MAR 2 5 1977

Distribution
Docket
ORB #3
Local PDR
NRC PDR
VStello
KGoller/TJCarter
CParrish
GLear
SNowicki
Attorney, OELD
OI&E (5)
BJones (4)
BScharf (10)
JMcGough
DEisenhut
ACRS (16)
DRoss
JRBuchanan
TBAbernathy
OPA (Clare Miles)

Docket No. 50-220

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
ATTN: Mr. Gerald K. Rhode
Vice President - Engineering
300 Erie Boulevard West
Syracuse, New York 13202

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 14 to Facility License No. DPR-63 for Unit No. 1 of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station. This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications and is in response to your request dated March 10, 1977.

The amendment will allow lowering the reactor water level below the low-low-low level set point during major maintenance on the reactor vessel.

Copies of the related Safety Evaluation and the FEDERAL REGISTER Notice also are enclosed.

Sincerely,

Original signed by
D. M. Elliott
George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 14 to License DPR-63
2. Safety Evaluation
3. FEDERAL REGISTER Notice

cc w/encls:
See next page

Subject to final version approved

BCB 3/23/77
RW 3/22/77
3/23/77
3/22/77

OFFICE ➤	ORB #3	ORB #3	OELD	ORB #3	DOR	DOR
SURNAME ➤	CParrish	SNowicki:mjf		GLear	Butler/Baer	LShao
DATE ➤	3/22/77	3/22/77	3/23/77	3/25/77	3/23/77	3/23/77

NRC FORM 318 (9-76) NRCM 0240 ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 — 626-624

cc: Arvin E. Upton, Esquire
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae
1757 N Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Anthony Z. Roisman, Esquire
Roisman, Kessler and Cashdan
1025 15th Street, N. W.
5th Floor
Washington, D. C. 20005

Dr. William Seymour, Staff Coordinator
New York State Atomic Energy Council
New York State Department of Commerce
99 Washington Street
Albany, New York 12207

Mr. Robert P. Jones, Supervisor
Town of Scriba
R. D. #4
Oswego, New York 13126

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
ATTN: Mr. Thomas Perkins
Plant Superintendent
Nine Mile Point Plant
300 Erie Boulevard West
Syracuse, New York 13202

Dr. Neill Thomasson (AW-459)
Chief, Energy Systems Analysis Branch
Office of Radiation Programs
Environmental Protection Agency
401 M Street S. W.
Washington, D. C. 20460

Paul A. Giardina
Regional Radiation Representative
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
26 Federal Plaza
New York, New York 10007

Mr. Eugene G. Saloga, Applicant Coordinator
Nine Mile Point Energy Information Center
P.O. BOX 81
Lycoming, New York 13093

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-220

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 14
License No. DPR-63

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) dated March 10, 1977, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-63 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 14, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Donald M. Ellis

for George Lear, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: March 25, 1977

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 14

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-63

DOCKET NO. 50-220

Replace pages 6, 13, 52, 56, 197, 199, 204, 205, 207, 208, 210 and 231 with the attached revised pages. Add pages 6a, 53a, and page 232a.

SAFETY LIMIT

c. The neutron flux shall not exceed its scram setting for longer than 1.5 seconds as indicated by the process computer. When the process computer is out of service, a safety limit violation shall be assumed if the neutron flux exceeds the scram setting and control rod scram does not occur.

   To ensure that the Safety Limit established in Specifications 2.1.1a and 2.1.1b is not exceeded, each required scram shall be initiated by its expected scram signal. The Safety Limit shall be assumed to be exceeded when scram is accomplished by a means other than the expected scram signal.

d. Whenever the reactor is in the shutdown condition with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, the water level shall not be more than 7 feet 11 inches (127.1 inches indicator scale) below minimum normal water level (Elevation 302'9"), except as specified in "e" below.

e. For the purpose of performing major maintenance (not to exceed 6 weeks in duration) on the reactor vessel, the reactor water level may be lowered 9' below the minimum normal water level (Elevation 302'9"). Whenever the reactor water level is to be lowered below the low-low-low level set point redundant instrumentation will be provided to monitor the reactor water level.

LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTING

d. The reactor water low level scram trip setting shall be no lower than -12 inches (53 inches indicator scale) relative to the minimum normal water level (302'9").

e. The reactor water low-low level setting for core spray initiation shall be no less than -5 feet (5 inches indicator scale) relative to the minimum normal water level (Elevation 302'9").

f. The flow biased APRM rod block trip settings shall be less than or equal to that shown in Figure 2.1.1.

