



Northeast Utilities System

Lesson Title: NRC LOUT2001 Operating Exam
Revision: 0
ID Number: Scenario #1

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SIMULATOR EXERCISE/EXAM GUIDE

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SECTION 1

EXAM OVERVIEW

Title: NRC LOUT2001 Operating Exam

ID Number: Scenario #1

Revision: 0

1. Purpose:

- a. This examination is used to evaluate crew/individual performance in the simulator to satisfy the requirements of the SAT based program. Annual evaluations are done to satisfy 10 CFR55 requirements for license renewal.
- b. Evaluate licensees in the following areas:
 - 1. Ability of the crew to perform crew dependent (and time critical) critical tasks.
 - 2. Ability of individuals to perform critical tasks.
 - 3. Ability of the crew to:
 - a. Understand/interpret annunciators/alarms.
 - b. Diagnose events/conditions based on signals/readings.
 - c. Understand plant/systems response.
 - d. Comply with/use procedures and Technical Specifications.
 - e. Properly communicate information/proper crew interactions.
 - f. Perform control board operations
 - 4. Ability of each individual to:
 - a. Respond and correctly interpret annunciators.
 - b. Correctly diagnose events.
 - c. Properly interpret integrated system response.
 - d. Comply with and use Technical Specifications.
 - e. Comply with and use procedures.
 - f. Properly perform control board operations.
 - g. Demonstrate responsible attitude.
 - h. Properly communicate information and interact with rest of crew.

2. Exercise Brief:

The simulator will be prepared for the exam.

The licensees will be briefed on the conduct of the exam and the areas in which they will be evaluated.

The simulator will be initialized to IC-24 (or equivalent) MOL @ 100% power. Charging Pump "A" is out of service for a seal change and Charging Pump "B" is on FAC 1.

The instructor will turn over to the SRO and inform him of existing simulator conditions.

The SG safety temp instrument to 2-MS-239 has failed, preventing the "Stm Gen No. 2 Safety Relief Valve Open" annunciator from responding. (Transparent to crew)

A slow failure of the # 2 Steam flow 'Main' transmitter causes the FRV to slowly ramp closed causing # 2 SG level to slowly drop. The crew discovers the failure and the US directs the feed transmitter control to be shifted to 'Aux.' or if necessary the FRV should be shifted to 'manual' to restore SG level. The US should then request assistance from WWM, Ops. Manager, or I&C to work on failed instrument.

Rod # 8 in group "B" slips in to 80 steps, the crew responds to the event by balancing turbine load and stabilizing RCS Tc (AOP 2556). They should then commence a down power to 70% (AOP 2556) and call I&C. I&C tech reports in ~ 5 min. that the power supply fuses are blown, the power supply is de-energized and that is "why" the rod dropped. The crew should realize that the rod is a 'stuck rod' and, therefore, they are in TSAS 3.0.3. which would require them to continue the downpower to take the plant to Hot Standby, Mode 3.

After some period of time an instrument air failure causes the #2 MSIV to fail closed, this causes the Main Steam Safeties on # 2 SG to lift and subsequent to that, one of the Safeties (2-MS-239) sticks open (no indication on the CO-5 annunciator).

A S/G Tube Leak of ~ 300 gpm also occurs in #2 S/G during the trip and stays at that level through the rest of the scenario.

Upon completion of EOP 2525, the US should enter the Functional Recovery EOP 2540 due to ESD and SGTR (two events). The crew could enter EOP-2534 SGTR or EOP-2536 ESDE initially but, should transition to EOP 2540. Terminate after Success Paths are selected from the RAT and initial actions are taken for the first (most at risk) success path.

The examiners will then meet to discuss the exam results.

3. Plant/Simulator differences that may affect the scenario are:

None noted.

4. Duration of Exam: 90 min. run time

SECTION 2
SCENARIO INITIAL CONDITIONS

ID NUMBER: Scenario #1

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Initial Conditions

The simulator is set to IC-24 or equivalent

Out of Service Equipment

'A' Charging Pump out of service, and the annunciator for 2-MS-239 is disabled.

