



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001
August 31, 1994

Mr. William A. Josiger, Acting Executive
Vice President - Nuclear Generation
Power Authority of the State of New York
123 Main Street
White Plains, NY 10601

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT (TAC NO. M86823)

Dear Mr. Josiger:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 216 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated June 17, 1993, as supplemented February 24, 1994, and June 13, 1994.

The amendment adds Section 3/4.2.J., "Remote Shutdown Capability," and associated Table 3.2-10, "Remote Shutdown Capability Instrumentation and Controls," to the TSs to provide Limiting Conditions for Operation and surveillance requirements for the remote/alternate shutdown equipment. The amendment also adds an associated Bases section to the TSs. These additions to the TSs were based on NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical Specifications - General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWR/4)." Several administrative changes were also made to accommodate the additions to the TSs.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "John E. Menning".

John E. Menning, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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Docket No. 50-333

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 216 to DPR-59
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

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Power Authority of the State of New York

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear
Power Plant

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DATED: August 31, 1994

AMENDMENT NO. 216 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59-FITZPATRICK

Docket File

PUBLIC

PDI-1 Reading

S. Varga, 014/E/4

C. Miller, 014/A/4

M. Case

C. Vogan

J. Menning

OGC

D. Hagan, 3302 MNBB

G. Hill (2), P1-22

C. Grimes, 011/F/23

I. Ahmed, 08/H/3

ACRS (10)

OPA

OC/LFDCB

PD plant-specific file

C. Cowgill, Region I

J. Wermiel, 08/H3

A. Singh, 08/D/1

C. McCracken, 08/D/1

cc: Plant Service list



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

DOCKET NO. 50-333

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 216
License No. DPR-59

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) dated June 17, 1993, as supplemented February 24, 1994, and June 13, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 is hereby amended to read as follows:


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(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 216, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Michael J. Case, Acting Director
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: August 31, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 216

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59

DOCKET NO. 50-333

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Remove Pages

i
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54
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Insert Pages

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

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PAGES 51-52 INTENTIONALLY DELETED

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3.2 (cont'd)

E. Drywell Leak Detection

The limiting conditions of operation for the instrumentation that monitors drywell leak detection are given in Table 3.2-5.

F. (Deleted)

G. Recirculation Pump Trip

The limiting conditions for operation for the instrumentation that trip(s) the recirculation pumps as a means of limiting the consequences of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient are given in Table 3.2-7.

H. Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

The limiting conditions for operation of the instrumentation that provides accident monitoring are given in Table 3.2-8.

I. 4kv Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip

The limiting conditions for operation for the instrumentation that prevents damage to electrical equipment or circuits as a result of either a degraded or loss-of-voltage condition on the emergency electrical buses are given in Table 3.2-2.

4.2 (cont'd)

E. Drywell Leak Detection

Instrumentation shall be calibrated and checked as indicated in Table 4.2-5.

F. (Deleted)

G. Recirculation Pump Trip

Instrumentation shall be functionally tested and calibrated as indicated in Table 4.2-7.

System logic shall be functionally tested as indicated in Table 4.2-7.

H. Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

Instrumentation shall be demonstrated operable by performance of a channel check and channel calibration as indicated in Table 4.2-8.

I. Not Used

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3.2 (cont'd)

J. Remote Shutdown Capability

1. The remote shutdown instrument and control circuits in Table 3.2-10 shall be operable in the Run and Startup/Hot Standby modes.
2. With one or more required instrument circuits inoperable:
 - a. restore the required instrument circuit to operable status within 30 days, or
 - b. establish an alternate method of monitoring the parameter within 30 days and restore the required instrument circuit to operable status within 90 days, or
 - c. be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.
3. With one or more required control circuits inoperable:
 - a. place the component actuated by that control circuit in the safe shutdown configuration, or
 - b. restore the required control circuit to operable status within 30 days, or
 - c. be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.
4. Specification 3.2.J does not apply if the component actuated by a required control circuit is inoperable.
5. The provisions of Specification 3.0.D are not applicable.

