Docket Files
PDR

Docket No.: 50-244

February 15, 1986

See correction letter of 3/21/86

Mr. Roger W. Kober, Vice President
Electric and Steam Production
Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation
89 East Avenue
Rochester, New York 14649

Dear Mr. Kober:

SUBJECT: CONTAINMENT PURGE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Re: R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 13 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-18 for the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. This amendment is in response to your application dated October 22, 1985 which was modified on December 23, 1985 and was supplemented on January 8, 1986.

The amendment approves changes to Technical Specifications to provide new limiting conditions of operation and surveillance requirements for the 48 inch purge system and the 8 inch mini-purge system.

A copy of our related Safety Evaluation and of the notice of issuance are also enclosed.

Sincerely,

George E. Lear, Director
Project Directorate #1
Division of PWR Licensing-A, NRR

Enclosures: 13
1. Amendment No. 13 to License No. DPR-18
2. Safety Evaluation
3. Notice

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

(with noted changes to SER) no violations check to until after Fed. Reg. notice for intervention when comment period expires

Office:	LA/PAD#1	PM/PAD#1	PD/PAD#1	(OELD)
Surname:	PShuttleworth	C. Miller/tg	GLear	J. GRAY
Date:	02/ 7 /86	02/ 7 /86	02/ /86	02/11 /86

cc:

Harry H. Voigt, Esquire
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Suite 1100
Washington, D.C. 20036

Ezra Bialik
Assistant Attorney General
Environmental Protection Bureau
New York State Department of Law
2 World Trade Center
New York, New York 10047

Resident Inspector
R.E. Ginna Plant
c/o U.S. NRC
1503 Lake Road
Ontario, New York 14519

Stanley B. Klimberg, Esquire
General Counsel
New York State Energy Office
Agency Building 2
Empire State Plaza
Albany, New York 12223

Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Supervisor of the Town of Ontario
1850 Ridge Road
Ontario, New York 14519

Jay Dunkleberger
Division of Policy Analysis & Planning
New York State Energy Office
Agency Building 2
Empire State Plaza
Albany, New York 12223

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION

DOCKET NO. 50-244

R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 13
License No. DPR-18

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (the licensee) dated October 22, 1985, modified December 23, 1985 and supplemented January 8, 1986, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public; and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-18 is hereby amended to read as follows:

   (2) Technical Specifications

   The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 13, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

James W. Clifford for

George E. Lear, Director
Project Directorate #1
Division of PWR Licensing-A, NRR

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: February 15, 1986

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 13

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-18

DOCKET NO. 50-244

Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE	INSERT
3.5-22	3.5-22
3.6-2	3.6-2
3.6-5	3.6-5
3.6-6	3.6-6
3.6-7	3.6-7
	3.6-7A
3.6-11	3.6-11
3.8-1	3.8-1
4.4-7	4.4-7
4.4-8	4.4-8
	4.4-8A

TABLE 3.5-7

Radiation Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

Instrument	Minimum Channels Operable	Action
1. Containment Area (R-29 and R-30)	2	1
2. Noble Gas Effluent Monitors		
i. Plant Vent (R-14)	1	1
ii. A Main Steam Line (R-31)	1	1
iii. B Main Steam Line (R-32)	1	1
iv. Containment Purge (R-12A)	1*	1
v. Air Ejector (R-15A)	1	1

Action Statements

Action 1 - With the number of operable channels less than required by the Minimum Channels Operable requirements, either restore the inoperable channel(s) to operable status within 7 days of the event, or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status.

* only when the shutdown purge system flanges are removed.

3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves

3.6.3.1 With one or more of the isolation valve(s) specified in Table 3.6-1 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve operable in each affected penetration that is open and either:

a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to operable status within 4 hours, or

b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or

d. Be in at least hot shutdown within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

Isolation valves are inopeable from a leakage standpoint if the leakage is greater than that allowed by 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.

3.6.4 Combustible Gas Control

3.6.4.1 When the reactor is critical, at least two independent containment hydrogen monitors shall be operable. One of the monitors may be the Post Accident Sampling System.

3.6.4.2 With only one hydrogen monitor operable, restore a second monitor to operable status within 30 days or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 6 hours.

3.6.4.3 With no hydrogen monitors operable, restore at least one monitor to operable status within 72 hours or be at least hot shutdown within the next 6 hours.

3.6.5 Containment Mini-Purge

Whenever the containment integrity is required, emphasis will be placed on limiting all purging and venting times to as low as achievable. The mini-purge isolation valves will remain closed to the maximum extent practicable but may be open for pressure control, for ALARA, for respirable air quality considerations for personnel entry, for surveillance tests that require the valve to be open or other safety related reasons. *

*Becomes effective upon installation of containment mini-purge valves

PENT. NO.	IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION	ISOLATION BOUNDARY	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME *(SEC)	ISOLATION BOUNDARY	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME *(SEC)	
121	Nitrogen to PRT	CV 528	NA	MV 547(8)	NA	
121	Reactor Makeup water to PRT	CV 529	NA	AOV 508	60	
121	Cont. Press. transmitter PT-945 (10)	PT 945	NA	MV 1819A	NA	
121	Cont. Press. transmitter PT-946 (10)	PT 946	NA	MV 1819B	NA	
123	Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT) to GA	AOV 1789	60	MV 1655(7)	NA	
124	Excess letdown supply and return to heat exchanger	AOV 745 CV 743	60 NA	(11) (11)	NA NA	
124	Post Accident air sample "C" fan	MV 1569 MV 1572	NA NA	MV 1571 MV 1574	NA NA	
125	Component Cooling Water (CW) from 1B RCP	MOV 759B	NA	(12)	NA	
126	COW from 1A RCP	MOV 759A	NA	(12)	NA	
127	CCW to 1A RCP	CV 750A	NA	MOV 749A	60	
128	COW to 1B RCP	CV 750B	NA	MOV 749B	60	
129	RCDT & PRT to Vent Header	AOV 1787 CV 1713	60 NA	AOV 1786	60	
130	CCW to reactor support cooling	MOV 813	60	(19)	NA	
131	COW to reactor support cooling	MOV 814	60	(19)	NA	
132	Mini-Purge exhaust [Depressurization at Power]	AOV 7970	5 [60]	AOV 7971	5 [60]	(23)
140	RHR pump suction from "A" Hot leg	MOV 701(20)	NA	(6)	NA	

PENT. NO.	IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION	ISOLATION BOUNDARY	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME *(SEC)	ISOLATION BOUNDARY	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME *(SEC)
141	RHR-#1 pump suction from Sump B	MOV 850A(13)	NA	MOV 851A(13)	NA
142	RHR-#2 pump suction from Sump B	MOV 850B(13)	NA	MOV 851B(13)	NA
143	RCDT pump suction	AOV 1721	60	AOV 1003A AOV 1003B	60 60
201	Reactor Compart. cooling Unit A & B	MV 4757(16) MV 4636(16)	NA NA	(11) (11)	NA NA
202	"B" Hydrogen recombiner (pilot & main)	MV 1076B MV 1084B	NA NA	SOV IV-3B SOV IV-5B	NA Normally Closed NA Normally Closed
203	Contain, Press. transmitter PT-947 & 948	PT 947 PT 948	NA NA	MV 1819C MV 1819D	NA NA
203	Post accident air sample to "B" fan	MV 1563 MV 1566	NA NA	MV 1565 MV 1568	NA NA
204	Shutdown Purge Supply Duct [Purge Supply Duct]	flange (22) [AOV 5870]	NA [5]	AOV 5869 (22)	5 (24)
205	Hot leg loop sample	AOV 966C	60	MV 956D(14)	NA
206	Przr. liquid space sample	AOV 966B	60	MV 956E(14)	NA
206	"A" S/G sample	AOV 5735	60	MV 5733(7)	NA
207	Przr. Steam space sample	AOV 966A	60	MV 956F	NA
207	"B" S/G sample	AOV 5736	60	MV 5734(7)	NA
209	Reactor Compart. cooling Units A & B	MV 4758(16) MV 4635(16)	NA NA	(11) (11)	NA NA
210	Oxygen makeup to A & B recombiners	MV 1080A	NA	SOV IV-2A SOV IV-2B	NA Normally Closed NA Normally Closed

