

April 5, 1977

Docket No.: 50-333

DISTRIBUTION:

Docket

NRC PDR

Local PDR

ORB#4 Rdg.

V. Stello

K. R. Goller

T. J. Carter

R. Ingram

M. Fairtile

Attorney, OELD

OI&E (5)

B. Jones (4)

B. Scharf (15)

J. M. McGough

D. Eisenhut

ACRS (16)

OPA (Clare Miles)

D. Ross

Gray File

T. B. Abernathy,

J. R. Buchanan

Extra Cy. File (4)

Power Authority of the State of New York

ATTN: Mr. George T. Berry

General Manager and

Chief Engineer

10 Columbus Circle

New York, New York 10019

Gentlemen:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 21 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 for the FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application for amendment submitted by letter dated May 19, 1976, as supplemented August 13, 1976.

The amendment provides for a reduction in the safety limit minimum critical power ratio from 1.06 to 1.05.

Copies of the Safety Evaluation and the Federal Register Notice are enclosed.

Sincerely,

Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 21
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Federal Register Notice

cc w/enclosures:

See next page

Const. 1

OFFICE	ORB#4:DOR	ORB#4:DOR	OELD	AD-OR:DOR	C-ORB#4:DOR
SURNAME	R. Ingram	M. Fairtile	Glasgow	K. R. Goller	R. W. Reid
DATE	10/21/76	10/22/76	10/19/76	10/13/76	10/15/76

Power Authority of the
State of New York

cc w/enclosure(s):

Scott B. Lilly, General Counsel
Power Authority of the State of New York
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

Lex K. Larson, Esq.
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae
1757 N Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Lauman Martin, Esquire
Senior Vice President
and General Counsel
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
300 Erie Boulevard
Syracuse, New York 13202

Charles V. Mangan
Manager Production Plant Engineering
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
300 Erie Boulevard West
Syracuse, New York 13202

Mr. Z. Chilazi
Power Authority of the State of New York
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

Oswego County Office Building
46 E. Bridge Street
Oswego, New York 13126

Mr. Robert P. Jones, Supervisor
Town of Scriba
R. D. #4
Oswego, New York 13126

Mr. Alvin L. Krakau
Chairman, County Legislature
County Office Building
46 East Bridge Street
Oswego, New York 13126

Director, Technical Development
Programs
State of New York
Energy Office
Swan Street Building
CORE 1 - Second Floor
Empire State Plaza
Albany, New York 12223

Chief, Energy Systems
Analyses Branch (AW-459)
Office of Radiation Programs
U. S. Environmental Protection
Agency
Room 645, East Tower
401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460

U. S. Environmental Protection
Agency
Region II Office
ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR
26 Federal Plaza
New York, New York 10007



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
AND
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-333

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 21
License No. DPR-59

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Power Authority of the State of New York and Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensees) sworn to May 17, 1976, as supplemented by letter dated August 13, 1976, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 21, are hereby incorporated in the license. The operator shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Karl R. Goller, Assistant Director
for Operating Reactors
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 5, 1977

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 21

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59

DOCKET NO. 50-333

Replace pages 7, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 30, 31, 35, 58, 94, 102 and 103 of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages bearing the same numbers. Changes on these pages are shown by marginal lines.

1.1 SAFETY LIMITS

1.1 FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY

Applicability:

The Safety Limits established to preserve the fuel cladding integrity apply to those variables which monitor the fuel thermal behavior.

Objective:

The objective of the Safety Limits is to establish limits below which the integrity of the fuel cladding is preserved.

Specifications

A. Reactor Pressure >785 psig and Core Flow > 10% of Rated

The existence of a minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) less than 1.05 shall constitute violation of the fuel cladding integrity safety limit.

2.1 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

2.1 FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY

Applicability:

The Limiting Safety System Settings apply to trip settings of the instruments and devices which are provided to prevent the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limits from being exceeded.

Objective:

The objective of the Limiting Safety System Settings is to define the level of the process variables at which automatic protective action is initiated to prevent the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limits from being exceeded.

Specifications

A. Trip Settings

The limiting safety system trip settings shall be as specified below:

1. Neutron Flux Trip Settings

- a. IRM - The IRM flux scram setting shall be set at $\leq 120/125$ of full scale.

