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March 29, 1985

EAB Weiss

Mr. Edward L. Jordan, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Maryland National Bank Building
7735 Old Georgetown Road
Bethesda, MD 20814

Dear Mr. Jordan

SUBJECT: CONTROL ROD DRIVE MOVABLE INNER FILTERS

Reference: Letter E. L. Jordan to R. L. Gridley, dated 2/27/85 attached.

General Electric (GE) has completed an evaluation of the incorrect mesh size for movable inner filters of the control rod drive (CRD) assembly supplied to Monticello. The evaluation included inner filter mesh sizes used by GE as part of the early control rod drive design.

Since the introduction of the modified stationary filter design in 1971, all domestic plants converted to the new design with the exception of Monticello (and 12 remaining drives at Oyster Creek). As such, there has been no demand from GE customers either for the 2 mil or the 10 mil movable filters.

Forty-six 2 mil filters were shipped to Monticello in May 1984. These filters were destroyed by Monticello when it was discovered in December 1984 that these were the wrong size filters. Another batch of forty-four 2 mil filters was shipped to Monticello in Dec 1984. One of these filters was cut open for inspection by Monticello and one filter was returned to GE in Jan 1985. The remaining 42 filters will be returned to GE from Monticello by the end of March 1985. No filters have been ordered by Oyster Creek. Oyster Creek was notified by GE of the Monticello incident.

All (2 mil and 10 mil) filters at GE San Jose site have been quarantined and there is current planning for disposition of these filters.

As part of the evaluation, GE verified the equipment classification of the movable inner filter as a non-safety related component which has as its only function the reduction in CRD assembly seal wear. It is on the basis of the non-safety related status of this component that the following responses are provided.

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Responses to Specific Questions listed in your letter are as follows:

1. Question — If our understanding of this situation is correct, what circumstances have caused GE to ship movable inner CRDM filters with the wrong mesh size (2 mil instead of 10 mil) to Monticello on these three occasions?

   Response — The 2 mil and the 10 mil filters are parts 1 and 4 respectively of GE Dwg#117C3709. Prior to 1974 an error was made during packaging of the filters by the vendor and/or GE and both Part 1 (2 mil) and Part 4 (10 mil) filters were labeled as Part 4 and stored in the GE warehouse.

   Since the CRD filters are classified as non-safety related items they do not have a retrievable records trail therefore providing no assistance in ascertaining when the packaging error occurred. In addition, the existing records cannot support any conclusions about the May and December 1984 shipments versus any previous 1974 shipment.

2. Question — Is there any way to determine from the package label (e.g., lot number) whether or not the movable inner filter for the CRDM is of the incorrect size?

   Response — Due to incorrect package labeling of the filter parts, the only way to determine the mesh size is to remove the filter from the package and physically examine the filter size.

3. Question — Since the first occurrence at Monticello in 1974 of shipping the movable inner filters with the incorrect mesh size, which other plants have been affected and which have been notified? How many incorrectly labeled inner filters were shipped to each plant.

   Response — To GE's knowledge, no other incorrectly labeled inner filters have been shipped to any other BWR plant other than Monticello.

4. Question — What measures has GE taken to prevent recurrence of the shipment of not only filters but all types of incorrectly labeled parts to nuclear power plants.

   Response — It is our position that GE's QA program ensures that all safety related spare parts go through rigorous and routine examination before shipment.

It should be recognized though that non-safety related item shipping errors can occur from time to time , although a tight inspection program is followed by GE on these parts as well.

Please let me know if you require additional information.

R. L. Gridley, Manager
Safety & Fuel Licensing
Safety & Licensing Operation

cc: C. E. Rossi (NRC-Bethesda)
R. Westberg (Region III NRC)
L. S. Gifford (GE-Bethesda)