SAFETY LIMIT

Written procedures will be developed and followed whenever the reactor water level is lowered below the low-low level set point. The procedures will define the valves that will be used to lower the vessel water level. All other valves that have the potential of lowering the vessel water level will be identified by valve number in the procedures and these valves will be red tagged to preclude their operation during the major maintenance with the water level below the low-low level set point.

In addition to the Facility Staff requirements given in Specification 6.2.2.b, there shall be another control room operator present in the control room with no other duties than to monitor the reactor vessel water level.

During periods when the reactor is shut down, consideration must also be given to water level requirements, due to the effect of decay heat. If reactor water level should drop below the top of the active fuel during this time, the ability to cool the core is reduced. This reduction in core cooling capability could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. The core will be cooled sufficiently to prevent clad melting should the water level be reduced to two-thirds of the core height.

The lowest point at which the water level can normally be monitored is approximately 4 feet 8 inches above the top of the active fuel. This is the low-low-low water level trip point, which is 7 feet 11 inches (127.1 inches indicator scale) below minimum normal water level (Elevation 302'9"). The safety limit has been established here to provide a point which can be monitored and also can provide adequate margin. However, for performing major maintenance as specified in Specification 2.1.1.e, redundant instrumentation will be provided for monitoring reactor water level below the low-low-low water level set point. (For example, by installing temporary instrument lines and reference pots to redundant level transmitters, so that the reactor water level may be monitored over the required range.) In addition written procedures, which identify all the valves which have the potential of lowering the water level inadvertently, are established to prevent their operation during the major maintenance which requires the water level to be below the low-low level set point.

The thermal power transient resulting when a scram is accomplished other than by the expected scram signal (e.g., scram from neutron flux following closure of the main turbine stop valves) does not necessarily cause fuel damage. However, for this specification a safety limit violation will be assumed when a scram is only accomplished by means of a backup feature of the plant design. The concept of not approaching a safety limit provided scram signals are operable is supported by the extensive plant safety analysis.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT
c. If a redundant component in each of the core spray systems becomes inoperable, both systems shall be considered operable provided that the component is returned to an operable condition within 7 days and the additional surveillance required is performed.	
d. If a copy spray system becomes inoperable and all the components are operable in the other system, the reactor may remain in operation for a period not to exceed 7 days.	d. Core spray header ΔP instrumentation check — Once/day calibrate — Once/3 months test — Once/3 months
e. If Specifications a, b, c and d are not met, a normal orderly shutdown shall be initiated within one hour and the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within ten hours. If both core spray systems become inoperable the reactor shall be in the cold shutdown condition within ten hours and no work (except as specified in "f" and "h" below) shall be performed on the reactor or its connected systems which could result in lowering the reactor water level to more than seven feet eleven inches below minimum normal water level (127.1 inches indicator scale).	e. <u>Surveillance with Inoperable Components</u> When a component or system becomes inoperable its redundant component or system shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately and daily thereafter.
	f. Surveillance during control rod drive maintenance which is simultaneous with the suppression chamber unwatered shall include at least hourly checks that the conditions listed in 3.1.4f are met.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION	SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
h. For the purpose of performing major maintenance (not to exceed 6 weeks in duration) on the reactor vessel, the reactor water level may be lowered to 9' below the minimum normal water level (elevation 302'9"). Whenever the reactor water level is to be lowered below the low-low-low level set point redundant instrumentation will be provided to monitor the reactor water level and written procedures will be developed and followed whenever the reactor water level is lowered below the low-low level set point. The procedures will define the valves that will be used to lower the vessel water level. All other valves that have the potential of lowering the vessel water level will be identified by valve number in the procedures and these valves will be red tagged to preclude their operation during the major maintenance with the water level below the low-low level set point. During the period of major maintenance requiring lowering the water level to more than 7 feet 11 inches below minimum normal water level (127.1 inches indicator scale), either both Core Spray Systems must be operable or, if one Core Spray System is inoperable because of the maintenance, all of the redundant components of the other Core Spray System must be operable.	

Based on the limited time involved in performance of the concurrent maintenance tasks, procedural controls to minimize the potential and duration of leakage from the control rod drive housing or LPRM penetration and available coolant makeup provides adequate protection against drainage of the vessel while the suppression chamber is drained.

Specification 3.1.4g establishes provisions to eliminate a potential single failure mode of core spray isolation valves 40-02 and 40-12. These provisions are necessary to ensure that the core spray system safety function is single failure proof. During system testing, when the isolation valve(s) are required to be in the closed condition, automatic opening signals to the valve(s) are operable if the core spray system safety function is required.

The intent of Specification 3.1.4h is to allow maintenance of reactor vessel structures while in the cold shutdown condition as specified in Specification 2.1.1e. This will require bypassing the core spray automatic initiation at the low-low water level signal.

Table 3.6.2b

INSTRUMENTATION THAT INITIATES
PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM OR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

Limiting Condition for Operation

Parameter	Minimum No. of Tripped or Operable Trip Systems	Minimum No. of Operable Instrument Channels per Operable Trip System	Set-Point	Reactor Mode Switch Position in Which Function Must Be Operable			
				Shutdown	Refuel	Startup	Run
PRIMARY COOLANT ISOLATION (Main Steam, Cleanup, and Shutdown)							
(1) Low-Low Reactor water level	2	2	≥5 inches (Indicator Scale)	(c)	X	X	X
(2) Manual	2	1	--	X	X	X	X
MAIN-STEAM-LINE ISOLATION							
(3) High Steam Flow Main-Steam Line	2	2	≤105 psid	X	X	X	X

Table 3.6.2b (cont'd)

INSTRUMENTATION THAT INITIATES
PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM OR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

Limiting Condition for Operation

Parameter	Minimum No. of Tripped or Operable Trip Systems	Minimum No. of Operable Instrument Channels per Operable Trip System	Set-Point	Reactor Mode Switch Position in Which Function Must Be Operable			
				Shutdown	Refuel	Startup	Run
CLEANUP SYSTEM ISOLATION							
(8) High Area Temperature	1	2	≤190	X	X	X	X
SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ISOLATION							
(9) High Area Temperature	1	1	≤170	X	X	X	X
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION							
(10) Low-Low Reactor Water Level	2	2	≥5 inches (Indicator Scale)	(c)	X	X	X

(a) May be bypassed in the refuel and startup positions of the reactor mode switch when reactor pressure is less than 600 psi.

(b) May be bypassed when necessary for containment inerting.

(c) May be bypassed when necessary for performing major maintenance as specified in Specification 2.1.1.e.

Table 3.6.2c

INSTRUMENTATION THAT INITIATES OR ISOLATES EMERGENCY COOLING

Limiting Condition for Operation

Parameter	Minimum No. of Tripped or Operable Trip Systems	Minimum No. of Operable Instrument Channels per Operable Trip System	Set-Point	Reactor Mode Switch Position in Which Function Must Be Operable			
				Shutdown	Refuel	Startup	Run
EMERGENCY COOLING INITIATION							
(1) High-High Reactor Pressure	2	2	$\leq$ 1080 psig	X	X	X	X
(2) Low-Low Reactor Water Level	2	2	$\geq$ 5 inches (Indicator Scale)	(b)	X	X	X
EMERGENCY COOLING ISOLATION (for each of two systems)							
(3) High Steam Flow Emergency Cooling System	2	2 (a)	19 psid	X	X	X	X
(4) High Radiation Emergency Cooling System Vent	1	2	25 mr/hr	X	X	X	X

(a) Each of two differential pressure switches provide inputs to one instrument channel in each trip system.

(b) May be bypassed when necessary for performing major maintenance as specified in Specification 2.1.1.e.

Table 3.6.2d

INSTRUMENTATION THAT INITIATES CORE SPRAY

Limiting Condition for Operation

Parameter	Minimum No. of Tripped or Operable Trip Systems	Minimum No. of Operable Instrument Channels per Operable Trip System	Set-Point	Reactor Mode Switch Position in Which Function Must Be Operable			
				Shutdown	Refuel	Startup	Run
START CORE SPRAY PUMPS							
(1) High Drywell Pressure	2	2	≤3.5 psig	(a)	X	(a)	(a)
(2) Low-Low Reactor Water Level	2	2	≥5 inches (Indicator Scale)	(b)	X	X	X
OPEN CORE SPRAY DISCHARGE VALVES							
(3) Reactor Pressure and either (1) or (2) above.	2	2	≥365 psig	X	X	X	X

(a) May be bypassed when necessary for containment inerting.

(b) May be bypassed when necessary for performing major maintenance as specified in Specification 2.1.1.e.

