UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 1, 1996

Dr. Robert C. Mecredy
Vice President, Nuclear Operations
Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation
89 East Avenue
Rochester, NY 14649

SUBJECT: ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 62 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-18, R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (TAC NO. M94186)

Dear Dr. Mecredy:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 62 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-18 for the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. This amendment is in response to your application dated February 9, 1996, as supplemented by March 20, 1996.

This amendment proposes to use an installed retractable overhead door assembly, and change Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.3 to satisfy closure requirements for the containment equipment hatch during core alterations or fuel movement in the containment building. The retractable door is to be used as a functionally equivalent closure plate currently required by TS 3.9.3.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

Allen R. Johnson, Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-244

Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 62 to License No. DPR-18
2. Safety Evaluation

cc w/encls: See next page

CP-1

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Original signed by:

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Document Name: G:\GINNA\GI94186.AMD

*See Previous Concurrence

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NAME	SLittle		AJohnson/rsl		SShankman		EHoller		CMiller			
DATE	3/28/96		3/28/96		03/26/96		03/27/96		03/27/96		/ /96	

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NAME	SLittle		AJohnson/rsl		SShankman							
DATE	3/25/96		3/25/96		/96		/96		3/27/96		/96	

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NAME	SLittle		AJohnson/rsl		SShankman		EHoller					
DATE	3/25/96		3/25/96		3/26/96		3/27/96		1 /96		1 /96	

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Dr. Robert C. Mecredy Ginna

cc:

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DATED: April 1, 1996

AMENDMENT NO. 62 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-18-GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Docket File
PUBLIC
PDI-1 Reading
S. Varga, 14/E/4
J. Zwolinski, 14/H/3
S. Shankman
S. Little
A. Johnson
OGC
G. Hill (2), T-5 C3
C. Grimes, 11/E/22
ACRS
OPA
PD plant-specific file
L. Doerflein, RI

cc: Plant Service list

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-244

R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 62
License No. DPR-18

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment filed by the Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (the licensee) dated February 9, 1996, as supplemented March 20, 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-18 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 62 , are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

for Susan F. Shankman, Acting Director
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 1, 1996

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 62

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-18

DOCKET NO. 50-244

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove	Insert
3.9-4	3.9-4
3.9-5	3.9-5
B 3.9-10	B 3.9-10
B 3.9-11	B 3.9-11
B 3.9-12	B 3.9-12
B 3.9-13	B 3.9-13

3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3.9.3 Containment Penetrations

LCO 3.9.3 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:

a. The equipment hatch shall be either:

1. bolted in place with at least one access door closed,

2. isolated by a closure plate that restricts air flow from containment, or

3. isolated by a roll up door and enclosure building;

b. One door in the personnel air lock shall be closed; and

c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or

2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment Ventilation Isolation System.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS,
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

ACTIONS

CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME
A. One or more containment penetrations not in required status.	A.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS. AND A.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.	Immediately Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SURVEILLANCE		FREQUENCY
SR 3.9.3.1	Verify each required containment penetration is in the required status.	7 days
SR 3.9.3.2	Verify each required containment purge and exhaust valve actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.	24 months

B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

B 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations

BASES

BACKGROUND

During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment when the LCO requirements are met. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining containment OPERABLE as described in LCO 3.6.1, "Containment." In MODE 5, there are no accidents of concern which require containment. In MODE 6, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not likely; therefore, requirements to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere can be less stringent. The LCO requirements are referred to as "containment closure" rather than "containment OPERABILITY." Containment closure means that all potential escape paths are closed or capable of being closed. Since there is no potential for containment pressurization, the Appendix J leakage criteria and tests are not required.

The containment serves to contain fission product radioactivity that may be released from the reactor core following an accident, such that offsite radiation exposures are maintained within the requirements of 10 CFR 100. Additionally, the containment provides radiation shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.