Crew Instructions

'A' Charging Pump out of service, 'B' pp on Z1.
Review the boards, perform shift brief, and assume the watch.

NONE

SECTION 3
INSTRUCTOR GUIDE

Title: NRC LOUT2001 Operating Exam

ID Number: Scenario #1 Rev: 0

All Control Room Conduct, Operations and Communications shall be in accordance with applicable unit procedures which include: U2 OP 200.1 UNIT 2 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS.

“Review the Simulator Operating Limits (design limits of plant) and the Simulator Modeling Limitations and Anomalous Response List prior to performing this training scenario on the simulator. The instructor should be aware if any of these limitations may be exceeded.”
(NSEM 6.02)

Time	ID/Mail	Instructor Information/Activity	Assign	Expected Response	Standard
T ₀		<u>Initial Conditions</u>			
T ₀	IC-24	IC-24 (or equivalent), 100% power, MOL, Equilibrium Xenon, RCS Boron 567 ppm			
T ₀	I/O Ann. CO5 DB17 (off)	Failure of the following annunciator to indicate : 2-MS-239 Safety Valve			
T ₀	MS07B (100) BT #1	Fail Open #2 MSSV on Trip			
T ₀	SG02B (10%) BT #1	SGTR on #2 SG on Trip			
		Place the simulator in run. Place the Chg Pp select switch in 3-1, place the A Chg Pp HS in PTL, (B Pp running).			
	CVR08 (RO)	Rack out the "A" Chg Pp bkr. Install yellow tag on CHG Pp "A"			
	CVR11 (22E)	Ensure B Chg Pp on Z1 (22E)			

Time	ID/Mail	Instructor Information/Activity	Assign	Expected Response	Standard
		Perform the actions of the session Prep/Brief instructions and provide the SM with a turnover. Provide the following information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The plant has been at 100% power for 30 days.(MOL) • There are no surveillances due • It is day shift, normal weekday. • Charging Pump "A" is out for a seal replacement. B is on Z1. 	Crew	Walk down control boards.	ODI 1.27 MM 14
		<u>Event 1, #2 FRV "Main" level instrument failure</u>			
T-1	RX11C	Insert a malfunction which will cause # 2 FRV to slowly ramp closed	Crew	Identify the Loss of the "Main" Steam flow instrument on the #2 FRV and either take manual control of the FRV or place the selector switch for the control to "Alternate"	
			US	Direct the crew to take manual control or shift the control to "Alternate" and stabilize level. Should inform the WWM, Ops Mngr. Or the I&C dept. that the #2 FRV "Main" instrument has failed and initiate action to repair.	

Time	ID/Mall	Instructor Information/Activity	Assign	Expected Response	Standard
		<u>Event # 2, Rod # 8 drops in to 80 steps</u>			
T-2 T-2 +	RD0308 (100%) RD0208	Insert malfunction which drops rod # 8 After CEA slips to 80 steps, enter malfunction to stick CEA.	Crew	Identify dropped rod and enter AOP 2556 "CEA Malfunctions"	AOP 2556
			US	Directs the crew to stabilize RCS temp. by backing down on the turbine. The US should then refer to the AOP and brief the required downpower to 70% with boration only.	AOP 2556 AOP 2575
			PPO	Commence boration to the suction of the CHG pumps for a ~30% downpower.	AOP 2575

Time	ID/Mall	Instructor Information/Activity	Assign	Expected Response	Standard
			SPO	As Rx power is reduced, lower turbine load. The crew may decide to allow the PPO to adjust turbine load.	AOP 2556
			US	The US should call the I&C department to request assistance with the dropped rod. In about five minutes the I&C tech. reports that the rod power supply fuse has blown, the power supply is de-energized and, that is why the rod dropped.	
			Crew	The US and the crew should realize that with the rod power supply de-energized and the rod <u>not</u> on the bottom they have a "stuck rod" which would put them into TSAS 3.0.3. This would require the continuation of the downpower to Hot Standby.	
		<u>Event 3, #2 MSIV Spurious Closure</u>			
T-3	MS06B	Insert a malfunction which causes #2 MSIV to fail closed.	Crew	Should identify the #2 MSIV closure, but may not. The crew responds to the plant trip and enters EOP 2525.	EOP 2525
		<u>Event #4, S/G #2 Safety valve fails open</u>			
T-3	Verify	At the time of the trip, Safety valve 2-MS-239 opens and fails open	Crew	The crew responds to the plant trip, EOP 2525, US directs actions.	EOP 2525