Table 3.6.2k

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION

Limiting Condition for Operation

Parameter	Minimum No. of Tripped or Operable Trip Systems	Minimum No. of Operable Instrument Channels per Operable Trip System	Set-Point	Reactor Mode Switch Position in Which Function Must Be Operable			
				Shutdown	Refuel	Startup	Run
(1) Low Reactor Water Level	2	2	1 ft. below water level at Elevation 302'-9"	(a)	X	X	X
(2) Automatic Turbine Trip	1	1	---			X	X

NOTE FOR TABLES 3.6.2k AND 4.6.2k

(a) May be bypassed when necessary for performing major maintenance as specified in Specification 2.1.1.e.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 14 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-13

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NINE MILE POINT UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-220

Introduction

By letter dated March 10, 1977, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-63 for the Nine Mile Point Unit No. 1. The amendment would modify the Technical Specifications to permit lowering the reactor vessel water level below the low-low-low level set point, with the reactor shutdown, for the purpose of performing inspection of and/or maintenance on the reactor vessel or its internals. The proposed change would permit the reactor vessel water level to be below the low-low-low level set point for an interval not to exceed six weeks. An amendment to lower the vessel water level below Technical Specification limits, had previously been issued on March 13, 1970 to allow similar maintenance work to be performed on the Core Spray System. However, the amendment issued in 1970 applied only to the work being performed at that time and therefore is being proposed again.

Discussion and Evaluation

The licensee on his own volition has agreed to perform the Feedwater Nozzle inspection and repair program during the current refueling outage. The Nine Mile Point Unit No. 1 inspection is consistent with the generic concern of the staff for Feedwater Nozzle Inspection to be performed at all BWR facilities. The purpose of the Feedwater Nozzle Inspection is to assure that the integrity of the feedwater nozzles has not been compromised, with the major objective of enhancing safe operation of the plant. Since the facility does not currently have the capacity to fully unload the core, the inspection will be performed with the fuel in the reactor vessel. However, in order to be able to perform the inspection and maintenance program, the water level must be lowered approximately one foot more than is specified in the Technical Specifications.

The current Technical Specifications limit the reactor vessel low water level to 7 feet 11 inches below the normal water level (approximately 56 inches above the top of the active fuel). To facilitate the performance of inspection and/or maintenance of the feedwater nozzles and spargers and future inspection and/or maintenance of the core spray nozzles and spargers the licensee has proposed that the Technical Specifications low water level limit be changed from 7 feet 11 inches to 9 feet below the normal water level during the maintenance operation.

Lowering the water level below the low-low set point for water level will require bypassing the automatic initiation of Primary Coolant and Containment Isolation Emergency Cooling, Core Spray, and the High Pressure Coolant Injection systems. The Core Spray System will be on ready standby for manual initiation from the control room. To insure that the correct water level will be maintained and monitored, a temporary reference water leg will be connected to level transmitters 1D13A and 1D13B which in turn input to two meters, two alarms, and at least one recorder. The alarms initiate when the water level drops to more than 8 feet 11 inches below the normal water level. The temporary water level monitoring system uses all the same system components of the normal water level instrumentation system except that the licensee has agreed to use an additional alarm and recorders, and redundant temporary water reference pots are being used. Based on our review of the licensee's submittal, the temporary water level monitoring system which will be in use for less than 6 weeks provides suitable redundance and the proposed changes to the monitoring system are acceptable.

Although review of the shielded platform and lifting system are not part of this amendment request for lowering the water level 13 inches more than the current Technical Specification limit, we reviewed the procedures and equipment being used for Feedwater Nozzle inspections to determine if new concerns need be addressed generically. For the Nine Mile Point Unit No. 1 inspection, a shielded inspection platform will be positioned on top of the core shroud to permit personnel to perform inspection and maintenance on the feedwater nozzles. The licensee has documented that the platform has been designed applying the requirements of Criterion III of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B (Design Control), and that the platform will be capable of sustaining the primary stresses combined with the secondary stresses due to temperature and seismic accelerations. The platform and associated lifting tools have been load tested with an equivalent load of 1.25 times the sum of the dead and live loads. Since the similar inspection performed in 1970, the licensee has upgraded the overhead handling crane system. They have replaced the trolley and hoist, which is redundant, within the limitations of the existing structures. The staff reviewed the modifications to the crane system and found them acceptable. The 125 ton reactor building crane and reactor head lifting assembly which were previously load tested to 100 tons will be used to lift and lower the platform onto the core shroud. Since the 125 ton crane is used during each refueling operation to lift objects that weigh as much as 122 tons, we find that the likelihood of crane failure while transporting the significantly smaller load of the shielded platform and the related lifting tool (the combined weight of which is 30.5 tons) is acceptably remote. Moreover, the purpose of this inspection, to assure that the integrity of the feedwater nozzles has not been compromised, is the major objective consistent with enhancing the safe operation of the plant. We also find that the core shroud will adequately sustain the loading of the shielded

platform. The core shroud normally supports both the steam dryer and separator assemblies which have a combined dead load of 61 tons.

While the water level is below the low-low level set point and the automatic initiation of ECCS equipment is bypassed, special procedures will be followed to insure that the core remains covered and adequately cooled. Cooling will be provided by the Shutdown Cooling System consisting of three pump and heat exchanger systems connected in parallel; each parallel system can extract water from a reactor recirculation loop, cool it, and return it to the recirculation loop. This system will be placed in steady operation before core water level is decreased below the low-low set point. Once the core level is below the low-low set point, operational procedures preclude any unnecessary adjustments in the Shutdown Cooling System (valving changes, pump changes, etc.) that could potentially affect vessel water level.

The ultimate system for supplying water to the vessel is the Core Spray System which is capable of supplying 3400 gpm. However, for routine makeup water used to maintain the reactor vessel water level, two systems will be used. The primary source of makeup water will be from the Demineralized Water Storage Tank through the Liquid Poison System (sodium-pentaborate solution injection system) with the explosive valves internals removed. The primary source is capable of supplying 60 gpm. The secondary source of makeup water will be from a hose connected to the Condensate Transfer System and run into the top of the vessel. The secondary source is capable of supplying 100 gpm. Operational procedures will be followed to insure that no changes are made in these systems that might render them inoperable while the water level in the vessel is below the low-low set point.

A thorough survey has been made of all valves and equipment on any system which could affect vessel water level. All of this equipment will be "red tagged" to minimize the possibility that any equipment or personnel action might inadvertently lower vessel water level.

Any necessary vessel water level reductions will be accomplished by opening valves BV-37-04 and BV-37-05 in the 2 inch line between the Cleanup System and the Equipment Drain Tank. Both of these valves can be independently closed from the control room, so that a single failure to close one of these valves cannot drain the vessel. The vessel water level will be continuously monitored by redundant equipment with constant manual surveillance. With the 2 inch drain line fully opened, the drain rate is conservatively calculated to be less than 490 gpm, which would cause a vessel water level decrease of about 4 inches per minute. More than sufficient time is available to close valves BV-37-04 and/or BV-37-05 to stop any unwanted drainage.

Ultimate protection against uncovering of the core is provided by the Core Spray System, which can be manually initiated at any time. The operability status of these systems will be such that after considering the worst single failure or operator error, at least one Core Spray System will be available to deliver rated flow during the time when core level is below the low-low set point and automatic initiation of ECCS is bypassed. In addition to the requirements of at least one licensed operator present in the control room presently required by Technical Specification 6.2.2.6 we are also requiring in the revised Technical Specifications that there be another control room operator present in the control room with no other duties but to monitor reactor water vessel level. Procedures and/or instructions will be used for the operator to manually initiate the Core Spray System should the water level fall to 9 feet 3 inches below the normal water level.

At any time when the status of the Core Spray System is such that any single failure could preclude availability of at least one Core Spray System, the water level will be returned in an orderly manner above the low-low level set point and the automatic initiation function of the ECCS will be reestablished.

The licensee has agreed to the modifications of the Technical Specifications to include the requirement that at least one Core Spray System, considering any single failure, will be available during this maintenance operation and that written procedures be available identifying all "red tagged" valves and restricting their operation.

With the above described redundant equipment, special procedures, and equipment operability requirements, the proposed inspection and maintenance operation is acceptable.

Environmental Considerations

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in conneciton with the issuance of this amendment.

Conclusions

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable

assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: March 25, 1977

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 50-220

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF FACILITY LICENSE AMENDMENT

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 14 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-63 to the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1 (the facility) located in Oswego County, New York. The amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications which will allow lowering the reactor water level below the low-low-low level set point during major maintenance on the reactor vessel.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated March 10, 1977, (2) Amendment No. 14 to License No. DPR-63, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. and at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. and at the Oswego City Library, 120 E. Second Street, Oswego, New York 13126.

A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C., 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 25th day of March 1977.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Donald M. Elliott

Donald M. Elliott, Acting Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors