Mr. Charles H. Cruse
Vice President - Nuclear Energy
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway
Lusby, MD 20657-4702

March 5, 19

SUBJECT: CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2, NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES, PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION, AND OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING (TAC NOS. M97363 AND M97364)

Dear Mr. Cruse:

Enclosed is a copy of a Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing for your information. This notice relates to your application dated December 4, 1996, as supplemented March 27, June 9, June 18, July 21, August 19, September 10, October 6, October 20, October 23, November 5, 1997, and January 12 and January 28, 1998. In your application, you proposed to convert the current Technical Specifications (TSs) for Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS) consistent with the provisions of NUREG-1432, Revision 1, "Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering Plants," dated April 1995.

On January 31, 1997, a Federal Register Notice (62 FR 4816) was published stating that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69. This notice stated that the proposed amendments would represent a full conversion from the current TSs to a set of TS based on NUREG-1432, Revision 1, "Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering Plants, dated April 1995. The enclosed notice addresses items of other TS changes included in the application for conversion to ISTSs.

This notice has been forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Alexander W. Dromerick, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-317
and 50-318
Enclosure: Notice
cc w/encl: See next page

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 5, 1998

Mr. Charles H. Cruse
Vice President - Nuclear Energy
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway
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Alexander W. Dromerick, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket Nos. 50-317
and 50-318

Enclosure: Notice

cc w/encl: See next page

Mr. Charles H. Cruse
Baltimore Gas & Electric Company

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NOS. 50-317 AND 50-318

NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES, PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION, AND OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING

On Friday, January 31, 1997, a Federal Register Notice (62 FR 4816) was published stating that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69 issued to the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BGE or the licensee) for operation of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, located in Calvert County, Maryland.

The proposed amendments requested by the licensee in a letter dated December 4, 1996, would represent a full conversion from the current Technical Specifications (TSs) to a set of TS based on NUREG-1432, Revision 1, "Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering Plants dated April 1995. Since that time, the Commission has received supplements to the application dated March 27, June 9, June 18, July 21, August 19, September 10, October 6, October 20, October 23, November 5, 1997, and January 12 and 28, 1998. Therefore, issues not fully discussed in (62 FR 4816) are presented below.

The proposed amendment includes the following :

1. The licensee is proposing to add a new surveillance requirement (SR) 3.4.9.2 to the Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) which will require verification that the capacity of each required bank of pressurizer heaters is equal to or greater than 150 kW every 24 months. This is a more restrictive change.

2. The licensee has proposed a change to the current TS applicability for the pressurizer safety valves which require that both safety valves be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3 and that one safety valve be operable in Modes 4 and 5. The ITS will modify these applicability requirements for Mode 3 to specify that two safety valves shall be operable with all reactor coolant system (RCS) cold leg temperature ⟩ 365°F for Unit 1 and ⟩ 301°F for Unit 2. This is a less restrictive change.

3. The licensee proposes that the power-operated relief valve (PORVs) be demonstrated operable by performance of a channel test once per 92 days as part of the conversion to the ITS. The current TS require that the PORVs be demonstrated operable by performance of a Channel Function Test once per 31 days. This a less restrictive change.

4. Current TS 3.4.6 2.C specifies that the RCS shall be limited to "1 gpm total primary - to secondary leakage through all steam generators and 100 gallon-per-day through any one steam generator." The proposed ITS LCO 3.4.1.3 eliminates the limit of 1 gpm total primary-to-secondary leakage through all steam generators and thus will only require a limit of 100 gallon per day through any one steam generator. This is an administrative change.

5. Current TS SR 4.5.2.f.2 requires verifying at least once per Refueling Interval, during shutdown, that the high-pressure safety injection pump and low-pressure safety injection pump (LPSI) start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection actuation test signal. Proposed ITS SR 3.5.2.6 retains this same requirement with a specified frequency of 24 months, which is equivalent to the refueling interval. The proposed ITS will add a new SR 3.5.2.7 which requires verification that each LPSI pump stops on an actual or simulated actuation signal. This a more restrictive change.

6. The proposed amendment regarding the control room emergency ventilation system (CREVS) changes the surveillance from 18 months to 24 months (each refueling cycle) for the following SR. Current TS SR 4.7.6.1.e.2 requires that each train of CREVS is demonstrated operable at least once every 18 months by verifying that on a control room high radiation test signal, the system automatically switches into a recirculation mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks and that both of the isolation valves in each duct and common exhaust duct, and isolation valve in the toilet exhaust area duct, close. The above change is less restrictive.

7. The proposed amendment regarding the control room emergency temperature system (CRETS) changes the surveillance interval from 62 days on a staggered basis (one train every 31 days) to 24 months (each refueling interval) for the following SR:

> Current TS SR 4.7.6.1.a requires demonstrating that each CRETS train is operable at least once every 62 days, on a staggered test basis (one train every 31 days) by: (1) deenergizing the backup Control Room air conditioner; and (2) verifying that the emergency Control Room air conditioners maintain the air temperature [less than or equal to] 104°F for at least 12 hours when in the recirculation mode.

SR 4.7.6.1a changes to ITS SR 3.7.9.1 to require demonstrating operability of CRETS at least every 24 months by verifying each CRETS train has the capability to maintain control room temperature within limits. The above changes are less restrictive.

8. The proposed amendment regarding the spent fuel pool exhaust ventilation system (SFPEVS) will change the surveillance interval from 18 months to 24 months (each refueling interval) for the following SR. This is a less restrictive change.

Current TS SR 4.9.12.d requires demonstrating that the SFPEVS is operable at least once per 18 months by : (1) verifying that the pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks are ⟨4 inches Water Gauge while operating the ventilation system at a flow rate of 32,000 cfm plus or minus 10%; and (2) verifying that each exhaust fan maintains the spent fuel storage pool at a measurable negative pressure relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation.

SR 4.9.12.d will change to ITS SR 3.7.11.3 to require demonstrating that the SFPEVS is operable at least once per 24 months by verifying that each exhaust fan maintains the spent fuel pool at a measurable negative pressure relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation.

9. The proposed amendment regarding the penetration room exhaust ventilation system (PREVS) changes the surveillance interval from 18 months to 24 months (each refueling interval for the following SR:

Current TS SR 4.6.6.1.d.2 requires demonstrating that each PREVS train is operable at least once per 18 months by verifying that the filter train starts on a Containment Isolation Test Signal.

SR 4.6.6.1.d.2 changes to ITS SR 3.7.12.3 to require demonstrating operability of the PREVS at least once every 24 months by verifying each PREVS train starts on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The above change is less restrictive.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment

would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Basis for proposed no significant hazards determination:

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration which is presented below for the above items:

Item 1 and Item 5 - More Restrictive Changes

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

   The proposed changes provide more stringent requirements than previously existed in the Technical Specifications. Each change was evaluated and it was determined that these more stringent requirements do not result in operation that will increase the probability of initiating an analyzed event. If anything, the new requirements may decrease the probability or consequences of an analyzed event by incorporating the more restrictive changes discussed above. The proposed changes do not alter assumptions relative to mitigation of an accident or transient. The more restrictive requirements continue to ensure process variables, structures, systems, and components are maintained consistent with the safety analyses and licensing basis. The proposed changes do not significantly affect initiators or mitigation of analyzed events, and therefore do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

   The proposed changes provide more stringent requirements than previously existed in the Technical Specifications. The changes will not involve a significant change in design or operation of the plant. No hardware is being added to the plant as part of the proposed changes. The proposed changes will not introduce any new accident initiators. The changes do impose different requirements. However, these changes are consistent with the assumptions in the safety analyses and licensing basis. Therefore, the changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in margin of safety?

The proposed changes provide more stringent requirements than previously existed in the Technical Specifications. An evaluation of these changes concluded that adding these more restrictive requirements either increases or has no impact on the margin of safety. The changes provide additional restrictions which may enhance plant safety. The changes maintain requirements within the safety analyses and licensing basis. As such, no question of safety is involved. Therefore, the changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Item 2 - Less Restrictive Changes

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change deletes the Mode 3 with any cold leg temperature [less than or equal to] 365°F ([less than or equal to] 301°F for Unit 2) and the Mode 4 and 5 Applicabilities from the Modes of Applicability for the pressurizer safety valves. The pressurizer safety valves are not initiators of any analyzed event. The pressurizer safety valves are not required to mitigate any accidents in Mode 3 with cold leg temperature [less than or equal to] 365°F ([less than or equal to] 301°F for Unit 2), or in Modes 4 or 5. In Mode 3 with any cold leg temperature [less than or equal to] 365°F ([less than or equal to] 301°F for Unit 2) overpressure protection is provided by the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System. The change will not alter assumptions relative to the mitigation of an accident or transient. The proposed changes do not significantly affect initiators or mitigation of analyzed events, and therefore do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated?

The proposed change deletes the Mode 3 with any cold leg temperature [less than or equal to] 365°F ([less than or equal to] 301°F for Unit 2), and the Mode 4 and 5 Applicabilities from the Modes of Applicability for the pressurizer safety valves. The change will not involve a significant change in design or operation of the plant. No hardware is being added to the plant as part of the proposed change. The proposed change will not introduce any new accident initiators. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in margin of safety?

The proposed change deletes the Mode 3 with any cold leg temperature [less than or equal to] 365°F ([less than or equal to] 301°F for Unit 2), and Mode 4 and 5 Applicabilities from the Modes of Applicability for the pressurizer safety valves. The pressurizer safety valves are not required for overpressure protection in Mode 3 with any cold leg temperature [less than or equal to] 365°F ([less than or equal to] 301°F for Unit 2), or in Modes 4 or 5. The overpressure protection in these Modes are provided by the

LTOP System. Therefore, the change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Item 3 - Less Restrictive Change

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

   The proposed change decreases the Surveillance Frequency for the PORV Special Test Exception from 31 days to 92 days. Decreasing the PORV Special Test Exception Frequency to 92 days is not an initiator of any analyzed event. The PORV shares the same instrumentation as the Reactor Protective System Pressurizer High Function, which was approved for quarterly Channel Functional Testing in an NRC Safety Evaluation Report, dated August 24, 1994. A plant-specific setpoint drift analysis demonstrated that the observed changes in instrument uncertainties for extended Surveillance test intervals do not exceed the current 30-day setpoint assumptions. This provides confidence the 90-92 day test interval will not impact the ability of the PORV to perform its safety function. The change will not significantly alter assumptions relative to the mitigation of an accident or transient. The proposed changes do not significantly affect initiators or mitigation of analyzed events, and therefore do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated?

   The proposed change decreases the Surveillance Frequency for the PORV Channel Functional Test from 31 days to 92 days. The change will not involve a significant change in design or operation of the plant. No hardware is being added to the plant as part of the proposed change. The proposed change will not introduce any new accident initiators. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in margin of safety?

   The proposed change decreases the Surveillance Frequency for the PORV Channel Functional Test from 31 days to 92 days. The PORV shares the same instrumentation as the Reactor Protective System Pressurizer Pressure High Function, which was approved for quarterly Channel Functional Testing in an NRC Safety Evaluation Report, dated August 24, 1994. This change makes the testing Frequency for the PORV consistent with the Reactor Protective System High Pressurizer Function, which shares the same instrumentation. The core melt Frequency remains unchanged. Also, the instrument drift resulting from the proposed Surveillance interval is less than the instrument drift presently assumed for the current Surveillance interval. Therefore, the change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Item 4 - Administrative Change

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed changes involve reformatting, renumbering, and rewording of the existing Technical Specifications, along with the incorporation of current plant practices and other changes, as discussed above, in order to be consistent with NUREG-1432. These changes involve no technical changes to the existing Technical Specifications. Specifically, there will be no change in the requirements imposed on Calvert Cliffs due to these changes. Thus, the changes are administrative in nature and do not impact initiators of analyzed events. The proposed changes do not significantly affect initiators or mitigation of analyzed events, and therefore do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

   The proposed changes involve reformatting, renumbering, and rewording of the existing Technical Specifications, along with the incorporation of current plant practices and other changes, as discussed above, in order to be consistent with NUREG-1432. The changes will not involve a significant change in design or operation of the plant. No hardware is being added to the plant as part of the proposed change. The proposed changes will not introduce any new accident initiators. Therefore, the changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does this change involve a significant reduction in margin of safety?

   The proposed changes involve reformatting, renumbering, and rewording of the existing Technical Specifications, along with the incorporation of current plant practices and other changes, as discussed above, in order to be consistent with NUREG-1432. The changes are administrative in nature and will not involve any technical changes. The changes will not reduce a margin of safety because it has no impact on any safety analysis assumptions. Therefore, the changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Item 6 - Less Restrictive Changes

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

   The proposed change decreases the Surveillance Frequency from 18 to 24 months for verifying that the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) will actuate on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The CREVS is not an initiator to any accident previously evaluated so there is no change in the probability of an accident. The 24-month test frequency is sufficient to verify that the equipment will actuate if needed, so the equipment will continue to be able to mitigate the consequences of accidents previously evaluated. Therefore, this change will not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change decreases the Surveillance Frequency from 18 to 24 months for verifying that the CREVS will actuate on an actual or simulated actuation signal. This change will not physically alter the plant (no new or different types of equipment will be installed). The change does not require any new or unusual operator actions. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The proposed change decreased the Surveillance Frequency from 18 to 24 months for verifying that the CREVS will actuate on an actual or simulated actuation signal. A review of previously performed Surveillances determined that no failures have been found during the performance of this SR once per 18 months. Given the performance history, there is no reason to believe that a Frequency of 24 months would result in reduced reliability of the system. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Item 7 - Less Restrictive Change