4.2 (cont'd)

J. Remote Shutdown Capability

Instruments and controls shall be tested and calibrated as indicated in Table 3.2-10.

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3.2 BASES (cont'd)

the specification are adequate to assure the above criteria are met. The specification preserves the effectiveness of the system during periods of maintenance, testing, or calibration, and also minimizes the risk of inadvertent operation; i.e., only one instrument channel out of service.

Flow integrators are used to record the integrated flow of liquid from the drywell sumps. The leak rate is calculated by dividing the integrated volume pumped out of the sumps by the time between sump pump operations. The resultant leak rate value, which is expressed in gallons per minute, is compared to the acceptance criterion specified in Specification 3.6.D.

For each parameter monitored, as listed in Table 3.2-8, by comparing the reading of each channel to the reading on redundant or related instrument channel a near continuous surveillance of instrument performance is available.

The recirculation pump trip has been added at the suggestion of ACRS as a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient. The response of the plant to this postulated event falls within the envelope of study events given in General Electric Company Topical Report, NEDO-10349, dated March, 1971.

Accident monitoring instrumentation provides additional information which is helpful to the operator in assessing plant conditions following an accident by (1) providing information needed to permit the operators to take preplanned manual actions to accomplish safe plant shutdown; (2) determining whether systems are performing their intended functions;

(3) providing information to the operators that will enable them to determine the potential for a breach of the barrier to radioactivity release and if a barrier has been breached; (4) furnishing data for deciding on the need to take unplanned action if an automatic or manually initiated safety system is not functioning properly or the plant is not responding properly to the safety systems in operation; and (5) allowing for early indication of the need to initiate action necessary to protect the public and for an estimate of the magnitude of any problem. This instrumentation conforms with the acceptance criteria of NUREG-0737, NUREG-0578, and NRC Generic Letter 83-36 and includes Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2 Type A variables.

The Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip System transfers the 4 kv emergency electrical buses to the Emergency Diesel Generators in the event an undervoltage condition is detected. The system has two levels of protection: (1) degraded voltage protection, and (2) loss-of-voltage protection. Degraded voltage protection prevents a sustained low voltage condition from damaging safety-related equipment. The degraded voltage protection has two time delays. A short time delay coincident with a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and a longer time delay to allow normal plant evolutions without unnecessarily starting the Emergency Diesel Generators. The loss-of-voltage protection prevents a more severe voltage drop from causing a long term interruption of power. Time delays are included in the system to prevent inadvertent transfers due to spurious voltage decreases. Therefore, both the duration and severity of the voltage drop are sensed by the Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip System.

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3.2 BASES (cont'd)

The remote/alternate shutdown capability at FitzPatrick is provided by a remote shutdown panel (25RSP) and five alternate safe shutdown panels (25ASP-1, 25ASP-2, 25ASP-3, 25ASP-4, and 25ASP-5). These panels are used in conjunction with the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) relief valve control panel (02ADS-71) adjacent to 25RSP, the emergency diesel generator (B & D) control panels (93EGP-B and 93EGP-D) opposite 25ASP-3, the reactor building vent and cooling panel (66HV-3B) near 25ASP-1, instrument rack 25-51, and instrument rack 25-6 opposite 25RSP. All of these locations are linked by communications and are provided with emergency lighting.

This Remote Shutdown capability provides the necessary instrumentation and controls to place and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition from a location other than the control room in the event the control room becomes inaccessible due to a fire or other reason.

This specification ensures the operability of the remote shutdown instrumentation and control circuits. Operability of components such as pumps and valves, which are controlled from these panels, is covered by other specifications. This specification does not impose conditions on plant operation which are more restrictive than those already imposed by other specifications. For example, Specification 3.7.D includes provisions for continued operation with one or more containment isolation valves inoperable. The 30 day time limitation imposed by 3.2.J would not apply in this situation, provided that the actions taken for the inoperable valve(s) to satisfy 3.7.D are also consistent with the safety function(s) required for fire protection.