1.1 BASES

1.1 FUEL CLADDING INTEGRITY

The fuel cladding integrity limit is set such that no calculated fuel damage would occur as a result of an abnormal operational transient. Because fuel damage is not directly observable, a step-back approach is used to establish a Safety Limit such that the minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) is no less than 1.05. MCPR > 1.05 represents a conservative margin relative to the conditions required to maintain fuel cladding integrity. The fuel cladding is one of the physical barriers which separate radioactive materials from the environs. The integrity of this cladding barrier is related to its relative freedom from perforations or cracking. Although some corrosion or use related cracking may occur during the life of the cladding, fission product migration from this source is incrementally cumulative and continuously measurable. Fuel cladding, perforations, however, can result from thermal stresses which occur from reactor operation significantly above design conditions and the protection system safety settings. While fission product migration from cladding perforation is just as measurable as that from use related cracking, the thermally caused cladding perforations signal a threshold, beyond which still greater thermal stresses may cause gross rather than incremental cladding deterioration. Therefore, the fuel cladding Safety Limit is defined with margin to the conditions which would produce onset of transition boiling, (MCPR of 1.0). These conditions

represent a significant departure from the condition intended by design for planned operation.

A. Reactor Pressure > 785 psig and Core Flow > 10% of Rated.

Onset of transition boiling results in a decrease in heat transfer from the clad and, therefore, elevated clad temperature and the possibility of clad failure. However, the existence of critical power, or boiling transition, is not a directly observable parameter in an operating reactor. Therefore, the margin to boiling transition is calculated from plant operating parameters such as core power, core flow, feedwater temperature, and core power distribution. The margin for each fuel assembly is characterized by the critical power ratio (CPR) which is the ratio of the bundle power which would produce onset of transition boiling divided by the actual bundle power. The minimum value of this ratio for any bundle in the core is the minimum critical power ratio (MCPR). It is assumed that the plant operation is controlled to the nominal protective set-points via the instrumented variables, i.e., normal plant operation presented on Figure 1.1-1 by the nominal expected flow control line. The Safety Limit (MCPR of 1.05) has sufficient conservatism to assure that in the event of an abnormal operational transient initiated from a normal operating condition (MCPR > 1.21 for cycle-1 exposures up to 8500 MWD/T and > 1.34 from 8500 MWD/T to end of cycle conditions) more than 99.9% of the fuel rods in the core are expected to avoid boiling transition. The margin between MCPR of 1.0 (onset of transition boiling) and the safety limit 1.05 is derived from a detailed statistical analysis considering all of the

1.1 BASES (Cont'd.)

uncertainties in monitoring the core operating state including uncertainty in the boiling transition correlation as described in Reference I. The uncertainties employed in deriving the safety limit are provided at the beginning of each fuel cycle. Because the boiling transition correlation is based on a large quantity of full scale data there is a very high confidence that operation of a fuel assembly at the condition of MCPR = 1.05 would not produce boiling transition. Thus, although it is not required to establish the safety limit, additional margin exists between the safety limit and the actual occurrence of loss of cladding integrity.

However, if boiling transition were to occur, clad perforation would not be expected. Cladding temperatures would increase to approximately 1100°F which is below the perforation temperature of the cladding material. This has been verified by tests in the General Electric Test Reactor (GETR) where fuel similar in design to Fitzpatrick operated above the critical heat flux for a significant period of time (30 minutes) without clad perforation.

If reactor pressure should ever exceed 1400 psia during normal power operating (the limit of applicability of the boiling transition correlation) it would be assumed that the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit has been violated.

In addition to the boiling transition limit

(MCPR = 1.05) operation is constrained to a maximum LHGR=18.5 Kw/ft. At 100% power this limit is reached with a maximum total peaking factor (MTPF) of 2.60. For the case of the MTPF exceeding 2.60, operation is permitted only at less than 100% of rated thermal power and only with reduced APRM scram settings as required by specification 2.1.A.1.C.

B. Core Thermal Power Limit (Reactor Pressure < 785 psig)

At pressures below 785 psig the core elevation pressure drop (0 power, 0 flow) is greater than 4.56 psi. At low powers and flows this pressure differential is maintained in the bypass region of the core. Since the pressure drop in the bypass region is essentially all elevation head, the core pressure drop at low powers and flows will always be greater than 4.56 psi. Analyses show that with a flow of 28×10^3 lbs/hr bundle flow, bundle pressure drop is nearly independent of bundle power and has a value of 3.5 psi. Thus, the bundle flow with a 4.56 psi driving head will be greater than 28×10^3 lbs/hr. Full scale ATLAS test data taken at pressures from 0 psig to 785 psig indicate that the fuel assembly critical power at this flow is approximately 3.35 MWt. With the design peaking factors this corresponds to a core thermal power of more than 50%. Thus, a core thermal power limit of 25% for reactor pressures below 785 psig is conservative.

2.1 BASES (Cont'd.)

JAFNPP

For analyses of the thermal consequences of the transients a MCPR of > 1.21 for cycle-1 exposures up to 8500 MWD/T and > 1.34 from 8500 MWD/T to end of cycle-1 conditions is conservatively assumed to exist prior to initiation of the transients.

This choice of using conservative values of controlling parameters and initiating transients at the design power level, produces more pessimistic answers than would result by using expected values of control parameters and analyzing at higher power levels.

Steady-state operation without forced recirculation will not be permitted, except during startup testing. The analysis to support operation at various power and flow relationships has considered operation with either one or two recirculation pumps.

In summary:

- i. The abnormal operational transients were analyzed to a power level of 2535 MWt.
- ii. The licensed maximum power level is 2436 MWt.
- iii. Analyses of transients employ adequately conservative values of the controlling reactor parameters.
- iv. The analytical procedures now used result in a more logical answer than the alternative method of assuming a higher starting power in conjunction with the expected values for the parameters.

A. Trip Settings

The bases for individual trip settings are discussed in the following paragraphs.

1. Neutron Flux Trip Settings

a. IRM Flux Scram Trip Setting

The IRM system consists of 8 chambers, 4 in each of the reactor protection system logic channels. The IRM is a 5-decade instrument which covers the range of power level between that covered by the SRM and the APRM. The 5 decades are covered by the IRM by means of a range switch and the 5 decades are broken down into 10 ranges, each being one-half of a decade in size. The IRM scram trip setting of 120 divisions is active in each range of the IRM. For example, if the instrument were on Range 1, the scram setting would be a 120 divisions for that range; likewise, if the instrument were on range 5, the scram would be 120 divisions on that range. Thus, as the IRM is ranged up to accommodate the increase in power level, the scram trip setting is also ranged up. The most significant sources of reactivity change during the power increase are due to control rod withdrawal. For insequence control rod withdrawal, the rate of change of power is slow enough due to the physical limitation of withdrawing control rods, that heat flux is in equilibrium with the neutron flux and an IRM scram would result in a reactor shutdown well before any Safety Limit is exceeded.

2.1 BASES (Cont'd.)

In order to ensure that the IRM provided adequate protection against the single rod withdrawal error, a range of rod withdrawal accidents was analyzed. This analysis included starting the accident at various power levels. The most severe case involves an initial condition in which the reactor is just subcritical and the IRM system is not yet on scale. This condition exists at quarter rod density. Additional conservatism was taken in this analysis by assuming that the IRM channel closest to the withdrawn rod is by-passed. The results of this analysis show that the reactor is scrammed and peak power limited to one percent of rated power, thus maintaining MCPR above 1.05. Based on the above analysis, the IRM provides protection against local control rod withdrawal errors and continuous withdrawal of control rods in sequence and provides backup protection for the APRM.

b. APRM Flux Scram Trip Setting (Refuel or Start & Hot Standby Mode)

For operation in the startup mode while the reactor is at low pressure, the APRM scram setting of 15 percent of rated power provides adequate thermal margin between the setpoint and the safety limit, 25 percent of rated. The margin is adequate to accommodate anticipated maneuvers associated with power plant startup. Effects of increasing pressure at zero or low void content are minor, cold water from sources available during startup is not much colder

than that already in the system, temperature coefficients are small, and control rod patterns are constrained to be uniform by operating procedures backed up by the rod worth minimizer and the Rod Sequence Control System. Worth of individual rods is very low in a uniform rod pattern. Thus, of all possible sources of reactivity input, uniform control rod withdrawal is the most probable cause of significant power rise. Because the flux distribution associated with uniform rod withdrawals does not involve high local peaks, and because several rods must be moved to change power by a significant percentage of rated power, the rate of power rise is very slow. Generally, the heat flux is in near equilibrium with the fission rate. In an assumed uniform rod withdrawal approach to the scram level, the rate of power rise is no more than 5 percent of rated power per minute, and the APRM system would be more than adequate to assure a scram before the power could exceed the safety limit. The 15 percent APRM scram remains active until the mode switch is placed in the RUN position. This switch occurs when reactor pressure is greater than 850 psig.