The containment equipment hatch, which is part of the containment pressure boundary, provides a means for moving large equipment and components into and out of containment. During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the equipment hatch must be bolted in place. Good engineering practice dictates that a minimum of 4 bolts be used to hold the equipment hatch in place and that the bolts be approximately equally spaced. As an alternative, the equipment hatch opening can be isolated by a closure plate that restricts air flow from containment or by an installed roll up door and enclosure building.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

The containment equipment and personnel air locks, which are also part of the containment pressure boundary, provide a means for personnel access during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 in accordance with LCO 3.6.2, "Containment Air Locks." Each air lock has a door at both ends. The doors are normally interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening when containment OPERABILITY is required. During periods of plant shutdown when containment closure is not required, the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frequent containment entry is necessary. During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, containment closure is required; therefore, the door interlock mechanism may remain disabled, but one air lock door must always remain closed in the personnel and equipment hatch (unless the equipment hatch is isolated by a closure plate or the roll up door and associated enclosure building).

The requirements for containment penetration closure ensure that a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment. The closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict fission product radioactivity release from containment due to a fuel handling accident during refueling.

The Containment Purge and Exhaust System includes two subsystems. The Shutdown Purge System includes a 36 inch purge penetration and a 36 inch exhaust penetration. The second subsystem, a Mini-Purge System, includes a 6 inch purge penetration and a 6 inch exhaust penetration. During MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the shutdown purge and exhaust penetrations are isolated by a blind flange with two O-rings that provide the necessary boundary. The two air operated valves in each of the two mini-purge penetrations can be opened intermittently, but are closed automatically by the Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation System. Neither of the subsystems is subject to a Specification in MODE 5.

(continued)

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

In MODE 6, large air exchangers are used to support refueling operations. The normal 36 inch Shutdown Purge System is used for this purpose, and each air operated valve is closed by the Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation in accordance with LCO 3.3.5, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation."

The Mini-Purge System also remains operational in MODE 6, and all four valves are also closed by the Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

The other containment penetrations that provide direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere must be isolated on at least one side. Isolation may be achieved by an OPERABLE automatic isolation valve, or by a manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent. Equivalent isolation methods may include use of a material that can provide a temporary, atmospheric pressure, ventilation barrier for the other containment penetrations during fuel movements.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the most severe radiological consequences result from a fuel handling accident. The fuel handling accident is a postulated event that involves damage to irradiated fuel (Ref. 1). Fuel handling accidents, analyzed using the criteria of Reference 2, include dropping a single irradiated fuel assembly and handling tool or a heavy object onto other irradiated fuel assemblies. The requirements of LCO 3.9.6, "Refueling Cavity Water Level," and the minimum decay time of 100 hours prior to CORE ALTERATIONS ensure that the release of fission product radioactivity, subsequent to a fuel handling accident, results in doses that are within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100. Standard Review Plan (SRP), Section 15.7.4, Rev. 1 (Ref. 2), requires containment closure even though this is not an assumption of the accident analyses. The acceptance limits for offsite radiation exposure is 96 rem (Ref. 3).

Containment penetrations satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement since these are assumed in the SRP.

(continued)

BASES (continued)

LCO

This LCO limits the consequences of a fuel handling accident in containment by limiting the potential escape paths for fission product radioactivity released within containment. The LCO requires any penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be closed except for the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations. For the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations, this LCO ensures that at least one valve in each of these penetrations is isolable by the Containment Ventilation Isolation System.

APPLICABILITY

The containment penetration requirements are applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment because this is when there is a potential for a fuel handling accident. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by LCO 3.6.1. In MODES 5 and 6, when CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment are not being conducted, the potential for a fuel handling accident does not exist. Therefore, under these conditions, no requirements are placed on containment penetration status.

ACTIONS

A.1 and A.2

If the containment equipment hatch (or its closure plate or roll up door and associated enclosure building), air lock doors, or any containment penetration that provides direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere is not in the required status, including the Containment Ventilation Isolation System not capable of automatic actuation when the purge and exhaust valves are open, the plant must be placed in a condition where the isolation function is not needed. This is accomplished by immediately suspending CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment. Performance of these actions shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

(continued)

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 62 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-18

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION

R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-244

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 9, 1996, as supplemented by letter on March 20, 1996, the Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specifications (TSs).

The requested changes would change Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.3 by allowing the licensee to use an retractable overhead door to satisfy closure requirements for the containment equipment hatch during core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel movement in containment. The retractable door is functionally equivalent to the closure plate that is currently required by TS 3.9.3. The March 20, 1996, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.

2.0 EVALUATION

The Ginna nuclear power plant is a two-loop Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.9.3.a states that during core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel within containment, the equipment hatch shall be bolted in place with at least one access door closed, or isolated by a closure plate that restricts air flow from containment. The licensee indicates in its submittal that since the overhead door can be opened and closed more quickly compared to the time required for removal and installation of the closure plate, use of the overhead door would expedite activities conducted during plant shutdown; e.g., movement of equipment into and out of containment. The licensee has therefore proposed to amend LCO 3.9.3.a and its associated Bases to allow use of an overhead retractable door to satisfy containment equipment hatch closure requirements applicable during refueling operations. The change would be effected by adding a third closure option under action statement 3.9.3.a. Note that this change does not alter in any way the requirement that the equipment hatch opening must be closed during irradiated fuel movement or core alterations.

The Bases of Westinghouse Standard Technical Specification (STS) 3.9.3, under which Ginna is licensed, indicate that the intent of the specification is to

provide a leak resistant barrier such that air flow from containment is restricted under postulated fuel handling accidents. Since the Bases consider the potential for containment pressurization as the result of an accident an unlikely event during refueling activities, the STS do not necessarily require that barriers used for containment closure be pressure resistant.

The overhead door proposed is a steel roll-up type composed of hinged panels and capable of motorized or manual operation. It is attached to a non-pressure rated reinforced concrete enclosure built around the equipment hatch opening outside of containment. The door moves on a track attached to the enclosure and when opened, retracts into the enclosure to lie horizontally in the track.

In teleconferences held on March 13 and 14, 1996, the licensee stated that weather-stripping or steel bristle brushes attached to the enclosure and which rub against the edge of the door provide a leak resistant barrier under conditions of zero or essentially zero differential pressures across the seal, and that sealing between the individual panels which compose the door is accomplished by the interlocking fashion by which the panels fit together. The licensee further stated that the sealing mechanisms are not considered pressure barriers, and that the door itself is not pressure rated. The licensee indicated that the door would not significantly hinder the replacement of the equipment hatch if this action became necessary. Replacement of the hatch would take approximately 2 hours.

Based on the leak-resistance of the door, the NRC staff finds that the overhead door performs the same function as the closure plate in that it restricts air flow from containment, and therefore satisfies the intent of the containment closure requirements as stated in the Bases for STS 3.9.3. It is not the explicit intent of the STS that the closure device be pressure resistant, so while the overhead door does not constitute a pressure resistant barrier, no inconsistency exists between use of the door and the intent of the STS. This interpretation of the TS is consistent with past TS amendments that approved alternate means of providing closure for containment penetrations during refueling.

The NRC staff finds that use of the overhead door in lieu of the closure plate would not remove any function served by the closure plate. The purpose of both is to prevent leakage from containment. The design of the door is also sufficiently robust such that the door can be reasonably expected to maintain its structural integrity and to perform its function reliably. Finally, the staff finds that based, on information provided by the licensee, use of the overhead door would not hinder replacement of the equipment hatch if such action were deemed necessary.

However, the staff points out that at the time this evaluation was written, draft rule 10 CFR 50.67, "Shutdown Operation of Nuclear Power Plants," was being developed. Studies leading to development of the rule indicate that certain accident scenarios during shutdown may result in containment pressurization. While it is still uncertain as to whether or how containment

pressurization events would be incorporated into the final rule, it is important to note that such events are being considered. The rule could therefore place greater emphasis on the pressure resistance of containment closure devices than do current requirements. In light of this and the pressure-resistant characteristics of the overhead door, the licensee should be aware that use of the door may need to be reevaluated by NRC staff if new requirements involving shutdown operations are implemented.

On the bases that the overhead door provides a leak resistant barrier and therefore meets the intent of STS 3.9.3, and because use of the door would not hinder replacement of the equipment hatch cover if this became necessary, the staff finds the proposed change acceptable. However, the staff reiterates that if new requirements regarding shutdown operations become effective, then use of the overhead door may need to be reevaluated against such requirements.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 7557). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Jack Dawson

Date: April 1, 1996