UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

January 16, 1992

Docket No. 50-333

Mr. Ralph E. Beedle
Executive Vice President - Nuclear Generation
Power Authority of the State of New York
123 Main Street
White Plains, New York 10601

Dear Mr. Beedle:

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF EXIGENT AMENDMENT FOR JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (TAC NO. M82295)

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 176 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated December 19, 1991. The associated Temporary Waiver of Compliance dated December 19, 1991 is superseded by this amendment upon its implementation.

The amendment revises Technical Specification (TS) Sections 3.12.F and 4.12.F, "Fire Barrier Penetration Seals," and the associated Bases to be more consistent with the NRC's Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-0123, "Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors," dated fall 1980. Specifically, TSs 3.12.F.1.a and 4.12.F.1.a were revised to clarify which fire barriers are covered by the associated Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and what actions are required when a fire barrier penetration is found not in the as-designed condition, respectively. Furthermore, TS 3.12.F.1.b was revised to allow the use of hourly fire watch patrols supplementing operable fire detectors in lieu of continuous fire watches when a fire barrier penetration is deemed non-functional. Administrative changes were also made in this amendment.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Brian C. McCabe

Brian C. McCabe, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. 176 to DPR-59
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/enclosures:
See next page

DF01
1/1

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Power Authority of the State of New York
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear
Power Plant

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New York, New York 10271

DATED: January 16, 1992

AMENDMENT NO. 176 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59-FITZPATRICK

Docket File
NRC & Local PDRs
PDI-1 Reading
S. Varga, 14/E/4
J. Calvo, 14/A/4
R. Capra
C. Vogan
B. McCabe
C. Cowgill
OGC-WF
D. Hagan, 3302 MNBB
G. Hill (4), P-137
Wanda Jones, P-130A
C. Grimes, 11/F/23
C. McCracken, 8/D/1
R. Architzel, 8/D/1
P. Madden, 11/E/22
ACRS (10)
GPA/PA
OC/LFMB
PD Plant-specific file [Gray File]

cc: Plant Service list

Docket No. 50-333

January 16, 1992

STRIBUTION:
See attached sheet

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Executive Vice President - Nuclear Generation
Power Authority of the State of New York
123 Main Street
White Plains, New York 10601

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The amendment revises Technical Specification (TS) Sections 3.12.F and 4.12.F, "Fire Barrier Penetration Seals," and the associated Bases to be more consistent with the NRC's Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-0123, "Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors," dated fall 1980. Specifically, TSs 3.12.F.1.a and 4.12.F.1.a were revised to clarify which fire barriers are covered by the associated Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and what actions are required when a fire barrier penetration is found not in the as-designed condition, respectively. Furthermore, TS 3.12.F.1.b was revised to allow the use of hourly fire watch patrols supplementing operable fire detectors in lieu of continuous fire watches when a fire barrier penetration is deemed non-functional. Administrative changes were also made in this amendment.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next regular biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,
Original Signed By:
Brian C. McCabe, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:
1. Amendment No. to DPR-59
2. Safety Evaluation
cc w/enclosures:
See next page
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFC	:LA:PDI-I	:PM:PDI-I	:SPLB	:OGC	:D:PDI-I
NAME	:*CVogan	:*BMcCabe:lm	:*CMcCracken	:*	:*RACapra
DATE	:01/06/92 1/16/92	:01/06/92 1/15/92	:01/08/92	:01/13/92	:01/15/92

OFC	:AADR	:REGI	:	:
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

DOCKET NO. 50-333

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 176
License No. DPR-59

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) dated December 19, 1991, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 176, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance to be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

John F. Stolz, Acting Assistant Director
for Region I Reactors
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 16, 1992

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 176

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59

DOCKET NO. 50-333

Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pages	Insert Pages
244f	244f
244g	244g
244h	244h
244i	244i
254g	254g

2. If the CO_2 protection for the areas listed in Table 3.12.2 cannot be restored to an operable status within 14 days a written report to the Commission outlining the action taken, the cause of inoperability, and plans and schedule to restore the system to an operable status shall be prepared and submitted within 30 days.

D. Manual Fire Hose Stations

1. a. The manual fire hose stations listed in Table 3.12.3 shall be operable except as specified below:

   b. From and after the date that any of the manual fire hose stations listed in Table 3.12.3 is made or found to be inoperable, additional hose lengths shall be added to adjacent operable manual hose stations such that the entire area of protection is maintained within one hour.

E. Fire Protection Systems Smoke and Heat Detectors

1. a. Fire protection systems smoke and/or heat detectors in each protected area as designated in Tables 3.12.1 and 3.12.2 shall be operable except as specified below:

   b. From and after the date that more than one smoke and/or heat detector in each protected area is found or made inoperable within one hour an hourly patrolling fire watch shall be established.

