concluded based on the considerations discussed above that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: December 12, 1980

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 50-220

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 39 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-63 to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) which revised the license and Technical Specifications for operation of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1 (the facility) located in Oswego County, New York. The amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifications to allow plant operation at reduced power with three primary coolant recirculation loops operable; i.e., N-2 loop operation.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated September 25, 1979 supplemented by letter dated October 22, 1980, (2) Amendment No. 39 to License No. DPR-63, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. and at the Oswego County Office Building, 46 East Bridge Street, Oswego, New York 13126. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Licensing.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 12th day of December, 1980.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Licensing