Time	ID/Mall	Instructor Information/Activity	Assign	Expected Response	Standard
		<u>Event #5, SGTR in #2 S/G</u>			
T-3	Verify	A 300 gpm tube leak in #2 SG occurs at time of trip.	Crew	Tube leak may not be identified until success paths are identified or after entry into an event specific or functional EOP.	
			PPO	Report: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reactor tripped • All CEAs fully inserted, with the exception of rod #8 • Power going down • SUR negative 	
			SPO	Report: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Turbine tripped • All steam admission valves are closed • Generator Megawatts are zero • 8T and 9T are opened 	
			US	Commence query of both control board operators to identify the status of the plant	
	CT ESDE-1 SGTR-2		PPO	Report: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pressurizer level < approx. 20% and going down slowly • Pressurizer pressure ~2280 psig and lowering 	

Time	ID/Mail	Instructor Information/Activity	Assign	Expected Response	Standard
			US	Queries PPO for proper operation of the Pressurizer Level control system.	
	CT SGTR-3 ESDE-3		SPO	Report: At least 1 S/G level being returned to 40-70% on Main or Aux. Feed.	
			PPO	Report: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CTMT conditions normal Rad Monitors NORMAL. SJAE or SGBD RM may trend up slowly after the tube leak.	
			US	Queries the control operators to identify the status of performance and verification of the subsequent actions of EOP 2525.	
			PPO	PPO should report that conditions are degrading, i.e. notice the loss of inventory through the tube leak.	
			SPO	Should notice the lowering #2 S/G pressure and level due to the Safety valve being open. The SPO should refer to the contingency action and have the local (outside) verification of the safety valves done.	
	CT SGTR-5		US	Uses the diagnostic flow chart to indicate the status of the plant. <p>A SGTR has occurred, or an Excess Steam Demand has occurred, directs entry into EOP 2534 or 2536. Should realize that two events are in progress (SGTR & ESD) and enter EOP 2540</p>	

Time	ID/Mall	Instructor Information/Activity	Assign	Expected Response	Standard
			Crew	Concurs with transitions into EOP 2534, 2536 or 2540. Crew could give input that shows two events are in progress.	EOP 2534 EOP 2540
			US	Enters EOP 2534 or 2536 and directs that EOP 2534 or 2536 SFSCs be completed every 10 min Once in EOP-2534 or 2536 the crew should discover that they have more than one event in progress and transition to EOP 2540.	EOP 2534, 2536 EOP 2540
			US	Direct that the SM Classify the event	EOP 2540
			US	Open the Safety Function Tracking Page enter EOP entry time, and ensure the master alarm silence switch is in "normal"	EOP 2540
		As Chemist: Wait ~ 10 minutes and report samples drawn and frisked with results of, #1 SG < MDA #2 SG = 200 cpm > background.	US	Direct that both Steam Generators be sampled for activity.	EOP 2540
			US	Direct that the H2 Analyzers be placed in service.	EOP 2540
			US	Identify Success Paths to be used by using the RAT and Safety Function Tracking page EOP 2540 step 6. The most likely Success Paths to be selected are: RC-1, MVA-DC-1, MVA-AC-1, IC-2, PC-1, HR-2, CI-1, CTPC-1, CCGC-1	EOP 2450

