

Salem January 2000 RO Written Examination Question Source Statistic Summary

QUESTION SOURCE	Memory	Comp/Applic
Salem Bank	2	6
Salem Bank - Significantly Modified	4	2
Salem NRC Exams (not in Salem Bank)	10	5
Previous 2 Salem NRC Exams	1	3
NRC Bank	6	8
Other Facility (not in Salem Bank)	7	8
New	15	23
Total	45	55

Salem 1/10/00 RO NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level and Source Summary

RECORD #	RO	COGNITIVE LEVEL	SOURCE	NOTES
2	X		NRC(PI)	SM
5	X		M	
6	X		M	
8	X		M	
9	X		C	
10	X		A	
11	X		C	
12	X		A	
13	X		A	
14	X		A	
15	X		C	
16	X		A	
17	X		C	
17	X		NRC(PI)	
22	X		M	
23	X		C	
23	X		SalemNRC 2/99	Last two NRC-SM
24	X		C	
26	X		M	
27	X		M	
28	X		M	
29	X		C	
30	X		A	
31	X		C	
32	X		C	
33	X		M	
34	X		M	
35	X		C	
36	X		M	
37	X		C	
38	X		A	
40	X		C	
41	X		C	SM
43	X		M	
44	X		M	
45	X		C	
			SainNRC 6/98	

Salem 1/10/00 RO NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level and Source Summary

RECORD #	RO	COGNITIVE LEVEL	SOURCE	NOTES
46	X	C	Fac Bk	
47	X	A	New(jk)	
48	X	C	Fac Bk	SM
50	X	C	SainRC 2/98	
51	X	M	New(jk)	
52	X	M	Fac Bk	
53	X	A	New(jk)	
54	X	M	New(jk)	
55	X	C	Fac Bk	
56	X	M	SainRC 6/98	
57	X	A	Fac Bk	
58	X	M	SainRC 2/98	
59	X	M	SainRC 2/98	
60	X	C	New	
61	X	C	SainRC 6/98	
62	X	A	SainRC 9/98	Last two NRC
63	X	M	SainRC 9/98	Last two NRC
65	X	A	Fac Bk	SM
66	X	C	New(jk)	
67	X	C	SainRC 6/98	
69	X	C	NRC Bank	
71	X	M	Fac Bk	
72	X	M	New	
73	X	M	NRC(Braid)	SM
74	X	M	SainRC 6/98	
75	X	M	Fac Bk	SM
77	X	M	SainRC 2/98	
78	X	M	New(jk)	
79	X	M	SainRC 2/98	
80	X	M	SainRC 6/98	
82	X	C	New(jk)	
83	X	C	New(jk)	
85	X	M	NRC Bank	
86	X	A	NRC(PI)	

RECORD #	RO	COGNITIVE LEVEL	SOURCE	NOTES
87		X	C	Fac Bk
88		X	M	New(jk)
89		X	M	New(jk)
91		X	C	NRC(PI)
92		X	C	PI Bank
93		X	M	New
94		X	C	New
95		X	C	SainRC 6/98
96		X	M	New
97		X	A	NRC(WC)
99		X	M	SainRC 6/98
101		X	M	Fac Bk
104		X	M	NRC(Byron)
105		X	C	NRC(Braid)
106		X	M	New(jk)
107		X	C	New(jk)
109		X	M	NRC(Braid)
110		X	M	NRC(Braid)
111		X	C	Fac Bk
112		X	M	SainRC 6/98
114		X	C	Fac Bk
115		X	M	Fac Bk
116		X	M	SainRC 2/97
117		X	C	New
118		X	M	PI Bank
119		X	M	Fac Bk
120		X	C	New(jk)
121		X	A	SainRC 2/99
122		X	C	NRC(Braid)
123		X	M	NRC(Braid)
125		X	C	New(jk)
127		X	C	New(jk)
				SM
				Last two NRC-SM
				SM

Salem January 2000 SRO Written Examination Question Source Statistic Summary

QUESTION SOURCE	Memory	Comp/Applic
Salem Bank	3	5
Salem Bank - Significantly Modified	5	None
Salem NRC Exams (not in Salem Bank)	8	4
Previous 2 Salem NRC Exams	1	3
NRC Bank	3	7
Other Facility (not in Salem Bank)	7	7
New	15	32
Total	42	58

Salem 1/10/00 SRO NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level and Source Summary

RECORD #	SRO	COGNITIVE LEVEL	SOURCE	NOTES
1	x	C	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only
3	x	A	New	NRC approved SRO Only
4	x	C	SaiNRC 6/98	NRC approved SRO Only
5	x	M	New(jkl)	
6	x	M	New	
7	x	A	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only
8	x	M	NRC(Braid)	
9	x	C	New(jkl)	
10	x	A	New	
12	x	A	New	
13	x	A	New(jkl)	
14	x	A	New(jkl)	
16	x	A	New(jkl)	
17	x	C	NRC(PI)	
18	x	A	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only
19	x	M	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only
20	x	M	SaiNRC 2/98	SM/NRC approved SRO Only
21	x	M	New(jkl)	
23	x	C	SalemNRC 2/99	Last two NRC-SM
25	x	C	NRC Bank	NRC approved SRO Only
26	x	M	NRC Bank	
27	x	M	NRC Bank	
28	x	M	NRC Bank	
29	x	C	NRC Bank	
30	x	A	New	
31	x	C	NRC Bank	
32	x	C	NRC Bank	
33	x	M	New(jkl)	
34	x	M	New(jkl)	
37	x	C	NRC Bank	
38	x	A	NRC Bank	
39	x	A	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only
41	x	C	NRC Bank	SM
42	x	C	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only

Salem 1/10/00 SRO NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level and Source Summary

RECORD #	SRO	COGNITIVE LEVEL	SOURCE	NOTES
46	x	C	Fac Bk	
49	x	C	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only
51	x	M	New(jkl)	
52	x	M	Fac Bk	
53	x	A	New(jkl)	
54	x	M	New(jkl)	
56	x	M	SalNRC 6/98	
57	x	A	Fac Bk	
59	x	M	SalNRC 2/98	
61	x	C	SalNRC 6/98	
62	x	A	SalNRC 9/98	Last two NRC
63	x	M	SalNRC 9/98	Last two NRC
64	x	A	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only
68	x	C	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only
70	x	C	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only
71	x	M	Fac Bk	
73	x	M	NRC(Braid)	SM
75	x	M	Fac Bk	SM
76	x	C	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only
77	x	M	SalNRC 2/98	
78	x	M	New(jkl)	
79	x	M	SalNRC 2/98	
80	x	M	SalNRC 6/98	
81	x	C	NRC(Braid)	SM
82	x	C	New(jkl)	
83	x	C	New(jkl)	
84	x	C	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only
86	x	A	NRC(PI)	
87	x	C	Fac Bk	
88	x	M	New(jkl)	
90	x	A	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only
91	x	C	NRC(PI)	
92	x	C	PI Bank	
93	x	M	New	

Salem 1/10/00 SRO NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level and Source Summary

RECORD #	SRO	COGNITIVE LEVEL	SOURCE	NOTES
94	x	C	New	
95	x	C	SalNRC 6/98	
96	x	M	New	
97	x	C	NRC(WC)	SM
98	x	M	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only
99	x	M	SalNRC 6/98	
100	x	C	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only
101	x	M	Fac Bk	SM
102	x	M	Fac Bk	SM/NRC approved SRO Only
103	x	M	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only
104	x	M	NRC(Byron)	
106	x	M	New(jkl)	
107	x	C	New(jkl)	
108	x	M	NRC(PI)	NRC approved SRO Only
110	x	M	NRC(Braid)	SM
111	x	C	Fac Bk	
112	x	M	SalNRC 6/98	
113	x	C	New(jkl)	NRC approved SRO Only
114	x	C	Fac Bk	
115	x	M	Fac Bk	SM
116	x	M	SalNRC 2/97	
117	x	C	New	
118	x	M	PI Bank	
119	x	M	Fac Bk	SM
120	x	C	New	
121	x	A	SalNRC 2/99	Last two NRC-SM
122	x	C	NRC(Braid)	SM
123	x	M	NRC(Braid)	
124	x	C	New	NRC approved SRO Only
125	x	C	New(jkl)	
126	x	M	Fac Bk	SM/NRC approved SRO Only
127	x	C	New(jkl)	

**Question:** Licensed operator scheduling

You are the Unit 2 Control Room Supervisor (CRS) with your crew on the last day of the current run of night shift is at 100% power. The crew is scheduled to be relieved by the same shift and personnel that all of you relieve at 0530 when the relieving Unit 2 RO calls in to report that his car has been stolen and he is not sure when he will be able to return to work.

Assuming all personnel are actively licensed, which one of the following statements correctly describes proper coverage for the RO position?

- a. With no formal approval or administrative action, the RO currently on duty can cover the watch until no later than 1100
- b. With your written approval, the RO currently on duty can volunteer to cover the watch until no later than 1100
- c. With written approval by the Operations Superintendent, the WCC NCO currently on duty can relieve the RO and remain on watch until no later than 1100
- d. With written or telecon approval by the Operations Manager and GM/VP-NO, the WCC NCO currently on duty can relieve the RO at 0700 and remain on watch until no later than 1100

**Answer:** d    **Exam Level:** S    **Cognitive Level:** Comprehension

**Record Number:** 1    **RO Number:**    **SRO Number:** 1

**Tier:** Generic Knowledge and Abilities    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

GENERIC

2.1 Conduct of Operations

2.1.1 Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.

3.7 3.8

**Explanation:** Limits are 16 straight hours, 16 in any 24 hour period, 24 in any 48 hour period, 72 hours in any 7 day period, 8 hours between shifts. d. – Correct, >24 in 48. OM and GM approval required; a., b., c. - >24 in 48, OM must approve prior to relief.

Reference Title/Facility	Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
STATION OPERATING PRACTICES		NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0005(Q), Sect. 5.10,	pg. 11		
LESSON PLAN		300-000.00S-CONDOP,	Obj. 9		

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: Log review**

A licensed reactor operator (RO) is currently assigned to administrative duties reviewing proposed abnormal procedure revisions. On Wednesday, the operator was required to cover the position of Unit 1 RO for the 0700-1900 due to illness of the assigned person. At 1900 on the following Sunday evening, the operator again assumed the position of Unit 1 RO at turnover.

Which one of the choices correctly completes the following sentence regarding review of the Unit 1 Control Room Narrative Log, following shift turnover on Sunday?

According to SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0107, SHIFT TURNOVER RESPONSIBILITIES, the operator must review the Unit 1 Control Room Narrative Log(s) back to at least . . . .

- a. 1900, Wednesday
- b. 1900, Thursday
- c. 1900, Friday
- d. 1900, Saturday

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    R    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 2    **RO Number:** 1    **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Generic Knowledge and Abilities **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

GENERIC

2.1    Conduct of Operations

2.1.3    Knowledge of shift turnover practices.

3.0    3.4

**Explanation:** a. – Correct. The on-coming operator will review the balance of unreviewed material generated within the previous 5 days after turnover is complete. The balance of unreviewed material exists from the end of the operator's shift on Wednesday; b. - Must review the narrative logs for the previous 72 hours or last time on shift, whichever time is shorter, prior to turnover. c.&d. – 48 and 24 hrs. prior is incorrect for post-turnover review

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	SectionPage	Revision	L. O.
SHIFT TURNOVER RESPONSIBILITIES	SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0107(Q)	5.3.1	5	
SHIFT TURNOVER AND LOGKEEPING	0300-000.00S-TNOVER-01	II.D.2.d	17	4, 5b

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Significantly Modified

**Question Source Comments:** Prairie Island 5/1999

**Question: TS ACTIONS evaluation**

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- S/G tube leak has been identified at 0.25 gpm
- Chemistry has confirmed rising SG activity levels
- The unit was tripped from 10% power and transition has been made to 2-EOP-TRIP-2 "REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE"
- RCS Tave is 547°F and a cooldown is being initiated as directed by S2.OP-AB.SG-0001(Q) "STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK" (AB.SG-1)
- Source Range (SR) channel N-32 failed earlier and, while I&C is checking the failed channel, misoperation results in failure of SR Channel N-31

Which one of the following describes the action(s) to be taken with respect to the Unit 2 Technical Specifications?

- Stabilize RCS temperature. Within ONE hour perform a shutdown margin surveillance, then continue with RCS cooldown.
- Invoke 10CFR50.54(x) to continue the cooldown with both SR channels out-of-service. Perform a shutdown margin surveillance prior to reaching cold shutdown.
- Make a one hour report to NRC. TS 3.0.3 will be violated when Mode 5 is entered with both SR channels out-of-service
- Continue the cooldown as directed by AB.SG-1. Abnormal Procedures take precedence over TS actions.

**Answer a** Exam Level S Cognitive Level Application

Record Number: 3 RO Number: SRO Number: 2

Area: Generic Knowledge and Abilities

RO Group: 1 SRO Group: 1

GENERIC

2.1 Conduct of Operations

2.1.33 Ability to recognize indications for system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for technical specifications. 3.4 4.0

**Explanation:** a. - Correct. Apply the ONE hour TSAS; b. - 10CFR50.54(x) is NOT applicable since departure from TS conditions is NOT required. c. - LCO 3.0.3 is NOT applicable; d. - Procedures do NOT take precedence over T.S.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
Salem - Unit 2 Technical Specifications		TABLE 3.3-1, 3/4	3-2, 3-6	113/121	
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS		FU 6			
		0300-000.00S-TECHSP-01	II.A.6, III.C.7.c, g		
			3-14, 22-23, 13, 26		

**Material Required for Examination**

Question Source: New

Question Modification Method:

Question Source Comments:

Review Format  
NRC Submission

**Question:** Surveillance time interval applicability

Given the following conditions for Unit 1:

- Today is June 23 @ 1115
- Unit is at normal operating temperature and pressure in preparation for reactor startup
- 1A Emergency Diesel Generator was declared inoperable today @1100.
- The weekly surveillance, S1.OP-ST.500-0001(Q), "ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES ALIGNMENT" was last performed June 16 at 1300.

According to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications, which one of the following correctly identifies the latest time for completion of this surveillance?

- a. 1200 hours today.
- b. 1215 hours today.
- c. 1300 hours today.
- d. 0700 hours on June 25.

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    **S**                      **Cognitive Level**    **Comprehension**  
**Record Number:** 4    **RO Number:**                      **SRO Number:** 3  
**Tier:** Generic Knowledge and Abilities                      **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1  
**GENERIC**

2.1 Conduct of Operations

2.1.12 Ability to apply technical specifications for a system.

2.9 4.0

**Explanation:** Normal TS surveillance interval is every 7 days. Also, T.S ACTION a. requires surveillance be performed within ONE hour. a. – Correct. This meets the 1-hour requirement of ACTION statement; b. - Incorrectly applies TS 4.0.2, 1.25 extension allowance to a compensatory 1-hour ACTION statement; c. - Identifies the 7 day surveillance interval; d. – 1.25 x 7 day surveillance interval.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AC SOURCES ALIGNMENT	S1.OP-ST.500-0001(Q)	1.3	2	7	
Salem - Unit 2 Technical Specifications		3.8.1.1 ACTION b	3/4 8-1	170	
Surveillances and Testing	0300-000.00S-SURV00-00	III.C.6	12		3

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

Editorially Modified

**Question Source Comments:** PAM NRC exam 6/98. Times modified.

**Question: Independent Verification**

Motor-operated valve (MOV) 2CV175, Rapid Borate Stop Valve, is being closed as part of a tagging operation.

In accordance with NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0005, STATION OPERATING PRACTICES, which one of the following describes the correct method for performing independent position verification for this valve?

- a. Check local valve stem position
- b. After power is removed, attempt to manually close the valve
- c. Check the bezel position lights after removing electrical power from the motor operator
- d. Prior to removing power, have the verifier attempt to close the valve from the control room

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    **B**    **Cognitive Level**    **Memory**  
**Record Number:** 5    **RO Number:** 2    **SRO Number:** 4  
**Tier:** Generic Knowledge and Abilities    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

GENERIC

2.1 Conduct of Operations

2.1.29 Knowledge of how to conduct and verify valve lineups.

3.4 3.3

**Explanation:** a. - Correct. The valve stem position indication is checked locally. b. - For a MOV, the valve is NOT normally operated by handwheel for closure (prevent binding). c. - There will be no indication after power is removed; d. - This just verifies that the same operation was performed.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
STATION OPERATING PRACTICES	NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0005(Q)	Attach 6, 2.2	2	9	
CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS	0300-000.00S-CONDOP-00	II.J.3	25		10

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** Licensed power level

Which one of the following describes the requirements for maintaining the maximum allowable steady-state full power level in accordance with IOP-4 "Power Operations"?

- a. Average power may exceed 100% for a 12-hour shift, but at NO time shall it exceed 102%.
- b. Average power for a 12-hour shift shall be <101%. If it exceeds 102%, then power shall be reduced to ≤100% within the next hour.
- c. Power may exceed 100% for a short duration due to intentional or unintentional operator action but at NO time shall it exceed 102%. The average power for a 12-hour shift is to be ≤100%.
- d. Power may exceed 100% for a short duration due to load fluctuation but at NO time shall it exceed 102%. The average power for a 12-hour shift is to be ≤100%.

**Answer d**    **Exam Level**    **B**                    **Cognitive Level**    **Memory**  
**Record Number:** 6    **RO Number:** 3    **SRO Number:** 5  
**Tier:** Generic Knowledge and Abilities                    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

Conduct of Operations

2.1.10 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.

2.7 3.9

**Explanation:** The average power level over a 12-hour shift should not exceed 100%. Intentional power excursions greater than 100 % are not allowed. These guidelines are applicable to unintentional power excursions and are reportable if exceeded: 1) Power excursions to 100.5% for up to one hour; 2) Power excursions to 101.0% for up to 30 minutes 3) Power excursions to 102.0% for up to 15 minutes. a. – NOT allowed to exceed 100% for the shift; b. – power cannot exceed 102%; c. – Intentional power excursions > 100% are NOT allowed; d. – correct answer, unintentional power level changes may occur up to 102% power within given time limits.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
IOP-4, POWER OPERATIONS	0300-000.00S-IOP004-01	II.C.6.b	12		2
S2>OP-IO.ZZ-0004, Power Operations, Precaution 3.7					

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** Responsibility in troubleshooting

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

- Abnormal Service Water system pressure indications have been observed
- The System Manager directs that troubleshooting be initiated in accordance with SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0008(Q), "Operations Troubleshooting And Evolutions Plan Development"

Which one of the following is a responsibility of the CRS prior to initiating troubleshooting activities?

- Approving the troubleshooting plan but only if it is evaluated by the system manager as a HIGH RISK or VERY HIGH RISK evolution
- Independent verification of the proper installation of test equipment specified by the maintenance supervisor and/or the system manager
- Approval of any system manager waiver of a 10CFR50.59 review requirement
- Determining the risk level for the troubleshooting evolution

**Answer d** Exam Level S Cognitive Level Application  
**Record Number: 7** RO Number: SRO Number: 6  
**Tier:** Generic Knowledge and Abilities RO Group: 1 SRO Group: 1  
GENERIC

2.2 Equipment Control

2.2.20 Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities.

