

GENERAL  ELECTRIC

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attention: C. E. Rossi

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: TELECON - CONDITION GERMANE TO SAFETY

Please find attached the memo of my telecon to Paul R. Farron on November 23, 1983. This telecon dealt with a condition germane to safety involving the MSIV actuator failures discovered during NUREG-0588 testing.

Very truly yours,



G. B. Stramback
Safety Evaluation Programs Manager
BWR Standardization
Nuclear Safety and Licensing Operation

GBS:im/2A

Attachment

cc: L. S. Gifford (GE-Bethesda)
P. R. Farron (NRC-Bethesda)
PRC File

IE20

10 EA-30431 (-2)

MEMO OF TELECON:

DATE: November 23, 1983

TIME: 8:00 a.m.

PERSON CALLING: George B. Stramback, GE

PERSON CALLED: Paul R. Farron, NRC-I&E

SUBJECT: GERMANE CONDITION - MSIV ACTUATOR TEST FAILURE

Handwritten notes:
George B. Stramback
Paul R. Farron
R. A. Hiller
Case
Get People

I communicated via phone with Paul Farron of the NRC I&E Branch on November 23rd regarding notification of a Germane Condition on MSIV actuators (R. A. Hiller Company) failures discovered during NUREG-0588 Testing.

I identified to Paul that GE had completed evaluation of the Potentially Reportable Condition and had determined that it was not reportable for our applications. However, we were concerned that it could be a potential problem in some other application, i.e., PWR.

The failure condition was discovered during NUREG-0588 testing which GE was conducting under contract to a group of utility customers. The testing was being conducted to thermal and radiation levels higher than those under which the equipment was originally supplied.

The failure mode is hardening of the Viton seals, and degradation of the Molycote lubrication (grease), used on the MSIV electric-pneumatic-hydraulic actuator which resulted in seal leakage and freezing of the two-way air valve.

GE believed that the 4-way valves might be similarly affected, but had not seen such a failure.

I then went thru some of GE's justification for concluding that it was not reportable which included:

- o Failure would not inhibit valve from failing in the closed-safe direction
- o Inboard and outboard valve arrangement.
- o Only inboard subjected to harsh environment.
- o Inboard and outboard valve would already be closed on RX water level 1 prior to core uncover.

The action which GE was taking was an investigation of new materials which upon conclusion both the NRC and the affected projects would be notified. At present the projects who are members of the qual program have been notified.

GBS:im/2E

ACTION REQUIRED: Yes, followup on the Engineering Resolution of materials fix.

Subsequent to this report and as a result of a meeting and discussion with NRC Region IV GE is expanding notification to other affected BWR plants.

cc: R. Villa
E. W. Giambalvo
PRC File