D. Manual Fire Hose Stations

1. The manual fire hose stations are inspected as listed in Table 4.12.3.

E. Fire Protection Systems Smoke and Heat Detectors

1. A channel functional test of smoke and heat detectors and associated circuitry shall be performed every 6 months. This test includes operability of valves associated with the detectors and verifying that the automatic valves in the flow path actuate to their correct positions.

2. If the fire protection systems smoke and/or heat detectors in Tables 3.12.1 and 3.12.2 cannot be restored to an operable status within 14 days, a written report to the Commission outlining the action taken, the cause of inoperability and plans and schedule for restoring the detectors to an operable status shall be prepared and submitted within 30 days.

F. Fire Barrier Penetration Seals

1. All fire barrier penetrations, including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers, in fire zone boundaries protecting safety related areas shall be functional.

2. With one or more of the required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration or verify the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.A, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.B within 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status.

F. Fire Barrier Penetration Seals

1. All fire barrier penetration seals for each protected area shall be visually inspected once/1.5 years to verify functional integrity. For those fire barrier-penetrations that are not in the as-designed condition, an evaluation shall be performed to show that the modification has not degraded the fire rating of the fire barrier penetration.

2. Any repair of fire barrier penetration seals shall be followed by a visual inspection.

3.12 and 4.12 BASES

The Fire Protection System specifications provide pre-established minimum levels of operability to assure adequate fire protection during any operating condition including a design basis accident or safe shutdown earthquake.

A. The high pressure water fire protection system is supplied by redundant vertical turbine pumps, one diesel driven and one electric motor driven, each design rated 2500 gpm at 125 psig discharge pressure. Both pumps take suction from the plant insure. Both pumps take suction from the plant intake cooling water structures from Lake Ontario. The high pressure water fire protection header is normally maintained at greater than 115 psig by a pressure maintenance subsystem. If pressure decreases, the fire pumps are automatically started by their initiation logic to maintain the fire protection system header pressure. Each pump, together with its manual and automatic initiation logic combined makes up a redundant high pressure water fire pump.

A third fire pump, diesel-driven, has been installed and is set to automatically actuate upon decreasing pressure after the actuation of the first two fire pumps. No credit is taken for this pump in any analyses and the requirements of Technical Specifications 3.12 and 4.12 do not apply.

Pressure Maintenance subsystem checks, valve position checks, system flushes and comprehensive pump and system flow and/or performance tests including logic and starting subsystem tests provide for the early detection and correction of component failures thus ensuring high levels of operability.

B. Safety related equipment areas protected by water spray or sprinklers are listed in Table 3.12.1. Whenever any of the protected areas, spray or sprinklers are inoperable continuous fire detection and backup fire protection equipment is available in the area where the water spray and/or sprinkler protection was lost.

Performance of the tests and inspections listed in Table 4.12.1 will prevent and detect nozzle blockage or breakage and verify header integrity to ensure operability.

C. The carbon dioxide systems provide total flood protection for eight different safety related areas of the plant from either a 3 ton or 10 ton storage unit as indicated in Table 3.12.2. Both CO_2 storage units are equipped with mechanical refrigeration units to maintain the storage tank content at 0°F with a resultant pressure of 300 psig. Automatic smoke and heat detectors are provided in the CO_2 protected areas and initiation is automatic and/or manual as indicated in Table 3.12.2. For any area in which the CO_2 protection is made or found to be inoperable, continuous fire detection is available and one or more large wheeled CO_2 fire extinguisher is also available for each area in which protection was lost.

Weekly checks of storage tank pressure and level verify proper operation of the tank refrigeration units and availability of sufficient volume of CO_2 to extinguish a fire in any of the protected areas.

3.12 and 4.12 BASES (continued)

Performance of the periodic tests and inspections listed in Table 4.12.2 are in accordance with NFPA-12, 1973, will verify the integrity of system nozzles and distribution headers as well as detect and remove any accumulation of rust or scale. The use of "puff test" rather than full flow tests will demonstrate proper valve operation without the attendant potential equipment and personnel hazards associated with full flow tests.

D. Manual hose stations provide backup fire protection throughout the Plant. Those hose stations that are in or near areas with safety related equipment are listed in Table 3.12.3. Hose station location and hose length selection provides the capability of reaching any fire in a safety related area with the hose stream. When any of the hose stations listed in Table 3.12.3 is inoperable, providing additional hose lengths from other operable hose stations assures maintenance of this capability. Periodic inspection and tests are in accordance with NFPA Code guidelines and assures prevention, detection and correction of hose, nozzle, valve and/or gasket damage or deterioration to maintain high levels of operability.