2.2 3.3

**Explanation:** d.-Correct. CRS determines risk level for all troubleshooting plans; a.-System Manager reviews all plans at this risk level but does not assign risk level; b.-Independent verification is performed by qualified individuals. The CRS is not qualified to evaluate all installations; c.-A 10CFR50.59 review requirement cannot be waived.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
OPERATIONS TROUBLESHOOTING AND EVOLUTIONS PLAN DEVELOPMENT	SH.OP-AP.ZZ-0008(Q)	3.3.1	3	0	
CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS	0300-000.00S-CONDOP-00	III.A.3.b.3)	11		2
WORK CONTROL AND DCR PROCESS	0300-000.00S-WORK00-00				8

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New(jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** Out of Spec values

The control room readings are being logged by the NCO. The NCO has made a red circle around the reading for 1PI-936A, 11 Accumulator Pressure.

Which one of the following is indicated by the circled value?

- a. The indicator is fluctuating within the log limits but may be failing
- b. The reading must be independently verified by the Shift Technical Advisor (STA)
- c. The data falls outside the limits specified in the LCO statement
- d. Accumulator pressure has changed by  $>\pm 5\%$  since the previous reading but is still within specifications

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory  
**Record Number:** 8    **RO Number:** 4    **SRO Number:** 7  
**Tier:** Generic Knowledge and Abilities    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

GENERIC

2.2    Equipment Control

2.2.23    Ability to track limiting conditions for operations.

2.6    3.8

**Explanation:** c. Correct. Out of specification readings should be circled in red ink. a. – This is a maintenance issue and should be addressed via maintenance notification; b. – Independent verification of log readings is not required; d. – Readings could change by 5% and, while requiring investigation/explanation, still be within the band.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
OPERATIONS STANDARDS	SH.OP-DD.ZZ-0004 (Z)	5.4.4.D.	39	3	
SHIFT TURNOVER AND LOGKEEPING	0300-000.00S-TNOVER-01	V.B.6.e	20		8

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

Editorially Modified

**Question Source Comments:**    Braidwood 1999 NRC exam

**Question: Breaker re-closure**

Unit 1 is currently in hot shutdown (HSD), heating up to hot standby (HSB) when the RO attempts to open 11SJ54, SI Accumulator Stop Valve, in accordance with S1.OP-IO.ZZ-0002, CSD to HSB. The valve fails to stroke open and the NEO sent to investigate reports that the breaker is tripped.

Which one of the following describes the correct action for the crew?

- a. Unseat the valve manually then reset and re-close the breaker. Under these conditions, two more attempts to stroke the valve are permitted.
- b. Unseat the valve manually then reset and re-close the breaker. Under these conditions, one additional attempt to stroke the valve is permitted.
- c. Refer to technical specifications and initiate a Notification to have maintenance investigate the problem.
- d. Dispatch a NEO to open the valve manually. Then reset the breaker but red tag it open and inform the Shift Electrician of the valve operation problem.

**Answer c Exam Level B Cognitive Level Comprehension**

**Record Number: 9 RO Number: 5 SRO Number: 8**

**Tier: Generic Knowledge and Abilities RO Group: 1 SRO Group: 1**

GENERIC

2.2 Equipment Control

2.2.24 Ability to analyze the affect of maintenance activities on LCO status

2.6/3.8

**Explanation:** c. – Correct, no abnormal plant condition or situation exists; a – Three attempts is a misuse of the limitations for stroking a MOV in any one hour period; b. – is for conditions where an abnormal plant condition or situation exists; d – while the valve may ultimately be de-energized and opened, the procedure requires an AR (now a Notification).

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
PROTECTIVE CIRCUIT/BREAKER RESET AND RECLOSURE POLICY	SC.OP-DD.ZZ-0006(Z)	5.1.1.a	3	0	
MISCELLANEOUS DIRECTIVES	0300-000.00S-MISCOD-01	II.C.4	8-9		3

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: Fuel Movement**

Unit 2 has been shutdown for refueling in accordance with the following schedule:

- 1/3/00, 0600 hours - Unit entered MODE 3
- 1/5/00, 2000 hours - Unit entered MODE 4
- 1/7/00, 1000 hours - Unit entered MODE 5
- 1/9/00, 1600 hours - Unit entered MODE 6

Which one of the following is the earliest date and time that spent fuel movement in the reactor vessel is permissible?

- a. 1/7/00, 1001 hours
- b. 1/10/00, 0601 hours
- c. 1/11/00, 1401 hours
- d. 1/14/00, 1001 hours

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    **B**                      **Cognitive Level**    **Application**  
**Record Number:** 10    **RO Number:** 6    **SRO Number:** 9  
**Tier:** Generic Knowledge and Abilities                      **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

GENERIC

2.2    Equipment Control

2.2.28    Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement procedures.

2.6    3.5

**Explanation:** b. – Correct. TS requires the reactor to be sub-critical for at least 168 hours (7 days); a. - Based on 100 hours (4 days + 4 hours) from MODE 4 entry. Several surveillances must be performed within 100 hours of fuel movement. and 100 hrs. is the old T.S. requirement; c.&d. – 100 and 168 hours from Mode 5 entry.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
COLD SHUTDOWN TO REFUELING	S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0007(Q)	5.1.9F		2C	
Salem Unit 2 Technical Specifications		LCO 3.9.3	3/4 9-3	131	
REFUELING SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-REFUEL-00	VIII.A.3	48		10, 12

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**



**Question: Radiation exposure limits for PSE (Emergency)**

Given the following information for an operator:

- Age is 47years
- Total lifetime exposure is 9200 mRem TEDE
- Current year exposure is 900 mRem TEDE

A Site Area Emergency has been declared due to a LOCA outside containment, with limited makeup to the RWST available. The operator volunteers to make an emergency entry into the penetration area to attempt to isolate the leak. This action would result in a significant reduction in offsite dose. The action has been properly approved.

Which one of the following is the maximum allowed exposure (TEDE) the operator may receive while performing this action?

- a. 2100 mRem TEDE.
- b. 3600 mRem TEDE.
- c. 24,100 mRem TEDE.
- d. 25,000 mRem TEDE.

**Answer d**    **Exam Level**    **B**                      **Cognitive Level**    **Application**  
**Record Number:** 12    **RO Number:** 8    **SRO Number:** 10  
**Tier:** Generic Knowledge and Abilities                      **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

2.3 Radiation Control

2.3.1 Knowledge of 10 CFR: 20 and related facility radiation control requirements.

2.6 3.0

**Explanation:** d. - correct, Emergency Exposure Limit for accident mitigation is 25 rem TEDE. This limit is for the event in progress. a. - PSE&G provides for normal routine administrative exposure control level of 3000 mRem TEDE/year. If the admin. limit is incorrectly applied, then 2100 mRem TEDE (3000 - 900) would take the NEO to his annual limit. b. - In the event of an emergency declaration of ALERT or higher, the annual limit is automatically extended to 4500 mRem, leaving 3600 mRem TEDE (4500 - 900) to reach the annual limit. c. - Incorrectly applying the current yearly exposure to the PSE limit gives 24,100 mRem (25, 000-900).

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0024, Radiation Protection Program	0300-000.00S-RADCON-01	IV.E.3.j	17	3	

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**



**Question: Radiation exposure and IV**

A procedure requires independent verification (IV) on a group of valves located inside a radiation area. The dose rate is 50 mR/hr and it is projected that the two operators will each have to spend 20 minutes in the area in order to perform the task.

In accordance with NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0005, STATION OPERATING PRACTICES, which one of the following describes the correct process for performing this IV?

- a. Two operators who have sufficient margin to perform the task and yet still remain below administrative dose limits shall be assigned to do a "hands on" IV
- b. The IV is not required if the Unit CRS and the WCC SRO verify that none of the valves have been re-positioned since the last IV
- c. Based on the ALARA concept, the Operations Superintendent has the authority to waive any IV requirement when entry into a defined radiation area is necessary to perform the task
- d. The "hands on IV" can be waived by the Unit CRS. However, an alternative means of IV via observation of process parameters/indications is required

Answer d Exam Level B Cognitive Level Application  
Record Number: 14 RO Number: 10 SRO Number: 12  
Tier: Generic Knowledge and Abilities RO Group: 1 SRO Group: 1

GENERIC

2.3 Radiation Control

2.3.10 Ability to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation and guard against personnel exposure. 2.9 3.3

**Explanation:** The threshold for not requiring "hands on IV" is 10 mR. d. – Correct, IV shall be accomplished by observation of process parameters, etc.; a. – 10 mR will be exceeded. "Hands on IV" should not be performed; b., c. – IV is not waived.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
STATION OPERATING PRACTICES	NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0005(Q)	Attach 6, 1.4	1	9	
CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS	0300-000.00S-CONDOP-00	III.J	24		10

**Material Required for Examination**

Question Source: New (jkl)

Question Modification Method:

Question Source Comments:

**Question: RO responsibilities**

A LOCA has occurred on Unit 2. The crew initiated a manual reactor trip/safety injection and has entered EOP-TRIP-1. RCS pressure is steadily trending down and has dropped below 1500 psig. While enroute to the control room, the shift technical advisor (STA) broke her leg and is unable to report for duty.

Which one of the following correctly identifies both the position responsible for monitoring the continuous action summaries (CAS) and when 2CV139 and 2CV140 can be closed?

- a. Reactor Operator (RO) and Plant Operator (PO) monitor and report parameter values as the CAS's are read by the CRS, when each EOP page is turned. The valves can be closed any time after the functional restoration procedure implementation step (20) in EOP-TRIP-1.
- b. RO and PO monitor parameters associated with the CAS's. The valves can be closed any time after the immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1 have been verified.
- c. RO monitors parameters associated with the CAS's. The valves can be closed any time after the functional restoration procedure implementation Step (20) in EOP-TRIP-1.
- d. RO and PO monitor and report values when the CAS's are read by the CRS, at page 2 of EOP-TRIP-1 and at each procedure transition. The valves can be closed any time after the immediate actions of EOP-TRIP-1 have been verified.

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    R    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 15    **RO Number:** 11    **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Generic Knowledge and Abilities    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

GENERIC

2.4    Emergency Procedures / Plan

2.4.13    Knowledge of crew roles and responsibilities during EOP flowchart use.

3.3    3.9

**Explanation:** b. – Correct; a – Former practice; c. – Incorrect implementation point; d. – CAS's are not read by CRS.

**Reference Title**

**Facility Reference Number**    **Section**

**Page**

**Revision L. O.**

Use of Procedures, SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0102

Sect. 5.3.5.f

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** EOP/AB implementation

The operating crew entered S2.OP-AB.CA-0001 (AB.CA-1), Loss of Control Air, when control air (CA) pressure lower. Short-term corrective actions have been unsuccessful and CA pressure has now reached the point where a reactor trip is required.

Which one of the following correctly describes the continued use of AB.CA-1 after the RO has initiated a reactor trip?

- a. This AB shall be implemented in parallel with the EOP's
- b. The AB is terminated as soon as EOP-TRIP-1 is entered
- c. The AB is terminated as soon as EOP-TRIP-1 is entered. Entry conditions are re-evaluated after the EOP is exited
- d. The CRS can suspend the EOP's and re-enter this AB if the low air pressure prevents the performance of EOP steps

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    **B**                      **Cognitive Level**    **Application**  
**Record Number:** 16    **RO Number:** 12    **SRO Number:** 13  
**Tier:** Generic Knowledge and Abilities                      **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1  
**GENERIC**

2.4    Emergency Procedures / Plan

2.4.16    Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures.                      3.0    4.0

**Explanation:** a. – Correct. AB.CA-1 requires a reactor trip, enter TRIP-1 and continue with this procedure, specifically. In addition, AP.ZZ-0102 "Use of Procedures" provides for the continuation of AB's after the EOP's are entered if there are sufficient resources available; b. – The AB is not terminated; c – There are no actions in the EOP's that will correct this problem; d. – AB is performed in parallel with EOP's but are not replacements.

Reference Title/Facility	Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
USE OF PROCEDURES	S2.OP-AB.CA-0001, Loss of Control Air	SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0102(Q)	5.3.12.C; E.2	19-20	7
USE AND CONTROL OF PROCEDURES		0300-000.00S-PROCED-02	III.E.14.c & e.2	28-29	3

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New(jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: Loss of AC path**

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

- A LOCA has occurred
- Safety Injection is actuated
- Actions of 2-EOP-TRIP-1, "REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION" were initiated
- When the main turbine tripped, all AC power was lost for the Site
- The crew has initiated actions of 2-EOP-LOPA-1, "LOSS OF ALL AC POWER"
- The crew notes the following for the Critical Safety Function Status Trees:
  - (a) PURPLE path condition exists for the Core Cooling Status Tree
  - (b) RED path condition exists for the Containment Environment Status Tree

Which one of the following is the correct action for these conditions?

- a. Continue the actions of 2-EOP-LOPA-1 "LOSS OF ALL AC POWER"
- b. Transition to 2-EOP-LOPA-3 "LOSS OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY/SI REQUIRED"
- c. Transition to 2-EOP-FRCE-1, "RESPONSE TO EXCESSIVE CONTAINMENT PRESSURE"
- d. Transition to 2-EOP-FRCC-2, "RESPONSE TO DEGRADED CORE COOLING"

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    **B**                      **Cognitive Level**    **Comprehension**

**Record Number:** 17    **RO Number:** 13    **SRO Number:** 14

**Tier:** Generic Knowledge and Abilities

**RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

GENERIC

2.4    Emergency Procedures / Plan

2.4.21    Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions including: 1.                      3.7    4.3  
Reactivity control; 2. Core cooling and heat removal; 3. Reactor coolant system integrity; 4. Containment conditions; 5. Radioactivity release control.

**Explanation:** a. – Correct. During a loss of all AC power, the Critical Safety Functions are monitored for information only. The availability of at least one train of safeguards AC power is assumed on entry into the Function Restoration procedures. b. – This is a recovery procedure which may be implemented after power is restored c. - If AC power had not been lost and transition had been made from TRIP-1, or if power had been restored and the appropriate actions of LOPA-1 completed, then transition to the highest-ranked Critical Safety Function, the RED path on Containment Environment. d. - When evaluating and choosing appropriate Critical Safety function actions, the (highest-ranked) RED path is addressed first, and once these actions are completed, then the PURPLE Path is considered.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
LOSS OF ALL AC POWER	2-EOP-LOPA-1	Step 1 NOTE	1	22	
EOP-LOPA-1, 2, 3; LOSS OF ALL AC POWER AND RECOVERY	0300-000.00S-LOPA00-02	4.3.1	29		7, 8
USE AND CONTROL OF PROCEDURES	0300-000.00S-PROCED-02	III.E.14	28-30		

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

Editorially Modified

**Question Source Comments:** Prairie Island 1998 NRC RO Exam.

**Question: Use of ECG**

Unit 2 is at 100% power when a loss of all overhead annunciators occurs for greater than 15 minutes. The Emergency Coordinator, in this case the Operations Superintendent, properly classified the problem as an UNUSUAL EVENT (UE) and provided the Initial Contact Message Form to the Primary Communicator. However, before the Primary Communicator makes any of the "within 15 minute notifications", the problem is corrected and the annunciators are restored.

Which one of the following describes the correct course of action for the Emergency Coordinator?

- a. Complete the actions for declaration of a UE and then terminate IAW the proper attachments
- b. Complete the actions for declaration of a UE and then issue a retraction IAW the ECG
- c. Make a 4 Hour Report in accordance with ECG Sect. 11.10 "Voluntary Notifications"
- d. Make a 1 Hour Report in accordance with ECG Sect. 11.6 "After the Fact"

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    S                      **Cognitive Level**    Application  
**Record Number:** 18    **RO Number:**                      **SRO Number:** 15  
**Tier:** Generic Knowledge and Abilities                      **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1  
**GENERIC**

2.4 Emergency Procedures / Plan

2.4.30 Knowledge of which events related to system operations/status should be reported to outside agencies. 2.2 3.6

**Explanation:** a. – Correct. The EAL has been exceeded, regardless of the current status; b. – retractions are for incorrect/improper reports; c. – This category is for voluntary/courtesy reports not clearly meeting existing EAL's or RAL's; d. – After the Fact reports are for events that are not ongoing but a report should have been made when it was discovered or ongoing.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
Event Classification Guide	SGS ECG	Applicable Sections			
Lesson Plan	ON SHIFT EMERGENCY RESPONSE,	Obj. 1.0			

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: Loss of Annunciator**

The operating crew entered S2.OP-AB.ANN-0001, Loss of Overhead Annunciators, when it was noted that the system stopped updating. In the process of implementing the procedure, operators are directed to perform the following:

2 PERFORM System Lamp Test and VERIFY at least two of the following occur:

- OHA Window A-9, alarms or reflashes
- OHA CRT displays 11 logic error alarms or reflashes
- OHA local printer cabinet, ANN115-2, displays incoming alarms

Which one of the following correctly describes the reason for performing that step?

- Any 2/3 of those verifies that the system is not operable and the 15 minute clock for the ECG call should be initiated
- Any 2/3 of those verifies that the system is operable and capable of actuating on a valid alarm but frequency is initiated
- Any 2/3 of those verifies that SER B is in command. The system is degraded but capable of displaying on the CRT and printer but will not actuate an audible alarm
- Identifies the specific source of the OHA problem to expedite reset or bypass of the proper component. If annunciators have been inoperable for >15 minutes

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    S                      **Cognitive Level**    Memory  
**Record Number:** 19    **RO Number:**                      **SRO Number:** 16  
**Tier:** Generic Knowledge and Abilities                      **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1  
GENERIC

2.4 Emergency Procedures / Plan

2.4.32 Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators.

3.3 3.5

**Explanation:** b – Correct, per AB.ANN-1 Basis; a. – Reciprocal of b.; c – SER operation is indicated by the status of the LED's; part of the diagnoses for the operator to determine if the system will actuate, not to isolate the problem.

Reference Title/Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
OVERHEAD ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM S2.OP-AB.ANN-0001, Basis section	0300-000.00S-OHA000-00	IX.C.1	33	14

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** Emergency on one unit

Given the following conditions:

- A Unit 1 reactor startup is in progress with Control Bank A presently being withdrawn
- The third NCO has started 12 SI Pump to refill 11 SI Accumulator due a low level alarm
- Reactor Engineering is using the fuel handling crane bridge to verify serial numbers for several spent fuel assemblies in Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool
- Unit 2 is at 100% power
- Unit 3 is running and is synchronized to the grid for peak load support

In accordance with SC.OP-DD.ZZ-0039, OPERATING WITH AN EMERGENCY ON OPPOSITE UNIT, which one of the following actions is required if Unit 2 experiences a reactor trip/safety injection and an ALERT is declared by the Operations Superintendent?

- a. Unload and shutdown Unit 3.
- b. Insert all control rods on Unit 1.
- c. Dispatch a NEO to evacuate all personnel from Unit 1 FHB and disable the bridge.
- d. Secure the lineup to fill 11 SI Accumulator and stop the 12 SI Pump.

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    S                      **Cognitive Level**    Memory  
**Record Number:** 20    **RO Number:**                      **SRO Number:** 17  
**Tier:** Generic Knowledge and Abilities                      **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

GENERIC

2.4    Emergency Procedures / Plan

2.4.38    Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan, including (if required) supporting or acting    2.2    4.0

**Explanation:** b. – Correct. When an emergency event of ALERT or higher is declared on a unit and the unaffected unit is being started up and the turbine is not synchronized to the grid, return the unit to Hot Standby with all control rod banks fully inserted. a. - Operation of Unit 3 is NOT addressed, by the procedure. c. - Fuel handling operations are addressed, but only to determine whether fuel movement should be continued. Specific actions address fuel movement only. d. - Specific unaffected unit system operations are NOT addressed. Operations required to meet Technical Specification LCOs should continue.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
OPERATING WITH AN EMERGENCY ON OPPOSITE UNIT	SC.OP-DD.ZZ-0039(Z)	5.8	3	2	
MISCELLANEOUS DIRECTIVES	0300-000.00S-MISCOD-01	III.B.4.f	7		2

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Significantly Modified

**Question Source Comments:** CGroup NRC Q97. Alter to change correct answer. Conditions, including accident event, modified.



**Question:** Rod Control Mode selection

When a dropped rod in Control Bank D is being recovered, the CBD position is selected on the Rod Bank Selector Switch (RBSS).

Which one of the following correctly describes a reason for that switch position selection?

- a. Using the CBD position prevents actuation of an URGENT FAILURE alarm during the rod withdrawal
- b. Using the CBD position ensures the Bank Overlap Unit is not tracking the affected rod motion while withdrawal is in progress
- c. Using the MANUAL position would require operators to open the lift coil disconnects for the non-affected rods in all control banks
- d. Using the MANUAL position would result in dropping all the rods in the opposite Control Bank D group

**Answer b** Exam Level R Cognitive Level Memory

**Record Number:** 22 **RO Number:** 14 **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Plant Systems **RO Group:** 1 **SRO Group:** 1

001 Control Rod Drive System

K4. Knowledge of CRDS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

K4.02 Control rod mode select control (movement control)

3.8 3.8

**Explanation:** b. - Correct, When Individual Bank positions are used, the Bank Overlap Unit is bypassed (GO pulses are not counted); a. - An URGENT FAILURE alarm still actuates from the opposite group; c.&d. - An URGENT FAILURE comes in from the opposite group and rod motion would be inhibited in MANUAL.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
Rod Control and Position Indication Systems	RODS00-00	IV.B.8.f.7)	39		7d
S2.OP-AB.ROD-0002, Dropped Rod Basis Document					

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** Improper rod worth curve use

The Unit 2 reactor is at BOL and was manually tripped due to a feedwater problem. An Estimated Critical Position (ECP) calculation has been performed and boron concentration was adjusted for a critical rod height of Control Bank D at 128 steps. However, when determining control bank worth, personnel performing the ECP incorrectly used the EOL HZP Integral Rod Worth Curve instead of the BOL HZP Curve.

Which one of the following correctly describes this how error affects critical rod height?

- a. Criticality would occur below the rod insertion limit (C-58 steps).
- b. Criticality would occur below the +/-300 pcm administrative limit but above the rod insertion limit.
- c. Criticality would occur above the +/-300 pcm administrative limit.
- d. Criticality cannot be achieved on rods alone.

Answer: **d**  
 Exam Level: B Cognitive Level: Comprehension  
 Record Number: 23 RO Number: 15 SRO Number: 19

Tier: Plant Systems RO Group: 1 SRO Group: 1  
 001 Control Rod Drive System

K5. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CRDS:

K5.05 Interpretation of rod worth curves, including proper curve to use: all rods in (ARI), all rods out (ARO), hot zero power (HZP), hot full power (HFP) 3.5 3.9

**Explanation:** This improper curve use introduces an approx. 600 pcm error. Since the rods appear to be worth more, operators will maintain the boron concentration at a higher value and the actual reactivity addition during rod withdrawal is less. d. – Correct. There is insufficient reactivity left @D-128 on the BOL-HZP Curve to overcome the error; a. – This error is in the opposite direction but a curve reading error (C-30 instead of D-30) makes it a valid distractor; b. – This the reciprocal of the correct answer; c. – This is an error in reading from the EOL HZP to the EOL HFP Curves.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
ESTIMATED CRITICAL POSITION	0300-000.00S-ECP000-00	I.C.1; II.B.9; IV.C.1.b	10; 14;20-21		2
ESTIMATED CRITICAL POSITION	S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0001(Q)	Attachment 1, 5.1 & 6	10-11	6	
FIGURES	S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0012(Q)	Figure 4	8	38	

**Material Required for Examination** Rod Worth curve - S2.RE-RA.ZZ-0012(Q), Figure 4

**Question Source:** Previous 2 NRC Exams

**Question Modification Method:** Significantly modified (jkl).  
 Changed rod position, curve reading error, choices a. and d.

**Question Source Comments:** DGroup

**Question: Th RTD failure**

Which one of the following will cause the Rod Control System to insert control rods at 72 steps per minute?

- a. T-hot wide range RTD shorted.
- b. T-cold wide range RTD is open.
- c. T-hot narrow range RTD is open.
- d. T-cold narrow range RTD is shorted.

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    R    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension  
**Record Number:** 24    **RO Number:** 16    **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

002    Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

A1. Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the RCS controls including:

A1.08    RCS average temperature    3.7    3.8

**Explanation:** c. Correct - An open RTD will be seen as maximum resistance & therefore maximum temperature. Tavg will fail high causing Rod Control to insert rods. a&b. - Tavg uses narrow range RTD for Rod Control input. d. - A shorted RTD will be seen as minimum resistance & therefore minimum temperature. Tave will decrease, but since Rod Control uses auctioneered HIGH Tave, this will have NO effect on rod motion.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
Instrument Failure	0300-000.00S-ICFAIL-00	III.B.1.d.1)a)	12		1

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: Evaluation of RCS leak**

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

- Reactor power is 75%
- A leak rate surveillance indicates the following:
  - Total RCS leakage rate is 5.2 gpm
  - Leakage to PRT is 2.0 gpm
  - Leakage to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank is 1.3 gpm
  - Total primary to secondary leakage is 0.08 gpm

Which one, if any, of the following Technical Specification leakage limits has been exceeded?

- a. Identified
- b. Unidentified
- c. Primary to Secondary
- d. Pressure Boundary

**Answer b** Exam Level S Cognitive Level Comprehension

Record Number: 25 RO Number: SRO Number: 20

Tier: Plant Systems RO Group: 2 SRO Group: 2

002 Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RCS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

A2.01 Loss of coolant inventory 4.3 4.4

**Explanation:** b. - Correct, Unidentified leakage is TOTAL-IDENTIFIED. Identified leakage includes PRT & S/Gs. RCDDT is considered unidentified. Unidentified leakage is  $(5.2 - (2.0+0.08)) = 3.12$  gpm. The leakage limits are: Identified - 10 gpm, Unidentified - 1 gpm, each S/G - 500 gpd & total S/G - 1gpm. Therefore, Unidentified leakage limit is exceeded. a. - Identified leakage is 2.08 gpm. c. - S/G leakage is 0.08 gpm and 115.2 gpd. d. - None of this would be pressure boundary leakage.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
Salem Unit 2 Technical Specifications		3.4.7.2	3/4 4-17	159	
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM WATER INVENTORY BALANCE	S2.OP-ST.RC-0008(Q)	Attach 3	1-3	16	

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: RVLIS**

A loss of coolant accident has occurred. The RVLIS Summary Display Page is displaying dynamic range. During a cooldown and depressurization, void content indication remains constant at 80%.

Which one of the following describes actual void content response during the cooldown and depressurization?

- a. Actual void content decreased due to change in density as pressure and temperature decreased.
- b. Actual void content increased due to change in density as pressure and temperature decreased.
- c. Actual void content remained constant; indicated void content is compensated using pressure and temperature signals.
- d. Actual void content remained constant; differential pressure is an accurate indication of void content.

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 26    **RO Number:** 17    **SRO Number:** 21

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

002    Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

K1. Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCS and the following:

K1.07    Reactor vessel level indication system    3.5    3.7

**Explanation:** c. - Correct, Hot leg temp and wide range press are used for density compensation in all ranges. a&b. - Indication will be constant due to compensation from temp and press. d. - dP is not accurate w/o density compensation.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-RVLIS0-00	IV.B.8	22		4

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** Seal return alignment basis

RCS pressure is 50 psig, VCT pressure is 18 psig.

Which one of the following describes both the proper alignment of and the basis for the RCP seal injection/seal return alignment?

- a. All No. 1 Seal return valves are closed to prevent VCT water from backflushing through the seals.
- b. Seal injection is isolated to prevent excessive seal leakoff flow.
- c. Seal leakoff is fully open to prevent boric acid from crystallizing and accumulating on the seal surfaces.
- d. Seal injection is isolated to prevent VCT water from backfilling the RCS.

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    **B**                      **Cognitive Level**    **Memory**

**Record Number:** 27    **RO Number:** 18    **SRO Number:** 22

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

003                      Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

A4.    Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

A4.01    Seal injection

3.3    3.2

**Explanation:** a. - Correct, RCP seals are isolated when RCS is less than 100 psig.    b. - Excessive leakoff flow will not exist at this pressure.    c. - Boric acid plate out is not a problem under these conditions.    d. - Not a reason for isolating seal injection.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
RCP Operation	S1/S2.OP-SO.RC-0001	3.6	4	16	
RCP	0300-000.OOS-RCPUMP-01				12

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: RCP/RPS trips**

With reactor power at 30%, the power supply breaker to 24 RCP trips.

Which one of the following is correct concerning the plant response with NO operator action?

- a. The plant will continue at 30% power unless a SG water level trip setpoint is exceeded
- b. A reactor trip will occur on low RCS flow
- c. A SI will occur on high steam flow (from 21/22/23 SG's) coincident with LO-LO Tave or low steam pressure
- d. A reactor trip will occur on 1/4 RCP under voltage

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 28    **RO Number:** 19    **SRO Number:** 23

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

003    Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

K3. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the RCPS will have on the following:

K3.04    RPS

3.9    4.2

**Explanation:** a. - Correct, Power is less than P-8 (36%) but there is a feedwater transient. b. - If power is < 36% but > 10% power, TWO RCPs must trip to automatically initiate a reactor trip. c. - The resultant increase in steam flow will still be below the SI setpoint and the coincidental setpoints will not be reached. d. - UV trips are sensed on the Group Bus, not the RCP breaker and two RCP breakers must open for a reactor trip, at this power.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
RCP	0300-000.00S-RCPUMP-01	V.C.3	37		9
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-RXPROT-00	V.A	33		12

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** Charging pump flow controller in MANUAL

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

- Reactor power is 50%
- Pressurizer level is at programmed level
- 22 Charging Pump is running
- The Master Flow Controller is in MANUAL
- Charging and letdown are balanced

Which one of the following describes the effect on the plant if the Master Flow Controller is maintained in MANUAL as power is raised to 100%?

- a. Pressurizer level will rise.
- b. Pressurizer level will remain the same.
- c. VCT level will lower.
- d. An eventual reactor trip on low pressure when the pressurizer goes empty

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    **B**    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 29    **RO Number:** 20    **SRO Number:** 24

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

004    Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

A3.    Ability to monitor automatic operations of the CVCS including:

A3.10    PZR level and pressure

3.9    3.9

**Explanation:** a. – Correct. Pressurizer level will rise due to the decrease in RCS density as the temperature increases and the equivalent volumetric increase of the water in the RCS. b. – It cannot remain the same w/o flow adjustments. c&d. - VCT level and charging flow would not be affected by manual operation without changes in other parameters such as letdown or RCS pressure

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
CVCS	0300-000.00S-CVCS00-01	V.B.2.z.2	87		4

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** Letdown temperature/pressure control

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

- Reactor power is 50%
- The operating 21 Charging Pump has tripped
- No operator action is taken

Which one of the following will occur?

- a. Letdown isolation valves, CV2 & CV277, will immediately CLOSE.
- b. Charging flow control valve, CV55, will fully CLOSE until 22 Charging Pump is started
- c. Letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature control valve, CC71, will OPEN.
- d. Letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature control valve, CC71, and Letdown pressure control valve, will both close.

**Answer d**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Application

**Record Number:** 30    **RO Number:** 21    **SRO Number:** 25

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

004    Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

K1. Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CVCS and the following:

K1.18    CCWS    2.9    3.2

**Explanation:** d. – Correct. With all charging pump breakers open, the letdown orifice isol (CV-3/4/5) will shut. When this occurs, pressure and flow will decay in the letdown line causing both valves to close and attempt to raise pressure and temperature. a. - No signal is present to close these valves. However, the orifice isol will close. b. – CV55 is not interlocked with the charging pumps. c - With letdown isolated, temperature in the letdown line will begin to lower. CC-71 will go closed, reducing CC flow through the HX in response to the temperature drop. This is a likely choice (Reg. HX outlet temp. rising) for those not recognizing that letdown isolates.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-CVCS00-01	IV.4.B.5 & C.10.e	34, 36	4	

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**



**Question:** VCT suction valve ops

Which one of the following would occur if SJ1, Charging Suction from RWST, failed at the 75% open position when a safety injection signal was received?

- a. Gas binding in the charging pumps when the VCT empties
- b. Lower than expected boron concentration in ECCS due to dilution from VCT makeup
- c. No effect, both CV40&41 close, isolating the VCT
- d. Backflow from the RWST to the VCT to the in-service CVC HUT, reducing the available inventory to inject into the reactor vessel.

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 32    **RO Number:** 23    **SRO Number:** 27

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

006    Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

K1.    Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ECCS and the following:

K1.08    CVCS    3.6    3.9

**Explanation:** c. Correct - Either SJ-1 or SJ-2 may be OPEN for the normal suction from CV-40/41 to CLOSE.  
a,b & d. - CV-40/41 will go closed because SJ-2 will open.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
CVCS	0300-000.00S-CVCS00-01	IV.C.18	41		6

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: ESF setpoints**

Which one of the following correctly identifies the setpoints and coincidences for the low RCS pressure automatic safety injection signal and the associated automatic unblock?

- a.  $2/4 \leq 1765; 3/4 \geq 1915$
- b.  $2/3 \leq 1765; 1/3 \geq 1915$
- c.  $2/4 \leq 1765; 2/4 \geq 1915$
- d.  $2/3 \leq 1765; 2/3 \geq 1915$

**Answer d**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 33    **RO Number:** 24    **SRO Number:** 28

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

006    Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

K4. Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

K4.05    Autostart of HPI/LPI/SIP.

4.3    4.4

**Explanation:** d. – Correct, both auto SI and unblock are 2/3; a., b., c. – One or more choices with the incorrect coincidence.

Reference Title	Facility	Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
ESF			0300-000.00S-ESF000-00	VII.B.1	50	21
Operator Fluency Manual						
Logic Diagram		221055				

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** Inputs to PRT

Unit 2 was at 100% power when an automatic reactor trip and safety injection occurred. All systems responded per design.

Which one of the following correctly describes the flow path for RCP seal leakoff?

- a. All #2 Seals become film-riding seals and discharge to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank, via the standpipe
- b. A relief valve in the seal return line lifts and discharges to the PRT
- c. A relief valve in the seal return line lifts and discharges to the Containment Trench
- d. A relief valve in the seal return line lifts and discharges upstream of the Seal Water Heat Exchanger

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 34    **RO Number:** 25    **SRO Number:** 29

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 3    **SRO Group:** 3

007    Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS)

K1. Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PRTS and the following:

K1.03    RCS    3.0    3.2

**Explanation:** b. – Correct, per system drawing; a – A seal return path still exists through the relief valve. #2 Seals will not become film-riding; c. – By a recent design change, many “discharges to the PRT” have been re-routed to the containment trench; d. – This would be a bypass around the Phase A isolation valves.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
PRESSURIZER AND PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK P&ID 205328, Sheet 3	0300-000.00S-PZRPRT-01	IV.B.8.	26-28		3,4

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** SEC operations for CCW

Given the following:

- 21 and 22 CCW Pumps are running
- 23 CCW is selected to AUTO

Which one of the following would cause 22 CCW Pump STOP push button to start flashing?

- A SEC MODE III actuation and the pump breaker failed to close.
- 28 VDC power swapped to the alternate source
- 125 VDC control power for the pump breaker has failed.
- A SEC MODE II actuation and the pump breaker failed to close.

**Answer d** Exam Level R Cognitive Level Comprehension

**Record Number:** 35 **RO Number:** 26 **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Plant Systems **RO Group:** 3 **SRO Group:** 3

008 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

A3. Ability to monitor automatic operations of the CCWS including:

A3.08 Automatic actions associated with the CCWS that occur as a result of a safety injection signal 3.6 3.7

**Explanation:** d. – Correct. In MODE II there is a start signal and the breaker failed to close. a. – There is no CCW start signal in Mode III. b.&c – Loss of 28 or 125VDC will not cause a flashing light.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
COMPONENT COOLING WATER	0300-000.00S-CCW000-02	V.A.1.f.4).b)	34		8

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** PZR master pressure controller operation

The following plant conditions exist:

- The reactor is at 100% power
- All Pressurizer heaters are OFF
- Both pressurizer spray valves are MODULATING
- Pressurizer PORVs are CLOSED

Which one of the following RCS pressures is appropriate for the stated conditions?

- a. 2215 psig
- b. 2223 psig
- c. 2272 psig
- d. 2340 psig

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    R    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 36    **RO Number:** 27    **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

010    Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)

A1.    Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the PZR PCS controls including:

A1.07    RCS pressure    3.7    3.7

**Explanation:** c. - Correct, Spray valves begin to modulate at 2260 psig. a. - Backup htrs should be ON. b. - Proportional heaters are on when < 2250 psig and B/U heaters off >2220 psig. d. - Spray valves are full open at 2310 psig.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL Control	0300-000.00S-PZRP&L-01	IV.B.1.I-k.	22-24		4

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: S/G Feed pump trip and PZR pressure**

Given the following for Unit 2:

- Reactor power is 85%
- A S/G Feed Pump trips

Which one of the following describes the expected initial response of the Pressurizer Pressure Control System during this event?

- a. Pressurizer spray valves will modulate open to reduce pressure to normal.
- b. The proportional heaters and the backup heaters turn full on to raise pressure to normal.
- c. Pressurizer heaters de-energize at the -5% level deviation setpoint
- d. The PORVs open and maintain pressure below the high reactor trip setpoint.

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 37    **RO Number:** 28    **SRO Number:** 30

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

010    Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)

A3.    Ability to monitor automatic operations of the PZR PCS including:

A3.02    PZR pressure    3.6    3.5

**Explanation:** c. - During a runback, Pzr level is expected to rise due to heatup of the RCS. This compresses the Pzr bubble, raising Pzr pressure. a. - Reciprocal of BUH response on a +5% deviation b. - Proportional heaters will remain off as pressure remains high. The backup heaters may energize in this instance if the Pzr level insurge exceeds the level setpoint by 5%. d. - Transient is well within the design capabilities of the pressure control system.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
N FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE SYSTEM NORMALITY	0300-000.00S-ABCN01-00				4B
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL CONTROL	0300-000.00S-PZRP&L-01	III.B	15		2

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** PZR pressure control channel fails high

The following conditions exist:

- The reactor is at 100% power
- The controlling Pressurizer Level Channel fails HIGH

Which one of the following will be the result from this failure if no operator action is taken?