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change will decrease the Frequency from 62 days on a Staggered Test Basis (one train every 31 days) to 24 months for verifying that the CRETS can maintain temperature in the Control Room at [less than or equal to] 104°F. This change will not significantly increase the possibility of an accident previously evaluated. The CRETS is not an initiator of any analyzed event. This change will not significantly increase the consequences of an accident. The CRETS will still be tested at a Frequency that will show it can maintain Control Room temperature. Review of the past 10 years of data has shown that during this period the test has never failed. This change will not significantly affect the assumptions relative to the mitigation of accidents or transients. Therefore, the change does not involve a significant increase in the probability of consequence of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change will decrease the Frequency from 62 days on a Staggered Test Basis (one train every 31 days) to 24 months for verifying that the CRETS can maintain temperature in the Control Room at [less than or equal to] 104°F. This change does not involve a significant change in the design or operation of the plant. No hardware is being added to the plant as part of the proposed change. The proposed change will not introduce any new accident initiators. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The proposed change will decrease the Frequency from 62 days on a Staggered Test Basis (one train every 31 days) to 24 months for verifying that the CRETS can maintain

temperature in the Control Room at [less than or equal to] 104°F. The margin of safety is not significantly affected by this change. The Surveillance will still be performed at an interval which will prove the CRETS remains Operable based on an evaluation of past Surveillance history. Also, increasing the Surveillance interval will prevent inadvertent wear and tear on the system due to over testing, which can possibly lead to premature failures. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Item 8 - Less Restrictive Change

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

   The proposed change decreases the Surveillance Frequency from 18 months to 24 months for verifying that the SFPEVS can maintain a measurable negative pressure in the spent fuel pool area of the Auxiliary Building. This change will not affect the probability of an accident. The SFPEVS is not an initiator of any analyzed event. The change will not affect the consequences of an accident. The 24-month Frequency is sufficient to ensure that the SFPEVS can maintain a measurable negative pressure in the spent fuel pool area. The change will not alter assumptions relative to the mitigation of an accident or transient. Therefore, the change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

   The proposed change decreases the Surveillance Frequency from 18 months to 24 months for verifying that the SFPEVS can maintain a measurable negative pressure in the spent fuel pool area of the Auxiliary Building. This change will not physically alter the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). The change does not require any new or unusual operator actions. Therefore, the change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

   The proposed change decreases the Surveillance Frequency from 18 to 24 months for verifying that the SFPEVS can maintain a measurable negative pressure in the spent fuel pool area of the Auxiliary Building. The margin of safety is not significantly affected by this change. The failure history for this SR has shown that no failures have occurred in the previous ten years. The proposed Frequency will continue to prove that the SFPEVS will maintain a negative pressure in the spent fuel pool area. Therefore, the change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Item 9 - Less Restrictive Change

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change decreases the Surveillance Frequency from 18 to 24 months for verifying that the Penetration Room Emergency Ventilation System (PREVS) will actuate on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The PREVS is not an initiator to any accident previously evaluated so there is no change in the probability of an accident. The 24-month test frequency is sufficient to verify that the equipment will actuate if needed so the equipment will continue to be able to mitigate the consequences of accidents previously evaluated. Therefore, this change will not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

   The proposed change decreases the Surveillance Frequency from 18 to 24 months for verifying that the PREVS will actuate on an actual or simulated actuation signal. This change will not physically alter the plant (no new or different types of equipment will be installed). The change does not require any new or unusual operator actions. Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

   The proposed change decreases the Surveillance Frequency from 18 to 24 months for verifying that the PREVS will actuate on an actual or simulated actuation signal. A review of previously performed Surveillances determined that no failures have been found during the performance of this SR once per 18 months. Given the performance history, there is no reason to believe that a Frequency of 24 months would result in reduced reliability of the system. Therefore, this change will not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analyses and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, regarding the matters discussed above.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and page number of this FEDERAL REGISTER notice. Written comments may also be delivered to Room 6D59, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.

The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below.

By April 6, 1998, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's "Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Calvert County Library, Prince Frederick, Maryland 20678. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why

the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a

material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above date. a copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to Jay E. Silberg, Esquire, Shaw,

Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037, attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(l)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment dated December 4, 1996, as supplemented March 27, June 9, June 18, July 21, August 14, August 19, September 10, October 6, October 20, October 23, November 5, 1997, and January 12 and January 28, 1998, which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Calvert County Library, Prince Frederick, Maryland 20678.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2ndday of March 1998.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Alexander W. Dromerick, Senior Project Manager
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation