

*Alternative Source Term Analysis Status  
Columbia Generating Station*

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Rockville, Maryland

*Energy Northwest*

NRC001



# Overview

- »»» Introduction J.Ar buckle
- »»» Action Item Review J.Ar buckle
- »»» Analysis Objectives M.Humphreys
- »»» Project / Schedule Update M.Humphreys
- »»» Technical Topics B.Boyum  
J.Metcalf
- »»» Preliminary Results B.Boyum
- »»» Summary M.Humphreys



# Introduction

- » Last Meeting - October 2000
  - » Energy Northwest discussed technical issues and schedule using AST Methodology to resolve outstanding issues and Deactivation of MSLC
  - » Action items resulted for Energy Northwest and NRC
- » Agreement on follow up meeting



# Introduction


## »»» Meeting Purpose

- »»» Review actions from last meeting
- »»» Provide update on Energy Northwest AST analysis including preliminary results
- »»» Discuss technical issues and content of submittal
- »»» Discuss future direction of Licensing Submittal



# Action Item Review

- »»»→ Energy Northwest
  - »»»→ Provide listing of computer codes versus their application (Complete)
  - »»»→ Provide reference for technical background on aerosol impaction (Complete)
  - »»»→ Evaluate crediting Control Room recirc filters (Dropped from consideration following October, 2000 meeting)



# Action Item Review

## »»»NRC

- »»»Coordinate review of technical issues with other NRC projects (Oyster Creek, etc.):
  - »»»Use of MAAP for thermal hydraulic analysis
  - »»»Aerosol impaction
  - »»»ESF leakage release fraction (<10%)
  - »»»MSIV leakage source term

# Analysis Objectives

- »»» Primary Objectives (Unchanged)
  - 1) Resolve the Secondary Containment Drawdown USQ and JCO
  - 2) Resolve Control Room Inleakage USQ
  - 3) Deactivation of Main Steam Leakage Control System (MSLC)
- »»» Secondary Objectives (Unchanged)
  - 4) Increase Allowable Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage
  - 5) Increase Allowable MSIV Leakage

# Project / Schedule Update

ID	Task Name	Schedule to NRC 6/00 Finish Date	Current Schedule (Draft) Finish Date
1	Evaluate CR Envelope	10/16/00	Complete
2	Develop Procedures	8/31/00	Complete
3	Conduct Testing	9/8/00	Complete
4	Finalize Results	10/16/00	Complete
5	Finalize CR X/Q	9/15/00	Complete
6	Complete Input Data	9/15/00	Complete
7	Review MSLC Feasibility Study	7/10/00	Complete
8	Select AST Vendor	7/31/00	Complete
9	Complete AST Analysis	1/31/01	Complete
10	Review / Approve Dose Calcs	4/16/01	5/2/01
11	Revise Related Calculations	4/16/01	5/16/01
12	Complete Licensing Submittal	6/15/01	6/15/01
13	Submit to NRC	6/29/01	6/29/01



# Technical Topics

- » Application of Containment Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Results
- » Suppression Pool Scrubbing
- » Crediting of Drywell Sprays
- » Aerosol Impaction at Entrance to Inboard MSIV
- » Iodine Release from ESF Leakage
- » Control Room X/Q Methodology (ARCON96)
- » MSLB X/Q Methodology (expansion and movement of puff release)
- » Energy Northwest Considers Above Technical Approaches Do Not Conflict With Reg Guide 1.183.



# 1) Application of Containment Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Results

- » Containment T/H Data Used for:
  - » Determination of When Drywell Sprays May Be Expected to Operate
  - » Specification of Drywell Conditions for Spray Removal Rate Calculation
  - » Quantification of Drywell-to-Wetwell Flow (End of Release Phase at Time of Core Quench )
  - » Justification of 50% Reduction in Containment and MSIV Leak Rate at 24 Hours (RG 1.183)




# 1) Application of Containment Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Results

- » Case for Large LOCA as T/H Basis
  - » Maximum Activity Release to Containment
  - » Minimum Time for Noble Gas Decay
  - » NUREG-1465 with respect to timing: “[F]or PWRs, a large LOCA is considered a reasonable initiator to assume ... should not unduly penalize BWRs and will maintain consistency ...”
  - » NUREG-1465 with respect to composition and magnitude: “[T]he composition and magnitude of the source term has [sic] been chosen to be representative of ... low pressure in the RCS ...”




# 1) Application of Containment Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Results

- » Events Investigated:
  - » Large Recirculation Suction Break
  - » Steam Line Breaks Both Upstream and Downstream of Flow Limiter (Large and Small)
  - » Large Steam Line Break Appears Most Limiting as it is the Greatest Challenge to Spray Operation
  - » Sensitivity Study for Spray Operation: Variations in Drywell Initial Temperature and Relative Humidity, Service Water Temperature, and Hydrogen Production were Evaluated



# 1) Application of Containment Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Results


- » Containment T/H Data Obtained from MAAP4 Analyses Reflects Lower Pool Temp and Drywell Pressure than Chapter 6.2 Containment DBA
- » ECCS (HPCS) Assumed to Be Restored at End of In-Vessel Release Phase
  - » No Vessel Failure
    - » No Core Debris Relocation from Core Region
- » MAAP4 Activity Release from Core (Timing and Magnitude), Activity Transport, and Dose Calculation Modeling Ignored



# 1) Application of Containment Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Results

## »»»→ Conservatism


- »»»→ Effects of Drywell Steam Condensation (Predicted by MAAP4) Ignored for Activity Removal
- »»»→ Prolonged (2 hr) Period of High Activity Concentration in Drywell before Sweep-Out
- »»»→ Suppression Pool Bypass Maximized to Minimize Suppression Pool Scrubbing, but Not “Credited” in Assessment of Spray Operation



# 1) Application of Containment Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Results

## »»» Benchmarking

- »»» Comparison of MAAP4 to Chapter 6.2  
Containment DBA
- »»» Power Uprate Revised Only Case “C” (No Spray)
- »»» Long-Term DW Pressure and Temp and  
Suppression Pool Temp Considered
- »»» Dramatic Decrease in DW Pressure and Temp  
(FSAR Fig 6.2-10 and 6.2-11) after ~420 Sec  
Believed Due to DW Temp = Spillage Temp  
Assumption in GE Methodology




# 1) Application of Containment Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Results

## »»» Benchmarking

- »»» MAAP4 Recirc LOCA Run with Case "C"  
Assumptions (Initial Conditions, No Sprays)
- »»» MAAP4 Uses Somewhat Lower Decay Heat, Higher  
HPCS/LPCI Flows, More Effective RHR HX
- »»» Expectation That Suppression Pool Temp and DW  
(Spillage) Temp Would be Less Than Chapter 6.2
- »»» At 1800 Sec
  - »»» Pool Temp = 140 F (MAAP4), 170 F (Ch 6.2)
  - »»» DW Temp = 162 F (MAAP4), 206 F (Ch 6.2)


# 1) Application of Containment Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Results

» Benchmarking




# Application of Containment Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Results

- FSAR 6.2-10 Containment Pressure Response




# Application of Containment Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Results

- FSAR 6.2-11 Containment Temperature Response



# Application of Containment Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Results

## ■ FSAR 6.2-12 Containment Temperature Response






# 1) Application of Containment Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Results

- **Benchmark Summary and Implications**
  - MAAP4 Results Qualitatively Similar to Chapter 6.2 DBA if  $T_{DW} = T_{Shroud}$
  - Close Correspondence of MAAP4 and Chapter 6.2 DBA (with Quantified Explanation of Differences) Supports Use of MAAP4 for AST Application
  - In Contrast to Chapter 6.2 DBA, MAAP Includes
    - » Lower Decay Power
    - » Greater ECCS Flow and RHR HX Performance
    - » Structural Heat Sinks



# 1) Application of Containment Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Results

- Benchmark Summary / Implications (Con't)
- MAAP4 Model Produces Lower Coolant Return Temperature to Containment than Chapter 6.2 DBA (Injection or Spray)
- Failed or Degraded Core Cooling Will Further Limit Energy Transfer to Containment - Use of Severe Accident T/H Important for AST Applications
- MAAP4 (Severe Accident) T/H More Conservative than Containment DBA for Columbia \*
- Similar Conclusion Reached for AP-600 \*




1) Application of Containment  
Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Results

»»» NRC Staff Report of Oyster Creek MAAP  
Review (October, 2000 Meeting Action Item)



## 2) Suppression Pool Scrubbing

- » Permitted by SRP 6.5.5
- » DF=2 Used for ABWR Design Certification Based on:
  - » MAAP Analysis
  - » Applied to Instantaneous TID-14844 Release
- » Pool Flow and Pool Bypass Must Be Realistically Treated and Conservatively Quantified
  - » No Flow Through Pool During Activity Release
  - » Steam/Hydrogen Production When Core Debris Finally Quenched Observed to Be Considerable – Little Bypass
- » For Columbia
  - » ~50% of DW Contents Purged at End of Release
  - » DF ~10 at That Time Yields Overall DF ~2




### 3) Crediting of Drywell Sprays

- » Spray Operation Assumptions
  - » EOPs and SAGs Direct Spray Operation
  - » Spray Operation When Radiation Dose Rate Approaches 14,000 R/Hr in Drywell
    - » Must Be within Safe Region of DSIL Chart to Start
    - » Sprays Will Be Terminated when Pressure Reduces to 1.68 PSIG
  - » One Loop of Spray Assumed to Begin at 15 Minutes After Start of Accident (Approx 13 Minutes After Start of Release)
  - » 14,000 R/Hr in Drywell Reached ~200 Sec After Start of Accident Based on Noble Gas Alone



### 3) Crediting of Drywell Sprays

- »»» Spray Design and Activity Removal in DW
  - »»» Spray Flux Much Higher in Drywell Than in PWR Containment
    - »»» Columbia Spray Flux =  $\sim 0.025^+ \text{ cm}^3/\text{s}\cdot\text{cm}^2$
    - »»» Typical PWR Range =  $0.005 - 0.01 \text{ cm}^3/\text{s}\cdot\text{cm}^2$
  - »»» Excellent Mixing Expected
  - »»» Spray Credit Recognizes Droplet Loss Due to Impingement at Spray Exit and Reduced Fall Height Caused by Obstructions
    - »»» Columbia Using 57% of DW Spray Flow (Not for T/H)
    - »»» Columbia Using 8' Fall Height from Upper Header<sup>26</sup>



### 3) Crediting of Drywell Sprays

- »»» Conservation of Columbia Application
  - »»»  $\Lambda = 1.5Fh/V(e/D)$
  - »»» F and h Minimized (as Discussed)
  - »»» (e/D) Ignores Hygroscopicity of Cs Compounds
- »»» Other BWRs Crediting DW Sprays for Activity Removal
  - »»» Perry (STARNAUA Used for Lambdas)
  - »»» Grand Gulf (Lambdas Compared to STARNAUA – STARNAUA Slightly Conservative)
  - »»» Oyster Creek (STARNAUA Used for Lambdas)



## 4) Impaction at Entrance to Inboard MSIV

- » Aerosols Have Difficulty Following Carrier Gas Streamlines Around/Through Obstructions
- » Stokes Number Characterizes Degree of Departure from Streamlines Where:

$$\text{Stk} = \text{Constant} * u L_p^2 \rho_p / \mu_g L'$$

$u$  = Speed Approaching Obstruction,

$L_p, \rho_p$  = Particle Characteristic Length, Density

$\mu_g$  = Gas Viscosity

$L'$  = Obstruction Characteristic Length



## 4) Impaction at Entrance to Inboard MSIV

- »»» Leak Path Plugging Predicted When “Suspended Mass Carried to or Past Plug” =  $KD^3$  Where  $K = 30 \pm 20 \text{ g/cm}^3$  (Model Developed by Vaughan and Reported by Morewitz – IDCOR References Provided)
- »»» For MSIV Leak “Orifice”
  - »»»  $D = \sim 0.07 \text{ cm}$  at 25 SCFH/MSIV
  - »»»  $D = \sim 0.12 \text{ cm}$  at 75 SCFH/MSIV
- »»» Plugging Predicted When
  - »»» 0.016 g Leaked (max) for 25 SCFH/MSIV
  - »»» 0.082 g Leaked (max) for 75 SCFH/MSIV



## 4) Impaction at Entrance to Inboard MSIV [Existing Overhead Except for Last Bullet]


- Plugging Concept Can Be Used to Justify DF
- DF=2 is a Conservative Minimum for WNP-2
  - at 25 SCFH/MSIV Analysis Shows 1.2 g Leaked (w/ DF=2)
  - at 75 SCFH/MSIV Analysis Shows 3.6 g Leaked (w/ DF=2)
- Actual DFs Based on Plugging Would Be 75 for 25 SCFH/MSIV and 44 for 75 SCFH/MSIV
- EnergyNW Claiming Only DF of 2 for MSIV
- No Other Plugging DF Credit Being Claimed


## 4) Impaction at Entrance to Inboard MSIV

- NRC Position on Issue 13A Stated in IDCOR Report 86.1
  - “For Driving Pressures up to a Few Tenths of an Atmosphere, the Vaughan Model Can Reasonably Be Trusted to Be Applicable to Ducts of Less than a Centimeter in Diameter.”
    - » See Next Overhead for Pressure Difference
    - » Leak Path Approx 1 mm Max in Diameter
  - “In Such Applications, the Vaughan Model Should Be Taken to Predict the Mass of Aerosol Escaping Through the Duct Prior to Plugging.”
    - » Acceptable to EnergyNW

# 4) Impaction at Entrance to Inboard MSIV


## Illustration of Driving Pressure for MSIV Leak






#### 4) Impaction at Entrance to Inboard MSIV

- NRC Staff Report of IDCOR/Oyster Creek Aerosol Impaction Review (October, 2000 Meeting Action Item)



## 5) Iodine Release from ESF Leakage

- »»» AST Analysis Uses 10% Iodine Release Fraction
- »»» ESF Leakage Occurs within Confined Areas of the RB
- »»» Elemental/Organic Iodine Released by ESF Leakage Determines Need for Charcoal Filtration in SGTS
- »»» Analysis of ESF Liquid Demonstrates a pH >8
- »»» Room Volumetric Flowrate of 10000 cfm results in Iodine Release Fraction of < 0.1%
- »»» This is a Significant Conservatism in the Analysis



## 5) Iodine Release from ESF Leakage

- » Iodine Release Analysis Used Technical Approach Previously Used By TMI-1 and IP-2
- » NRC Staff Report of TMI-1 and IP-2 Iodine Release Review (October, 2000 Meeting Action Item)




## 6) Control Room X/Q Methodology

- »»» ARCON96 analysis updated in accordance with draft NRC direction
- »»» Draft calculation utilizing Murphy/Campe methodology examined using 0.5 m/s wind speed
- »»» ARCON96 and Murphy/Campe results are similar
- »»» Using ARCON96 updated analysis
- »»» Peer Review Comment Resolution Ongoing

## 7) MSLB X/Q Methodology (expansion and movement of puff release)

- » Principal Issue is MSLB X/Q for Control Room
- » Features of Energy Northwest Application
  - » MSLB In Steam Tunnel or Turbine Building
  - » Steam Tunnel Released to Atmosphere And/Or Turbine Building
  - » Volume of Steam “Bubble” = Approx  $6 \times 10^4 \text{ m}^3$
  - » Comparable to Volume of Turbine Building
  - » Atmospheric Release from Either Steam Tunnel Blowout Panel or Turbine Building Roof



## 7) MSLB X/Q Methodology (expansion and movement of puff release) (Cont'd)

- »»» Features of Energy Northwest Application
  - »»» Initial Dispersion by Expansion of Released Steam
  - »»» Further Dispersion by Substantial Transient Buoyant Plume Rise
  - »»» Rise Evaluated as Sphere and Hemisphere
  - »»» Minimum Entrainment and Dilution Observed for Spherical Bubble Treatment
  - »»» Dilution Assumed in Dose Analysis is Average of Leading Edge Dilution and Trailing Edge Dilution (~ a Factor of 10 Reduction)

## 7) MSLB X/Q Methodology (expansion and movement of puff release (Con't))

- Comparison to RG 1.78 (for Toxic Gas Puff)
  - Reg Guide Expression Reduces to  $X/Q_1 \cong [\sqrt{2\pi^3 \sigma_1^3}]^{-1}$  for
    - Point of Maximum Concentration, and When
    - $\sigma_x^2, \sigma_y^2$ , and  $\sigma_z^2, \ll \sigma_1^2$
  - Since by Definition  $\sigma_1^3 = Q_1 / \sqrt{2\pi^3 X_0}$ , then
  - $X \cong X_0$  (i.e, Concentration Near Point of Release = Density of Toxic Gas at Standard Conditions)

## 7) MSLB X/Q Methodology (expansion and movement of puff release (Con't))

- Comparison to RG 1.78 (Con't)
  - “Standard Conditions” Not Applicable to Steam Release (Instead Assume Saturation at  $P = 1 \text{ Atm}$ )
  - For Columbia MSLB Steam Release,  $\sigma_l \cong 18 \text{ m}$
  - Figures 1 and 2 of Reg Guide:  $\sigma$  Data Available for Distance from Release Point  $\geq 100 \text{ m}$
  - At 100 m:  $\sigma_x = \sigma_y = 4 \text{ m}$  and  $\sigma_z = 2.2 \text{ m}$  (for F Stability); i.e.,  $\sigma_x^2, \sigma_y^2$ , and  $\sigma_z^2 \ll \sigma_l^2$
  - Conclusion: Reg Guide Concentration Nearly Constant within 100 Meters of Release

## 7) MSLB X/Q Methodology (expansion and movement of puff release (Cont))

### ■ Comparison to RG 1.78 (Cont)

- For Columbia MSLB Steam Release:  
 $X/Q_1 \approx [\sqrt{2\pi^3} \sigma_1^{-3}]^{-1}$  and for  $\sigma_1 \approx 18$  m  
 $X/Q_1 \approx 2E-5 / m^3$

- For 0.2  $\mu$ Ci/g DE I-131 at Power:  
Release ( $Q_1$ ) = 9.5 Ci DE I-131

Expanded Concentration (X) = 2E-4 Ci DE I-131 / m<sup>3</sup>


- Note that Example Assumes All Iodine Becomes Airborne - This is Also True for Columbia

Calculation



## 7) MSLB X/Q Methodology (expansion and movement of puff release (Con't))

- Comparison to RG 1.78 (Con't)
  - For Plume Release (As Modeled in Dose Codes):  
Concentration over Duration of Plume = Release Rate (Ci/sec) x X/Q (sec/m<sup>3</sup>)  
 $X/Q = 2E-4 \text{ Ci/m}^3 / 9.5 \text{ Ci} \times \text{Release Time, sec}$
  - Columbia Assumes 61 sec Release (i.e., Plume Passage) Time (Hemisphere at 1 m/s)
  - Effective X/Q for Columbia (Using Reg Guide Methodology) Would Be Approx 1E-3 sec/m<sup>3</sup>
  - Columbia Using Instead 1E-4 sec/m<sup>3</sup> (Buoyancy of Puff Considered)



## 7) MSLB X/Q Methodology (expansion and movement of puff release) (Cont'd)

- » Energy Release Rate for BWR MSLB Very Large - Typically of the Order of  $10E10$  Joule
- » Two Independent Confirmations Made of Simple Model
  - » CALPUFF Code Used to Calculate the Relative Concentration of Plume at Receptor Location (i.e., the CR Local Intake). CALPUFF Predicted Dilution Factors of  $10^5$  Minimum
  - » UC Berkeley Consultant Also Asked to Review Problem - Numerically-Integrated Puff Model Yielded Results Within Approximately a Factor of 4 of CALPUFF
- » Factor of 10 Dilution Appears Very Conservative



# Preliminary Results

- »»» Control Room Doses Limiting All Cases
- »»» LOCA Doses Bound Non-LOCA Accidents
- »»» Non-LOCA Accidents Analyzed
  - »»» CRDA
  - »»» FHA
  - »»» MSLB Outside Containment

# Preliminary Result - Cont'd

- LOCA Analysis Major Assumptions
  - Containment Leakage = 0.5%/day (vs 0.32%/day)
  - Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage = .04%/day (14.5 scfh vs 0.74 scfh currently)
  - Secondary Containment Drawdown Time = 20 minutes (6.2 minutes calculated)
  - During Drawdown Time:
    - No SGT Filtration Credited
    - Sec Cmt Leakage Rate = 1 vol/day
    - Containment Leakage Directly to Environment



# Preliminary Results - Cont'd

»»»→ Secondary Containment Mixing = 40%

»»»→ SGT Filter Efficiency


»»»→ 94% for Halogens (99% Previously)

»»»→ 0% for Noble Gases

»»»→ SGT Flow

»»»→ 5000 cfm Single Train

»»»→ 50 cfm Bypass Leakage



# Preliminary Results Cont'd

## »»» Control Room Filter Efficiency


»»» 94% for Elemental and Organic Iodine (95% Previously)

»»» 94% for Particulate Iodine (99% Previously)

## »»» ESF Leakage Into Secondary Containment

»»» 1 gpm (2 gpm used in Calculation)

»»» 10 % Iodine Release Fraction (< 0.1% Calculated)



# Preliminary Results Cont'd

## »»» Control Room Inleakage

»»» Measured Leakage = 82 +/- 36 scfm and 76 +/- 24 scfm (Train A and B)

## »»» Analyzed Leakage

»»» 300 cfm/150 cfm (before/after 30 minutes)

»»» 300 cfm/200 cfm

»»» 350 cfm/200 cfm

»»» 300 cfm for entire accident



# Preliminary Results Cont'd

## »»» Dose Analysis Results

### »»» Variables in analysis:

»»» Control Room Inleakage

»»» ESF Leakage Treatment

»»» Release Fraction

»»» Credit SGT Charcoal

»»» MSIV Leakage

# Preliminary Results Cont'd


## Offsite and CR TEDE From ESF Leakage Iodine Release (10% Release Fraction)

<u>CR Inleakage<sup>(1)</sup></u>	<u>CR<sup>(2)</sup></u>	<u>EAB<sup>(2)</sup></u>	<u>LPZ<sup>(2)</sup></u>
300/150	.874	.02	.26
300/200	1.068	.02	.26
300/300	1.434	.02	.26
350/200	1.088	.02	.26

(1) Leakage in CFM. Initial Leakage/Leakage After 30 min.

(2) Dose in REM TEDE.

# Preliminary Results (cont'd)



# Preliminary Results Cont'd

## »»» Example LOCA Dose Results:

### »»» Case 1

»»» MSLC Deleted

»»» Control Room Inleakage = 300cfm/150cfm,

»»» Total MSIV Leakage = 100 scfh

»»» ESF Iodine Release = 10%


»»» SGTS Charcoal Credit = Yes

»»» Dose (TEDE):

»»» CR = 4.57 R (0.87 R ESF, 0.5 R Shine)

»»» EAB = 3.72 R (.02 R ESF)

»»» LPZ = 3.46 R (0.26 R ESF)



# Preliminary Results Cont'd

- »»» Case 2
  - »»» MSLC Deleted
  - »»» Control Room Inleakage = 300cfm/150cfm,
  - »»» Total MSIV Leakage = 100 scfh
  - »»» ESF Iodine Release = 0.1%
  - »»» SGTS Charcoal Credit = No
  - »»» Dose (TEDE):
    - »»» CR = 4.02 R (0.12 R ESF, 0.5 R Shine)
    - »»» EAB = 3.73 R (0.003 R ESF)
    - »»» LPZ = 3.31 R (0.03 R ESF)

# Preliminary Results Cont'd

»»» Other Accident Analyses (Using Control Room Inleakage = 300cfm/150cfm):


»»» Fuel Handling Accident:

»»» CR Dose = 0.58 R TEDE

»»» EAB = 0.64 R

»»» LPZ = 0.21 R

»»» Results Not Sensitive to SGT Charcoal Filtration



# Preliminary Results Cont'd

## »»» Control Rod Drop Accident:

»»» CR Dose = 0.388 R TEDE

»»» EAB = 0.021 R


»»» LPZ = 0.024 R

## »»» Main Steam Line Break Accident:

»»» CR Dose = 0.014 R TEDE

»»» EAB = < 1% of Limit

»»» LPZ = < 1% of Limit



# Preliminary Results (cont'd)


## »»» Tech Spec Changes Anticipated

### »»» Section 3.6.1.3 - Primary Containment Isolation Valves

»»» Increase Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage from 0.74 scfh to 0.04%/day (14.5 scfh) and revise the allowable MSIV leakage

### »»» Section 3.6.1.8 - Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Control (MSLC) System

»»» Delete the MSLC System



# Preliminary Results (cont'd)


## »»» Section 3.6.4.1 - Secondary Containment

»»» Change the Surveillance Requirement to Verify Every 24 Hours that the Pressure Within Secondary Containment is  $< 0$  inch (vs 0.25 inch) of Vacuum Water Gauge

»»» Increase Secondary Containment Drawdown Time from 120 seconds to 20 minutes

## »»» Section 5.5.7 - Ventilation Filter Testing Program

»»» Increase Standby Gas Treatment System Flow Rate from 4457 cfm to 5000 cfm



# Preliminary Results (cont'd)

»»» AST Peer Review

»»» Duke Engineering (X/Q Review)

»»» Grand Gulf

»»» Perry (Tentative)



# Summary

- »»» On Schedule for Submittal June 2001
- »»» Capture Concerns, Questions, or Actions from this Discussion
- »»» Propose Next Meeting with the Submittal