- a. Actual Pressurizer level will start rising due to MAXIMUM charging flow and the reactor will trip on HIGH Pressurizer level.
- b. Actual Pressurizer level will lower due to reduced charging flow and the reactor will trip on LOW Pressurizer pressure.
- c. Actual Pressurizer level will initially lower, then rise until the reactor trips on HIGH Pressurizer level.
- d. Actual Pressurizer level will initially rise until PORVs open, then lower due to loss of RCS inventory until the reactor trips on LOW Pressurizer pressure.

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Application

**Record Number:** 38    **RO Number:** 29    **SRO Number:** 31

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

011    Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS)

A1.    Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the PZR LCS controls including:

A1.02    Charging and letdown flows    3.3    3.5

**Explanation:** c. - Correct, Charging flow will drop to minimum, level initially decreases, until letdown isolates. With charging flow at minimum, level will then slowly rise to the high level reactor trip. a. - Level will not increase until letdown isolation occurs. b. - Reactor will not trip on low pressure, heaters will remain available except for the short time when Pzr level is at its lowest (heater cutout). d. - Level will not initially increase nor are PORVs expected to open.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL CONTROL	0300-000.00S-PZRP&L-01	IX.B.2.b	41		6

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** PZR heater power supplies and interlocks

Given the following plant conditions:

- Unit 1 is at 100% power
- All major controls are in AUTO
- PZR HTR 11 Backup Heater (BUH) Group is powered from the 1C 460V Vital Bus in accordance with SO.PZR-0010 for a test
- PZR HTR 12 BUH Group is powered from the normal source and selected to AUTO
- The controlling pressurizer level (PL) channel just failed low. No action has been taken

Which one of the following correctly describes BUH response and PZR operability if a SGFP trip re-directs actions for the failed PZR level channel are not completed in a timely manner?

- 12 BUH Group is de-energized until an operable PL channel is selected for control. The PZR is operable. 11 BUH Group remains energized and 12 BUH Group is capable of being powered from the emergency supply.
- 12 BUH Group is de-energized until an operable PL channel is selected for control. 11 BUH Group remains energized but the PZR is inoperable because there is <150 KW of heater capacity currently available from the 11 BUH Group.
- 12 BUH Group de-energized when the level channel failed low but will re-energize on high level deviation. 11 BUH Group remains energized. The PZR is operable since both groups can be powered from the emergency supply.
- 12 BUH Group de-energized when the level channel failed low but will re-energize on high level deviation. 11 BUH Group remained energized but the PZR is inoperable because there is <150 KW of 11 BUH Group capacity available when so aligned.

**Answer a** Exam Level S Cognitive Level Application

**Record Number:** 39 **RO Number:** SRO Number: 32

**Area:** Plant Systems **RO Group:** 2 **SRO Group:** 2

011 Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS)

K6. Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PZR LCS:

K6.03 Relationship between PZR level and PZR heater control circuit

2.9 3.3

**Explanation:** a. – Correct. 12 BUH Group cannot be energized with the selected control channel failed low. TS requires two heaters each with 150 KW capacity and capable of being powered from the emergency source; b. – 12 BUH Group is still being supplied from the emergency source; c&d. – 12 BUH Group will not re-energize because the failed channel controller that develops the deviation signal.

Reference Title/Facility	Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL CONTROL	0300-000.00S-PZRP&L-01	IV.B.1.j		22	4, 9
PRESSURIZER BACKUP HEATERS POWER SUPPLY TRANSFER	S1.OP-SO.PZR-0010(Q)	CAUTION 2, 5.1		4	4

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New(jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: PZR level master controller fail**

The unit is at 100% power with 21 Charging Pump running and 2CV55, Charging Flow Control Valve, in AUTO when the controlling pressurizer level channel fails. The RO has placed the Charging Flow Master Controller in MANUAL in accordance with alarm response procedures.

Which one of the following correctly describes what will happen if the RO misunderstands an order and lowers Flow Demand to ZERO?

- a. All charging flow will be through the RCP seals
- b. Charging header flow lowers to zero but the miniflow valves open to maintain cooling flow through the pump
- c. 2CV55 will close to the minimum stop position
- d. 2CV55 will fully close then shift to MANUAL and go to the minimum stop position

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    R    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 40    **RO Number:** 30    **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

011    Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS)

K6.    Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PZR LCS:

K6.04    Operation of PZR level controllers

3.1    3.1

**Explanation:** c. – Correct. Master controller will drive 2CV55 closed but it will stop at the electrical stop setpoint; a. – The majority but not all flow will go to the RCP seals; b. – There is a minimum open position on 2CV55, unless removed by I&C; d. – The valve will not fully close and will only shift to MANUAL on operator action.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL CONTROL	0300-000.00S-PZRP&L-01	IX.B.2.a.		42	8
INSTRUMENT FAILURE REVIEW	0300-000.00S-ICFAIL-00	VI.C.1		27	4
	Applicable Logic Diagrams				

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**



**Question: SEC inoperability**

The circuit breaker (2CVIB9) providing 115VAC power to the 2C Safeguards Equipment Control (SEC) cabinet removed for replacement.

Which one of the following correctly describes the actions necessary to operate 22 SI Pump (SIP) if a valid start is initiated with a concurrent loss of off-site AC power (Blackout)?

- a. Manually start 22 SIP
- b. Block 2C SEC at RP-1 and then manually start 22 SIP
- c. Close 2C EDG breaker and then manually start 22 SIP
- d. Start 2C EDG, close 2C EDG breaker, and then manually start 22 SIP

**Answer d**    **Exam Level**    S    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension  
**Record Number:** 42    **RO Number:**    **SRO Number:** 34

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1  
013    Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the ESFAS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct and mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

A2.04    Loss of instrument bus    3.6    4.2

**Explanation:** d. – Correct. 2C SEC cannot function with that breaker removed; a. – 22 SIP is powered from 2C Vital Bus; b.&c. inoperable, the associated EDG will not start

Reference Title/Facility	Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-ECCS00-00,	IV.C.4, IV.D.2	28-29	5, 7	

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New(jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: CS actuation**

Given the following conditions:

- A LOCA has occurred inside containment
- All busses are supplied from off-site power and all SEC's are reset
- Containment pressure has just exceeded the Hi-Hi Containment pressure setpoint

Which one of the choices correctly completes the following statement?

The Containment Spray (CS) pumps . . .

- a. will start automatically and the CS valves will align automatically.
- b. must be started manually and the CS valves must be manually aligned.
- c. will start automatically but the CS valves must be manually aligned.
- d. must be started manually but the CS valves will align automatically.

**Answer d** Exam Level R Cognitive Level Memory

Record Number: 43 RO Number: 32 SRO Number:

Tier: Plant Systems RO Group: 1 SRO Group: 1

013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

A3. Ability to monitor automatic operations of the ESFAS including:

A3.02 Operation of actuated equipment

4.1 4.2

**Explanation:** d. - Correct, Pumps will not start because the SEC is reset but the valves will re-align from SSPS. a. - With SEC reset the pumps will not start automatically. b. Pump can be manually started, however the valves auto align at > 15 psig regardless of SEC status c. - Reciprocal of correct answer.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT CONTROL SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-SEC000-01	IV.C.5.g.2)b)	19		4,9

**Material Required for Examination**

Question Source: New

Question Modification Method:

Question Source Comments:

**Question:** CS actuation interlock

Which one of the following "isolations" occurs in coincidence with a MANUAL Containment Spray actuation?

- a. Steamline
- b. Feedwater
- c. Containment Phase A
- d. Containment Ventilation

**Answer d**    **Exam Level**    R    **Cognitive Level**    Memory  
**Record Number:** 44    **RO Number:** 33    **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

013    Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

A4.    Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

A4.03    ESFAS initiation

4.5    4.7

**Explanation:** d. - Correct, CNMT Ventilation Isolation will result if CS/Phase B is manually actuated. a. - Steamline Isolation occurs from the CNMT pressure channel inputs which will also initiate an automatic CS signal. b. - Feedwater Isolation is associated with SI signal. c. - CNMT Phase A Isolation occurs either manually or coincident with SI.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
RPS Logic Diagram	221057 B 9545	Sh. 8		17	
CONTAINMENT AND CONTAINMENT SUPPORT SYSTEMS	0300-000.00S-CONTMT-01	II.C.11.d.1).c)	33		9b

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: ESF status**

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- Mode 3 with RCS cooldown and depressurization underway in accordance with procedures
- RCS pressure is 1900 psig
- RCS temperature is 525°F
- When a Main Steam Safety Valve on the 23 S/G fails open resulting in the following S/G pressures : 820 psig (21); 780 psig (22); 700 psig (23); 810 psig (24)

Which one of the following correctly describes the status of the ESF actuation system for the stated conditions?

- No ESF signal has been generated.
- Only a Safety Injection signal has been generated.
- Only a Main Steam Line Isolation signal has been generated.
- A Safety Injection signal and a Main Steam Line Isolation signal have been generated.

**Answer b** Exam Level R Cognitive Level Comprehension

**Record Number:** 45 **RO Number:** 34 **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Plant Systems **RO Group:** 1 **SRO Group:** 1

013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

K4.03 Main Steam Isolation System

3.9 4.4

**Explanation:** b. - Correct, A SI signal is generated for Steam Line High Differential Pressure when the setpoint of 100 psid is reached. a. - A SI has actuated to Steamline ΔP. c. - The Steam Line Isolation is NOT generated because High Steam Flow coincident with low steam header pressure is well above the required setpoint of 600 psig. d. - There is no Steamline Isolation on a Steamline ΔP SI.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
INTRODUCTION TO ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES AND DESIGN CRITERIA	0300-000.00S-ESF000-01	VII.B.1.b & c	50		21
RPS - Steam Generator Trip Signals Logic	221056 B 9545	sh. 7	7		
RPS - Safeguards Actuation Signals	221057 B 9545	sh. 8	17		

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:** pamexam

**Question: P-A Converter failure**

Unit 2 is operating at 100% power, with all systems in automatic when annunciator alarms "ROD INSERT LMT LO" (E8) and "ROD INSERT LMT LO-LO" (E16) activate. The plant is stable (no rod motion, no power changes, etc.)

Which one of the following correctly explains the cause of these alarms?

- a. 22 RCS loop Tavg signal has failed low
- b. A RCS Thot RTD has failed high
- c. The P-A Converter has failed
- d. Power has been lost to the IRPI's

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 46    **RO Number:** 35    **SRO Number:** 35

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 1

014    Rod Position Indication System (RPIS)

A1.    Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the RPIS controls including:

A1.02    Control rod position indication on control room panels    3.2    3.6

**Explanation:** c. – Correct. P-A Converter failure would cause the alarms and a zero input to the recorder; a. - (Auct. High) Tavg input to the P-A converter is not used; b. – This failure would not change the RIL; d. – The IRPI's do not feed the OHA's.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
ROD CONTROL AND POSITION INDICATION SYSTEMS	0300-000.00S-RODS00-00	IV.B.13.f.4)d)	46		4.d,6.k

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: P-6 permissive**

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

- Reactor startup is in progress
- No manual blocks have been inserted
- Intermediate Channel N35 indicates 2E-10
- Intermediate Channel N36 indicates 9E-11
- Power is lost to Source Range Channel N31

Which one of the following describes the reactor response to the conditions above?

- a. A reactor trip signal is generated resulting in a reactor trip
- b. A reactor trip signal is generated but no trip occurs since one channel is above P-6
- c. No reactor trip signal is generated since the channel has failed low
- d. No reactor trip signal is generated until N36 indicates greater than 1E-10.

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    R    **Cognitive Level**    Application

**Record Number:** 47    **RO Number:** 36    **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

015    Nuclear Instrumentation System

K3. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Nuclear Instrumentation System will have on the following:

K3.01    RPS    3.9    4.3

**Explanation:** a. – Correct. No manual blocks have been inserted. The associated bistable trips, setting up the 1/2 SR High Flux. Trip b. - Must be manually blocked. c. – Indication fails low but the bistable trips. d. – This is the opposite of how it works.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
Excure NI	0300-00.00S-EXCORE-00	IV.C.3.j.2)	27		10

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: Calorimetric error**

During performance of S2.RE-ST.ZZ-0001(Q) "Calorimetric Calculation", the feedwater temperature points utilized were reading 10°F lower than actual feedwater temperature. Power range NI's were adjusted in accordance with the directions of the calorimetric procedure.

Which one of the following correctly describes the effect of the NIS adjustment?

- a. Indicated power is less than actual power; therefore, power range instruments are set conservatively.
- b. Indicated power is less than actual power; therefore, power range instruments are set non-conservatively.
- c. Indicated power is greater than actual power; therefore, power range instruments are set conservatively.
- d. Indicated power is greater than actual power; therefore, power range instruments are set non-conservatively.

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    R    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 48    **RO Number:** 37    **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Plant Systems

**RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

015    Nuclear Instrumentation System

K5. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Nuclear Instrumentation System:

K5.04 Factors affecting accuracy and reliability of calorimetric calibrations 2.6 3.1

**Explanation:** For the calibration, the relationship between primary and secondary power are determined by the calculations:  $Q_{sec} = m (h_s - h_f) - m h_s (SGBD)$  and  $Q_{prim} = Q_{core} - Q_{RCPs}$ . At equilibrium  $Q_{prim} = Q_{sec}$ . c. - Correct. With actual FW temperature lower than that used in calculation, then  $h_f$  used is lower and a higher power level than actual is calculated. Therefore, the NI's were set at a higher than actual value. Since trip setpoints do NOT change, the reactor would trip with actual power less than the trip setpoint, which is conservative. a. - Indicated power is higher than actual power. b. - Indicated power is higher than actual power and the instruments are set conservatively. d. - Since the trip would occur with actual power less than that required by the analysis, the instruments are set conservatively.

Reference Title	Page	Revision	L. O.	Facility Reference Number	Section
EXCORE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM			0300-000.00S-EXCORE-00	X.A.1    78	14

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Significantly Modified

**Question Source Comments:** Changed conditions such that CONSERVATIVE readings exists, which changed correct answer.

**Question: PT-505 OOS/SGFP Trip**

Unit 2 is at 100% power with a Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel (PT-505) properly removed from serv

Which one of the following correctly describes the required crew action if 22 SGFP trips?

- a. Enter AB.CN-1, verify the immediate actions, and terminate the runback by placing turbine control in T MANUAL when power reaches 60-65%
- b. Enter AB.CN-1, verify the immediate actions, and stabilize the plant after the automatic runback is con
- c. Trip the reactor and then enter EOP-TRIP-1
- d. Trip the turbine and then enter EOP-TRIP-1

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    S    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension  
**Record Number:** 49    **RO Number:**    **SRO Number:** 36

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2  
016    Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System (NNIS)

A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the NNIS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

A2.01    Detector failure    3.0    3.1

**Explanation:** c. – Correct. With a Turbine First Stage Pressure Channel OOS, the direction is to trip the reactor because a desi the ADFWCS causes the runback to be continuous; a.&b. – AB.CN-1 directs a reactor trip; d. – This presents a challenge to the RPS.

Reference Title/Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
S2.OP-AB.CN-0001, Procedure and Basis Document				
300-000.00S-ABCN01, Obj. 3				

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New(jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: POPS**

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

- Reactor cooldown and depressurization is in progress
- Pzr PORV block valves PR-6 and PR-7 are closed in accordance with TSAS 3.4.5, due to seat leakage past the PORVs PR-1 and PR-2
- RCS pressure is being maintained at 800 psig due to problems isolating the SI accumulators
- RCS temperature drops to 305°F.

Which one of the following correctly describes the outcome if the operator arms the Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System (POPS) under these conditions?

PR-6 and PR-7 would . . .

- a. OPEN; PR-1 and PR-2 would remain CLOSED.
- b. OPEN; PR-1 and PR-2 would OPEN.
- c. remain CLOSED; PR-1 and PR-2 would remain CLOSED.
- d. remain CLOSED; PR-1 and PR-2 would OPEN.

**Answer b** Exam Level R Cognitive Level Comprehension

**Record Number:** 50 **RO Number:** 38 **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Plant Systems **RO Group:** 2 **SRO Group:** 2

016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System (NNIS)

K1. Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the NNIS and the following:

K1.01 RCS

3.4 3.4

**Explanation:** b. – Correct. To arm POPS the Key Control Switch is taken to ON (top switch). This sets the associated PORV (PR1, PR2) setpoint to 375 psig, opens the associated PORV block valves (PR6, PR7), and places associated PORV in AUTO. Since RCS pressure is above the POPS setpoint, PR-1 and PR-2 would open. a. - RCS pressure is above setpoint so PR1 and PR2 would open. c&d. - The act of arming sends an open signal to the PORV block valves.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control	0300-000.00S-PZRP&L-01	IV.B..1.c.3)	17		4, 9
Reactor Coolant System	0300-000.00S-RCS000-02	V.A.4.a.2)	28		9

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:** Cgroup

**Comment Type** Comment

**Question:** CET readings

A LOCA has occurred on Unit 1. The crew is in EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant. The RO notes that the reading on the Subcooling Margin Monitor (SCMM) is 16 °F lower than the last time he checked it but RCS temperature and pressure have not changed significantly.

Which one of the following correctly describes a reason for that change?

- a. The changing containment temperature is affecting the output signals from the in-core thermocouple reference junction box
- b. An in-core thermocouple has failed high
- c. Rising containment pressure is lowering RCS pressure detector output, pound for pound
- d. The SCMM automatically shifted to ADVERSE

**Answer d**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 51    **RO Number:** 39    **SRO Number:** 37

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

017    In-Core Temperature Monitor (ITM) System

A1. Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the ITM System controls including:

A1.01 Core exit temperature    3.7 3.9

**Explanation:** d. – Correct, the SCMM shifts automatically on containment pressure or radiation levels; a. – The system compensates for changes in the reference junction temperature; b. – One T/C failed high is discriminated out by the processor; c. – Containment pressure does not affect RCS pressure output and a pound for pound change would not result in a 16 degree change.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
Incore Instrument System	0300-000.00S-INCORE-00,	Objective 7			

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: SEC effect on CFCUs**

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

- A loss of offsite power has occurred
- 2A 4KV Bus de-energized on DIFF

Which one of the following correctly describes the status of the CFCUs?

- a. 3 CFCU's will be operating in SLOW speed
- b. 4 CFCU's will be operating in SLOW speed
- c. CFCU's running before the event will restart in the speed selected
- d. No CFCU's will be operating

**Answer d**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Application

**Record Number:** 53    **RO Number:** 41    **SRO Number:** 39

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

022    Containment Cooling System (CCS)

K2.    Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following:

K2.01    Containment cooling fans

3.0 3.1

**Explanation:** d.- Correct. In the event of "blackout" during normal operation, Breakers No. 1 and No. 2 are tripped by SEC and the CFCU must be manually restarted after the SEC is reset; a. – Choice if candidates believes two CFCU's are powered from 2A Bus; b. – Choice if candidate believes all available CFCU's start; c. – SEC trips both CFCU breakers.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
CONTAINMENT AND CONTAINMENT SUPPORT SYSTEMS	0300-000.00S-CONTMT-01	III.H.1.f.3)	71		4, 5

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: Manual actuation of CS**

A large break LOCA has occurred. The crew has transitioned to FRCE-1, Response to Excessive Containment Pressure, on a PURPLE Path. Prior to starting containment spray (CS) pumps, the procedure poses the question "Is EOP-LOCA-5 in effect?" If the answer is YES then the crew is directed to "Operate CS Pumps as directed by EOP-LOCA-5."

Which one of the following correctly describes the difference between operation of the CS Pumps in LOCA-5 as compared to FRCE-1?

- a. LOCA-5 stops both CS Pumps to allow evaluation of CFCU capability to control containment pressure. CS Pumps are re-started one-at-a-time, if needed. FRCE-1 starts both CS Pumps and runs all CFCU's in LOW speed
- b. LOCA-5 stops both CS Pumps if all five CFCU's are available to run in HIGH speed. FRCE-1 starts both CS Pumps and runs all CFCU's in LOW speed
- c. LOCA-5 runs only one CS Pump as long as containment pressure is <47 psig. FRCE-1 starts both CS Pumps, regardless of containment pressure
- d. LOCA-5 runs CS Pumps based on the combined status of RWST level, containment pressure and the number of operating CFCU's. FRCE-1 always starts both CS Pumps

**Answer d**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 54    **RO Number:** 42    **SRO Number:** 40

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 1

026    Containment Spray System (CSS)

A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the CSS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

2.03    Failure of ESF

4.1    4.4

**Explanation:** d – Correct. CS Pumps are run according to LOCA-5, Table C; a – CS Pumps are not stopped unless permitted by Table C or LO-LO RWST level; b – CFCU's are not run in HIGH speed in either procedure; c – If insufficient CFCU's are available then 2 CS Pumps are running, even though containment pressure may be <47 psig.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
EOP-LOCA-5, Table C					
EOP-FRCE-1					

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: CS pump start failure impact**

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- A large-break LOCA has occurred
- The Injection Phase of SI is in progress
- 22 Containment Spray Pump is unavailable

Which one of the following correctly describes the response to the above conditions?

- a. Safeguards Pumps will operate for a longer time with suction from the RWST before swapover to the containment sump.
- b. The higher pressure in containment will result in overpressurizing the RHR suction piping when swapover to the containment sump occurs.
- c. A portion of the 22 RHR pump discharge flow must be diverted to provide flow through the affected spray header.
- d. Water level in the containment sump will NOT be sufficient to supply all ECCS pumps when the alignment for cold leg recirculation is complete.

Answer a Exam Level R Cognitive Level Comprehension  
Record Number: 55 RO Number: 43 SRO Number:

Tier: Plant Systems RO Group: 2 SRO Group: 1  
026 Containment Spray System (CSS)

K1. Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CSS and the following:

K1.01 ECCS 4.2 4.2

**Explanation:** a. Correct. During the injection phase, the CS pumps take suction from the RWST and deliver borated water (mixed with sodium hydroxide) to the Containment atmosphere. Without this pump taking suction from the RWST, the inventory of the RWST will last longer. b. - With one CS pump operating in conjunction with CFCUs, the CNMT pressure will remain below 47 psig, which is well below the design pressure for RHR suction piping. c. - RHR is used to provide spray in the recirculation mode. d. - The inventory is the same. It just takes longer to get to the recirculation initiation setpoint.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-CSPRAY-01	IV.B.2.a.2)	18		3.b.iii
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-ECCS00-00	IV.A.4.a	20		4.a

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**



**Question: H2 Recombiner setting**

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- A large break LOCA has occurred
- Prior to the LOCA, containment temperature was 90°F
- Following the LOCA, containment pressure is 5 psig
- Containment temperature is currently 120°F
- The EOPs require that a Hydrogen Recombiner be placed in service

Which one of the following values will be set on the Hydrogen Recombiner potentiometer for the above conditions?

- a. 50.2 Kw
- b. 52.8 Kw
- c. 54.5 Kw
- d. 55.9 Kw

**Answer c** Exam Level B Cognitive Level Application

Record Number: 57 RO Number: 45 SRO Number: 42

Tier: Plant Systems RO Group: 3 SRO Group: 2

028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control System (HRPS)

A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the HRPS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

A2.01 Hydrogen recombinder power setting, determined by using plant data book 3.4 3.6

**Explanation:** c. – Correct. At 5 psig & 90°F, the Cp (correction factor) is approximately 1.24. Using Att 1, the calculated value is (1.24 x 44.00) = 54.5 Kw. a. - Approximates 3 psig on the 120°F curve. b. - Approximates 5 psig on the 120°F curve. d. - Approximates 5 psig on the 60°F curve.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
Hydrogen Recombiner Operation	S2.OP-SO.CAN-0001	Att1&2	1	3	
CONTAINMENT AND CONTAINMENT SUPPORT SYSTEMS	0300-000.00S-CONTMT-01	IX.I.1.b	122		4, 12

**Material Required for Examination** S2.OP-SO.CAN-0001,Hydrogen Recombiner Operation Attachments 1 & 2

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**





**Question:** Affect of steam dump steam press. setpoint change

While in Hot Standby awaiting reactor startup, an operator error causes the steam dump auto steam pressure setpoint to be reduced from 1005 psig to 940 psig.

Which one of the following is the resulting RCS Tavg maintained by the steam dumps?

- a. 536°F
- b. 539°F
- c. 543°F
- d. 547°F

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    R    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 60    **RO Number:** 48    **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

039    Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)

A2.    Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the MRSS and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

A2.04    Malfunctioning steam dump

3.4    3.7

**Explanation:** c. Correct - Temperature interlock auto closure of dumps at 543°F; a. - Possible error if interpolation of the Steam Tables is not done; b. - Temperature for saturation at 940 psig. d. - No-load Tave. for 1005 psig.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
Steam Dump	0300-000.00S-STDUMP-02	V.A.6.c	22		9e

**Material Required for Examination**    Steam Tables

**Question Source:** New

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: Steam Dump Failure**

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- Reactor power is 100%
- 2A 115 VAC Vital Bus power is lost

Which one of the following correctly describes the reason the operator is directed to shift the Steam Dump controller from TAVG to MS PRESS CONT?

- a. The steam dumps are armed. The steam dump valves will open due to the signal from the load rejection controller if Tavg exceeds Tref by 5°F.
- b. A steam dump demand signal is generated from the plant trip controller. If an arming signal is generated, the steam dump valves will open to the demanded position.
- c. A steam dump demand signal is generated from the load rejection controller. If an arming signal is generated, the steam dump valves will open to the demanded position.
- d. The steam dumps CANNOT be armed from the turbine first stage pressure signal. If ONE reactor trip breaker fails to open on a trip, the steam dumps would be inoperable in TAVG Mode.

**Answer c** Exam Level B Cognitive Level Comprehension

Record Number: 61 RO Number: 49 SRO Number: 44

Tier: Plant Systems RO Group: 3 SRO Group: 3

041 Steam Dump System (SDS) and Turbine Bypass Control

K3. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the SDS will have on the following:

K3.02 RCS

3.8 3.9

**Explanation:** c. Correct. First Stage Impulse Pressure Channel PT-505 is lost, generating a demand signal on the Load Rejection circuit. a. - No arming signal present since PT-506 provides arming signal for steam dumps and remains operable. b. - With trip breakers closed, demand signal is from Load Rejection Controller. When trip breakers open, demand is from Plant Trip Controller. d. - PT-506 provides the arming signal.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
STEAM DUMP SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-STDUMP-02	V.A.5.a), V.A.7.c	19, 226		9, 10
LOSS OF 2A, 2B, 2C AND 2D 115V VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS	0300-000.00S-AB1151-01	III.C.5	9		3
Steam Dump Logic	221059 B 9545				10

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:** Pamexam

**Question:** Stm dmp interlock on low vacuum

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- Turbine Trip has occurred from 20% Reactor Power
- Maintenance activities have resulted in a break in the condenser rupture disk
- Condenser Air Removal Pumps are unable to handle the in-leakage volume and condenser vacuum is at 19 inches of Hg
- Tavg is at 547°F
- All Circulating Water System Pumps are in service.

Which one of the following correctly describes the status of the Condenser Steam Dump System?

- a. The Load Rejection Controller will be modulating the steam dump valves
- b. Low condenser vacuum is blocking steam dump valve operation
- c. The Plant Trip Controller will be modulating the steam dump valves
- d. Tavg is blocking steam dump valve operation

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Application

**Record Number:** 62    **RO Number:** 50    **SRO Number:** 45

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

055    Condenser Air Removal System (CARS)

K3.    Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CARS will have on the following:

K3.05    SDS

2.3    2.6

**Explanation:** b. – Correct. Steam Dump operation is blocked when either the East or West condenser vacuum switches indicate vacuum is less than 20 inches of Hg. a. - The Load Rejection Controller would modulate if BLOCK was not present. c. – At this power, a turbine trip will not cause a reactor trip. d. - Tave block does not occur until Tave reaches 543°F.

<b>Reference Title</b>	<b>Facility Reference Number</b>	<b>Section</b>	<b>Page</b>	<b>Revision</b>	<b>L. O.</b>
STEAM DUMP SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-STDUMP-02	V.A.7.e	23		10

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Previous 2 NRC Exams

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:** CStar - #75





**Question:** Coordinated SGFP speed/FRV control

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- Reactor is at 100% power
- All BF19 and BF40 valves, and both feed pumps are in AUTO
- The operator places the feed pump MASTER controller in MANUAL and lowers the demand setting.

Which one of the following describes the result of this action?

Feed pump speed will lower resulting in . . .

- a. all BF19's closing down to maintain  $\Delta P$  and the resultant continuous lowering of S/G levels
- b. all BF19's opening further to maintain programmed S/G levels.
- c. a reduction in feed flow and a possible reactor trip on steam flow-feed flow mismatch in coincidence with a low steam generator level
- d. an ADFWCS alarm on LOW  $\Delta P$  and shifting of all BF19 and BF40 controllers to MANUAL

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    R    **Cognitive Level**    Application

**Record Number:** 65    **RO Number:** 52    **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

059    Main Feedwater (MFW) System

A3.    Ability to monitor automatic operations of the MFW System including:

A3.07    ICS

3.4    3.5

**Explanation:** b. - Correct, A SGFP speed lowers, feed flow and S/G levels will drop. The BF19s will open to maintain level.  
a. - SGFP speed is automatically controlled on BF19 DP. c. - This trip has been eliminated. d. - ADFWCS shifts controllers to MANUAL on various controller failures

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
ADVANCED DIGITAL FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-ADFWCS-00	II.B	15		8

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Changed a, c, d

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: FRV interlock reset**

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- The Unit tripped from 100% 4 hours ago
- Unit is in MODE 3 at normal operating pressure and temperature
- Level in 22 S/G rose to 72% due to misoperation of 22AF21, AFW Discharge Flow Control Valve
- Level has been restored to 35%

Which one of the following states the minimum actions necessary to perform stroke testing of the BF40s, FWRV Bypass valves?

- a. Cycle the reactor trip breakers
- b. Reset the Feedwater Interlock Signal
- c. Cycle the reactor trip breakers and then reset the Feedwater Interlock Signal
- d. Reset the Feedwater Isolation signal

**Answer c** Exam Level R Cognitive Level Comprehension

Record Number: 66 RO Number: 53 SRO Number:

Tier: Plant Systems RO Group: 1 SRO Group: 1

059 Main Feedwater (MFW) System

K4. Knowledge of MFW System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

K4.19 Automatic feedwater isolation of MFW

3.2 3.4

**Explanation:** With RCS temperature less than 554°F and P-4 present (reactor trip breakers open), the FWRV Bypass valves and the FWRVs are closed on Feedwater Interlock. Additionally when S/G level went above 67%, a FWI signal was generated. The generation of this signal cleared when S/G level was returned to normal. However, with the trip breakers open, either an SI signal or P-14 signal will seal in the closure signal to the FWRV Bypass and FWRVs. To clear this both the SI signal and the P-14 (if they exist) must be reset/blocked and/or clear AND the trip breakers must be cycled to clear the seal-in. c. - Correct, No SI is present. The P-14 has cleared but the FWI is sealed in by P-4. Also, the Feedwater Interlock is active. To move the FWRV Bypass valves, the reactor trip breakers must be cycled and then the Feedwater Interlock must be reset. a. - This action will not clear the FWI. It is all that is required following a "normal" reactor trip. b. - The trip breakers must be cycled. d. The Feedwater Isolation signal cleared when SG levels returned to normal.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number, Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
ADVANCED DIGITAL FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-ADFWCS-00 V.I.	37-38		10, 13a
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-RXPROT-00 VII.B.7	50		13
Feedwater Control & Isolation Logic	221062 B 9545	1	6	

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** AFW pump x-connect and runout protection

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- Unit is in Mode 3 with Tavg at 547°F
- The 23 AFW pump is NOT available
- The 21 AFW pump has been just stopped due to unusual motor noises
- The 22 AFW pump is running with normal parameters
- An operator has been dispatched to open 21AF923 and 22AF923 to allow cross-tie of the AFW headers from the motor-driven AFW pumps.

Assuming the CRS wants to maintain all SG levels within the normal operating band, which one of the choices correctly completes the following statement?

After the AF923 valves have been opened, the PO...

- a. only needs to throttle the AF21 valve to each SG.
- b. must depress the PRESS OVERRIDE DEFEAT for both AFW Pumps, then throttle the AF21 valve to each SG
- c. must depress the PRESS OVERRIDE DEFEAT for 22 AFW Pump, and then throttle the AF21 valve to each SG.
- d. must depress the PRESS OVERRIDE DEFEAT for 21 AFW Pump, and then throttle the AF21 valve to each SG

**Answer d**    **Exam Level**    R    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 67    **RO Number:** 54    **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

J61    Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System

A1.    Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the AFW System controls including:

A1.01    S/G level    3.9    4.2

**Explanation:** d. - Correct, Runout protection for the MD AFW pumps is provided by respective AF21 valve. With 21 AFW pump disch header pressure <1150 psig, the associated AF21 valves remain closed. Feeding the S/Gs when pump discharge is <1350 psig, the operator will depress PRESS OVERRIDE DEFEAT pushbutton to remove runout protection for the idle pump and allows operator control of AF21 valves. Since the headers are tied and 21 AFW Pump is not running, the operator must override 23 and 24AF21. a. - Must actuate PRESS OVRD DEFEAT to open 23& 24AF21. b. - PRESS OVRD DEFEAT only needed for valves associated with idle pump (21, 23 & 24AF21). c. - PRESS OVRD DEFEAT not required for valves associated with running pump (22, 21 & 22AF21).

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-AFW000-02	IV.B.3.g.2).d); IV.B.3.g.3).a)	27		4.h; 8.c

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:** Pamexam

Review Format  
NRC Submission

**Question: TDAFWP LOCAL control**

Unit 1 is at 100% power. 13 AFW Pump is in LOCAL with the control board LOCAL-MANUAL bezel pushbut illuminated while a technician tests the control circuit.

Which one of the following is a correct statement regarding the capability of the AFW system to provide design flow if a loss of all AC power occurs?

- a. The AFW system will provide the design flow requirement because the pump is still capable of manual REMOTE start
- b. The AFW system will provide the design flow requirement because the pump can be started locally or automatically after 2/3 levels on 2/4 SG's drop below the actuating setpoint
- c. The AFW system will not provide the design flow requirement unless the pump is started locally or the switch is returned to REMOTE and the PO depresses 13 AFW Pump START pushbutton
- d. The AFW system will not provide the design flow requirement unless the pump is started locally, or the switch is returned to REMOTE or the PO depresses the 13 AFW Pump LOCAL-MANUAL pushbutton pushes the START pushbutton

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    S    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 68    **RO Number:**    **SRO Number:** 48

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

061    Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System

A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the AFW System and (b) based on those predictions, use

A2.04    Pump failure or improper operation

**Explanation:** The purpose of the SDAFW Pump is to maintain the heat sink during a loss of all AC power.    3.4    3.8  
c. – Correct. With the switch in LOCAL, the pump cannot be started; a. With the switch in LOCAL, the pump cannot be started; b – All automatic starts are blocked; d. – the LOCAL-MANUAL PB is for alarm/indication only.

Reference Title/Facility	Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM		0300-000.00S-AFW000-02	IV.B.6.b.	31	8

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: MDAFW Pp local controls**

The unit is at 100% power. 22 AFW Pump is stopped but selected to LOCAL while a technician performs a circuit test.

Which one of the following correctly describes the status of 22 AFW Pump if 2B 4KV Vital Bus de-energizes when the transfer relay fails during a swap to the alternate SPT?

- a. 22 AFW Pump will not start when 2B SEC loads the EDG
- b. 22 AFW Pump will not start since 2B SEC will not actuate
- c. 22 AFW Pump will start when 2B SEC loads the EDG and the associated AF21 valves will stroke open after the pump discharge pressure interlock is satisfied
- d. 22 AFW Pump will start when 2B SEC loads the EDG but the associated AF21 valves will remain closed on pressure override due to lower SG pressure at HFP

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    R    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 69    **RO Number:** 55    **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

061    Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System

A3.    Ability to monitor automatic operations of the AFW System including:

A3.01    AFW startup and flows

4.2    4.2

**Explanation:** c. – Correct. 2B 4KV Bus will load onto the EDG in Mode II\*. MDAFW Pumps will start on SEC actuation, even when selected to LOCAL; a. – SEC starts are still functional; b. – SEC actuates in Mode II\*; d. – Pressure is sensed upstream of the associated AF21's.

<b>Reference Title</b>	<b>Facility Reference Number</b>	<b>Section</b>	<b>Page</b>	<b>Revision</b>	<b>L. O.</b>
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-AFW000-02	IV.B.4.c.6) a)(1)	31	6,9	

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** Electrical failure impact on CW/Stm Dump

Unit 2 is at 40% power. Operators had been raising power but a SW leak has developed on the MTLO Cooler. The following conditions exist:

- #23B Circulating Water (CW) Pump is OOS while electricians test the 4KV breaker, outside of the breaker
- The generator is synchronized to the grid
- Operators just tripped the turbine due to the SW leak on the MTLO Cooler
- Coincident with the turbine trip, the DIFF Relay on 2CW Bus Section 23 actuated

Which one of the following correctly describes the correct course of action for the control room crew?

- a. No action is required since 2CW Bus will swap to the alternate source
- b. Reduce power as necessary to maintain condenser vacuum above the steam dump interlock setpoint
- c. Reduce power to <5% to establish unit power generation within AFW capacity
- d. Immediately trip the reactor due to complete loss of steam dump capability

**Answer:** c    **Exam Level:** S    **Cognitive Level:** Comprehension

**Record Number:** 70    **RO Number:**    **SRO Number:** 49

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

062    A.C. Electrical Distribution System

A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the A.C. Electrical Distribution System and (b) based on those prediction procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:

A2.01 Types of loads that, if de-energized, would degrade or hinder plant operation    3.4    3.9

**Explanation:** The bus failure leaves 21B and 22B Circulators in service. c. – With <3 CW Pumps, AB.TURB requires a power reduction to AFW capability; a. – The bus “locks out” on a DIFF relay actuation; b. – Power is reduced in preparation for stopping the reactor to maintain steam dump capability; d. – With two circulators in service, 2/3 steam dump capacity remains.

**Reference Title/Facility Reference Number/Section/Page/Revision/L.O.**

Lesson Plan: Steam Dump    0300-000.00S-STMDMP, Obj. 10

Lesson Plan: 4160 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM    0300-000.00S-4KVAC0-01, Obj. 4.b, 6.d

Logic Diagram 221059

S2.OP-AB.TURB-0001 Procedure and Basis

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New(jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**



**Question: EDG voltage control**

The 2A Diesel Generator (EDG) is running and paralleled to the grid during a surveillance test.

