

June 19, 1995

Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr.
Chief Nuclear Officer
Power Authority of the State of
New York
123 Main Street
White Plains, NY 10601

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT (TAC NO. M91679)

Dear Mr. Cahill:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 225 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated February 22, 1995.

The amendment modifies operability and surveillance requirements for the reactor vessel overfill protection instrumentation that initiates feedwater pump turbine and main turbine trips on high reactor vessel water level. The NRC staff has determined that the proposed TS changes will have no adverse impact on plant safety and will enhance the current TSs by adding operability requirements for the reactor vessel overfill protection system. Therefore, the proposed TS changes are acceptable.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

C. E. Carpenter, Jr., Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-333

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 225 to
DPR-59
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encs: See next page

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AMENDMENT NO. 225 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59-FITZPATRICK

Docket File

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

June 19, 1995

Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr.
Chief Nuclear Officer
Power Authority of the State of
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123 Main Street
White Plains, NY 10601

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT (TAC NO. M91679)

Dear Mr. Cahill:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 225 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated February 22, 1995.

The amendment modifies operability and surveillance requirements for the reactor vessel overflow protection instrumentation that initiates feedwater pump turbine and main turbine trips on high reactor vessel water level. The NRC staff has determined that the proposed TS changes will have no adverse impact on plant safety and will enhance the current TSs by adding operability requirements for the reactor vessel overflow protection system. Therefore, the proposed TS changes are acceptable.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "C. E. Carpenter, Jr.", written over a horizontal line.

C. E. Carpenter, Jr., Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-333

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 225 to
DPR-59
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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Power Authority of the State
of New York

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

DOCKET NO. 50-333

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 225
License No. DPR-59

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) dated February 22, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by deleting paragraph 2.E on page 4 of the Facility Operating License No. DPR-59.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "LB Marsh".

Ledyard B. Marsh, Director
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: June 19, 1995

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 225

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59

DOCKET NO. 50-333

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages

i
v
53
60a
76
84a

Insert Pages

i
v
53
60a
76
84a

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3.2 (cont'd)

E. Drywell Leak Detection

The limiting conditions for operation for the instrumentation that monitors drywell leak detection are given in Table 3.2-5.

F. Feedwater Pump Turbine and Main Turbine Trip

The limiting conditions for operation for the instrumentation that provides a feedwater pump turbine and main turbine trip are given in Table 3.2-6.

G. Recirculation Pump Trip

The limiting conditions for operation for the instrumentation that trip(s) the recirculation pumps as a means of limiting the consequences of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient are given in Table 3.2-7.

H. Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

The limiting conditions for operation for the instrumentation that provides accident monitoring are given in Table 3.2-8.

I. 4kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip

The limiting conditions for operation for the instrumentation that prevents damage to electrical equipment or circuits as a result of either a degraded or loss-of-voltage condition on the emergency electrical buses are given in Table 3.2-2.

4.2 (cont'd)

E. Drywell Leak Detection

Instrumentation shall be calibrated and checked as indicated in Table 4.2-5.

F. Feedwater Pump Turbine and Main Turbine Trip

Instrumentation shall be tested and calibrated as indicated in Table 4.2-6.

G. Recirculation Pump Trip

Instrumentation shall be functionally tested and calibrated as indicated in Table 4.2-7.

System logic shall be functionally tested as indicated in Table 4.2-7.

H. Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

Instrumentation shall be demonstrated operable by performance of a channel check, channel calibration and functional test as indicated in Table 4.2-8, as applicable.

I. Not Used

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3.2 BASES (cont'd)

Surveillance Requirement 4.2.J requires that each remote shutdown transfer / isolation switch and control circuit be periodically tested to demonstrate that it is capable of performing its intended function. The requirements of this section apply to each remote shutdown control circuit on the panels listed in Table 3.2-10 and on panels 25ASP-4, 25ASP-5, and 66HV-3B. This demonstration is performed from the remote shutdown panel and locally, as appropriate. This will ensure that if the control room becomes inaccessible, the plant can be placed and maintained in a shutdown condition from the remote shutdown panel and the local control stations.

Three channels of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - High instrumentation are provided as input to a two-out-of-three initiation logic that trips the two feedwater pump turbines and the main turbine. An event involving excessive feedwater flow results in a rising reactor vessel water level, which upon reaching the reactor vessel water level trip setpoint, results in a trip of both feedwater pump turbines, and the main turbine. The feedwater pump turbine trip under these conditions limits further increase in the reactor vessel water level due to feedwater flow. A trip of the main turbine protects the turbine from damage due to excessive water carryover.

