# From: <Steve\_Hale@fpl.com> To: <rca@nrc.gov>, <ssk2@nrc.gov> Date: 3/12/01 6:52PM Subject: Draft Responses to RAIs Transmitted by letter dated 2/2/01 RegardingSection 3.3 Engineered Safety Features Systems

Raj/Steve,

Attached are the draft responses to the subject RAIs. Please review the attached draft responses to see if they address the reviewers' questions. Please arrange a telecon to discuss comments/questions on these responses when the reviewers are ready, or, if possible, we can discuss them at the 3/20/01 meeting.

Thanks

(See attached file: L-2001-60 Response to RAIs dated 2-2-01 ESF System.doc)

CC: <Liz\_Thompson@fpl.com>, <Tony\_Menocal@fpl.com>, <Howard\_Onorato@fpl.com>

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# ATTACHMENT 1

# RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DATED FEBRUARY 2, 2001 FOR THE REVIEW OF THE TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4, LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION

#### SECTION 3.3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEMS

# RAI 3.3-1:

In Section 3.3.2 of the LRA, the applicant states that the aging effect requiring management for carbon steel mechanical closure bolting is the loss of mechanical closure integrity. This aging effect, as listed in Tables 3.3-1 through 3.3-7, is managed by Boric Acid Wastage Surveillance Program described in Appendix B, Section 3.2.3. For closure bolting, loss of material, loss of preload, and crack initiation and growth due to stress corrosion cracking are applicable aging effects that are not described in the boric acid wastage surveillance program. Provide a discussion of how the Boric Acid Wastage Surveillance Program would manage these aging effects including acceptance criteria and specific operating experience. If this program does not adequately manage these aging effects then discuss the specific aging management program that will be used to manage the aging effects of the closure bolting.

#### FPL RESPONSE:

The LRA, Appendix B, Subsection 3.2.3 (page B-44) states that the Boric Acid Wastage Surveillance program manages the effects of loss of material and loss of mechanical closure integrity due to aggressive chemical attack. When external leakage involves borated water, the aging effect of concern is loss of carbon or low alloy steel bolting material due to aggressive chemical attack (i.e., boric acid corrosion). Loss of bolting material can result in failure of the mechanical joint and thus, loss of a component's pressure boundary integrity. Therefore, the LRA addresses loss of mechanical closure integrity resulting from borated water leaks and credits the Boric Acid Wastage Surveillance Program (LRA, Appendix B, page B-44) for management of this effect on carbon and low alloy steel bolting. The acceptance criteria for this program is provided in the LRA, Appendix B, Subsection 3.2.3 (page B-46).

LRA Section 5.4 (page C-21) states that loss of pre-load of mechanical closures can occur due to settling of mating surfaces, relaxation after cyclic loading, gasket creep, and loss of gasket compression due to differential thermal expansion. The loss of pre-load due to these mechanisms can result in leakage at the joint, e.g. gasket or seal leakage, not failure of the mechanical

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Attachment 1

joint. It is noted that the ASME Code does not consider gaskets, seals and O-rings to perform a pressure retaining function. It follows that the loss of pre-load from the above mechanisms does not result in loss of mechanical closure or loss of pressure boundary integrity. Therefore, no aging effects associated with loss of pre-load resulting from settling, relaxation after cyclic loading, gasket creep, and temperature effects are considered to require management during the period of extended operation.

High stress in conjunction with an aggressive environment can cause cracking of certain bolting materials due to stress corrosion cracking (SCC). As identified in NRC IE Bulletin 82-02, "Degradation of Threaded Fasteners in Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary of PWR Plants" and Generic Letter 91-17, "Generic Safety Issue 29, Bolting Degradation or Failure in Nuclear Power Plants," cracking of bolting in the industry has occurred due to SCC. These instances of SCC have been primarily attributed to the use of high yield strength bolting materials, excessive torquing of fasteners and contaminants, such as the use of lubricants containing molybdenum disulfide (MoS<sub>2</sub>). In response to NRC IE Bulletin 82-02, Turkey Point verified that:

- (a) Specific maintenance procedures were in place to address bolted closures.
- (b) The procedures in use addressed detensioning and retensioning practices and gasket installation and controls.
- (c) Threaded fastener lubricants used in pressure boundary applications have specified maximum allowable limits for chloride and sulfur content to minimize susceptibility to SCC environments.
- (d) Maintenance crew training on threaded fasteners is performed.