E. Early fire detection and fire fighting activity is essential to ensuring that any fire will result in minimum damage to safety related equipment. Since each area monitored utilizes a number of smoke and/or heat detectors when more than one detector is inoperable, early fire detection is assured by establishing a patrolling fire watch which check the area where the detectors are inoperable at least hourly.

Testing of smoke and heat detectors and associated circuitry every 6 months, in accordance with manufacturers and NFPA 72E-1974 recommendations ensures a high level of operability.

F. The functional integrity of the fire barrier penetrations ensure that fire will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portion of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment. The fire barrier penetrations are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.

The barrier penetrations, including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and dampers are considered functional when the visually observed condition is the same as the as-designed condition.

During periods of time when the barriers are not functional, either, 1) a continuous fire watch is required to be maintained in the vicinity of the affected barrier, or 2) the fire detectors on at least one side of the affected barrier must be verified operable and a hourly fire watch patrol established until the barrier is restored to functional status.

(B) SPECIAL REPORTS

1. Fifteen copies of the Evaluation Report of the results of the first five years of performance of the non-destructive inspection listed in Table 4.6-1 of Technical Specifications 4.6.F, Structural Integrity, relating to the FitzPatrick in-service inspection program shall be submitted to the NRC, Director of Operating Reactors, within three months of the completion of the fifth year of the program.
2. Special reports relating to fire protection equipment and systems shall be submitted to the NRC in accordance with Specifications 3.12.A.1.c, 3.12.A.1.d.2, 3.12.B.2, 3.12.C.2, 3.12.E.2, and 3.12.F.2.

6.10 RECORD RETENTION

(A) The following records shall be retained for at least five years:

1. Records and logs of facility operation covering time intervals at each power level.
2. Records and logs of principal maintenance activities, inspections, repair and replacement of principal items of equipment related to nuclear safety.
3. All Reportable Events.
4. Records of surveillance activities, inspections and calibrations required by these Technical Specifications.
5. Records of reactor tests and experiments.
6. Records of changes made to Operating Procedures.
7. Records of radioactive shipments.
8. Records of sealed source leak tests and results.
9. Records of annual physical inventory of all source material of record.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 176 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated December 19, 1991, the Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would revise Technical Specification (TS) Sections 3.12.F and 4.12.F, "Fire Barrier Penetration Seals," and the associated Bases to be more consistent with the NRC's Standard Technical Specifications, NUREG-0123, "Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors," dated fall 1980. Specifically, TSs 3.12.F.1.a and 4.12.F.1.a would be revised to clarify which fire barriers are covered by the associated Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and what actions are required when a fire barrier penetration is found not in the as-designed condition, respectfully. Furthermore, TS 3.12.F.1.b would be revised to allow the use of hourly fire watch patrols supplementing operable fire detectors in lieu of continuous fire watches when a fire barrier penetration is deemed non-functional. Administrative changes were also requested by the licensee.

2.0 STATEMENT OF EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES

This proposed amendment was processed on an exigent basis to reduce unnecessary personnel exposure and adhere to accepted ALARA principles. Specifically, on August 2, 1991, during a meeting with the NRC's staff concerning FitzPatrick's fire protection program, the licensee committed to perform a full baseline barrier seal inspection. As a baseline inspection, this inspection uses inspection requirements more detailed than previously employed at FitzPatrick and a new acceptance criteria. On November 8, 1991, the first fire barrier penetration seal was inspected. Engineering evaluations of the seals inspected have resulted in a significantly higher failure rate than anticipated by the licensee. In accordance with TS 3.12.F.1.b, when a fire barrier penetration seal is determined to be non-functional, a continuous fire watch is established on one side of the fire barrier. As a result of the non-functional fire barrier penetration seals found to date during the baseline inspection, approximately 28 continuous fire watches have been established. Furthermore,

as more fire barrier penetration seals are determined to be non-functional during this baseline inspection, additional personnel will be required to stand continuous fire watch. Because many of these penetrations are in radiation and high radiation areas, the posting of continuous fire watches (as opposed to hourly roving fire watches) results in unnecessary personnel exposures and is contradictory to ALARA principles. The use of roving hourly fire watches would provide an estimated reduction in personnel exposure of approximately 20 person-rem during the remainder of the baseline inspection. On December 19, 1991, the NRC granted a Temporary Waiver of Compliance allowing hourly fire watch patrols in areas with operable fire detection capability in lieu of continuous fire watches when a fire barrier penetration is determined to be non-functional. This Temporary Waiver of Compliance remains in effect until the NRC completes its review of this associated application for an exigent technical specification amendment.