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TABLE 3.2-6

FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE AND MAIN TURBINE TRIP INSTRUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS

Minimum Number of Operable Instrument Channels (Notes 1 & 2)	Trip Function	Trip Level Setting	Applicable Modes
3	Reactor Vessel Water Level - High	≤ 222.5 inches above TAF	Thermal Power $\geq 25\%$ RTP

NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2-6

1. There shall be three operable instrument channels, except as provided for below:
 - a. With one less than the required minimum number of operable instrument channels, either restore the inoperable instrument channel to operable status, or place the inoperable instrument channel in the tripped condition, within 7 days. Otherwise, reduce reactor power to less than 25% rated thermal power within the next 4 hours.
 - b. With two or more channels less than the required minimum number of operable instrument channels, restore the feedwater pump turbine and main turbine trip capability within 2 hours. Otherwise, reduce reactor power to less than 25% rated thermal power within the next 4 hours.
2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required surveillances, entry into associated Limiting Conditions for Operation and required actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours provided the associated Trip Function maintains feedwater pump turbine and main turbine trip capability.

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TABLE 4.2-6

**FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE AND MAIN TURBINE TRIP INSTRUMENTATION
TEST AND CALIBRATION REQUIREMENTS**

Instrument Channel	Instrument Functional Test Frequency (Note 2)	Logic System Functional Test Frequency	Calibration Frequency	Instrument Check Frequency
Reactor Vessel Water Level - High	Note 1	Once every 24 months	Once every 24 months	Daily

NOTES FOR TABLE 4.2-6

1. Perform the instrument functional test:
 - a. During each refueling outage, and
 - b. Each time the plant is in cold shutdown for a period of more than 24 hours, unless performed in the previous 92 days.
2. This instrumentation is exempt from the instrument channel functional test definition. The functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the instrument channel as close to the sensor as practicable.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 225 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
DOCKET NO. 50-333

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 22, 1995, the Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) submitted a request to change the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick) Technical Specifications (TSs). The proposed change to the FitzPatrick TSs would modify operability and surveillance requirements for the reactor vessel overfill protection instrumentation that initiates feedwater pump turbine and main turbine trips on high reactor vessel water level.

2.0 BACKGROUND

In a letter dated September 20, 1989, the NRC staff issued Generic Letter (GL) 89-19, "Request for Action Related to Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-47." As part of the technical resolution of USI A-47, the NRC concluded that all boiling-water reactors (BWRs) should provide automatic reactor vessel (RV) overfill protection and that plant procedures and TSs should include provisions to periodically verify the operability of the overfill protection system during reactor power operation. By letter dated August 5, 1994, the licensee submitted its implementation schedule for the recommendations of GL 89-19. By letter dated June 30, 1994, the NRC staff concluded that the FitzPatrick plant did "not have appropriate Technical Specifications (TS) governing the availability of the main feedwater overfill protection system instrumentation," and that "the TS should be revised to reflect the plant as-built configuration." The NRC staff requested that the licensee revise the FitzPatrick TS to "be similar to the General Electric Standard Technical Specifications (STS) that were applicable at the time the staff issued Generic Letter 89-19" (September 20, 1989). The applicable STS for FitzPatrick is NUREG-0123, Rev. 3. However, in lieu of the STS presented in NUREG-0123, the licensee elected to model the proposed changes to the TS on the most recent STS approved by the NRC, contained in NUREG-1433.

The FitzPatrick plant utilizes three instrument channels that sense reactor vessel water level, and initiate a trip of the two feedwater pump turbines, and the main turbine, on high reactor vessel water level. The three channels provide input to a two-out-of-three initiation logic. The proposed changes incorporate operability and surveillance requirements into the TS that conform, with one exception, to the STS. The exception applies to the

frequency of the instrument functional test. The STS specifies a quarterly frequency for this test. The design of the FitzPatrick trip system does not permit functional testing of this trip function without lifting electrical leads. Consequently, testing this trip system on-line poses an unacceptable risk of an inadvertent trip of the feedwater pump turbines and main turbine, resulting in a plant transient. The proposed TS change has a frequency that permits the testing to be accommodated during plant shutdowns. The proposed surveillance interval for the instrument functional test will permit testing while the plant is shutdown, avoiding the risk of a plant transient. As proposed, a functional test will be performed each refueling outage, and each time the plant is in cold shutdown for a period of more than 24 hours. The testing requirement during shutdown may be waived if the test has been performed during the previous 92 days. The 92-day limit corresponds to a quarterly frequency as defined in the STS, and avoids the risks of plant transients associated with excessive testing.