Not all instruments, controls, and necessary transfer switches are located at the remote/alternate shutdown panels. Some controls

and transfer switches will have to be operated locally at the switchgear, motor control centers, or other local stations.

Operability of the remote shutdown instrumentation and control functions ensure that there is sufficient information available on selected plant parameters to place and maintain the plant in a shutdown condition should the control room become inaccessible. The instrumentation and controls installed on the remote/alternate shutdown panels are listed in Table 3.2-10. This table does not include the isolation/transfer switches for the control functions on the remote/alternate shutdown panels. As specified in Surveillance Requirement 4.2.J, the operability of the transfer switches will be demonstrated when the remote/alternate shutdown control functions are tested.

The remote shutdown instruments and control circuits covered by this LCO do not need to be energized to be considered operable. This LCO is intended to ensure that the instruments and control circuits will be operable if plant conditions require the use of the remote shutdown capability. Performance of the instrument check once every 31 days ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred and is intended to ensure that the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each instrument channel calibration.

As specified in the surveillance requirements, an instrument check is only required for those instruments that are normally energized. Performance of this surveillance provides assurance that undetected outright instrument failure is limited to 31 days. The surveillance frequency is based upon plant operating experience which indicates that channel failure is rare.

3.2 BASES (cont'd)

Surveillance Requirement 4.2.J requires that each remote shutdown transfer / isolation switch and control circuit be periodically tested to demonstrate that it is capable of performing its intended function. The requirements of this section apply to each remote shutdown control circuit on the panels listed in Table 3.2-10 and on panels 25ASP-4, 25ASP-5, and 66HV-3B. This demonstration is performed from the remote shutdown panel and locally, as appropriate. This will ensure that if the control room becomes inaccessible, the plant can be placed and maintained in a shutdown condition from the remote shutdown panel and the local control stations.

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TABLE 3.2-10

REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS

[Refer to Notes on Page 77m]

	INSTRUMENT OR CONTROL	PANEL OR LOCATION
1.	RHR Service Water Flow (Loop B) (10FI-134)	25RSP
2.	RHR Service Water Pump Control (10P-1B)	25RSP
3.	RHR Service Water Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve Control (10MOV-89B)	25RSP
4.	RHR Service Water to RHR Cross-Tie Valve Control (10MOV-148B)	25ASP-1
5.	RHR Service Water to RHR Cross-Tie Valve Control (10MOV-149B)	25ASP-1
6.	RHR Flow (Loop B) (10FI-133)	25RSP
7.	RHR Discharge Pressure (Pump D) (10PI-279)	25RSP
8.	RHR Pump Control (10P-3D)	25RSP
9.	RHR Heat Exchanger Bypass Valve Control (10MOV-66B)	25RSP

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TABLE 3.2-10 (cont'd)

REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS
[Refer to Notes on Page 77m]

	INSTRUMENT OR CONTROL	PANEL OR LOCATION
10.	RHR Inboard Injection Valve Control (10MOV-25B)	25RSP
11.	RHR Heat Exchanger Steam Inlet Valve Control (10MOV-70B)	25ASP-1
12.	RHR Heat Exchanger Vent Valve Control (10MOV-166B)	25ASP-1
13.	RHR Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve Control (10MOV-12B)	25ASP-1
14.	RHR Pump D Torus Suction Valve Control (10MOV-13D)	25ASP-2
15.	RHR Pump D Shutdown Cooling Suction Valve Control (10MOV-15D)	25ASP-2
16.	RHR Pump P-3B Minimum Flow Valve Control (10MOV-16B)	25ASP-2
17.	RHR Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve Control (10MOV-65B)	25ASP-2
18.	RHR Outboard Injection Valve Control (10MOV-27B)	25ASP-2

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TABLE 3.2-10 (cont'd)

REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS
[Refer to Notes on Page 77m]

	INSTRUMENT OR CONTROL	PANEL OR LOCATION
19.	RHR Heat Exchanger Discharge to Torus Valve Control (10MOV-21B)	25ASP-2
20.	Torus Cooling Isolation Valve Control (10MOV-39B)	25ASP-2
21.	DW Spray Outboard Valve Control (10MOV-26B)	25ASP-3
22.	ADS & Safety Relief Valve A Control (02RV-71A)	02ADS-71
23.	ADS & Safety Relief Valve B Control (02RV-71B)	02ADS-71
24.	ADS & Safety Relief Valve C Control (02RV-71C)	02ADS-71
25.	ADS & Safety Relief Valve D Control (02RV-71D)	02ADS-71
26.	ADS & Safety Relief Valve E Control (02RV-71E)	02ADS-71
27.	ADS & Safety Relief Valve G Control (02RV-71G)	02ADS-71

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TABLE 3.2-10 (cont'd)

REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS

[Refer to Notes on Page 77m]

	<u>INSTRUMENT OR CONTROL</u>	<u>PANEL OR LOCATION</u>
28.	ADS & Safety Relief Valve H Control (02RV-71H)	02ADS-71
29.	Safety Relief Valve F Control (02RV-71F)	02ADS-71
30.	Safety Relief Valve J Control (02RV-71J)	02ADS-71
31.	Safety Relief Valve K Control (02RV-71K)	02ADS-71
32.	Safety Relief Valve L Control (02RV-71L)	02ADS-71
33.	Main Steam Line Drain Outboard Isolation Valve Control (29MOV-77)	25ASP-2
34.	Drywell Temperature (68TI-115)	25RSP
35.	Torus Water Temperature (27TI-101)	25RSP
36.	Torus Water Level (23LI-204)	25RSP

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TABLE 3.2-10 (cont'd)

REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS

[Refer to Notes on Page 77m]

	INSTRUMENT OR CONTROL	PANEL OR LOCATION
37.	Reactor Vessel Pressure (02-3PI-60B)	Rack 25-6
38.	Reactor Vessel Water Level (02-3LI-58A)	Rack 25-6
39.	Reactor Vessel Water Level (02-3LI-93)	Rack 25-51
40.	HPCI Steam Supply Outboard Isolation Valve Control (23MOV-16)	25RSP
41.	HPCI Outboard Isolation Bypass Valve Control (23MOV-60)	25ASP-2
42.	HPCI Minimum Flow Valve Control (23MOV-25)	25ASP-2
43.	CAD B Train Inlet Valve Control (27AOV-126B)	25RSP
44.	Nitrogen Instrument Header Isolation Valve Control (27AOV-129B)	25RSP
45.	Reactor Water Cleanup Outboard Isolation Valve Control (12MOV-18)	25ASP-2

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TABLE 3.2-10 (cont'd)

REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS

[Refer to Notes on Page 77m]

	INSTRUMENT OR CONTROL	PANEL OR LOCATION
46.	Emergency Service Water Pump B Control (46P-2B)	25ASP-3
47.	ESW Loop B Supply Header Isolation Valve Control (46MOV-101B)	25ASP-3
48.	ESW Pump B Test Valve Control (46MOV-102B)	25ASP-3
49.	Bus 11600 Supply Breaker Control (71-11602)	25RSP
50.	EDG B & EDG D Tie Breaker Control (71-10604)	25ASP-3
51.	Bus 10400-10600 Tie Breaker Control (71-10614)	25ASP-3
52.	Unit Substation L16 & L26 Feeder Breaker Control (71-10660)	25ASP-3
53.	Bus 12600 Supply Breaker Control (71-12602)	25ASP-3
54.	Breaker 71-10614 Synchronizing Check Control	25ASP-3
55.	EDG B Control Room Metering Check Control	25ASP-3

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TABLE 3.2-10 (cont'd)

REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS
 [Refer to Notes on Page 77m]

