



**Northeast  
Nuclear Energy**

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The Northeast Utilities System

**Docket No. 50-245**

**50-336**

**50-423**

**B18347**

MAR 6 2001

Re: 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3  
Licensee Event Report 2001-001-00 (Unit No. 1)  
Site Vehicle Access Point Gate Open During Snowstorm Without  
Compensatory Measures

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report (LER) 2001-001-00 for Unit 1, documenting an event that occurred at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3, on February 5, 2001. This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1).

There are no commitments made within this letter.

Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. David W. Dodson at (860) 447-1791, extension 2346.

Very truly yours,

**NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY**

  
C. J. Schwarz

Master Process Owner, Operate the Asset

cc: see page 2

IE74  
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Attachment: Unit 1 LER 2001-001-00

cc: H. J. Miller, Region 1 Administrator  
J. B. Hickman, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 1  
P. C. Cataldo, Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit No. 2  
D. S. Collins, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2  
S. R. Jones, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit No. 2  
V. Nerses, NRC Senior Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 3  
A. C. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit No. 3

RAL:ral

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**Attachment 1**

**Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3**

**Unit 1 LER 2001-001-00**

<b>NRC FORM 366</b> (1-2001)		<b>U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION</b>		<b>APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 6-30-2001</b> Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to bjs1@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.						
<b>LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)</b> (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)										
<b>FACILITY NAME (1)</b> Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1			<b>DOCKET NUMBER (2)</b> 05000245		<b>PAGE (3)</b> 1 OF 3					
<b>TITLE (4)</b> Security Event Report: Site Vehicle Access Point Gate Open During Snowstorm Without Compensatory Measures										
<b>EVENT DATE (5)</b> MO DAY YEAR		<b>LER NUMBER (6)</b> YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO.		<b>REPORT DATE (7)</b> MO DAY YEAR		<b>OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)</b>				
02 05 2001		2001 - 001 - 00		03 06 2001		FACILITY NAME Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 05000336 FACILITY NAME Unit 3 DOCKET NUMBER 05000423				
<b>OPERATING MODE (9)</b> N		<b>THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) (11)</b>								
<b>POWER LEVEL (10)</b> 000		20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)				
		20.2201(d)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)				
		20.2203(a)(1)		50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) X				
		20.2203(a)(2)(i)		50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)				
		20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)				
		20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.46(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)				
		20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)				
		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)				
20.2203(a)(2)(vi)		50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A				
20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
<b>LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)</b>										
<b>NAME</b> David W. Dodson, Team Lead - Compliance				<b>TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)</b> 860-447-1791						
<b>COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)</b>										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	
<b>SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)</b>						<b>EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)</b>				
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		MONTH DAY YEAR				
<b>ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)</b>										
<p>On February 5, 2001, at approximately 1720 hours, during a snowstorm, Gate 14 A at the Vehicle Access Point (VAP) was found in the fully open position. Following classification, the NRC Operations Center was notified at 1916, on February 5, 2001, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1) and 10 CFR 73.71 Appendix G, "Reportable Safeguards Events." At the time of this condition, Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, Unit 3 was in Mode 5, shutdown for refueling (0.0 percent power), and Unit 1 was defueled and shutdown for decommissioning.</p> <p>The apparent cause was determined to be snow and wind creating conditions such that the drive belt on VAP Gate 14 A stretched, the electro-magnetic locks failed to engage, and wind caused Gate 14 A to blow open.</p> <p>This event had low safety significance because there was no undetected access to the protected area nor was there any evidence of contraband or sabotage within the protected area.</p> <p>The immediate corrective action involved posting a compensatory Security Officer at the open Vehicle Access Point gate (Gate 14 A) upon discovery. Subsequently, the VAP Protected Area gates were secured with additional Protected Area padlocks.</p>										

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1	05000245	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 3
		2001	-- 001	-- 00	

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

I. Event Description

On February 5, 2001, at approximately 1720 hours, during a snowstorm, Gate 14 A at the Vehicle Access Point (VAP) was found in the fully open position. Following classification, the NRC Operations Center was notified at 1916, on February 5, 2001, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1) and 10 CFR 73.71 Appendix G, "Reportable Safeguards Events." At the time of this condition, Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, Unit 3 was in Mode 5, shutdown for refueling (0.0 percent power), and Unit 1 was defueled and shutdown for decommissioning.

During the morning of February 5, 2001, a major snowstorm occurred and continued into the early morning of February 6 depositing approximately 7 to 9 inches of wet snow. At 1450 the last vehicle (prior to this event) processed through the VAP. At 1504 snow affected the perimeter intrusion detection system (IDS) [IA] that covers Gate 14 A resulting in the IDS becoming inoperable. Compensatory measures were implemented. Between 1630 and 1720, a Security Officer assigned to compensatory patrols made approximately 5 to 6 patrols of the area during which he observed Gate 14 A, and believed the gate to be closed and secured. Gate 14 A was last observed in the apparently closed position at approximately 1705. At 1720 a Security Supervisor observed Gate 14 A to be in the fully open position and posted himself as compensatory action until the arrival of another Security Officer. Following investigation by the Security Supervisor of the open gate, the guard at the VAP closed the gate electronically at 1725. At 1745 padlocks were placed on the VAP gates.

Gate 14 A is driven by a rubber drive belt from an electric motor with a clutch mechanism. The gate swings in a 90 degree arc with limited ground clearance due to requirements associated with Protected Area (PA) barriers. Although attempts were made to keep the gate's pathway clear of snow, a snow berm built up at the end of the travel path which prevented the gate from reaching its fully closed/secure position. This resulted in the electro-magnetic gate locks not engaging and since the gate did not reach its fully closed/auto-stop position the motor continued to operate causing the drive belt to heat up and expand. The motor eventually shut off due to heat buildup. Snow accumulated on the gate fabric presenting an increased sail area to the wind and also added to the weight of the gate. This increased weight/wind resistance combined with the expanded drive belt, and windy conditions resulted in the gate being blown open.

This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(d), which refers to Appendix G, "Reportable Safeguards Events," Section I.(c), which requires that, "Any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in a safeguards system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, ... for which compensatory measures have not been employed..." be reported.

II. Cause

The apparent cause was determined to be snow and wind creating conditions such that the drive belt on VAP Gate 14 A stretched, the electro-magnetic locks failed to engage, and wind caused Gate 14 A to blow open.

III. Analysis of Event

There were no safety consequences from this event in that an unauthorized intrusion into the Protected Area did not occur. A search was conducted and there was no evidence of sabotage and no contraband was found within the Protected Area.

This event had low safety significance because there was no undetected access to the protected area nor was there any evidence of contraband or sabotage within the protected area.

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 1	05000245	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 3
		2001	-- 001	-- 00	

**NARRATIVE** (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

## IV. Corrective Action

The immediate corrective action involved posting a compensatory Security Officer at the open Vehicle Access Point gate (Gate 14 A) upon discovery. Subsequently, the VAP Protected Area gates were secured with additional Protected Area padlocks.

The VAP Protected Area gates are verified to be secure each time a gate is closed to ensure the electro-magnetic locks are engaged. Previously the gates were visually observed for closure.

## V. Additional Information

Additional information is required for Security Events. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 5.62, "Reporting of Safeguard Events," the Item Numbers are provided below.

5. Type of Security Force Onsite: Contract
6. Number and Type of Personnel Involved: One Security Officer
7. Method of Discovery: Security Guard Observation
8. Procedural Errors Involved: None
11. Local, State, or Federal law enforcement agencies contacted: None
12. Description of media interest and press release: None

## VI. Similar Events

None

## VII. Manufacturer Data

None

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

### EIIS Code Systems:

Security System.....IA