PENT. NO.	IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION	ISOLATION BOUNDARY	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME *(SEC)	ISOLATION BOUNDARY	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME *(SEC)
300	Shutdown Purge Exhaust Duct [Purge Exhaust Duct]	flange (22) [AOV 5878]	NA [5]	AOV 5879 (22)	5 (24)
301	Aux. steam supply to containment	MV 6151	NA	MV 6165(15)	NA
303	Aux. steam condensate return	MV 6175	NA	MV 6152(15)	NA
304	"A" Hydrogen recombiner (pilot and main)	MV 1084B MV 1076A	NA NA	SOV IV-5A SOV IV-3A	NA Normallly Closed NA Normallly Closed
305	Radiation Monitors R-11, R-12 & R-10A Auto Inlet Isol.	AOV 1597	60	MV 1596	NA
305	R-11, R-12 & R-10A Outlet	AOV 1599	60	AOV 1598	60
305	Post Accident air sampler (containment)	MV 1554 MV 1557 MV 1560	NA NA NA	MV 1556 MV 1559 MV 1562	60 NA NA
307	Fire Service Water	CV 9229	NA	AOV 9227	(18)
308	Service Water to "A" fan cooler	MV 4627(16)	NA	(11)	NA
309	Mini-Purge supply [Leakage Test Depressurization]	AOV 7478 [Flange]	5 [NA]	AOV 7445 [MOV 7445]	5 [NA normally closed] (23)
310	Service Air to Contain.	CV 7226	NA	MV 7141	NA
310	Instrument Air to Contain.	CV 5393	NA	AOV 5392	60
311	Service Water from "B" fan cooler	MV 4630(16)	NA	(11)	NA
312	Service Water to "D" fan cooler	MV 4642(16)	NA	(11)	NA
313	Leakage test depressurization	flange	NA	MOV 7444	NA Normally Closed

PENT. NO.	IDENTIFICATION/DESCRIPTION	ISOLATION BOUNDARY	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME *(SEC)	ISOLATION BOUNDARY	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME *(SEC)
315	Service Water from "C" fan cooler	MV 4643(16)	NA	(11)	NA
316	Service Water to "B" fan cooler	MV 4628(16)	NA	(11)	NA
317	Leakage test supply	flange	NA	MOV 7443	NA Normally Closed
318	Dead weight tester (decomissioned)	welded shut	NA	welded shut	NA
319	Service Water from "A" fan cooler	MV 4629(16)	NA	(11)	NA
320	Service water to "C" fan cooler	MV 4647(16)	NA	(11)	NA
321	A S/G Blowdown	AOV 5738	60	MV 5701(7)	NA
322	B S/G Blowdown	AOV 5737	60	MV 5702(7)	NA
323	Service Water from "D" fan cooler	MV 4644(16)	NA	(11)	NA
324	Demineralized water to Containment	CV 8419	NA	AOV 8418	NA
332	Cont. Press. Trans. PT-944, 949 & 950	PT 944	NA	MV 1819G	NA
		PT 949	NA	MV 1819F	NA
		PT 950	NA	MV 1819E	NA
332	Leakage test and hydrogen monitor instrumentation lines	MV 7448	NA	cap	NA
		MV 7452	NA	cap	NA
		MV 7456	NA	cap	NA
		SOV 921	NA	(21)	NA
		SOV 922	NA	(21)	NA
		SOV 923	NA	(21)	NA
		SOV 924	NA	(21)	NA

(21) **Acceptable isolation capability is provided for instrument lines by two isolation boundaries outside containment. One of the boundaries outside containment may be a Seismic Class 1 closed system which is subjected to Type C leak rate testing.**

(22) **The flanges at penetrations 204 and 300 can only be removed at cold or refueling shutdown. The flanges and associated double seals provide containment isolation and are a containment boundary for all modes of operation between cold shutdown and normal operation. During cold and refueling shutdown when the flanges are removed integrity is provided by the 48 inch valves.**

(23) Items in square brackets are effective until the installation of the new containment mini-purge valves for penetration Nos. 132 and 309. At that time, they are replaced by mini-purge line items as identified.

(24) Items in square brackets are effective until the installation of the flanges that convert the containment purge system to the containment shutdown purge system for penetration Nos. 204 and 300. At that time they are replaced by shutdown purge system line items as identified.

3.8 REFUELING

Applicability

Applies to operating limitations during refueling operations.

Objective

To ensure that no incident could occur during refueling operations that would affect public health and safety.

Specification

3.8.1 During refueling operations the following conditions shall be satisfied.

a. The equipment door, or a closure plate that restricts air flow from the containment, and at least one personnel door in the equipment door or closure plate and in the personnel air lock shall be properly closed. In addition, all automatic containment isolation valves shall be operable or at least one valve in each line shall be locked closed. The 48 inch shutdown purge valves must also be operable or closed or the associated flange must be installed.

b. Radiation levels in the containment shall be monitored continuously.

c. Core subcritical neutron flux shall be continuously monitored by at least two source range neutron monitors, each with continuous visual indication in the control room and one with audible indication in the containment and control room available whenever core geometry is being changed. When core geometry is not being changed at

shutdown and depressurized until repairs are effected and the local leakage meets the acceptance criterion.

c. If it is determined that the leakage through a mini-purge supply and exhaust line is greater than 0.05 L_a an engineering evaluation shall be performed and plans for corrective action developed. **

4.4.2.4 Test Frequency

a. Except as specified in b., c., and d. below, individual penetrations and containment isolation valves shall be tested during each reactor shutdown for refueling, or other convenient intervals, but in no case at intervals greater than two years. In addition, the four mini-purge isolation valves shall be tested at six month intervals.* **

b. The containment equipment hatch, fuel transfer tube, and shutdown purge system flanges shall be tested at each refueling shutdown or after each use, if that be sooner.

* (This requirement is applicable for two years following installation of the mini-purge system).

**Becomes effective upon the installation of the containment mini-purge valves.

c. The containment air locks shall be tested at intervals of no more than six months by pressurizing the space between the air lock doors. In addition, following opening of the air lock door during the interval, a test shall be performed by pressurizing between the dual seals of each door opened, within 48 hours of the opening, unless the reactor was in the cold shutdown condition at the time of the opening or has been subsequently brought to the cold shutdown condition. A test shall also be performed by pressurizing between the dual seals of each door within 48 hours of leaving the cold shutdown condition, unless the doors have not been open since the last test performed either by pressurizing the space between the air lock doors or by pressurizing between the dual door seals.

d. Within 24 hours after each closing when containment integrity is required, except when being used for multiple cycles and then at least once per 72 hours, each containment purge isolation valve shall be tested to verify that when the measured leakage rate is added to the leakage rates determined for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60 La. *

*This paragraph may be deleted upon installation of the containment shutdown purge system flanges.

4.4.3 Recirculation Heat Removal Systems

4.4.3.1 Test

a. The portion of the residual heat removal system that is outside the containment shall either be tested by use in normal operation or hydrostatically tested at 350 psig at the interval specified in 4.4.3.4.

b. Suction piping from containment sump B to the reactor coolant drain tank pump and the discharge piping from the pumps to the residual heat removal system shall be hydrostatically tested at no less that 100 psig at the interval specified in 4.4.3.4.

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.13 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-18
ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION
R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
DOCKET NO. 50-244

By letters dated October 22, 1985 and December 23, 1985, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (the licensee) requested an amendment to Appendix A of Operating License, No. DPR-18, for the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant to change the Technical Specifications (TS). Supplemental information was received in a letter dated January 8, 1986. The proposed TS changes are in response to the NRC letter, dated June 21, 1984, which transmitted staff's Safety Evaluation (SE) concerning the Multi-Plant Action (MPA) B-24 review of containment purging during normal plant operation.

The existing purge and vent systems at Ginna plant consist of a 48-inch purge system and a 6-inch containment vent (depressurization) system. In response to staff's previous evaluation, the licensee proposed to modify the 48-inch purge system to use it only when the reactor is in cold or refueling shutdown and to install a new mini-purge system to allow limited purging of the containment during normal plant operation. In order to implement these modifications, the licensee has proposed to amend the TS to incorporate the new mini-purge system and to modify the requirements associated with the existing 48-inch purge system.

In the purge system modification program, the licensee has proposed to close during normal plant operation the 48-inch purge supply and exhaust lines using blind flanges with double O-ring seals located inside containment; the blind flanges will replace the existing inboard 48-inch butterfly type isolation valves. The existing, outboard 48-inch butterfly type valves will remain in place for containment isolation purposes during refueling operations. The outboard valves are not required for containment isolation during normal plant operation. A new 2000 cfm mini-purge system will be installed to permit containment purging on a limited basis during all modes of reactor operation.

The mini-purge system uses the existing 6-inch Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) vent line (penetration 309) as the supply line and the existing 6-inch, depressurization line (penetration 132) as the exhaust line. Two 6-inch, air-operated butterfly valves will be installed in the supply line, one inboard and one outboard, for automatic containment isolation. Two 8-inch, air-operated butterfly valves will replace the existing 6-inch inboard and outboard automatic isolation valves in the exhaust line. The inboard ends of the mini-purge supply and exhaust lines will be equipped with 1/2 inch mesh debris screens.