Which one of the following correctly states the result of operating the EDG Voltage Control Switch in the manner described?

Positioning the VOLTAGE CONTROL switch...

- a. to LOWER raises generator amperage but has no effect on either real or reactive load.
- b. to LOWER has no effect because voltage control is automatic when the EDG is synchronized.
- c. to RAISE causes the generator to pick up a larger share of the real load.
- d. to RAISE causes the generator to pick up a larger share of the reactive load.

**Answer d** Exam Level R Cognitive Level Memory

Record Number: 72 RO Number: 57 SRO Number:

Tier: Plant Systems RO Group: 2 SRO Group: 2

064 Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System

A4. Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

A4.02 Adjustment of exciter voltage (using voltage control switch)

3.3 3.4

**Explanation:** d. – Correct. Operating the VOLTAGE CONTROL will affect reactive load. KVARs will rise when taken to RAISE. a. - Reactive load will change. b. – Voltage control is not automatic with the EDG synchronized. c. - Operation of VOLTAGE CONTROL does not affect generator real load.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS	0300-000.00S-EDG000-01	IV.B.11.c.6) & 9).b)	73-75	4,7	

**Material Required for Examination**

Question Source: New

Question Modification Method:

Question Source Comments:

**Question:** Isol of liquid rad waste

Which one of the following correctly describes TWO conditions that will independently cause automatic closure of 2WL51, Liquid Waste Discharge Valve?

- a. High discharge flow rate or high radiation sensed in the release header.
- b. High discharge flow rate or loss of power to RMS Channel R-18
- c. Loss of power to the flow recorder or loss of control air
- d. High radiation sensed in the release header or loss of 125 VDC control power to the valve.

**Answer d**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 73    **RO Number:** 58    **SRO Number:** 51

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

068    Liquid Radwaste System (LRS)

A4.    Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

A4.04    Automatic isolation

3.8    3.7

**Explanation:** d. - Correct, 2WL51 closes automatically on High rad in the discharge stream, loss of 125 VDC control power or 28 VDC control power, and loss of air to the valve . a. – There is no interlock on high flow rate since flow rate is specifically determined for each release. b. – See explanation for a. and WL51 closes on high radiation sensed by R-18, not power. c. – There is no interlock between the flow recorder and WL51.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-WASLIQ-01	V.B.3.b.5)	56		6e

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Significantly Modified (jkl)

**Question Source Comments:** Braidwood June 1999 NRC exam.



**Question: Waste Gas system pressure**

Which one of the following correctly states the basis for the inlet pressure limitation on WG41, Waste Gas Release Valve?

- a. Maintain pressure less than the maximum design pressure for the packing in WG41
- b. At higher pressures leaks may develop in the release line components, leading to an unmonitored release
- c. Maintain D/P across the valve less than design to ensure the valve can close automatically
- d. The calculated release flow rate could be exceeded at higher pressures

**Answer d**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 75    **RO Number:** 60    **SRO Number:** 52

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

071    Waste Gas Disposal System (WGDS)

A3.    Ability to monitor automatic operations of the Waste Gas Disposal System including:

A3.02    Pressure-regulating system for waste gas vent header    2.8    2.8

**Explanation:** d. - Correct, Pressure regulating valve 2WG38 is set to maintain a constant pressure upstream of 2WG41 so that a constant flow is maintained while discharging to the Plant Vent. a. - Pressure is maintained much lower than the design capabilities of the valve. b. - Pressure is not limited to prevent leaks. c. - D/P across the valve is very low, even if the procedural requirement is not maintained.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
RADIOACTIVE WASTE GAS SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-WASGAS-01	IV.B.3.f	25		4k
DISCHARGE OF 21 GAS DECAY TANK TO PLANT VENT	S2.OP-SO.WG-0008(Q)	3.7	3	18	

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Significantly Modified

**Question Source Comments:**







**Question: ECAC auto actions**

Due to concurrent problems with off-site power and the Station Air Compressors, control air header pressure is lowering on both units.

Which one of the following correctly describes the associated automatic actions for the conditions above?

- a. At 85 psig, #1 ECAC automatically starts to supply "A" Header and #2 ECAC automatically starts to supply "B" Header
- b. At 85 psig, #1 ECAC automatically starts to supply "B" Header and #2 ECAC automatically starts to supply "A" Header
- c. At 80 psig, #1 ECAC automatically starts to supply "A" Header and #2 ECAC automatically starts to supply "B" Header
- d. At 80 psig, #1 ECAC automatically starts to supply "B" Header and #2 ECAC automatically starts to supply "A" Header

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 79    **RO Number:** 63    **SRO Number:** 56

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

079    Station Air System (SAS)

K4.    Knowledge of SAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

K4.01    Cross-connect with IAS    2.9    3.2

**Explanation:** b. - Correct, Emergency Control Air Compressors (ECAC) start automatically when header pressure reaches 85 psig. #1 ECAC supplies the "B" Header, #2 ECAC supplies the "A" header. a. - #1 ECAC supplies the "B" Header, #2 ECAC supplies the "A" header. c&d. - Procedure directs the operators to trip the reactor if control air header pressure reaches 80 psig. The ECAC's start at 85 psig.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
Control Air System	0300-000.00S-CONAIR-00	V.B.1.f.1)	37		4, 9

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:** CGroup

**Question: EDG CO<sub>2</sub>**

Which one of the following correctly describes a difference in response for an AUTO as compared to a MANUAL actuation of the DG Area CO<sub>2</sub> system?

- a. AUTO CO<sub>2</sub> actuation is blocked on a SEC start
- b. MANUAL CO<sub>2</sub> actuation trips the associated, running EDG
- c. AUTO CO<sub>2</sub> actuation is blocked when the associated EDG is in LOCKOUT
- d. On a MANUAL actuation, there is no CO<sub>2</sub> discharge delay

**Answer d**    **Exam Level**    **B**                      **Cognitive Level**    **Memory** .  
**Record Number: 80**    **RO Number: 64**    **SRO Number: 57**

**Tier:** Plant Systems    **RO Group: 2**    **SRO Group: 2**

086                      Fire Protection System (FPS)

K4.    Knowledge of Fire Protection System design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

K4.06    CO2

3.0    3.3

**Explanation:** d. – Correct. When a CO<sub>2</sub> system actuates, the system performs a planned sequence of events as follows:  
1) First, a system timer is energized to start timing a predischage period; 2) Once the predischage period is timed out the CO<sub>2</sub> discharge starts. The CO<sub>2</sub> System may be discharged manually by using the operating lever installed on the electro-manual pilot operating cabinet. This method of operation bypasses the timer functions. a. - SEC will not block DG CO<sub>2</sub> actuation. b. - Neither auto nor manual CO<sub>2</sub> actuation will trip the DG, but it does trip DG Ventilation fans. c. - There are no interlocks between EDG switch positions and CO<sub>2</sub> actuation.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-FIRPRO-00	IV.B.2.p.15).g)	55, 58		4.c.v, 7.b & c
DIESEL GENERATOR AREA VENTILATION OPERATION	S2.OP-SO.DGV-0001(Q)	3.7	3	5	

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:** Pamexam

**Question:** Uncontrolled control rod withdrawal

Unit 2 is at 50% power with all major controls in AUTO.

Assuming no operator action, which one of the following failures presents the greatest challenge to fuel integ

- a. NIS Power Range Channel N-41 fails low
- b. RCS Loop 23 Thot RTD fails low
- c. RCS Loop 23 Tcold RTD fails high
- d. Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-505 fails high

**Answer d** Exam Level S Cognitive Level Application

**Record Number:** 81 **RO Number:** **SRO Number:** 58

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions **RO Group:** 2 **SRO Group:** 1

001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal

AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal:

AA2.05 Uncontrolled rod withdrawal, from available indications

4.4 4.6

**Explanation:** d. – Correct. AUTO Rod Control believes turbine power is much higher and a continuous rod withdrawal begins a motion since PRNIS signal is from auctioneered high; b. – No rod motion since Tave signal is from auctioneered h rod motion since Tave is failed high.

Reference Title/Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
CONTINUOUS ROD MOTION TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT	S2.OP-AB.ROD-0003(Q)	2.2	3	7
CONTINUOUS ROD MOTION	0300-000.00S-ABROD3-00	II.A.2.d	8	1, 4.A

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank **Question Modification Method:** Significantly Modified

**Question Source Comments:** Braidwood 6/7/99 NRC Exam, Q58. Modified conditions and distractor 'b'.

**Question:** Rod recovery alarms

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

- Reactor power - 25%
- Control rod 2D2 in Control Bank D has fully dropped.
- Recovery of the dropped rod is in progress per S2.OP-AB.ROD-0002(Q) "DROPPED ROD"
- All Disconnect Switches in Control Bank D are in DISCONNECT except for 2D2

Which one of the following describes an alarm that will actuate and the affect that alarm actuation will have on recovering the dropped control rod?

- a. A Non-Urgent Failure will actuate; rod recovery can proceed without additional operator action
- b. A Non-Urgent Failure will be received; rod recovery can proceed after depressing the ALARM RESET pushbutton on the console
- c. An Urgent Failure will actuate; rod recovery can proceed without additional operator action
- d. An Urgent Failure will actuate; rod recovery can proceed after depressing the ALARM RESET pushbutton on the console

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 82    **RO Number:** 65    **SRO Number:** 59

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 1  
003    Dropped Control Rod

AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the Dropped Control Rod and the following:

AK2.05 Control rod drive power supplies and logic circuits

2.5 2.8

**Explanation:** c. Correct – The alarm is from the opposite group not moving. With the RBSS selected to CBD, rod motion continues. a.&b. – A Non-Urgent Failure alarm does not actuate. d. – Rod motion continues because of the position of the RBSS.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
DROPPED ROD	S2.OP-AB.ROD-0002(Q)	3.33 & NOTE	5	5	
DROPPED ROD	0300-000.00S-ABROD2-00	II.C.1.d&e	8		4.A

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: Misaligned rod indication**

Unit 1 is at 100% power when a SGFP trip results in an automatic rapid power reduction.

Which one of the following correctly identifies an alarm actuation that would be indicative of a single immovable control rod?

- a. Auxiliary Annunciator "DELTA I/EXCEEDS TARGET BAND"
- b. OHA E-38, UPPER SECT DEV ABV 50% PWR
- c. OHA E-40, ROD BANK URGENT FAILURE
- d. TAVE/TREF DEV Console Alarm

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension  
**Record Number:** 83    **RO Number:** 66    **SRO Number:** 60

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1  
005    Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod

AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod:

AA2.01 Stuck or inoperable rod from in-core and ex-core NIS, in-core or loop temperature measurements    3.3    4.1

**Explanation:** b. – Correct. A single immovable rod affects quadrant power; a. – This alarm is indicative of bank motion/misalignment; c. – This should only be indicative of a rod bank problem; d. – The moving rods will still correct Tave/Tref deviations.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
IMMOVABLE/MISALIGNED CONTROL RODS TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT	S2.OP-AB.ROD-0001(Q)	3.5	5	6	
ROD POSITION INDICATION FAILURE TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT	S2.OP-AB.ROD-0004(Q)	2.2	2	5	
IMMOVABLE/MISALIGNED CONTROL ROD	0300-000.00S-ABROD1-01	II.D.1	11		3.A.4

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** RTB failure to open

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- An electronic failure and technician error caused a reactor trip/SI from 100% power
- Train A reactor trip breaker (RTB A) failed to open
- All control rods inserted

Which one of the following correctly describes the purpose of the EOP-TRIP-1, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFE INJECTION, steps for opening RTB A or the alternative path of having I&C install a P-4 jumper?

- To reset the high steam flow SI setpoint to the zero power value
- To allow a subsequent automatic SI signal to actuate the ESFAS on Train A
- To allow the operating crew to regain control of equipment
- To provide a lock in signal to ensure the Train A actuated containment isolation and feedwater isolation only be opened by deliberate action

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    S    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 84    **RO Number:**    **SRO Number:** 61

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2  
007    Reactor Trip

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to a reactor trip:

EA2.03 Reactor trip breaker position

4.2 4.4

**Explanation:** c. – Correct. The P-4 signal must be available for SI and then SEC reset; a. – While it does accomplish this on Train A already reset to the zero power value; b. – With the trip breaker closed Train A is setup for a SI actuation; d. – An alternative train closes these valves.

Reference Title/Facility Reference Number, Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
RPS - Safeguards Actuation Signals 221057	2-D	8	17
EOP-TRIP-2, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE 0300-000.00S-TRP002-02	3.3.6.1	14-15	2
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM 0300-000.00S-RXPROT-00	VII.B.6.b-d	50	10

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New(jkl)

**Question Modification Method:** Editorially Modified

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** SR response following Rx trip

Which one of the following is the expected Source Range indication following a reactor trip? (No operator action taken)

The Source range channels read approximately...

- a. 4000 cps at 10 minutes, post trip.
- b. 6000 cps at 20 minutes, post trip
- c. 0 cps at 30 minutes, post trip.
- d. 1000 cps at 40 minutes, post trip.

**Answer b** Exam Level R Cognitive Level Memory

**Record Number:** 85 **RO Number:** 67 **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions **RO Group:** 2 **SRO Group:** 2  
007 Reactor Trip

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the reactor trip:

EK1.05 Decay power as a function of time 3.3 3.8

**Explanation:** The SR instruments will automatically actuate when both IR Channels are less than 7E-11 Amps. From the normal "at power" IR level, this takes about 13-18 minutes with -80 second period (-1/3 dpm). b. - Correct, This is the approximate count rate on SR when it re-energizes 15 minutes following a trip. a. - Expected count rate is reasonable. However, the time for automatic SR reinstatement is premature. c. - The SR would be energized by this time and is expected to read about 100-500 cps. d. - The count rate is too high for the time following trip.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE	2-EOP-TRIP-2	22	4	23	
EXCORE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-EXCORE-00	IV.B, IV.D.2.h	22, 29-31		2, 7.c

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Editorially Modified

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** PORV leak indication

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- Reactor power is 87%
- Pzr pressure is 2235 psig
- Pzr PORV 2PR1 is leaking
- PRT pressure is 5 psig
- PORV discharge temperature has stabilized near 230°F

Considering each one individually, which one of the following directly causes PORV discharge temperature to rise?

- a. PRT pressure is allowed to rise to 10 psig
- b. PORV leak rate rises by 2 gpm
- c. Pzr vapor space temperature rises by 1°F
- d. The PRT rupture disk fails

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Application

**Record Number:** 86    **RO Number:** 68    **SRO Number:** 62

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2  
008    Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open)

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident:

AK3.02 Why PORV or code safety exit temperature is below RCS or PZR temperature    3.6 4.1

**Explanation:** The leaking PORV can be considered a isenthalpic process. The temperature downstream is based on the downstream pressure at the determined enthalpy for the Pzr pressure. a. - Correct, If PRT pressure rises, the saturation temperature of the PRT increases. Since both conditions result in saturated conditions temperature rises from 230°F to 235°F. b. - Increase in the leak rate does not significantly affect the throttling (isenthalpic) process. c. - Increase in Pzr temperature results in an increase in pressure. This results in a lower enthalpy for the steam. However, since pressure has not changed in the PRT, tailpipe temperature does NOT change. d. - Lowering PRT pressure lowers tailpipe temperature.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision L. O.
Steam Tables				
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE MALFUNCTION	0300-000-00S-ABPZR1-01	III.C.1	9	1, 3

**Material Required for Examination**    Steam Tables

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**    Direct From Source

**Question Source Comments:** Prairie Island 1996 NRC exam.

**Question: RCS pressure & temperature changes**

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- A Small Break LOCA has occurred
- All ECCS pumps are operating as designed
- Twenty minutes after the initial transient, the following conditions exist:
  - No RCPs running
  - Core Exit TCs read 580°F
  - Pzr level indicates 0%
  - RCS pressure is at 1310 psig
- The operators begin drawing more steam from all S/Gs and increase AFW flow to maintain level

Which one of the following describes how and why ECCS flow changes as a result of these operator actions?

- a. As the plant cools down, RCS pressure lowers and ECCS flow rises
- b. ECCS flow will not change until the pressurizer begins to refill, then ECCS flow will lower
- c. For this set of conditions, cooldown has no effect on ECCS flow. RCS pressure cannot change unless one or more ECCS pumps are stopped
- d. ECCS flow will not change because the SI and Charging Pumps all are operating at their maximum flow rate

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 87    **RO Number:** 69    **SRO Number:** 63

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2  
009    Small Break LOCA

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA:

EA2.01    Actions to be taken, based on RCS temperature and pressure, saturated and superheated    4.2    4.8

**Explanation:** No subcooling a.- Correct. Pzr pressure control is unavailable with 0% level. As the cooldown continues RCS temperature and pressure will fall. This will allow more flow from the ECCS pumps. b. – ECCS flow will change before the pressurizer refills. c. – In a saturated system, a temperature reduction affects pressure. This choice is more likely in a solid system. d. – Neither set of pumps is at their maximum flow rate.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
EOP-LOCA-2, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION	0300-000.00S-LOCA02-01	I.C.4; III.C.10.b	7, 23	1, 5	

**Material Required for Examination**    Steam Tables

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**    Editorially Modified

**Question Source Comments:**    SOQL0002.

**Question:** Hot Leg recirc basis

EOP-LOCA-1, Loss of Reactor Coolant, Step 28 reads "WAIT UNTIL 14 HOURS HAVE ELAPSED SINCE SI ACTUATION". The following arrow box reads "EOP-LOCA-4, TRANSFER TO HOT LEG RECIRCULATION".

Which one of the following correctly describes the basis for transitioning to EOP-LOCA-4 after 14 hours?

- a. Eliminate steam voids that may be hindering heat removal in the upper core
- b. Wash fission product particulates back into solution for processing in the CVCS demineralizers
- c. Preclude the potential for boron precipitation to hinder core cooling
- d. Cover the core above the hot leg elevation to establish natural circulation flow to the SG's

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 88    **RO Number:** 70    **SRO Number:** 64

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 1  
011    Large Break LOCA

EA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA:

EA1.11 Long-term cooling of core

4.2 4.2

**Explanation:** c. – Correct, per EOP-LOCA-4 Basis Document; a. – Steaming is a means of heat removal rather than a hindrance; b. – At this point, containment rather than processing waste is the concern; d. – SG's are not re-established as the heat sink.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT		2-EOP-LOCA-4, Basis Document			
EOP-LOCA-01, LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT AND LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT ANALYSIS		0300-000.00S-LOCA04, Objective 4			

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** Contmt. Sump indications for LBLOCA

Which one of the following correctly lists indications that are evaluated as possible sources of excessive inventory in the containment sump, per EOP-FRCE-2, Response to High Containment Sump Level?