At Turkey Point, the potential for SCC of fasteners is minimized by utilizing ASTM A193, Gr. B7 bolting material and limiting contaminants such as chlorides and sulfur in lubricants and sealant compounds. Additionally, sound maintenance bolt torquing practices are used to control bolting material stresses. These actions have been effective in eliminating the potential for SCC of bolting materials. The results of a review of the Turkey Point condition report (1992 through 2000) and metallurgical report (1986 through 2000) databases supports this conclusion in that no instances of bolting degradation due to SCC were identified. Therefore, cracking of bolting material due to SCC is not considered an aging effect requiring management at Turkey Point.

#### SECTION 3.3.2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY

#### RAI 3.3.2-1:

For all stainless steel pressure retaining components, such as, pumps, valves, piping, fittings, tubing, etc., in the containment spray system, where borated water is the internal environment, is crack initiation and growth due to stress corrosion cracking an applicable aging effect? It appears to be a possible effect according to some of the industry experience as listed in Section 3.3.3.1 of the Turkey Point license renewal application (LRA). Is there an inservice inspection aging management program in place to address this aging effect? If not, provide an explanation of why this aging effect is not addressed in the LRA or a discussion of the program that manages these aging effects.

#### FPL RESPONSE:

As discussed in LRA Appendix C, Section 5.2 (page C-19), for austenitic stainless steels in treated water, the relevant conditions required for stress corrosion cracking (SCC) are the presence of halogens in excess of 150 ppb or sulfates in excess of 100 ppb, and elevated temperature. For Turkey Point treated water environments, a temperature criterion of greater than 140°F is utilized for susceptibility of austenitic stainless steels to SCC. Containment Spray (CS) operates at a temperature less than 140°F, therefore, cracking due to SCC is not an aging effect requiring management for CS components. This conclusion is supported by plant operating and maintenance experience.

NRC Bulletin 79-17, "Pipe Cracks in Stagnant Borated Water Systems at PWR Plants, " IN 79-19, "Pipe Cracks in Stagnant Water Systems at PWR Plants," and Condition Report CR 76-06 describe several instances of thru-wall cracking in stainless steel piping in stagnant borated water systems. NRC Bulletin 79-17 required licensees to review safety related systems that contain stagnant, oxygenated, borated water. For these identified systems, licensees were required to review pre-service NDE, inservice NDE results, and chemistry controls. Also, ultrasonic and visual examinations of representative samples of circumferential welds were performed. The results of these reviews and inspections for Turkey Point, which included the containment spray system, identified no anomalies in chemistry or indications of SCC at welds. All of the instances of SCC in the nuclear industry have identified the presence of halogens, such as chlorides in the failed component. These occurrences most likely resulted from the inadvertent introduction of contaminants into the system. SCC can occur in stainless steel at ambient temperature if exposed to a harsh environment (i.e. with significant contamination). However, these conditions are considered to be event driven. Based upon the above, cracking due to SCC was

Attachment 1 determined not to be an aging effect requiring management for the containment spray system.

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# RAI 3.3.3-1:

In Section 2.3.2.3 of the Turkey Point LRA, FPL states that all containment penetrations and associated containment isolation valves and components that ensure containment integrity, regardless of where they are described, require an aging management review. Provide a cross reference to sections in the LRA where aging effects and aging management programs for the containment isolation valves and associated piping are described and summarize the applicable aging effects and the programs used to manage them.

# FPL RESPONSE:

The following table provides a list of systems/components having the intended function of containment isolation/containment integrity and identifies the corresponding table in the LRA that contains the aging effects/program information:

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEMS and COMPONENTS	
SYSTEM	LRA SECTION
Auxiliary Feedwater and Condensate	Table 3.5-3, pp 3.5-17
Storage	through 21
Breathing Air Systems	Table 3.3-3, p 3.3-17
Chemical & Volume Control	Table 3.4-4, pp 3.4-28
	through 34
Component Cooling Water	Table 3.4-2, pp 3.4-19
	through 23
Containment Post Accident Monitoring	Table 3.3-7, pp 3.3-28
and Control	through 31
Containment Purge Systems	Table 3.3-3, p 3.3-16
Containment Spray	Table 3.3-2, pp 3.3-11
	through 15
Emergency Containment Cooling (CCW)	Table 3.3-1, pp 3.3-9
	through 10
Feedwater & Blowdown	Table 3.5-2, pp 3.5-11
	through 16
Instrument Air	Table 3.4-8, pp 3.4-44
	through 49
Main Steam and Turbine Generators	Table 3.5-1, pp 3.5-8
	through 10
Nitrogen & Hydrogen Systems	Table 3.3-3, p 3.3-18
Normal Containment and Control Rod	Table 3.4-9, pp 3.4-50
Drive Mechanism Cooling (CCW)	through 54
NSSS Sample System	Table 3.4-6, p 3.4-36
	through 38
Primary Water Makeup	Table 3.4-5, p 3.4-35

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEMS and	COMPONENTS (continued)
SYSTEM	LRA SECTION
Reactor Coolant Piping - Non Class 1	Table 3.2-1, pp 3.2-58
Components (RCP Bearing Oil Heat	through 60
Exchanger Shell Side - CCW)	
Reactor Coolant Pumps (Thermal	Table 3.2-1, pp 3.2-80
Barrier Heat Exchanger Nozzles - CCW)	through 82
Regenerative and Excess Letdown Heat	Table 3.2-1, pp 3.2-61
Exchangers (Excess Letdown shell side	through 62
- CCW)	
Residual Heat Removal	Table 3.3-5, pp 3.3-23
	through 25
Safety Injection	Table 3.3-4, pp 3.3-19
	through 22
Secondary Sample System	Table 3.4-6, pp 3.4-39
	through 40
Steam Generators (shell side)	Table 3.2-1, pp 3.2-83
	through 89
Waste Disposal	Table 3.4-7, p 3.4-41
	through 43

Provided below is a summary of containment isolation/integrity component materials, aging effects requiring management and credited aging management programs. For additional details see the applicable section of the LRA identified in the table above.

Typical containment isolation/integrity components are valves, piping/fittings, tubing/fittings, and mechanical closure bolting associated with these components. For specific components associated with containment penetrations see License Renewal Boundary drawings supplied with LRA, identified in Tables 2.3-1 (page 2.3-44), 2.3-4 (page 2.3-50), 2.3-5 (page 2.3-51), and 2.3-6 (page 2.3-56). (Note the steam generator and CCW are closed systems inside containment that are credited for containment integrity.) The materials of construction for these components are carbon steel, galvanized carbon steel, stainless steel or copper alloys. The external environments include containment air, outdoor, or indoor - no air conditioning. The aging effects requiring management for external surfaces are as follows:

Carbon steel: loss of material and loss of mechanical closure integrity Stainless steel: none Copper alloy: loss of material Galvanized carbon steel: none The programs credited for managing these effects are:

System & Structures Monitoring Program ASME Section XI (shell side steam generator only) Periodic Surveillance and Preventive Maintenance Program Boric Acid Wastage Surveillance Program

The internal environments include air/gas<sup>1</sup> (including nitrogen, dry air and ambient air) and treated water (including borated, primary and secondary). The aging effects requiring management for internal surfaces are as follows:

Carbon steel: loss of material Copper alloy: loss of material Stainless steel: loss of material, cracking<sup>2</sup>

The programs credited for managing these effects are:

Chemistry Control Program Emergency Containment Coolers Inspection Galvanic Corrosion Susceptibility Inspection Program<sup>3</sup> Periodic Surveillance and Preventive Maintenance Program Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program.

Based on the evaluations provided in Appendix B for the programs listed above, aging effects are adequately managed so that the intended functions of containment isolation/integrity are maintained consistent with the current licensing basis for the period of extended operation.

Notes:

- 1. Stainless steel, and galvanized carbon steel have no aging effects requiring management in an internal environment of air/gas.
- Stress corrosion cracking is an aging effect requiring management for austenitic stainless steel at temperatures >140°F.
- 3. Excess Letdown Cooling, Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cooling, Reactor Coolant Pump Bearing Oil Heat Exchangers and Normal Containment Cooling only

# RAI 3.3.3-2:

For containment isolation, Section 3.3.2 of the Turkey Point LRA, states that the aging effect requiring management is loss of material for carbon steel components and the aging effect requiring management for carbon steel mechanical closure bolting is loss of mechanical closure integrity, clarify if these aging effects apply to all containment isolation valves and associated piping or is limited to the ones described in this section.

#### FPL RESPONSE:

As described in LRA Subsection 2.3.2.3 (page 2.3-15), "Containment Isolation", Breathing Air, Nitrogen and Hydrogen, and Containment Purge are the process systems whose only license renewal intended function is containment isolation. LRA Subsection 3.3.2 (page 3.3-3), "Aging Effects Requiring Management", Containment Isolation refers to the above mentioned systems. For aging effects applicable to other system components that perform a containment isolation function, see response to RAI 3.3.3-1.

# RAI 3.3.4-1:

In Table 3.3-4 of the Turkey Point LRA, FPL indicates that the SI pump thrust bearing coolers and SI shaft seal heat exchanger shells and covers are fabricated from cast iron materials. Volume Four of the American Welding Society (AWS) Welding Handbook indicates that welding of cast iron materials tends to result in the precipitation of carbides and the formation of high-carbon martensitic material in the heat affected zones immediately adjacent to the weld metal. Since both of these materials are extremely brittle, the AWS states that welded cast iron materials may be susceptible to spontaneous cracking or cracking while in service. FPL has not identified cracking as an aging effect that could effect these components during the periods of extended operation for the Turkey Point units. Clarify whether or not the SI pump thrust bearing coolers and SI shaft seal heat exchanger shells and covers have any welds in them. If these components do contain welded regions, cracking must be added as an aging effect that needs managing in these components during the periods of extended operation for the Turkey Point units.

#### FPL RESPONSE:

The Safety Injection (SI) pump thrust bearing coolers and SI shaft seal heat exchangers do not contain any welds. The thrust bearing coolers are castings with threaded ports to accommodate oncethrough cooling. The shaft seal heat exchangers have cast bodies with gasketed and bolted covers.

# RAI 3.3.4-2:

In Section 3.3.2 of the TP LRA, FPL identifies that cracking of stainless steel and Inconel components in the SI system is an aging effect that requires management during the periods of extended operation for the TP units. However, this aging effect was not included in Table 3.3-4 for stainless steel and Inconel components in the SI system. Clarify whether or not the operating conditions for the SI system, when taken into account with the environmental conditions for the system, will allow FPL to preclude cracking as a potential aging effect for the stainless steel and Inconel SI components. If cracking is an applicable aging effect for the stainless steel and Inconel SI components, then Table 3.3-4 should be modified accordingly.

#### FPL RESPONSE:

For Safety Injection (SI), LRA Subsection 3.3.2 (page 3.3-3), states "The aging effects requiring management are cracking for certain stainless steel components; and loss of material and fouling for Inconel heat exchanger tubing...". Table 3.3-4, "Safety Injection" (page 3.3-22), component/commodity group "Piping/fittings, (large bore, thin wall outdoors, and outdoors in trenches)", lists cracking as an external aging effect requiring management. The Systems Structures Monitoring Program is credited with managing this effect. Cracking is not an aging effect requiring management for any other stainless steel SI component. The statement in Subsection 3.3.2 does not identify cracking as an aging effect requiring management for Inconel in the SI system. LRA Table 3.3-4 (page 3.3-19), correctly identifies loss of material and fouling as aging effects for the Inconel tubes of the SI pump shaft seal heat exchangers. The Chemistry Control Program is credited with managing this aging effect.

#### RAI 3.3.4-3:

In Section 3.3.2 and Table 3.3-4 of the TP LRA, FPL identifies that the SI pump shaft seal heat exchanger tube shields, which are fabricated from brass material, may be effected by loss of material. Since Section 5.2 of Appendix C does not discuss whether cracking of brass materials is an aging effect requiring management, discuss your basis for not including it as a plausible aging effect for the SI pump shaft seal heat exchanger tube shields.

#### FPL RESPONSE:

Copper alloys exhibit excellent resistance to stress corrosion cracking in treated water<sup>1</sup>, therefore this aging effect was not considered to require management for copper alloys.

Reference 1: "Corrosion of Metals in Marine Environments", J. A. Beavers, G. H. Koch, W.E. Berry, Metals and Ceramics Information Center Report, July 1986.

#### SECTION 3.3.5 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM

#### RAI 3.3.5-1:

For those RHR components identified in Table 3.3-5 as being within the scope of license renewal and for whom cracking has been identified as a potential aging effect, justify why the chemistry control program is sufficient by itself as the basis for managing this aging effect.

#### FPL RESPONSE:

As listed in LRA Table 3.3-5 (pages 3.3-23 and 3.3-24), cracking has been identified for certain stainless steel RHR components exposed to treated water - borated. As discussed in LRA Appendix C, Section 5.2 (page C-19), for austenitic stainless steels in treated water, the relevant conditions required for stress corrosion cracking (SCC) are the presence of halogens in excess of 150 ppb or sulfates in excess of 100 ppb, and elevated temperature. For Turkey Point treated water environments, a temperature criterion of greater than 140°F is utilized for susceptibility of austenitic stainless steels to SCC. Portions of RHR operate at a temperature greater than 140°F during refueling outages. However, the chemistry of RHR water is controlled such that halogens and sulfates are maintained below 150 and 100 ppb respectively. The Chemistry Control program as described in LRA Appendix B, Subsection 3.2.4, page B-47 monitors halogens and sulfates in systems with an internal environment of treated water - borated to insure that they are maintained within specified limits. The effectiveness of the Chemistry Control Program in managing cracking for the RHR system is supported by a review of plant operating and maintenance history, including condition reports and metallurgical laboratory failure analysis reports. This review indicated no instances of SCC or age related cracking in the RHR system components.