INSTRUMENT OR CONTROL	PANEL OR LOCATION
56. EDG B Engine Start/Stop Control	25ASP-3
57. EDG D Control Room Metering Check Control	25ASP-3
58. EDG D Engine Start/Stop Control	25ASP-3
59. EDG B Governor Switch	93EGP-B
60. EDG B Synchronizing Switch	93EGP-B
61. EDG B Load Breaker Control (71-10602)	93EGP-B
62. EDG B Motor Control	93EGP-B
63. EDG B Frequency Meter (93FM-1B)	93EGP-B
64. EDG B Voltage Control	93EGP-B
65. EDG B Emergency Bus Meter (93VM-600-1B)	93EGP-B
66. EDG B Incoming Bus Meter (93VM-12B)	93EGP-B
67. EDG B Running Bus Meter (93VM-11B)	93EGP-B
68. EDG D Governor Switch	93EGP-D
69. EDG D Synchronizing Switch	93EGP-D

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TABLE 3.2-10 (cont'd)

REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS

	INSTRUMENT OR CONTROL	PANEL OR LOCATION
70.	EDG D Load Breaker Control (71-10612)	93EGP-D
71.	EDG D Motor Control	93EGP-D
72.	EDG D Frequency Meter (93FM-1D)	93EGP-D
73.	EDG D Voltage Control	93EGP-D
74.	EDG D Emergency Bus Meter (93VM-600-1D)	93EGP-D
75.	EDG D Incoming Bus Meter (93VM-12D)	93EGP-D
76.	EDG D Running Bus Meter (93VM-11D)	93EGP-D

NOTES FOR TABLE 3.2-10

- A. Minimum required number of divisions for all instruments and controls listed is 1.
- B. Perform instrument check for each required instrument that is normally energized once per 31 days. The normally energized instruments are identified in line items 1, 6, 7, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39.
- C. Perform instrument calibration for each required instrumentation channel once per operating cycle.
- D. Demonstrate each required control circuit and transfer / isolation switch is capable of performing the intended function once per operating cycle.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 216 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 17, 1993, as supplemented February 24, 1994, and June 13, 1994, the Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specifications (TSs). The requested changes would add Section 3/4.2.J., "Remote Shutdown Capability," and associated Table 3.2-10, "Remote Shutdown Capability Instrumentation and Controls," to the TSs to provide Limiting Conditions for Operation and surveillance requirements for the remote/alternate shutdown equipment. The amendment would also add an associated Bases section to the TSs. The proposed additions to the TSs were based on NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical Specifications - General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWR/4)." Several administrative changes would also be made to accommodate the additions to the TSs. The February 24, 1994, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the initial no significant hazards consideration determination. The June 13, 1994, letter transmitted clarifying changes to the proposed TSs that also did not change the initial no significant hazards consideration determination.

Remote/alternate shutdown capability is provided by a remote shutdown panel (25RSP) and five alternate safe shutdown panels (25ASP-1, 2, 3, 4, and 5). The remote shutdown panel and the first three alternate shutdown panels were installed in August 1985 and preoperationally tested. The two newest alternate shutdown panels were installed during the 1992 refueling outage and pre-operationally tested. The design included keylocks on the panel doors and antitampering switches in each panel to alarm in the control room when the panel doors are opened. These panels are used in conjunction with the Automatic Depressurization System relief valve control panel (02ADS-71) adjacent to 25RSP, the emergency diesel generator (B & D) control panels (93EGP-B and 93EGP-D) opposite of 25ASP-3, the reactor building vent and cooling panel (66HV-3B) near 25ASP-1, and instrumentation rack 25-6 opposite of 25RSP. All of these locations are linked for communications and provided with emergency lighting. This remote shutdown capability provides the necessary instrumentation and controls to place and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition from a location other than the control room in the event the control room becomes inaccessible due to a fire or other reason.