c. APRM Flux Scram Trip Setting (Run Mode)

The average power range monitoring (APRM) system, which is calibrated using heat balance data taken during steady state conditions, reads in percent of rated thermal power (2436 MWt). Because fission chambers provide the basic input signals, the APRM

2.1 BASES (Cont'd.)

system responds directly to average neutron flux. During transients, the instantaneous rate of heat transfer from the fuel (reactor thermal power) is less than the instantaneous neutron flux due to the time constant of the fuel. Therefore, during abnormal operational transients, the thermal power of the fuel will be less than that indicated by the neutron flux at the scram setting. Analyses demonstrate that with a 120 percent scram trip setting, none of the abnormal operational transients analyzed violate the fuel Safety Limit and there is a substantial margin from fuel damage. Therefore, the use of flow referenced scram trip provides even additional margin. An increase in the APRM scram trip setting would decrease the margin present before the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is reached. The APRM scram trip setting was determined by an analysis of margins required to provide a reasonable range for maneuvering during operation. Reducing this operating margin would increase the frequency of spurious scrams which have an adverse effect on reactor safety because of the resulting thermal stresses. Thus, the APRM scram trip setting was selected because it provides adequate margin for the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit yet allows operating margin that reduces the possibility of unnecessary scrams.

The scram trip setting must be adjusted to ensure that the LHGR transient peak is not

increased for any combination of MTPF and reactor core thermal power. The scram setting is adjusted in accordance with the formula in Specification 2.1.A.1.c, when the maximum total peaking factor is greater than 2.60.

Analyses of the limiting transients show that no scram adjustment is required to assure MCPR > 1.05 when the transient is initiated from MCPR > 1.21 for cycle-1 exposures up to 8500 MWD/T and > 1.34 from 8500 MWD/T to end of cycle-1 conditions.

d. APRM Rod Block Trip Setting

Reactor power level may be varied by moving control rods or by varying the recirculation flow rate. The APRM system provides a control rod block to prevent rod withdrawal beyond a given point at constant recirculation flow rate, and thus to protect against the condition of a MCPR less than 1.05. This rod block trip setting, which is automatically varied with recirculation loop flow rate, prevents an increase in the reactor power level to excessive values due to control rod withdrawal. The flow variable trip setting provides substantial margin from fuel damage, assuming a steady-state operation at the trip setting, over the entire recirculation flow range. The margin to the Safety Limit increases as the flow decreases for the specified trip setting versus flow relationship; therefore the worst case MCPR which could occur during steady-state operation is at 108% of rated thermal power because of the APRM rod block trip setting. The actual power distribution in the core is established

2.1 BASES (Cont'd)

by specified control rod sequences and is monitored continuously by the in-core LPRM system. As with the APRM scram trip setting, the APRM rod block trip setting is adjusted downward if the maximum total peaking factor exceeds 2.60, thus preserving the APRM rod block safety margin.

2. Reactor Water Low Level Scram Trip Setting (LLI)

The reactor low water level scram is set at a point which will assure that the water level used in the Bases for the Safety Limit is maintained. The scram setpoint is based on normal operating temperature and pressure conditions because the level instrumentation is density compensated.

3. Turbine Stop Valve Closure Scram Trip Settings

The turbine stop valve closure scram trip anticipates the pressure, neutron flux and heat flux increase that could result from rapid closure of the turbine stop valves. With a scram trip setting of ≤ 10 percent of valve closure from full open, the resultant increase in surface heat flux is limited such that MCPR remains above 1.05 even during the worst case transient that assumes the turbine bypass is closed. This scram is bypassed when turbine steam flow is below 30% of rated, as measured by turbine first stage pressure.

4. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Scram Trip Setting

This turbine control valve fast closure scram anticipates the pressure, neutron flux, and heat flux increase that could result from fast closure of the turbine control valves due to load rejection exceeding the capability of the turbine bypass. The Reactor Protection System initiates a scram when fast closure of the control valves is initiated by the fast acting solenoid valves. This is achieved by the action of the fast acting solenoid valves in rapidly reducing hydraulic control oil pressure at the main turbine control valve actuator disc dump valves. This loss of pressure is sensed by pressure switches whose contacts form the one-out-of-two-twice logic input to the reactor protection system. This trip setting, a nominally 50 percent greater closure time and a different valve characteristic from that of the turbine stop valve, combine to produce transients very similar and no more severe than for the stop valve. No significant change in MCPR occurs. Relevant transient analyses are discussed in Section 14.5 of the Final Safety Analysis Report. This scram is bypassed when turbine steam flow is below 30 percent of rated, as measured by turbine first stage pressure.

5. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure Scram Trip Setting

3.1 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEMApplicability:

Applies to the instrumentation and associated devices which initiate the reactor scram.

Objective:

To assure the operability of the Reactor Protection System.

Specification:

A. The setpoints, minimum number of trip systems, minimum number of instrument channels that must be operable for each position of the reactor mode switch shall be as shown on Table 3.1-1. The design system response time from the opening of the sensor contact to and including the opening of the trip actuator contacts shall not exceed 100 msec.

B. Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)

MCPR shall be > 1.21 at rated power and flow for cycle-1 exposures from up to 8500 MWD/T and > 1.34 at rated power and flow from 8500 MWD/T to end of cycle-1 conditions. If at any time during steady state operation it is determined that the limiting value for MCPR is being exceeded action shall then be initiated within 15 minutes to restore operation to within the prescribed limits. If the steady state MCPR is not returned to within the prescribed limits within two (2) hours, the

4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS4.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEMApplicability:

Applies to the surveillance of the instrumentation and associated devices which initiate reactor scram.

Objective:

To specify the type and frequency of surveillance to be applied to the protection instrumentation.

Specification:

A. Instrumentation systems shall be functionally tested and calibrated as indicated in Tables 4.1-1 and 4.1-2 respectively.

B. Daily, during reactor power operation, while in the RUN MODE, the peak heat flux and peaking factor shall be checked and the SCRAM and APRM Rod Block settings given by equations in Specifications 2.1.A.1 and 2.1.B shall be calculated if the peaking factor exceeds 2.6.

3.1 (cont'd)

reactor shall be brought to the Cold Shutdown condition within 36 hours. Surveillance and corresponding action shall continue until reactor operation is within the prescribed limits. For core flows other than rated, the MCPR shall be > 1.21 for cycle-1 exposures up to 8500 MWD/T and > 1.34 from 8500 MWD/T to end of cycle-1 conditions times K_f where K_f is as shown in Figure 3.1.1.

- C. *MCPR shall be determined daily during reactor power operation at $\geq 25\%$ rated thermal power and following any change in power level or distribution that would cause operation with a limiting control rod pattern as described in the bases for Specification 3.3.B.5.*
- D. When it is determined that a channel has failed in the unsafe condition, the other RPS channels that monitor the same variable shall be functionally tested immediately before the trip system containing the failure is tripped. The trip system containing the unsafe failure may be placed in the untripped condition during the period in which surveillance testing is being performed on the other RPS channels.

Turbine control valves fast closure initiates a scram based on pressure switches sensing electro-hydraulic control (EHC) system oil pressure. The switches are located between fast closure solenoids and the disc dump valves, and are set relative ($500 < P < 850$ psig) to the normal EHC oil pressure of 1,600 psig so that, based on the small system volume, they can rapidly detect valve closure or loss of hydraulic pressure.

The requirement that the IRM's be inserted in the core when the APRM's read 2.5 indicated on the scale in the startup and refuel modes assures that there is proper overlap in the neutron monitoring system functions and thus, that adequate coverage is provided for all ranges of reactor operation.

- B. The limiting transient which determines the required steady state MCPR limit depends on cycle exposure. At cycle-1 exposure up to 8500 MWD/T it is the rod withdrawal error transient. It yields the largest Δ MCPR (0.16) which when added to the Safety Limit MCPR of 1.05 yields the minimum operating limit of 1.21. At exposures from 8500 MWD/T to EOC-1 conditions, the turbine trip without bypass is limiting. The Δ MCPR is 0.29 and the operating limit MCPR is 1.34. The ECCS performance analysis assumed reactor operation will be limited to MCPR of 1.18. However, the Technical Specifications limit operation of the reactor to the more conservative MCPR based on consideration of the limiting transient as given above.

crease to 1.05. The trip logic for this function is 1 out of n: e.g., any trip on one of six APRM's, eight IRM's, or four SRM's will result in a rod block.