3.0 PROPOSED TS CHANGES

The proposed changes add limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) and surveillance requirements for the feedwater system isolation instrumentation to TS 3/4.2, "Protective Instrumentation." The proposed changes are:

1. Add Specification 3.2.F as follows:

"Feedwater Pump Turbine and Main Turbine Trip

The limiting conditions for operation for the instrumentation that provides a feedwater pump turbine and main turbine trip are given in Table 3.2-6"

2. Add Specification 4.2.F as follows:

"Feedwater Pump Turbine and Main Turbine Trip

Instrumentation shall be tested and calibrated as indicated in Table 4.2-6"

3. Add the following description of the reactor vessel water level trip function to Section 3.2 Bases:

"Three channels of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - High instrumentation are provided as input to a two-out-of-three initiation logic that trips the two feedwater pump turbines and the main turbine. An event involving excessive feedwater flow results in a rising reactor vessel water level, which upon reaching the reactor vessel water level trip setpoint, results in a trip of both feedwater pump turbines, and the main turbine. The feedwater pump turbine trip under these conditions limits further increase in the reactor vessel water level due to feedwater flow. A trip of the main turbine protects the turbine from damage due to excessive water carryover."

4. Add Table 3.2-6, "Feedwater Pump Turbine and Main Turbine Trip Instrumentation Requirements." The table establishes operability requirements for the reactor vessel high water level trip function for the feedwater pump turbines and the main turbine. The addition establishes a minimum number of operable channels of three instrument channels when the reactor power is greater than or equal to 25% rated thermal power, and a trip level setting of less than or equal to 222.5 inches above top of active fuel (TAF). An allowable out-of-service time (AOT) of 7 days is permitted by note 1 with one less than the minimum number of operable instrument channels, before the channel must either be restored to an operable status or placed in the tripped condition. The AOT for two or more inoperable instrument channels is 2 hours. Failure to meet these limiting conditions for operation requires a reduction in reactor power to less than 25% rated thermal power within the next 4 hours. Note 2 provides a 6-hour AOT to perform required surveillances provided the trip function maintains feedwater pump turbine and main turbine trip capability.

5. Add Table 4.2-6, "Feedwater Pump Turbine and Main Turbine Trip Instrumentation Test And Calibration Requirements." The table establishes the surveillance requirements for the reactor vessel high water level trip function for the feedwater pump turbines and the main turbine as follow:

Instrument Functional Test Frequency: Note 1

Logic System Functional Test: Once every 24 months

Instrument Calibration Frequency: Once every 24 months

Instrument Check Frequency: Daily

Note 1. Perform the instrument functional test:

- a. During each refueling outage, and
- b. Each time the plant is in cold shutdown for a period of more than 24 hours, unless performed in the previous 92 days.

6. Define the instrument functional test with note 2 as follows:

"This instrumentation is exempt from the instrument channel functional test definition. The functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the instrument channel as close to the sensor as practicable."

4.0 EVALUATION

The design of the FitzPatrick trip system does not permit functional testing of this trip function without lifting electrical leads. Consequently, testing this trip system online poses an unacceptable risk of an inadvertent trip of

the feedwater pump turbines and main turbine, and subsequent scram. The proposed surveillance interval for the instrument functional test will permit testing while the plant is shutdown, avoiding the risk of a plant transient. As proposed, a functional test will be performed each refueling outage, and each time the plant is in cold shutdown for a period of more than 24 hours. The testing requirement during shutdown may be waived if the test has been performed during the previous 92 days. The 92-day limit corresponds to a quarterly frequency as defined in the STS, and avoids the risks of plant transients associated with excessive testing.

Limiting instrument functional testing to plant shutdown opportunities is similar to that approved in GL 91-09. The GL provided an alternative testing schedule to the semi-annual surveillance requirement for the electrical protection assemblies used in the power supplies for the reactor protection system. As stated in GL 91-09, the recommended alternative is to test the system each time the plant is in cold shutdown for more than 24 hours if the test has not been performed within the previous 6 months.

The feedwater pump turbine and main turbine trip function is currently functionally tested once every operating cycle. The proposed TS will result in more frequent testing of the trip system when considering the likelihood of scheduled and unscheduled mid-cycle outages.

The nature of the instrument functional tests is defined by note 2 on Table 4.2-6 which reads: "The instrumentation is exempt from the instrument channel functional test definition. The functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the instrument channel as close to the sensor as practicable." The testing, as defined by the note, recognizes the impracticability of injecting a known signal into the reactor vessel level sensors. The note is consistent with note 5 on page 84 of the FitzPatrick TS which applies to most of the instrument functional test requirements. Further, the note is consistent with the definition of "Channel Functional Test" presented in Section 1.1 of NUREG-1433 STS.

NUREG-1433 STS specifies a frequency for the calibration and logic system functional test (LSFT) of the trip system that is consistent with the length of the plant-specific fuel cycle. Since the FitzPatrick fuel cycle is based on a 24-month period, the frequency proposed for the calibration and LSFT has been selected to coincide with this period.

Based on the above, the NRC staff has determined that the proposed TSs changes will have no adverse impact on plant safety and will enhance the current TSs by adding operability requirements for the RV overfill protection system. Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed TS change is acceptable.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (60 FR 24915). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: C. E. Carpenter

Date: June 19, 1995