Accordingly, the licensee requested to change the TS to reflect these physical modifications. The proposed TS changes include: (1) specifying the operable radiation monitoring instrumentation in Table 3.5-7 of the TS when the 48-inch purge system is being used, (2) adding new requirements in Section 3.6.5 of the TS to limit usage of the minipurge system, (3) revising TS Table 3.6-1 to add (or delete) certain isolation valves and blank flanges to reflect the purge system modifications and adding a note to clarify that the blind flanges in the 48-inch lines can only be removed during cold and refueling shutdowns, (4) revising Section 3.8.1 of the TS to allow the 48-inch purge system to be used during refueling outages and to specify a leakage acceptance limit (0.05 La) in the TS for the mini-purge system, and (5) revising Section 4.4.2.4 of the TS to specify a leak test frequency for the mini-purge valves and the blank flanges, and to delete the leak test requirements for the 48-inch butterfly valves.

The staff has reviewed the proposed modifications to the purge systems for compliance with containment isolation requirements set forth in BTP CSB 6-4, Item II.E.4.2 of NUREG-0737, and guidelines developed as part of MPA B-24, and finds that the proposed modifications are in compliance. The isolation provisions for the mini-purge system supply and exhaust lines meet the requirements of GDC-56. The blind flanges with testable double O-ring seals in the 48-inch supply and exhaust lines are acceptable containment isolation barriers in lieu of redundant isolation valves since the isolation provisions are similar to that for an equipment hatch. Therefore, the staff finds the design of the purge systems acceptable.

The licensee has proposed surveillance requirements in the TS for the modified purge systems. The licensee has committed to leak test the mini-purge system isolation valves at six-month intervals for the first two years; the staff has recommended a three-month test interval for an active purge system. The licensee has stated, however, that the smaller isolation valves in the mini-purge system use an improved resilient seat material that is not likely to wear out through limited use, and staff agrees. The staff, therefore, finds the proposed 6-month test interval over two years acceptable, but the licensee should maintain test records to check for onset of valve seat deterioration. The proposed leak testing of the blind flanges in the 48-inch lines at each refueling or after each use is in accordance with Appendix J to 10 CFR 50, and, therefore, acceptable. The licensee deleted the leak test requirement for the outboard, 48-inch butterfly valves on the basis that the valves are not required for containment isolation. The staff concurs with the licensee action.

The licensee has proposed leak test acceptance criteria in the TS. If the leakage through a mini-purge system supply or exhaust line is greater than 0.05 La an engineering evaluation shall be performed and a corrective action plan developed. This limit will serve as the basis for determining the

adequacy of test and repair frequencies for the valves. Furthermore, the summation of all Type B and C leakage tests should not exceed the 0.6 La limit established in Appendix J. The licensee's proposed surveillance requirements for leak rate testing the mini-purge supply and exhaust lines are acceptable since they reflect a continuing commitment to assuring satisfactory valve integrity and are compatible with Appendix J requirements.

Rochester Gas and Electric Cooperation performed an analysis using the CONTEMPT-EI/28A code to determine the reduction in containment pressure due to the mini-purge system being in operation at the start of a LOCA. The results of the analysis showed that the peak containment pressure decreased 0.05 psi and this decrease resulted in an increase in the peak clad temperature of 4°F. The staff has agreed with the licensee's findings that this change is not significant as defined by paragraph II.1.b of 10 CFR 50 Appendix K and is, therefore, acceptable.

In addition, the licensee performed an analysis which demonstrated the radiological consequences of a LOCA were acceptable assuming the purge valves were open for the maximum interval required. The results of the analysis show that the 0-2 hour dose contribution from the open mini-purge system is approximately 0.375 rem to the thyroid. The thyroid dose from a LOCA is given in the updated Ginna FSAR as 130 rem (0-2 hour dose). The licensee found that the additional dose associated with the mini-purge valves being open was an insignificant increase (approximately 0.3%) in the LOCA dose. The staff reviewed the licensee's calculations and finds them acceptable.

In sum, the staff has completed its review of the licensee's submittal concerning the purge system modifications and associated TS changes, and concludes that the purge system design, operating practices, and surveillance requirements are acceptable.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves changes to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and a surveillance requirement. We have determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative radiation exposure. The NRC staff has made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that this amendment involved no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (51 FR 1880) on January 15, 1986 and consulted with the state of New York. No public comments were received, and the State of New York did not have any comments.

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: This Safety Evaluation was prepared by J. Guo and C. Miller.

Dated: February 15, 1986