The minimum instrument channel requirements assure sufficient instrumentation to assure the single failure criteria is met. The minimum instrument channel requirements for the RBM may be reduced by one for maintenance, testing, or calibration. This time period is only three percent of the operating time in a month and does not significantly increase the risk of preventing an inadvertent control rod withdrawal.

The APRM rod block function is flow biased and prevents a significant reduction in *M CPR* especially during operation at reduced flow. The APRM provides gross core protection; i.e., limits the gross core power increase from withdrawal of control rods in the normal withdrawal sequence. The trips are set so that *M CPR* is maintained > 1.05.

The RBM rod block function provides local protection of the core: i.e., the prevention of *boiling transition* in a local region of the core, for a single rod withdrawal error from a limiting control rod pattern.

The IRM rod block function provides local as well as gross core protection.

The scaling arrangement is such that trip setting is less than a factor of 10 above the indicated level.

A downscale indication on an APRM or IRM is an indication the instrument has failed or the instrument is not sensitive enough. In either case the instrument will not respond to changes in control rod motion and thus, control rod motion is prevented. The downscale trips are set at 2.5 indicated on scale.

The flow comparator and scram discharge volume high level components have only one logic channel and are not required for safety. The flow comparator must be bypassed when operating with one recirculation water pump.

The refueling interlocks also operate one logic channel, and are required for safety only when the Mode Switch is in the Refueling position.

For effective emergency core cooling for small pipe breaks, the HPCI system must function since reactor pressure does not decrease rapidly enough to allow either core spray or LPCI to operate in time. The automatic pressure relief function is provided as a backup to the HPCI in the event the HPCI does not operate. The arrangement of the tripping contacts is such as to provide this function when necessary and minimize spurious operation. The trip settings given in

4. Control rods shall not be withdrawn for startup or refueling unless at least two source range channels have an observed count rate equal to or greater than three counts per second.
5. During operation with limiting control rod patterns, as determined by the designated qualified personnel, either:
 - a. Both RBM channels shall be operable, or
 - b. Control rod withdrawal shall be blocked, or
 - c. The operating power level shall be limited so that MCPR will remain above 1.05 . |
assuming a single error that results in complete withdrawal of any single operable control rod.

4. Prior to control rod withdrawal for startup or during refueling, verify that at least two source range channels have an observed count rate of at least three counts per second.
5. When a limiting control rod pattern exists, an instrument functional test of the RBM shall be performed prior to withdrawal of the designated rod(s).

JAFNPP

any transient, should it occur, begins at or above the initial value of 10^{-8} of rated power used in the analyses of transient cold conditions. One operable SRM channel would be adequate to monitor the approach to criticality using homogeneous patterns of scattered control rod withdrawal. A minimum of two operable SRM's are provided as an added conservatism.

5. The Rod Block Monitor (RBM) is designed to automatically prevent fuel damage in the event of erroneous rod withdrawal from locations of high power density during high power level operation. Two channels are provided, and one of these may be bypassed from the console for maintenance and/or testing. Tripping of one of the channels will block erroneous rod withdrawal soon enough to prevent fuel damage. This system backs up the operator who withdraws control rods according to written sequences. The specified restrictions with one channel out of service conservatively assure that fuel damage will not occur due to rod with-

drawal errors when this condition exists.

A limiting control rod pattern is a pattern which results in the core being on a thermal hydraulic limit (i.e., MCPR 1.21 for cycle-1 exposures up to 8500 MWD/T and 1.34 from 8500 MWD/T to end of cycle-1 conditions or LHGR = 18.5 kW/ft). During use of such patterns, it is judged that testing of the RBM System prior to withdrawal of such rods to assure its operability will assure that improper withdrawal does not occur. It is the responsibility of the Reactor Analyst to identify these limiting patterns and the designated rods either when the patterns are initially established or as they develop due to the occurrence of inoperable control rods in other than limiting patterns. Other personnel qualified to perform this function may be designated by the Plant Superintendent .

C. Scram Insertion Times

The Control Rod System is designed to bring the reactor subcritical at a rate fast enough to prevent fuel damage: i.e., to prevent the MCPR from becoming less than 1.05. The limiting power transient is that

resulting from a turbine stop valve closure with failure of the turbine bypass system. Analysis of this transient shows that the negative reactivity rates resulting from the scram (NEDO-21166-1, Figure 7-1) with the average response of all the drives as given in the above Specification, provide the required protection, and MCPR remains greater than 1.05.