2.0 EVALUATION

The licensee has proposed that a new Section 3.2.J., "Remote Shutdown Capability," be added to the TSs that would read as follows:

1. The remote shutdown instrument and control circuits in Table 3.2-10 shall be operable in the Run and Startup/Hot Standby modes.
2. With one or more required instrument circuits inoperable:
 - a. restore the required instrument circuit to operable status within 30 days, or
 - b. establish an alternate method of monitoring the parameter within 30 days and restore the required instrument circuit to operable status within 90 days, or
 - c. be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.
3. With one or more required control circuits inoperable:
 - a. place the component actuated by that control circuit in the safe shutdown configuration, or
 - b. restore the required control circuit to operable status within 30 days, or
 - c. be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.
4. Specification 3.2.J does not apply if the component actuated by a required control circuit is inoperable.
5. The provisions of Specification 3.0.D are not applicable.

The licensee has also proposed that a new Section 4.2.J., "Remote Shutdown Capability," be added to the TSs that would read as follows:

Instruments and controls shall be tested and calibrated as indicated in Table 3.2-10.

A new Table 3.2-10, "Remote Shutdown Capability Instrumentation and Controls," would be added to the TSs that would identify the applicable instruments or controls, their locations, and related surveillance requirements. In essence, instrument checks would be required once per 31 days on instruments that are normally energized. Instrument calibrations would be required once per operating cycle. The licensee would also be required to demonstrate that each control circuit and transfer/isolation switch is capable of performing the intended function once per operating cycle.

During its review of the previously described proposed additions to the TSs, the NRC staff noted that they are similar to NUREG-1433 with one exception. Specifically, NUREG-1433 specifies that a required instrument circuit must be restored to operable status within 30 days or that hot shutdown must be achieved within the next 12 hours if one or more required remote/alternate shutdown instrument circuits are inoperable. The licensee has proposed to include an additional provision that with one or more required instrument circuits inoperable would allow continued operation of the unit provided that an alternate method of monitoring the affected parameter is established within 30 days and the required instrument circuit is restored to operable status within 90 days. The staff finds the use of an alternate method of monitoring to be acceptable since it will provide the operator with indication of the parameter of interest.

The staff concludes that the proposed TS Section 3/4.2.J. and associated Table 3.2-10 are acceptable since they are similar to NUREG-1433, will enhance safety by establishing positive control over the operability of the remote/alternate shutdown panels, and increase the probability that the panels will perform as intended. The staff has no objections to the proposed associated Bases section.

The licensee also proposed certain administrative changes to accommodate the additions of Section 3/4.2.J. and associated Table 3.2-10 to the TSs. Specifically, page i of the Table of Contents and Page v which lists TS Tables would be updated to reflect the additions. The contents of existing Page 54 would be moved to previously deleted Page 53 and Page 51 would be modified to indicate that Page 53 is no longer deleted. New Section 3/4.2.J. would be inserted on Page 54. The contents of existing page 60 would be added to Page 59. The new associated Bases for Section 3/4.2.J. would be inserted on Page 60 and a new Page 60a. The new Table 3.2-10 would be inserted on new Pages 77f through 77m. The staff has determined that these changes are administrative in nature and are, therefore, acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a

proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (58 FR 41511). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors:

I. Ahmad
J. Menning

Date: August 31, 1994

August 31, 1994

Mr. William A. Josiger, Acting Executive
Vice President - Nuclear Generation
Power Authority of the State of New York
123 Main Street
White Plains, NY 10601

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT FOR JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT (TAC NO. M86823)

Dear Mr. Josiger:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 216 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application transmitted by letter dated June 17, 1993, as supplemented February 24, 1994, and June 13, 1994.

The amendment adds Section 3/4.2.J., "Remote Shutdown Capability," and associated Table 3.2-10, "Remote Shutdown Capability Instrumentation and Controls," to the TSs to provide Limiting Conditions for Operation and surveillance requirements for the remote/alternate shutdown equipment. The amendment also adds an associated Bases section to the TSs. These additions to the TSs were based on NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical Specifications - General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWR/4)." Several administrative changes were also made to accommodate the additions to the TSs.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

John E. Menning, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-333

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 216 to DPR-59
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

Distribution: See attached sheet

*See previous concurrence

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