

Mr. James Knubel  
 Chief Nuclear Officer  
 Power Authority of the State of  
 New York  
 123 Main Street  
 White Plains, NY 10601

December 28, 1998

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER  
 PLANT (TAC NO. MA2243)

Dear Mr. Knubel:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 249 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated July 6, 1998.

This amendment revises Appendix B TS Section 3.5, Main Condenser Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) and Table 3.10-1, Radiation Monitoring Systems that Initiate and/or Isolate Systems including the associated Bases to provide Allowable Outage Times (AOTs) for selected instrumentation.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Joseph F. Williams, Project Manager  
 Project Directorate I-1  
 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-333

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No.249 to DPR-59  
 2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

December 28, 1998

Mr. James Knubel  
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Power Authority of the State of  
New York  
123 Main Street  
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A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Joseph F. Williams".

Joseph F. Williams, Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-333

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 249 to DPR-59  
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

DATED: December 28, 1998

AMENDMENT NO. 249 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59 JAMES A.  
FITZPATRICK POWER PLANT

Docket File

PUBLIC

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

DOCKET NO. 50-333

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 249  
License No. DPR-59

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) dated July 6, 1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 249 , and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B are incorporated into Facility License No. DPR-59. PASNY shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

2. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



S. Singh Bajwa, Director  
Project Directorate I-1  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:  
Changes to the Technical  
Specifications

Date of Issuance: December 28, 1998

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 249

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59

DOCKET NO. 50-333

Revise Appendix B as follows:

Remove Pages

29

37

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42

Insert Pages

29

37

37a

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42

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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- b. Except as specified in 1. and 2. below, both SJAE system radiation monitors shall be operable during reactor power operation. The trip time delay setting for closure of the SJAE isolation valve shall not exceed 15 min.
  - 1. A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to six hours during periods of required surveillance without placing the Trip System in the tripped condition provided the other OPERABLE channel is monitoring that Trip Function. Otherwise, in the event that one of the two SJAE radiation monitors is made or found to be inoperable, continued reactor power operation is permissible provided that the inoperable monitor is tripped.
  - 2. Upon the loss of both SJAE system radiation monitors, either temporarily monitor radiation levels at the SJAE or initiate an orderly shutdown and have the main steam isolation valves closed within 8 hours.

- b. Operation of the SJAE radioactive offgas monitors shall be verified by performing instrument surveillance as specified on Table 3.10-2.

JAFNPP

Table 3.10-1

RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEMS THAT INITIATE AND/OR ISOLATE SYSTEMS

Minimum No. of Operable Instrument Channels per Trip System	Trip Function	Trip Level Setting	Total Number of Instrument Channels Provided by Design	Action
1(a)	Refuel Area Exhaust Monitor	(b)	2	(c) or (d)
1(a)	Reactor Building Area Exhaust Monitors	(b)	2	(d)
(j)	SJAE Radiation Monitors	$\leq 500,000 \mu\text{Ci/sec}$	2	(e)
1(a)	Turbine Building Exhaust Monitors	(b)	2	(f)
1(a)	Radwaste Building Exhaust Monitors	(b)	2	(f)
(k)	Main Control Room Ventilation	$\leq 4 \times 10^3 \text{ cpm}^{(i)}$	1	(g)
(h)	Mechanical Vacuum Pump Isolation	$\leq 3 \times \text{Normal Full Power Background}$	4	(h)

NOTES FOR TABLE 3.10-1

- (a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to six hours during periods of required surveillance without placing the Trip System in the tripped condition provided the other OPERABLE channel is monitoring that Trip Function, that is, trip capability is maintained.  
An inoperable channel need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur. In these cases, the inoperable channel shall be restored to operable status within 24 hours, or the indicated action shall be taken.
- (b) Trip level setting is in accordance with the methods and procedures of the ODCM.
- (c) Cease operation of the refueling equipment.
- (d) Isolate secondary containment and start the SBGTS.
- (e) Bring the SJAE release rate below the trip level within 72 hours or isolate either the SJAE or all main steam lines within the next 12 hours.

JAFNPP

Table 3.10-1

**RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEMS THAT INITIATE AND/OR ISOLATE SYSTEMS**

NOTES FOR TABLE 3.10-1 (cont'd.)

- (f) Refer to Appendix B LCO 3.1.c and LCO 3.1.d.
- (g) Control room isolation is manually initiated.
- (h) Uses same sensors as primary containment isolation on high main steam line radiation. Refer to Appendix A Table 3.2-1 for minimum number of operable instrument channels and action required.
- (i) Conversion factor is  $8.15 \times 10^7$  cpm -  $1\mu\text{Ci/cc}$ .
- (j) See RETS LCO 3.5.b.1 and 3.5.b.2.
- (k) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to six hours during periods of required surveillance without placing the Trip Function in the tripped condition, or the indicated action shall be taken.

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## BASES

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### 3.0 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS

#### 3.1 GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORS

The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during planned or unplanned releases. The alarm/trip set points for these instruments shall be calculated in accordance with methods in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 20.

The operability and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 60, 63 and 64.

Refer to Appendix A Technical Specification Bases 4.2 for references pertaining to surveillance and allowable outage times for selected monitors listed on RETS Table 3.10-1 and Table 3.10-2.

#### 3.3 GASEOUS DOSE RATES

This specification is provided to ensure that the dose at or beyond the site boundary from gaseous effluents will be within the annual dose limits of 10 CFR 20. The annual dose limits are the doses associated with the concentrations of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 1. These limits provide reasonable assurance that radioactive material discharges in gaseous effluents will not result in the exposure of a member of the public to annual average concentrations exceeding the limits specified in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II (10 CFR 20.106[b]). The specified limits restrict, at all times, corresponding gamma and beta dose rates above background to an individual at or beyond the exclusion area boundary to  $\leq 500$  mrem/year to the total body or to  $\leq 3000$  mrem/year to the skin. These limits also restrict the corresponding thyroid dose rate above background to a child via the inhalation pathway to  $\leq 1500$  mrem/year.

#### 3.3 AIR DOSE, NOBLE GASES

This specification is provided to assure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix I, Section II.B, III.A and IV.A are met. The Limiting Conditions for Operation are the guides set forth in Appendix I, Section II.B. The specification provides the required operating flexibility and, at the same time, implements the guides set forth in Appendix I, Section IV.A, to assure that the releases of radioactive material in gaseous effluents will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable."

#### 3.4 DOSE DUE TO IODINE-131, IODINE-133, TRITIUM AND RADIONUCLIDES IN PARTICULATE FORM

The specification is provided to assure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix I, Section II.C, III.A and IV.A are met. The Limiting Conditions for Operation are the guides set forth in Appendix I, Section II.C. The specifications provide the required operating flexibility and, at the same time, implement the guides set forth in Appendix I, Section IV.A, to assure that the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable."

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## BASES

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### 3.7 OFFGAS TREATMENT SYSTEM EXPLOSIVE GAS MIXTURE INSTRUMENTATION

This specification is provided to ensure that the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in portions of the offgas treatment system not designed to withstand a hydrogen explosion is maintained below the lower explosive limit of hydrogen. Operation of the offgas recombiner system ensures that the concentration of hydrogen in the offgas charcoal filters remains below combustible levels.

Thus it provides assurance that the releases of radioactive materials will be controlled in conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 60. The low steam flow trip point is based on 92% of design steam flow and reroutes the offgas to prevent overheating or ignition of the recombiner catalyst. The high steam flow trip point isolates the recombiner on excess steam flow that may be associated with a pipe break downstream of the recombiner.

### 3.8 STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM (SBGTS)

Four radiation monitors are provided which initiate isolation of the reactor building and operating of the SBGTS. The monitors are located as follows: two in the reactor building ventilation exhaust duct and two in refuel floor ventilation exhaust duct. Each pair is considered a separate system. The trip logic consists of any upscale trip on a single monitor or a downscale trip on both monitors in a pair to cause the desired action.

Trip settings for the monitors in the refueling area ventilation exhaust ducts are based upon initiating normal ventilation isolation and SBGTS operation so that most of the activity released during the refueling accident is processed by the SBGTS.

The radiation monitors in the refueling area ventilation duct which initiate building isolation and standby gas treatment operation are arranged in a one out of two logic system. The air ejector offgas monitors are connected in a two out of two logic arrangement. Based on experience with instruments of similar design, a testing interval of once every three months has been found adequate.

### 3.9 MECHANICAL VACUUM PUMP ISOLATION

### 3.10 MAIN CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION RADIATION MONITOR



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 249 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 6, 1998, The Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) requested a revision to Appendix B Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (RETSs) Section 3.5, "Main Condenser Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAЕ)" and Table 3.10-1, "Radiation Monitoring Systems that Initiate and/or Isolate Systems" and the associated bases pages to provide Allowable Outage Times (AOTs) and incorporate administrative and editorial changes.

2.0 BACKGROUND

The licensee performed a review of the RETS as a result of corrective actions associated with License Event Report (98-01) "Partial Invalid Isolations of Reactor Building Ventilation." The licensee determined that performance of certain surveillance and preventative maintenance may result in short periods when radiological monitoring equipment is inoperable. During these periods, current RETS requires either tripping of the initiation logic associated with the instrumentation to be tested, or entry into the RETS Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) action associated with the inoperable instrumentation. Entry into the LCO would place the systems associated with the instrumentation in an abnormal configuration during normal plant operations placing additional challenges on the operators. The licensee determined that an amendment was required to provide AOTs for surveillance testing and for repair of selected radiation monitoring instrumentation. The proposed AOTs would provide a period of time for selected radiation monitoring instrumentation surveillance testing (6 hours) and repair (24 hours), after which entry into the LCO would be required.

3.0 EVALUATION

The licensee proposed the following changes to TS 3.5.b:

Current wording:

- b. Except as specified in 1. below, both SJAЕ system radiation monitors shall be operable during reactor power operation. The trip time delay setting for closure of the SJAЕ isolation valve shall not exceed 15 min.

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1. In the event that one of the two SJAE radiation monitors is made or found to be inoperable, continued reactor power operation is permissible provided that the inoperable monitor is tripped in the downscale position.
2. Upon the loss of both SJAE system radiation monitors, either temporarily monitor radiation levels at the SJAE or initiate an orderly shutdown and have the main steam isolation valves closed within 8 hours.

Proposed wording:

- b. Except as specified in 1. and 2. below, both SJAE system radiation monitors shall be operable during reactor power operation. The trip time delay setting for closure of the SJAE isolation valve shall not exceed 15 min.
  1. A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to six hours during periods of required surveillance without placing the Trip System in the tripped condition provided the other OPERABLE channel is monitoring that Trip Function. Otherwise, in the event that one of the two SJAE radiation monitors is made or found to be inoperable, continued reactor power operation is permissible provided that the inoperable monitor is tripped.
  2. Upon the loss of both SJAE system radiation monitors, either temporarily monitor radiation levels at the SJAE or initiate an orderly shutdown and have the main steam isolation valves closed within 8 hours.

The licensee proposed change to TS 3.5.b to explicitly include current TS 3.5.b.2 as an exception to the requirement that both SJAE radiation monitors be operable during reactor power operations is editorial in nature and does not change the intent of the TS. The staff finds this change acceptable.

The licensee in RETS 3.5.b.1 proposed deleting "in the downscale position." The monitor is still required to be tripped. This will allow the licensee greater flexibility in how to place a channel in trip. This proposed change does not alter the intent of the specification and is therefore acceptable.

The proposed RETS 3.5.b.1 permits a channel to be inoperable for up to six hours for periods of required surveillance without placing the trip system in the trip condition provided the other operable channel is monitoring the trip function. The licensee provides the following justification for a six-hour surveillance AOT for this instrument:

These radiation monitors are arranged in a two-out-of-two logic; therefore, both must trip to initiate the required action (closure of the off-gas isolation valve to the main stack after a time delay). A high radiation condition sensed by the monitor in service would provide sufficient time to take the corrective actions. A six-hour AOT is deemed acceptable for instrumentation in the Reactor Protective System and Emergency Core

Cooling System. Therefore, it is appropriate to apply a six-hour AOT to the SJAE radiation monitors which are non-safety related. Also, the six-hour test duration provides a reasonable amount of time for testing without placing undue time constraints on the maintenance personnel.