The numerical values assigned to the specified scram performance are based on the analysis of data from other BWR's with control rod drives the same as those on JAFNPP.

The occurrence of scram times within the limits, but significantly longer than the average, should be viewed as an indication of a systematic problem with control rod drives especially if the number of drives exhibiting such scram times exceeds eight, the allowable number of inoperable rods.

In the analytical treatment of the transients, 390 msec are allowed between a neutron sensor reaching the scram point and the start of negative reactivity insertion. This is adequate and conservative when compared to the typically observed time delay

of about 270 msec. Approximately 70 msec after neutron flux reaches the trip point, the pilot scram valve solenoid power supply voltage goes to zero and approximately 200 msec later, control rod motion begins. The 200 msec are included in the allowable scram insertion times specified in Specification 3.3.C.

The scram times generated at each refueling outage and during operation when compared to scram times generated during pre-operational tests demonstrate that the control rod drive scram function has not deteriorated. In addition, each instant when control rods are scram timed during operation or reactor trips, individual evaluations shall be performed to insure that control rod scram times have not deteriorated.

D. Reactivity Anomalies

During each fuel cycle, excess operative reactivity varies as fuel depletes and as any burnable poison in supplementary control is burned. The magnitude of this excess reactivity may be inferred from the critical rod configuration. As fuel burnup progresses, anomalous behavior in the excess reactivity may be detected by comparison of



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 21 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

AND

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

INTRODUCTION

By an application for amendment to Operating License, submitted by letter dated May 19, 1976, as supplemented August 13, 1976, the Power Authority of the State of New York and Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensees), proposed changes to the Technical Specifications appended to Facility Operating License No. DPR-59, for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The proposed changes provide for the reduction of the safety limit minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) from 1.06 to 1.05.

EVALUATION

The FitzPatrick reactor is a BWR-4 class reactor which incorporates bypass flow holes in the lower core plate. The region between the fuel channel boxes which receive flow from the bypass flow holes is termed the bypass region. During initial operation in 1975 the bypass flow holes were not plugged which precluded boiling in the bypass region.

In early 1976 the bypass flow holes were plugged to protect against channel box damage due to excessive vibration of instrument and source tubes caused by lateral force components of the unplugged bypass core flow. In addition to solving the vibration problem plugging of the bypass holes resulted in two principal side effects: (1) some boiling now occurred in the bypass region due to decreased bypass flow and (2) the fuel bundle flow increased by more than 5%. This boiling in the bypass region reduces the maximum local peaking factor within a fuel bundle resulting in an increase in thermal margins and increases the nodal power calculation uncertainty. The increase in the fuel bundle flow results in an increase in thermal margins.

For this reactor configuration, the Safety limit MCPR was computed to be 1.06.

Tests¹ conducted by the General Electric Company regarding the effect of bypass flow, subsequently approved by NRC, for the elimination of significant vibration of the instrument and source tubes have shown that more flow was being measured for the bypass region than the calculations had predicted. This augmented bypass flow decreased the boiling in the bypass region somewhat. A reanalysis showed that the safety limit MCPR should be 1.05. Based on our review, we conclude that credit can be given for the augmented bypass flow when computing MCPR. Therefore, the FitzPatrick safety limit MCPR can be reduced to 1.05.

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: April 5, 1977

¹Supplemental Information for Plant Modification to Eliminate Significant On-Core Vibration, NEDE 21156, January 1976 (Proprietary In-Core General Electric Report).

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. 50-333

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
AND
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY
OPERATING LICENSE

The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 21 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-59, issued to Power Authority of the State of New York and Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensees), which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (the facility) located in Oswego County, New York. The amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

The amendment provides for a reduction in the safety limit minimum critical power ratio from 1.06 to 1.05.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Notice of Proposed Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License in connection with this action was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on June 10, 1976 (41 F.R. 23492). No request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene was filed following notice of proposed action.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment submitted by letter dated May 19, 1976, as supplemented August 13, 1976, (2) Amendment No. 21 to License No. DPR-59, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D.C. and at the Oswego County Office Building, 46 E. Bridge Street, Oswego, New York 13126.

A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 5th day of April 1977.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Morton B. Fairtile

Morton B. Fairtile, Acting Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Operating Reactors