Time	ID/Mail	Instructor Information/Activity	Assign	Expected Response	Standard
	CT ESDE-4		US	<p>Prioritize Safety Functions per EOP 2540 step 7, using the RAT. The most likely order is:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. CI-1 first due to <u>not</u> meeting SFSC. 2. IC-2 SI operating and injecting, meeting SFSC. 3. HR-2 Heat Removal with one SG, meeting SFSC. 4. PC-1 RCS subcooled and meeting SFSC. 5. RC-1 ARI except rod # 8, meeting SFSC. 6. MVA-DC-1 All DC available, meeting SFSC. 7. MVA-AC-1 All AC available, meeting SFSC. 8. CTPC-1 CTMT temp. & Press. Sat., meeting SFSC. 9. CCGC-1 CTMT H2 sat., meeting SFSC. 	EOP 2540
			US	Direct the STA perform SFSC's, per step 8	EOP 2540
			US	Brief and direct the crew in performing the chosen success paths based on assigned priority.	EOP 2540

Time	ID/Mall	Instructor Information/Activity	Assign	Expected Response	Standard
			Note	The examiners need to go the appropriate FR description below, based on the US's assigned order of priority.	
	CT ESDE-4		All	<p>CI-1 Safety Function is not being met due to the SGTR and ESDE with release to the environment. Steps 1 thru 4 are required to be verified but no Control Board manipulations are needed.</p> <p>CI-CA Continuing Actions for CTMT Integrity should be referred to and the next Safety Function should be addressed.</p>	
			All	IC-2 Steps 1 & 2 require verifications and no Control Board manipulations are required.	
			All	IC-2 Step 3 will require the US direct that the RCS be depressurized to allow adequate SI flow. Control of Heat Removal should be stated but, is inhibited at this time due to the stuck open safety valve.	
			END	The scenario may be terminated after RCS pressure is being reduced and the crew is preparing to move to the next Safety Function.	
		EAL Classification information		<p>At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, the EAL classification may be used for the 'Event Classification JPM' for Part A of the Operating Test.</p> <p>This scenario results in a Site Area Emergency "Charlie 2" based on loss of two barriers (RCB4-SGTR, and CNB3-unisolable leak to the environment.)</p>	

EXAM GUIDE SUMMARY

1. Critical Tasks:

ESDE-1, SGTR-2 - Establish RCS pressure control

ESDE-3, SGTR-3 - Establish Primary to Secondary Heat Sink

SGTR-5 - Identify the Most Affected S/G

ESDE-4 - Identify the need for CTMT Isolation

Attachment 1

VALIDATION CHECKLIST

Title: NRC LOUT2001 Operating Exam

ID Number: Scenario #1

Rev: 0

Remote functions:

All remote functions contained in the guide are certified.

Verified by

RH

Malfunctions:

All malfunctions contained in the guide are certified.

RH

Initial Conditions:

The initial condition(s) contained in the guide are certified or have been developed from certified IC's

RH

Simulator Operating Limits:

The simulator guide has been evaluated for operating limits and/or anomalous response.

RH

Test Run:

The scenario contained in the guide has been test run on the simulator. Simulator response is reasonable and as expected.

RH

For Examination Scenario:

The Scenario Attributes Checklist (Attachment 4) is complete and attached. This is not required for Progress Review Exams.

RH

Robert C. Cunningham
Technical Reviewer

8/9/01
Date

AK

*Originally signed on 1/23/01 and sent to NRC for review.
"Copy" of original signed sheet not made before transmittal to NRC.

ATTACHMENT 2

SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT

NOTE:

Replace this Shift Turnover Report with the latest format prior to the exam.

ATTACHMENT 3

SCENARIO ATTRIBUTES CHECKLIST

Scenario # 1

Rev. 0

Date 3/09/01

Technical Reviewer

Robert D. Cunningham

QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES

- NH 1. The scenario summary clearly states the objectives of the scenario.
- NH 2. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the crew into expected events.
- NH 3. The scenario consists mostly of related events.
- NH 4. Each event description consists of:
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
 - the malfunctions(s) that are entered to initiate the event
 - the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
 - the expected operator actions (by shift position)
 - the event termination point
- NH 5. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
- NH 6. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
- NH 7. Sequencing/timing of events is reasonable, and allows for the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
- NH 8. If time compression techniques are used, scenario summary clearly so indicates. Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints. Cues are given.
- NH 9. The simulator modeling is not altered.
- NH 10. All crew competencies can be evaluated.
- NH 11. The scenario has been validated.
- N/A 12. If the sampling plan indicates that the scenario was used for training during the requalification cycle, evaluate the need to modify or replace the scenario.

* Originally signed on 1/23/01 and sent to NRC for review.
"Copy" of original signed sheet was not made before
Scenario #1 transmittal to NRC.

- | | | | |
|-----|--|-------|----------|
| 13. | Total Malfunctions (TM) - Include EM's 4 to 8 required 10 to 14 for a set of two scenarios)- | Total | <u>5</u> |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Failure of #2 Steam flow "Main" transmitter 2. Rod #8 drops to 80 steps 3. MSIV #2 fails closed 4. #2 S/G Safety 2-MS-239 fails open (ESDE) 5. SGTR ~ 300 gpm | | |
| 14. | Malf's after EOP entry (EM's)1- to 4 required, 3 to 6 for a set of two scenarios | Total | <u>2</u> |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ESDE on #2 S/G 2. SGTR on #2 S/G | | |
| 15. | Abnormal Events (AE)_ 1 to 2 required, 2 to 3 for a set of two scenarios | Total | <u>2</u> |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. #2 FRV control failure 2. Rod #8 drops to 80 steps | | |
| 16. | Major Transients (MA)-1 to 2 required/2 to 3 for a set of two scenarios | Total | <u>2</u> |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. ESD #2 S/G 2. 300 gpm SGTR #2 S/G | | |
| 17. | EOP's Used (EU) beyond primary scram response 1 to 3, or 3 to 5 for a set of two scenarios | Total | <u>1</u> |
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EOP 2534, 2536, and/or2540 | | |

18.	EOP Contingencies/Transitions (EC) 0 to 3 required/1 to 3 for a set of two scenarios	Total	<u>1</u>
1.	EOP 2540E		
19.	Crew Critical Task (CT) - 2 to 5 required, 5-8 for a set of two scenarios	Total	<u>4</u>
1.	Establish RCS Pressure control ESDE-1, SGTR-2		
2.	Establish Primary to Secondary heat sink ESDE-3, SGTR-3		
3.	Identify most affected S/G SGTR-5		
4.	Identify need to establish CTMT integrity ESDE-4		
20.	Approximate Scenario Run Time: 60 to 90 min. (One scenario may approach 90 minutes)	Total	<u>90</u>
21.	EOP run time: 40 to 70 percent of scenario run time	Total	<u>70</u>
22.	Technical Specifications are exercised during the scenario	<u>Yes/No</u>	<u>y</u>

Facility: Millstone Unit 2	Scenario No.:1	Op-Test No.:1 (2)	
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 45%;">Examiners:</div> <div style="width: 45%;">Operators:</div> </div>			
Initial Conditions: IC 24; 100% power at MOL.			
Turnover: The plant is at 100% power at MOL. Boron is at 568 ppm. BLEND RATIO:BAST 9.5 :1 The following equipment is out of service: "A" Charging pump.			
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description
1	RX11C	I (BOP)	The #2 FRV "Main" level transmitter fails to cause the #2 FRV to slowly ramp closed.
2	RD030 8 (100%)	C (RO)	Rod # 8 drops in to 80 steps. (rod is actually de-energized and stuck)
2+	RD020 8		Rod #8 sticks in at 80 steps
3		N (US)	Decision to commence downpower to 70% initially and also to continue after rod is determined to be stuck.
4&5	MS06B MS07B	M (Crew)	A malfunction causes the #2 MSIV to fail closed (Plant trips), simultaneously one of the #2 Steam Generator Safety Valves fails open with it's alarm function inhibited.
6	SG02B (10%)	M (Crew)	A 300 GPM tube leak occurs in # 2 Steam Generator at the time of the trip.

Scenario #1

Millstone Unit 2 **Functional Recovery**

EOP 2540

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Safety Function Status Checklist

4.0 SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECKLIST

SAFETY FUNCTION TRACKING PAGE

EOP ENTRY TIME _____

Safety Function	Success Path		Equipment Operating	SFSC Met	Priority
Reactivity Control	RC-1	CEA Insertion	y	y	
	RC-2	Boration using CVCS			
	RC-3	Boration using SI			
Maintenance of Vital DC Power	MVA-DC-1	Battery Chargers/ Station Batteries	y	y	
Maintenance of Vital AC Power	MVA-AC-1	RSST	y	y	
	MVA-AC-2	EDG			
	MVA-AC-3	Bus 34A/34B			
RCS Inventory Control	IC-1	CVCS			
	IC-2	Safety Injection	y	y	
RCS Pressure Control	PC-1	Subcooled	y	y	
	PC-2	Saturated			
	PC-3	PORVs			
RCS and Core Heat Removal	HR-1	SI not operating			
	HR-2	SI operating	y	y	
	HR-3	O-T-C			
Containment Isolation	CI-1	Automatic/Manual	N	N	1
Containment Temperature and Pressure Control	CTPC-1	CARs (Normal)			
	CTPC-2	CARs (Emerg)			
	CTPC-3	Containment Spray			
Containment Combustible Gas Control	CCGC-1	Hydrogen Recombiners			
	CCGC-2	Hydrogen Purge			

STOP

THINK

ACT

REVIEW

MP2 SIMULATOR TRAINING
SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT

FOR TRAINING USE ONLY

Simulator Scenario: NRC LOUT 1

PLANT STATUS:	
MODE:	<u>1</u>
MEGAWATTS:	Thermal: <u>2695</u> MWth Electric: <u>899</u> MWE
RCS LEAKAGE:	Identified: <u>0.3</u> gpm Unidentified: <u>.04</u> gpm
BLEND RATIO:	BAST <u>6.3:1</u>
XENON TREND:	<u>stable</u>
ASI TREND:	<u>stable</u>
ESI Value:	<u>0.0</u>
RX POWER:	<u>100%</u>
PZR PRESS:	<u>2250</u> psia
RCS T-AVE:	<u>572</u> degrees F
S/G BLOWDOWN:	# 1 <u>25</u> gpm <u>1</u> turns small # 2 <u>25</u> gpm <u>1</u> turns small
RCS BORON:	<u>810</u> ppm
UNIT 1/2 SA CROSS TIE:	<u>Split</u>
HOUSE HEATING:	<u>In Service</u>
ECOLOGEM:	<u>CST at 100 gpm</u>

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ACTION STATEMENTS (TSAS) IN EFFECT				
TSAS	EQUIPMENT AFFECTED; AWO's. REASON FOR REMAINING IN TSAS	MODE	ENTERED DATE/TIME	EXPIRING DATE/TIME
3.4.11.a	Pzr Vent Solenoids OOS	1-4	1/1/00	Infinite
TRM 3.0	"A" Chg. Pp OOS, Action 2 for item 27	1-4	0600 Today	0600 Today +7

SYSTEM/COMPONENT AVAILABILITY: (systems, components out of service, deviations from required system alignments, the need for valve lineups or other restoration activities)	
SYSTEM/COMPONENT	STATUS
Pzr Vent Valves	Out of Service
"A" Chg. Pp.	Out for seal replacement

U-1/U-2/U-3 CROSS UNIT EQUIPMENT STATUS (list the status of all Unit 1 and Unit 3 equipment alignments that effect Unit 2, i.e., fire protection, Bus 14H, Circulating Water (dilution flow) etc.)	
SYSTEM	STATUS
Bus 24E	24C w/U3 backup from 34A

RADWASTE SYSTEM STATUS (ARW, CLRW, CPF, GRW) (identify water/gaseous inventory problems, discharges in progress or planned.)	
SYSTEM	STATUS
N/A	
N/A	

SURVEILLANCES/EVOLUTIONS IN PROGRESS	Lead Dept
1. None	
2. None	

FOR TRAINING USE ONLY