3.0 EVALUATION

The Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, "Fire Protection Program For Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior To January 1, 1979," requires that each nuclear power plant establish a fire protection program that extends the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in fire areas important to safety, with the following objectives:

1. To prevent fires from starting;

2. To detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur;

3. To provide protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant.

Fire barriers are just one feature of the FitzPatrick fire protection program. The functional integrity of these fire barrier penetrations ensures that fire will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to an adjacent portion of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment. The fire barrier penetrations are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's proposed revision to TS 3.12.F.1.b adopting the use of an hourly fire watch in an area with operable fire detection in lieu of a continuous fire watch when a fire barrier penetration seal is determined to be non-functional. The staff concludes that an hourly fire watch in an area with operable fire detection constitutes an equivalent level of protection as a continuous fire watch and is consistent with the

Standard Technical Specifications. These surveillance options also constitute an acceptable alternative to functional fire barrier penetration seals. Furthermore, the use of an hourly fire watch, when permitted, would reduce unnecessary personnel exposure and adhere to accepted ALARA principles.

The staff has also reviewed the current levels of fire protection, detection, and suppression at the FitzPatrick plant to ensure that a fire in the vicinity of a non-functional fire barrier penetration seal will be promptly detected and extinguished. The staff found that the defense-in-depth concept has been incorporated into the FitzPatrick fire protection program via detection, suppression, and protection features which include:

- Automatic suppression and/or detection systems are installed in some fire hazard areas including carbon dioxide systems, halon and water sprays.
- Manual hose stations are installed throughout the plant.
- A trained fire brigade is on site to respond to a fire.
- A local fire department is available to respond to a fire.
- Portable extinguishers are installed throughout the plant.
- Fire protection systems are periodically tested to assure that they are capable of performing their intended function.
- Fire barriers separate safety-related components and reduce the potential for the spread of fire between fire areas or zones.
- An alternate safe shutdown panel, procedures and operator training will assure that the plant can be safely shutdown and maintained in a shutdown condition.
- The physical integrity of structural steel is assured by fire proof coatings.
- Emergency lighting and communication systems have been installed.

The staff concludes that, even if a fire barrier penetration seal becomes non-functional, the current levels of detection, suppression, and protection, at FitzPatrick are adequate to ensure maintenance of safe shutdown capability and to provide reasonable assurance of prompt extinguishment of postulated fires.

The NRC staff has also reviewed the proposed changes to TSs 3.12.F.1.a and 4.12.F.1.a and concludes that these changes merely clarify which fire barriers are covered by the associated LCO and what actions are required when a fire barrier penetration is found not in the as-designed condition, respectively. The staff concludes that these changes are consistent with the Standard Technical Specifications and Bases and do not adversely affect the capability of the fire barrier penetration seals to perform their design function.

The NRC staff determines that the remaining proposed changes to the TS are administrative changes and cannot impact the capability of the fire barrier penetration seals to perform their design function.

For the above reasons, the NRC staff finds that the proposed amendment is acceptable.

4.0 FINAL NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARD CONSIDERATION

The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The following evaluation, by the licensee and with which we agree, demonstrates that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Operation of the FitzPatrick plant in accordance with the proposed Amendment will not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, since it does not:

1. involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

   The proposed changes involve no hardware changes, no changes to the functions of the fire barrier penetration seals or the fire barriers, and does [do] not change the ability of fire protection equipment to perform its intended functions. The compensatory actions [surveillance requirements] implemented by the Authority [licensee] constitute a level of protection equivalent to that required in the existing FitzPatrick Technical Specifications and identical to that previously accepted by the NRC staff.

2. create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated.

   The proposed changes involve no hardware changes, no changes to the functions of the fire barrier penetration seals or the fire barriers, and do not change the ability of fire protection equipment to perform its intended functions. These changes will not introduce any new fire hazards. A functional fire detection system on one side of the barrier plus an hourly patrol or a continuous fire watch constitutes an equivalent level of protection.

3. involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The proposed changes involve no hardware changes, no changes to the functions of the fire barrier penetration seals or the fire barriers, and does not change the ability of fire protection equipment to perform its intended functions. The probability of a fire will not be increased nor will the ability of the fire detection and suppression systems to detect and extinguish a fire be degraded as a result of these changes.

Based on the foregoing, the Commission has concluded that the standards of 10 CFR 50.92 are satisfied. Therefore, the Commission has made a final determination that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (56 FR 67644). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor:
Brian C. McCabe

Date: January 16, 1992