The staff reviewed the licensee's proposal and agrees that due to the normal actuation time delay on a receipt of a high radiation signal before the SJAE isolation valves shut, the plant operators will have sufficient time to take the appropriate actions if a real actuation signal occurs. The six-hour period for testing is consistent with the testing period allowed for other instrumentation in the licensee's proposal. Therefore, the staff finds that the six-hour AOT for surveillance testing is acceptable.

The licensee proposed the following changes to RETS Table 3.10-1, Radiation Monitoring Systems that Initiate and/or Isolate Systems:

Incorporated a change to clarify that the column titled "minimum number of operable instrument channels" refers to each trip system. A change was made to note (f) to add LCO 3.1.c (limiting condition for operation) to provide the correct TS reference. The above changes are editorial in nature and do not change the intent of the TS and are acceptable to the staff.

Added a six-hour AOT for surveillance testing and up to 24 hour AOT for repair to RETS (Radiation Effluent Technical Specification) Table 3.10-1 note a, "Radiation Monitoring Systems that Initiate and/or Isolate Systems" for the Refueling Area Exhaust Monitor, Reactor Building Area Exhaust Monitors, Turbine Building Exhaust Monitors and the Radwaste Building Exhaust Monitors.

While one channel is out of service for surveillance or repair, the remaining operable channel will monitor the associated parameter and will initiate the required protective action if the set point is exceeded. The allowable out of service time of six hours for surveillance testing and 24 hours for repair is small in comparison to the length of a normal operating cycle. Therefore, not placing a trip system in the tripped condition for the proposed allowable out of service time will have a negligible effect on the reliable operation of the protective systems and will decrease the likelihood of plant trips, scrams, transients, and challenges to safety systems.

Taking the actions associated with inoperable instruments in RETS Table 3.10-1 during the short testing and repair AOTs (6 and 24 hours respectively) is undesirable. This would place the plant systems associated with the instrumentation in abnormal configurations during normal plant operations (e.g., secondary containment isolated with SGT system in service) placing additional challenges on the Operators.

The six-hour AOTs for surveillance testing and 24 hour AOT for repair to the above radiation monitors follows the guidance provided in NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWR/4)", Revision 1, dated April 1995. The guidance provided states, "When a channel is placed in an inoperable condition solely for the performance of required surveillance, entry into the associated

Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to six hours provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability." The 24 hour repair AOT for the above monitors is in accordance with NUREG-1433 standard. The above changes are therefore acceptable to the staff.

Added note (j) for SJAE radiation monitors to Table 3.10-1. Note (j) references RETS 3.5.b.1 and 3.5.b.2, Main Condenser Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) for minimum number of operable channels requirements. This change is editorial in nature and only provides reference to the TS that actually delineates the minimum number of channels required to be operable. The staff finds this acceptable.

Added note (k) for Main Control Room Ventilation. The note stated that "A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to six hours during periods of required surveillance without placing the Trip Function in the tripped condition, or the indicated action shall be taken." The licensee provides the following justification for the six-hour surveillance AOT:

For systems with only one channel ( Main Control Room Ventilation )... a six-hour AOT is being proposed. This is consistent with GE Topical Reports referenced in current TS Bases 4.2 and STS [Standard Technical Specifications].

The six-hour AOTs for surveillance testing to the above radiation monitor follows the guidance provided in NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWR/4)", Revision 1, dated April 1995. The guidance provided states, "When a channel is placed in an inoperable condition solely for the performance of required surveillance, entry into the associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to six hours provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability." The above changes are, therefore, acceptable to the staff.

The licensee proposed to change 3.1 Gaseous Effluents Monitors Bases to add the following, "Refer to Appendix A Technical Specification Bases 4.2 for references pertaining to surveillance and allowable outage times for selected monitors listed on RETS Table 3.10-1 and Table 3.10-2." The licensee in 3.8 Standby Gas Treatment System Bases, deleted the statement, "The bases given in Appendix A Bases 4.2 for the rod blocks apply here also and were used to arrive at the functional testing frequency."

The licensee's proposed changes to the bases clarifies where the references for AOTs are located and deletes a redundant statement. The proposed change is editorial and does not change any license requirement. The staff finds the proposed change acceptable.

#### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

#### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment change requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (63 FR 43211). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

#### 6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: John S. Cushing

Date: December 28, 1998