- a. Fire Protection water flow, Demineralized Water Storage Tank, Primary Water Storage Tank
- b. Fire Protection water flow, Auxiliary Feedwater Storage Tank, Component Cooling Water Surge Tank
- c. CFCU SW flow, CVCS Volume Control Tank, Component Cooling Water Surge Tank
- d. CFCU SW flow, Demineralized Water Storage Tank, Boric Acid Storage Tank

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    R    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 89    **RO Number:** 71    **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 1

011    Large Break LOCA

2.1    Conduct Of Operations

2.1.31    Ability to locate control room switches, controls and indications and to determine that they are correctly reflecting the desired plant lineup.    4.2    3.9

**Explanation:** a. – Correct, per FRCE-2; b. – AFWST is incorrect; c. – VCT is incorrect; d. – BAST is incorrect

<b>Reference Title</b>	<b>Facility Reference Number</b>	<b>Section</b>	<b>Page</b>	<b>Revision</b>	<b>L. O.</b>
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EOP-FRCE-2, Response to Excessive Containment Sump Level					
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Lesson Plan 300-000.00S-FRCE00, Objective 5					
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**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: LOCA Continuous Action**

A LOCA has occurred on Unit 2. After stopping all ECCS pumps except 21 Charging Pump, the control room crew properly transitioned from EOP-TRIP-3, SI Termination to EOP-LOCA-2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization. The following conditions are observed:

- 21 Charging Pump running, drawing from the RWST
- Group Busses were lost during the automatic transfer
- RCS Subcooling is 20 °F
- RCS Pressure 1700 psig, slowly rising
- Pressurizer (PZR) Level 21%, slowly rising
- Containment Pressure 3 psig
- VCT Level is 19%

Which one of the following is the correct crew action if the leak rate begins to rise?

- a. If PZR level reaches  $\leq 19\%$  and RCS subcooling = 0 °F, then start ECCS Pumps as necessary to restore PZR level or subcooling
- b. If PZR level reaches  $\leq 19\%$  or RCS subcooling = 0 °F, then start ECCS Pumps as necessary to restore PZR level and subcooling
- c. If PZR level reaches  $\leq 11\%$  or RCS subcooling = 0 °F, then start ECCS Pumps as necessary to restore PZR level and subcooling
- d. If PZR level reaches  $\leq 11\%$  and RCS subcooling = 0 °F, then start ECCS Pumps as necessary to restore PZR level or subcooling

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    S    **Cognitive Level**    Application

**Record Number:** 90    **RO Number:**    **SRO Number:** 65

**Facility:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 1

011    Large Break LOCA

2.4    Emergency Procedures / Plan

2.4.49    Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls.    4.0    4.0

**Explanation:** c. – Correct. LOCA-2 CAS; a., b., d. – Combinations of either adverse values for non-adverse conditions or misplaced and/or statements.

**Reference Title**    **Facility Reference Number, Section**    **Page**    **Revision**    **L. O.**  
EOP-LOCA-2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, CAS  
Lesson Plan 300-000.00S-LOCA02, Obj. 4, 5

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question** Indication with #2 seal in control

The unit is at 100% power.

Which one of the following set of indications would occur if 21CV104, Seal Leakoff Isolation Valve, fails closed while operating at 100% power?

- a. #1 Seal D/P indicates low and PRT level is rising
- b. #1 Seal D/P indicates low and Seal Leakoff Flow is zero
- c. #1 Seal D/P indicates high and RCDT level is rising
- d. #1 Seal D/P indicates high and Seal Leakoff Flow is zero

**Answer b** Exam Level B Cognitive Level Comprehension

Record Number: 91 RO Number: 72 SRO Number: 66

Tier: Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions RO Group: 1 SRO Group: 1  
015 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Malfunctions

AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions and the following:

AK2.10 RCP indicators and controls

2.8 2.8

**Explanation:** b. Correct. Closure of the seal leakoff results in the following as the #2 seal becomes the full pressure drop boundary: #1 seal D/P goes to ZERO, seal leakoff flow goes to ZERO since line is isolated, #2 seal leakoff increases, Standpipe high level alarm may be expected as #2 seal leakoff flow increases (backs up into standpipe). a. - PRT level increase is expected only if a seal leakoff containment isolation valve (2CV116 or 2CV284) closes with CV104 valve open. c.&d. - D/P would NOT indicate high because the pressure drop is across #2 seal, not #1 seal.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMALITY TECHNICAL BASIS DOCUMENT	S2.OP-AB.RCP-0001(Q)	2.4.D	4	12	
CONTROL CONSOLE 2CC1	S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0011(Q)	Alarm 2-5, 3.1;	129	26	
REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMALITY	0300-000.00S-ABRCP1-0	VII.E.7.e-g, F.3	25-26, 28		4.B

**Material Required for Examination**

Question Source: NRC Exam Bank

Question Modification Method: Significantly Modified

Question Source Comments: Prairie Island 5/1999 NRC exam.

**Question: Makeup system failure**

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

- Reactor power is 65%
- Auto makeup initiated to the VCT
- Shortly after AUTO Makeup started, boric acid filter clogging caused the BORIC ACID FLOW DEVIATION console alarm actuate

Assuming no operator action, which one of the following correctly describes what will occur?

- a. Control rods will insert in AUTO to control Tave
- b. Reactor power will rise slightly and level off.
- c. The running Boric Acid Transfer Pump will trip
- d. VCT level will drop until charging suction swaps to the RWST.

**Answer d** Exam Level B Cognitive Level Comprehension

Record Number: 92 RO Number: 73 SRO Number: 67

Tier: Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions RO Group: 2 SRO Group: 2

022 Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup

AA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Makeup:

AA1.08 VCT level

3.4 3.3

**Explanation:** d. Correct. With the deviation alarm in for over 60 sec., a signal is sent to close 2CV185, Charging Suction Make-Up Stop Valve. This terminates makeup. a. - Assumes dilution only continues, but this is stopped when 2CV185 closes. b. - Power constant due to turbine load. Also dilution is stopped when 2CV185 closes. c. - No interlock to trip the BAT Pump.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
CONTROL CONSOLE 2CC2	S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0012(Q)	3-16	19	12	
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-CVCS00-01	V.B.2,v.2) & gg.2)	83, 103		4.d, 8

**Material Required for Examination**

Question Source: Other Facility

Question Modification Method:

Editorially Modified

Question Source Comments: Prairie Island exam bank

**Question:** Boric Acid Pump ops

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- Power is 90%
- A plant transient has occurred that results in Control Bank D rods inserting beyond their insertion limits
- The RO is in the process of initiating a rapid boration,
- One Boric Acid Transfer Pump (BATP) is running in FAST speed
- 2CV175, Rapid Borate Stop Valve is open
- Charging flow is 75 gpm on 2FI-128B

Which one of the following actions will significantly raise the RCS boration rate?

- a. Starting the second BATP in FAST speed.
- b. Closing 21/22CV160 Boric Acid Tank Recirc valves.
- c. Throttle further open 2CV71, Seal Pressure Control valve.
- d. Close 2V175 and align the Charging Pumps suction to the RWST

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 93    **RO Number:** 74    **SRO Number:** 68

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1  
024    Emergency Boration

AA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration:

AA1.20 Manual boration valve and indicators

3.2 3.3

**Explanation:** b. - Correct. Closing the recirculation valves forces more flow through the discharge line to the charging pump suction. This action is directed in the procedure. a. - Due to system limitations, boron addition rate is essentially same whether one or both Boric Acid Transfer Pumps are operating. c. This will increase charging flow to the RCS and reduce flow to the RCP seals. Adjusting CV71 just changes the direction of flow and has no effect on boration rate. d. - The flowpath from the RWST is an alternate rapid boration flowpath. However, the boration rate is lower because the RWST is at a lower boron concentration.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
RAPID BORATION	S2.OP-SO.CVC-0008(Q)	3.2, 5.1.5/6	2-3	2	
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-CVCS00-01	8.b & c	134-135		4.d, 12

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** Loss of RHR Alternate cooling

Given the following conditions:

- Plant in Mode 5
- Highest CET temperature is 190°F
- RCS pressure is 325 psig
- 21 RHR loop is in service, 22 RHR loop is out of service for repairs
- RCS is intact with 20% Pzr level indicated
- 21 RHR Pump experiences a seal failure and is isolated from the RCS

According to S2.OP-AB.RHR-0001(Q), LOSS OF RHR, which one of the following is the preferred method of core cooling if a RHR cannot be restored and RCS temperatures are rising?

- a. Natural or forced RCS flow while steaming intact S/Gs with a level of equal to or greater than 70% NR.
- b. Fill from RWST via one SI Pump and the Hot Leg Injection Isolation valves, and spill through the Pzr PORVs.
- c. Fill via RWST gravity flow through RHR and reflux cooling to any S/G with level equal to or greater than 70% NR.
- d. Fill from RWST via one charging pump and the BIT Isolation valves, and spill via both PORVs and Reactor Head Vent Solenoid Valves.

**Answer d** Exam Level B Cognitive Level Comprehension

Record Number: 94 RO Number: 75 SRO Number: 69

Tier: Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions RO Group: 2 SRO Group: 2  
025 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System:  
AK3.01 Shift to alternate flowpath 3.1 3.4

**Explanation:** d. Correct. With Core Exit TCs < 200°F, the preferred alternate path is Cold Leg Injection Feed & Bleed.  
a. - Natural or forced flow cooling via S/G is an allowed method but not preferred ( fails to minimize temperature rise). b. - Hot leg injection feed and bleed is a preferred path if CETs are greater than or equal to 200°F. c. - Reflux cooling is used only if RCS is depressurized & RCPs NOT available. (least limiting of temperature rise).

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
LOSS OF RHR	S2.OP-AB.RHR-0001(Q)	3.31, Attach 8	9, 1-3	9	
LOSS OF RHR	0300-000.00S-ABRHR1-01	III.D.7.a	16		3, 4.c

**Material Required for Examination**

Question Source: New

Question Modification Method:

Question Source Comments:

**Question: CCW leak**

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- A LOCA has occurred
- Actions of 2-EOP-LOCA-3 "TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION" have been completed
- Two CCW Pumps are running

Which one of the following correctly identifies a consequence resulting from a tube leak in the Seal Water Heat Exchanger?

- a. Both CCW Pumps will eventually trip on loss of NPSH.
- b. A high level alarm will actuate for the CCW Surge tank.
- c. The CCW Pump supplying the safety related header will eventually trip due to loss of NPSH.
- d. The CCW Pump supplying the non-safety related header will eventually trip due to loss of NPSH.

**Answer d** Exam Level B Cognitive Level Comprehension

Record Number: 95 RO Number: 76 SRO Number: 70

Tier: Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions RO Group: 1 SRO Group: 1  
026 Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW)

AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water:

AA2.02 The cause of possible CCW loss

2.9 3.6

**Explanation:** d. Correct. At the completion of EOP-LOCA-3, the CCW systems are aligned as independent loops with 22 CC loop supplying the non-safety loads. A leak in the Seal Water HX will allow CCW in-leakage to CVCS. The CCW Surge Tank internal baffle indicated level will prevent loss of suction (NPSH) to the 21 CCW Pump but the side from which 22 CC Pump takes suction from will fall and NPSH is lost. d. - Correct, 22 CCW Pump is supplying non-safety header a. - Only 22 CCW Pump affected to point where NPSH lost. b. - Leakage is in the opposite direction. c. - 21 CCW Pump will maintain adequate NPSH due to baffle in CCW Surge Tank.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
No. 2 Unit Component Cooling P&ID	205331		1 & 2	48, 35	
COMPONENT COOLING WATER	0300-000.00S-CCW000-02	IV.B.1.b.3) & 4)	19		3.c, 4.a
EOP-LOCA-03, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION	0300-000.00S-LOCA3-U2-00	IX.C.39	38-39		2

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Changed LTDN HX to Seal Water HX

**Question Source Comments:** Pam NRC 1998 re-exam.

**Question:** POPS input failure

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

- RCS Tave - 150°F
- RCS pressure - 280 psig

Which one of the following describes the response of the PORVs if PT-405 wide range loop pressure transmitter fails high?

- a. Only the PORV fed by that channel opens
- b. Both PORVs open because the coincidence is 1/2 with POPS armed.
- c. Neither PORV opens because the enabling signal from the other channel is NOT met
- d. Neither PORV opens because both open when 2/2 WR pressure channels are >setpoint

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    **B**                    **Cognitive Level**    **Memory**

**Record Number:** 96    **RO Number:** 77    **SRO Number:** 71

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions                    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 2

027                    Pressurizer Pressure Control (PZR PCS) Malfunction

AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions and the following:

AK2.03    Controllers and positioners

2.6    2.8

**Explanation:** b. - Correct, RCS loop 1 hot leg wide-range, PT-405, Channel I provides the pressure input for POPS operation of 2PR1. a. - The circuits have separate temperature & input channels with control 1/1 for each PORV. c. - There is no feed from the opposite channel. d. -Each pressure transmitter feeds a separate POPS channel.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL CONTROL	0300-000.00S-PZRP&L-01	IV.B.3, V.E.1	27, 34		4.1, 8

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: PZR level alarms**

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

- Turbine load is 19% and Rod Control is in AUTO
- Charging flow controller has failed high

Which one of the following identifies the approximate value for actual pressurizer level when OHA E-20, PZR HTR ON LVL HI, actuates?

- a. 28%
- b. 33%
- c. 55%
- d. 70%

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    **B**    **Cognitive Level**    **Application**

**Record Number:** 97    **RO Number:** 78    **SRO Number:** 72

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 3    **SRO Group:** 3

028    Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction

AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions:

AA2.01 PZR level indicators and alarms

3.4 3.6

**Explanation:** Controller will turn on heaters when level is 5% above the level setpoint. Level changes from 22% (22.3) at 0% power to 49.7% at 100% power. Level setpoint at 19% power is 27-28% (27.5). b. Correct. OHA E-20 comes in & heaters actuate at 28+5 = 33%. a. - Approx. level setpoint at 19% power. c. - 5% above the 100% setpoint. d. - Bezel alarm for Hi Pzr level actuates at 70%.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L.O.
OVERHEAD ANNUNCIATORS WINDOW E	S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0005(Q)	E-20	32	12	
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL CONTROL	0300-000.00S-PZRP&L-01	IV.B.2.c.1)	26		6.g, 9

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Significantly Modified

**Question Source Comments:** Wolf Creek 1993 NRC. Changed from temperature to power value. Changed power level.

**Question: FRSM actions for boration**

Which one of the following is a correct statement regarding operation of the charging pump(s) during the implementation of FRSM-1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation.

- a. A manual safety injection is initiated to start both centrifugal charging pumps and thereby ensure the maximum possible boron injection rate
- b. If RCS pressure exceeds 2335 psig then a second centrifugal charging pump is started to ensure the maximum possible boron injection rate
- c. Both charging pumps are placed in-service to provide the maximum possible charging flow and boron injection rate
- d. Only one charging pump is run. Running only one pump prevents excessive charging from contributing to a RCS pressure rise that actually lowers the boration rate

**Answer:** c    **Exam Level:** S    **Cognitive Level:** Memory  
**Record Number:** 98    **RO Number:**    **SRO Number:** 73

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 1  
029    Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)

AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to a ATWS:

AA2.04 CVCS centrifugal charging pump operating indication

3.2 3.3

**Explanation:** c. Correct, per FRSM-1 and FRSM-1 Basis Document; a. – Not initiating SI to avoid a SGFP trip is discussed in the Basis Document; b. – If RCS pressure exceeds 2335 then PZR PORV operation is initiated; d. – Two charging pumps are always started.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION	2-EOP-FRSM-1	4	1	23	
EOP-FRSM-1 and 2 RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION	0300-000.00S-FRSM00-02	3.2.4	21-22		4.A, 5.A

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: ATWS conditions**

Which one of the following correctly describes the reason why it is worse for a full-power ATWS event to occur at the Beginning-of-Life (BOL) as compared to the End-of-Life (EOL)?

- a. The additional burnable poisons provide less heat conduction; therefore, the fuel pin outer clad temperatures are higher.
- b. The effective delayed neutron fraction is higher; therefore, the rate of power reduction is slower.
- c. The Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) is less negative; therefore, the reactor power reduction due to heat addition is less.
- d. The higher boron concentration in the RCS causes the emergency boration to be less effective; therefore, it takes longer to achieve adequate Shutdown Margin (SDM).

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory  
**Record Number:** 99    **RO Number:** 79    **SRO Number:** 74

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 1  
029    Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ATWS:

EK1.05 Definition of negative temperature coefficient as applied to large PWR coolant systems    2.8    3.2

**Explanation:** c. Correct, An ATWS event is more severe early in core life (least negative MTC) due to RCS pressure response; pressure could exceed safety setpoints. a. - Reduced heat conduction will raise fuel temperature which is better for Doppler coefficient. b. - Delayed neutron fraction is lower at BOL. d. - Boron addition rates do not mitigate the peak transient concerns.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
EOP-FRSM-1 and 2 Response to Nuclear Power Generation	0300-000.00S-FRSM00-02	1.3.4; 1.4.5	8-9		2.A, 5.A

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Direct From Source

**Question Source Comments:** PAM NRC 6/1998 re-exam

**Question: SR fuse failure**

Core re-load is in progress on Unit 2. The Audio Count Rate is selected to Source Range NIS (SRNIS) Channel N-31. Which one of the following is the correct course of action if the count rate on SRNIS Channel N-31 rises dramatically?

- a. If the rising count rate is NOT confirmed on SRNIS Channel N-32 and IRNIS Channels N-35 and N-36, immediately switch the Audio Count Rate to SRNIS Channel N-32
- b. Restore SRNIS Channel N-31 to operable or switch the Audio Count Rate to an operable channel within 15 minutes or suspend fuel movement
- c. Immediately suspend any positive reactivity changes, direct the Refueling SRO to place any assembly moved into a safe position and then suspend fuel movement
- d. Immediately select the Audio Count Rate Channel to SRNIS Channel N-32. Fuel movement can continue if boron concentration is  $\geq 2050$  ppm

**Answer:** c    **Exam Level:** S    **Cognitive Level:** Comprehension  
**Record Number:** 100    **RO Number:**    **SRO Number:** 75

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2  
032    Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation

AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation:  
AA2.05 Nature of abnormality, from rapid survey of control room data    2.9 3.2

**Explanation:** c. Correct. With a SR Channel and/or the Audio CR Channel OOS, fuel movement and positive reactivity changes are suspended; a&b – Validation of channel failure is not an option for continuation of fuel movement. d. – Boron concentration is an allowable substitute for SRNIS unavailability.

Reference Title/Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM MALFUNCTION	S2.OP-AB.NIS-0001(Q)	3.19	5	3
NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM MALFUNCTION	0300-000.00S-ABNIS1-00	19	13	1
EXCORE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM Technical Specifications, Section 3.9.2	0300-000.00S-EXCORE-00	V.A.1.a, b, c	53	8

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New(jkl)    **Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** IR overcompensated

Which one of the following describes the effect of having compensating voltage set too high on N35 during a unit startup?

- a. N35 indicates lower than N36; P-6 is not affected since the coincidence is 1/2.
- b. N35 indicates higher than N36; the Source Range High Flux Trip will occur prior to reaching P-6.
- c. N35 indicates lower than N36 but the SUR will be the same.
- d. N35 indicates higher than N36 and P-6 will energize prior to achieving proper Source Range/Intermediate Range overlap on the correctly reading channel

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 101    **RO Number:** 80    **SRO Number:** 76

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

033    Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation

AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation:

AA2.02 Indications of unreliable intermediate-range channel operation

3.3 3.6

**Explanation:** a. Correct, Overcompensation occurs resulting in a lower reading for the affected channel. Also the SUR for that channel will be higher since the curve slope increases faster. However P-6 is NOT affected because only one channel is required to BLOCK the SR channels. b. This may be true if BOTH IR channels are overcompensated. c. - N36 reads higher and the relative difference is not constant since the rate of change (SUR) for the affected channel is higher. d. - N-35 will be reading lower.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
EXCORE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-EXCORE-00	IV.D.2.h.5).b)	31		5.b

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

Concept Used

**Question Source Comments:** SOQL0189. Changed from shutdown to startup conditions.

**Question:** Worst case FH accident

Which one of the choices correctly completes the following statement?

In accordance with the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), the worst case fuel handling accident when a spent fuel assembly \_\_\_\_\_.

- a. is dropped into the refueling cavity
- b. is dropped into the spent fuel pit
- c. is located in the RCC Change Fixture and a large leak occurs in the refueling cavity seal
- d. is upright in the Transfer Pool and a large leak occurs in the refueling cavity seal

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    S    **Cognitive Level**    Memory  
**Record Number:** 102    **RO Number:**    **SRO Number:** 77

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 3    **SRO Group:** 3  
036    Fuel Handling Incidents

AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents:

AA2.03 Magnitude of potential radioactive release

3.1 4.2

**Explanation:** b. – Correct. The most limiting event is dropping of a spent fuel assembly onto the spent fuel pit floor resulting in the cladding of all fuel rods in the assembly; a. - The accident in containment has the containment barrier to reduce outside the plant. c. – This could result in rising radiation levels but inside containment; d. – A NEO is assigned and close the gate valve.

Reference Title/Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
0300-000.00S-ABFUEL1-00	V.A	16		4.A
UFSAR, Chapter 15.6, Fuel Handling Accident				

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank    **Question Modification Method:** Changed c. and d.

**Question Source Comments:** SOQL1132.

**Question: SG Tube leak vs. rupture**

Which one of the following conditions differentiates between a S/G tube leak, which is addressed in S2.OP-AB.SG-0001(Q) "STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK", and a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), which is addressed in the Emergency Procedures (EOPs)?

- a. Affected S/G level is controlled at the programmed level, in automatic
- b. RCS pressure is stable or rising with all PZR heaters energized and no load change in progress
- c. PZR level can be maintained stable or rising
- d. Affected S/G Blowdown Radiation Monitor (R-19) remains below the alarm setpoint

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    S    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 103    **RO Number:**    **SRO Number:** 78

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

037    Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Leak

2.4    Emergency Procedures / Plan

2.4.4    Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.    4.0    4.3

**Explanation:** c. - Correct. The capability to maintain PZR level and VCT level are the parameters reviewed to determine if the unit should be tripped & SI actuated; a. - S/G level can be controlled in AUTO even though a relatively large difference may exist between SF and FF; b. While the two are related, the trip criteria is based on the capability to control inventory, not pressure; d. - The criteria is PZR/VCT level, not RMS alarms.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK	S2.OP-AB.SG-0001(Q)	Attach 1, CAS	1	13	
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK	0300-000.00S-ABSG01-01	III.C.2-4	11		4

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** SGTR basis for RCS temperature control

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- A S/G tube rupture has been identified on 23 S/G
- SI has been actuated
- The crew has completed the initial cooldown actions of 2-EOP-SGTR-1

Which one of the following conditions would occur if the RCS temperature established is higher than the target temperature stipulated by the EOP?

- a. Pzr level will go solid (100%) during the subsequent RCS depressurization
- b. Pressure of the ruptured S/G rises with resultant lifting of a S/G Safety Valve
- c. Pressure of the non-ruptured S/Gs rises with resultant opening of the MS10's
- d. RCS subcooling may be lost before RCS and ruptured S/G pressures are equalized

**Answer d** Exam Level B Cognitive Level Memory

Record Number: 104 RO Number: 81 SRO Number: 79

Tier: Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions RO Group: 2 SRO Group: 2

038 Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the SGTR:

EK3.06 Actions contained in EOP for RCS water inventory balance, S/G tube rupture, and plant shutdown procedures 4.2 4.5

**Explanation:** d. – Correct. Target temperature for the cooldown is selected based on ruptured S/G pressure, which is the target pressure for the RCS depressurization. The cooldown of the RCS establishes sufficient subcooling for ruptured S/G pressure. a. - This will not occur as a direct result of the cooldown; however, any delay in equalizing pressures delays SI termination, increasing the likelihood of reaching a solid Pzr condition. b&c. - Once the cooldown is completed, even if the temperature isn't as low as required, the operator is directed to maintain that temperature, preventing these conditions from occurring. If leakage to the ruptured S/G is NOT controlled (by pressure equalization), then the S/G pressure is expected to increase to that of the RCS once the S/G is filled. This resultant pressure should be below the MS10 setpoints (1045 psig).

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE	2-EOP-SGTR-1	15 Table D	3	23	
EOP-SGTR-1, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE	0300-000.00S-SGTR01-02	III.A.1, 3.c	20-21		3, 7

**Material Required for Examination**

Question Source: NRC Exam Bank

Question Modification Method: Editorially Modified

Question Source Comments: Byron 9/98 NRC exam

**Question**      LOCA/STEAM leak indications

Which one of the following parameters can be used shortly after event initiation to differentiate between a secondary steam leak and a small primary loss-of-coolant accident, both inside containment?

- a. Pzr level.
- b. RCS pressure.
- c. T-cold temperatures.
- d. ECCS injection flow rates.

**Answer** c    **Exam Level**      R                      **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension  
**Record Number:** 105    **RO Number:** 82    **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1  
040                      Steam Line Rupture

AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Line Rupture:

AK1.06 High-energy steam line break considerations 3.7 3.8

**Explanation:** c. Correct. T-cold is the discriminator, being lower on steam break due to cooldown. a. - Pressurizer level would be low on each break. b. - RCS pressure changes on either break. d. - ECCS flow would be high as RCS pressure changes for both accidents.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
EOP-LOSC-1, Loss Of Secondary Coolant	0300-000.00S-LOSC01-03	II.C.2	12		1

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Direct From Source

**Question Source Comments:** Braidwood 6/1999 NRC exam.

**Question:** Loss of vacuum action basis

Abnormal procedure S2.OP-AB.COND-0001, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, requires load reductions in accordance with Attachment 4, Condenser Back Pressure Limits, to stabilize condenser vacuum at or greater than the OPERATING LIMIT. However, it is possible to stabilize vacuum at that value but still be required to initiate a turbine trip based on the 5 MINUTE OPERATING LIMIT.

Which one of the following correctly describes the basis for the 5 MINUTE OPERATING LIMIT?

- a. During low load-low vacuum conditions, extraction steam temperatures rise causing excessive thermal stresses in and possible failure of the feedwater heaters.
- b. During low load-low vacuum conditions, the turbine-condenser "boot" overheats rapidly and may fail.
- c. Low steam flow-low vacuum conditions can cause non-synchronous blade vibration (flutter) in the final stage of turbine blades and irreversible damage will occur.
- d. At low loads, one or more turbine governor valves may be closed. If the closed governor valves are in alternate quadrants then "double-shocking" of the first stage turbine blades occurs and the turbine may fail.

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 106    **RO Number:** 83    **SRO Number:** 80

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

051: Loss of Condenser Vacuum

2.1    Conduct Of Operations

2.1.32    Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions.

3.4    3.8

**Explanation:** c. – Correct, per AB.COND-1 Basis Document; a. – Extraction steam temperatures will rise but the turbine limits are the most restrictive element of the procedure; b. – Exhaust temperatures rise but this is controlled by sprays; d. This is a valid problem for a turbine but governor valve failure is necessary for this to occur.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM	S2.OP-AB.COND-0001(Q),	Basis Document			
LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM	0300-000.00S-ABCOND-01,	Obj.3			

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: FW line break evaluation**

Unit 2 is at 100% power. A break has occurred in the main feedwater line just upstream of 23BF22, Feedwater Stop Valve.

Assuming no operator action, which one of the choices correctly completes the following statement?

The reactor will trip on low SG level and 23 SG will . . . .

- a. completely blowdown. 23AF21 will remain closed on pressure override.
- b. be maintained at steam header pressure. AFW flow will maintain a level.
- c. be maintained at steam header pressure. AFW flow will be out the break.
- d. depressurize, causing an AUTO SI when steam pressure drops to 100 psi less than the other SG's.

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 107    **RO Number:** 84    **SRO Number:** 81

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

054    Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW)

AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW):

AK1.01 MFW line break depressurizes the S/G (similar to a steam line break) 4.1 4.3

**Explanation:** b. – Correct. 23BF22 is a MOV stop check valve and will terminate reverse flow. The AFW connection is downstream; a. – BF22 will close and terminate reverse flow from the SG and isolating AFW from the break; c. – It will not boil dry since AFW flow is maintained; d. – It will not de-pressurize because the remaining MS167's are open.

<b>Reference Title</b>	<b>Facility Reference Number</b>	<b>Section</b>	<b>Page</b>	<b>Revision</b>	<b>L. O.</b>
Lesson Plan: FEED and CONDENSATE P&ID 205302, Sheet 3	0300-000.00S-CN&FDW,	Obj. 3, 4.s			

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: LOPA recovery**

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- A loss of all AC power has occurred
- The SECs have been deenergized in accordance with 2-EOP-LOPA-1, "LOSS OF ALL AC POWER"
- RCP Seal Cooling isolation has been completed
- Buses 2B and 2C vital buses were just re-energized

Which one of the following sets of parameters/conditions is used to select the appropriate recovery procedure?

- a. SI actuation status
- b. RCS subcooling and Pzr level
- c. The vital buses power sources
- d. Pzr pressure and S/G pressures

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    S    **Cognitive Level**    Memory  
**Record Number:** 108    **RO Number:**    **SRO Number:** 82

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1  
055    Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout)

2.4    Emergency Procedures / Plan

2.4.4    Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures. 4.0 4.3

**Explanation:** Two criteria are used to determine whether the recovery actions include the need for SI or not. b. - Correct, The parameters for recovery without SI are RCS subcooling >0°F and Pzr level >11% (19% ADVERSE). These define the status of the RCS when AC power is restored; a. - SI is in title of recovery procedures but as "required" or "not required", not whether (or not) it has actuated; c. - The vital power source is only a concern for loading of DG; d. - Pzr pressure & S/G pressure provide for actuation of SI but are NOT directly addressed by the evaluation for recovery procedure selection.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
LOSS OF ALL AC POWER	2-EOP-LOPA-1	48	4	23	
EOP-LOPA-1, 2, 3; LOSS OF ALL AC POWER AND RECOVERY	0300-000.00S-LOPA00-02	4.3.48	53		9.B, 10

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Editorially Modified

**Question Source Comments:** Prairie Island 5/1999 NRC exam. Modified conditions & equipment for Salem.

**Question:** LOPA action basis

In accordance with 2-EOP-LOPA-1 "LOSS OF ALL AC POWER", which one of the following is the basis for maintaining S/G Narrow Range levels above 9% when the RCS is being cooled to 310°F Cold Leg temperature?

- a. Ensures the capability to cooldown once AC power is restored
- b. Ensure proper thermal stratification layer in the S/Gs in the event of a S/G tube rupture
- c. Narrow Range level is the only indication of S/G inventory available after a loss of all AC power
- d. Ensure sufficient heat transfer capability exists to remove heat from the RCS via natural circulation

**Answer d**    **Exam Level**    R    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 109    **RO Number:** 85    **SRO Number:**

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

055    Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout)

2.4    Emergency Procedures / Plan

2.4.7    Knowledge of event based EOP mitigation strategies.

3.1    3.8

**Explanation:** d. – Correct. Maintaining the U-tubes covered in at least one S/G will ensure that sufficient heat transfer capability exists to remove heat from the RCS via either natural circulation or reflux boiling after the RCS saturates. a. - Cooldown capability following power restoration is not a concern since equipment will be available to establish S/G feed flow. b. – A SGTR is no more or less likely during a LOPA. c. - Wide Range level indication is also available.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
LOSS OF ALL AC POWER	2-EOP-LOPA-1	37	3	23	
EOP-LOPA-1, 2, 3; LOSS OF ALL AC POWER AND RECOVERY	0300-000.00S-LOPA00-02	4.3.37.3	48		7, 8

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

Editorially Modified

**Question Source Comments:** Braidwood 6/1999 NRC exam. Changed values for Salem specific.

**Question: SEC ops**

Which one of the following describes SEC operation if a Safety Injection actuation (Mode I) occurs while Blackout (Mode II) loading is in progress?

- a. Mode II loading is completed. Operators must reset the SEC and start any Mode III loads not started in Mode II
- b. Mode II loading stops, all loads are shed, and Mode III loading begins
- c. Mode II loading stops, the SEC resets to Mode III and any ESF loads not already running are sequentially started.
- d. Mode II loading is completed. The SEC will then shed any non-Mode III loads and start any Mode III loads not already running

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 110    **RO Number:** 86    **SRO Number:** 83

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 3    **SRO Group:** 3  
056    Loss of Offsite Power

AA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power:

AA1.21 Reset of the ESF load sequencers 3.3 3.3

**Explanation:** When mode change is called for: 1) SEC stops where it is, 2) Sequencer currently in use is reset (by the SEC), 3) all loads previously started are shed, and 4) new loading sequence is initiated. Automatic mode changes are restricted and only certain changes can occur: 1) Mode I to Mode III, 2) Mode I to Mode IV, and 3) Mode II to Mode III. No other modes changes can occur until SEC is reset. b. – Correct. The mode change is allowed from MODE II (blackout) to MODE III (SI w/Blackout). The process is as described above. a. - This would be true if the Mode change was NOT allowed. c.&d. - These both incorrectly describe operation of the SEC in controlling sequencers.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT CONTROL SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-SEC000-01	IV.D.1	21		8

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Significantly Modified

**Question Source Comments:** Braidwood 6/1999 NRC exam.

**Question:** PZR heater control

Procedure S2.OP-AB.115-0002, "LOSS OF 2B 115V VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS", directs the installation of a jumper to energize pressurizer level comparator 2LC460D-C from an alternate source.

Which one of the following describes the operation of the Pzr Backup Heaters during the interim?

Until the jumper is installed, the heaters...

- a. cannot be energized
- b. can be operated using the LOCAL control
- c. can be operated using the normal console pushbuttons
- d. can only be operated by transferring to the emergency power supplies

**Answer b** Exam Level B Cognitive Level Comprehension

**Record Number:** 111 **RO Number:** 87 **SRO Number:** 84

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions **RO Group:** 1 **SRO Group:** 1  
057 Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus

AA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus:

AA1.06 Manual control of components for which automatic control is lost 3.5 3.5

**Explanation:** b. - The affected level comparator provides for Letdown Isolation and Pressurizer Heater Interlock. The heaters must be energized in local control as long as the comparator remains de-energized. a. - The heaters can be operated in local control. c. - The interlock prevents manual Control Room operation (manual and auto). d. - Only is incorrect and the emergency power supply has a limited heater capacity.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
LOSS OF 2B 115V VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS	S2.OP-AB.115-0002(Q)	3.11 NOTE	3	8	
LOSS OF 2A, 2B,2C and 2D 115V VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS	0300-000.00S-AB1151-01	III.D.11	12		3, 4.b

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Modified choices

**Question Source Comments:** SOQL1488

**Question:** Loss of 125 VDC

Which one of the following describes how a loss of 125 VDC affects the Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs)?

- a. The breaker is not capable of opening on a signal to the shunt trip coil
- b. The loss of voltage causes a shunt trip actuation and the breaker opens
- c. The breaker is not capable of opening on a signal to the UV trip coil
- d. The loss of voltage de-energizes the UV coil and the breaker opens

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    B                    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 112    **RO Number:** 88    **SRO Number:** 85

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions            **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2  
058                    Loss of DC Power

AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power:

AA2.03 DC loads lost; impact on ability to operate and monitor plant systems 3.5 3.9

**Explanation:** a. - Correct, The shunt trips are provided with external 125 VDC supplies and are energized to actuate. b. - The shunt trip energizes to actuate. c&d. - The undervoltage trip power to the reactor trip breakers is supplied from the respective SSPS cabinet 48 VDC and is not affected by the 125VDC.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
125VDC GROUND DETECTION	S2.OP-SO.125-0004(Q)	Attach 2,	5	7	
REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-RXPROT-00	IV.C.4.c&e, C.7.a	28-29, 31		10, 11

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Editorially Modified

**Question Source Comments:** CGroup NRC exam.

**Question:** WL permit conditions

Unit 2 is in Mode 5 and Unit 1 is at 100% power. A radioactive liquid release is in progress from 21 CVCS Monitor Tank, via 22 CCHX to Unit 1 Circulating Water. 12A Circulating Water Pump is OOS, all others are operating.

Which one of the following correctly describes the required action if 11B Circulator trips?

- a. The release can continue, the minimum dilution flow is still available
- b. The release shall be terminated, immediately
- c. The release may continue but only if RMS Channel R-18 is in service
- d. The Unit 2 CRS shall direct the responsible NEO to reduce the release flow rate by 50%

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    S    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 113    **RO Number:**    **SRO Number:** 86

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 1  
059    Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release

AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release:

AA2.02 The permit for liquid radioactive-waste release

2.9 3.9

**Explanation:** a. – Correct. There is still one circulator running in the release path; b. – Both pumps in the dilution medium have not been lost; c. – R-18 has nothing to do with the dilution flow rate or path; d. – While the dilution flow has been reduced by 50%, the minimum dilution flow is still available.

<b>Reference Title</b>	<b>Facility Reference Number</b>	<b>Section</b>	<b>Page</b>	<b>Revision</b>	<b>L. O.</b>
S2.OP-SO.WL-0001(Q), RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE					
S1.OP-AB.CW-0001(Q), Circulating Water Malfunction					
Lesson Plan: RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE SYSTEM, 0300-000.00S-WASLIQ-01, Obj. 3.b, 12					

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: SWS leak**

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- Power is at 100%
- OHAs for 21 SW HDR PRESS LO (B-13) and 22 SW HDR PRESS LO (B-14) actuated
- Pressure on both Service Water (SW) header pressure indicators is lowering
- Actions of S2.OP-AB.SW-0001(Q), "Loss of Service Water Header Pressure" are being performed
- After closing 21&22SW17, SW Bay tie valves, and 21&22SW23 Nuclear Header tie valves, both SW header pressure meters still indicate a slow pressure reduction

Which one of the following components would the NEOs be directed to check for leaks and proper operation?

- a. 21 CFCU Piping.
- b. 2SW308, SW Bay 2 Pressure Control Valve.
- c. Leakage into the 22SW valve and piping compartment.
- d. Emergency Diesel Generator SW supply header piping.

**Answer d**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension  
**Record Number:** 114    **RO Number:** 89    **SRO Number:** 87

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1  
062    Loss of Nuclear Service Water

AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water:

AA2.01 Location of a leak in the SWS

2.9 3.5

**Explanation:** d. – Correct. Once 21 & 22 headers have been separated, a continued decrease in pressure would be in common piping. This is either common piping to the DGs or 23 CFCU. a. - Only 23 CFCU has common SW piping. b. - Only one header affected. c. - Only one header affected and would be accompanied by other alarms

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
LOSS OF SERVICE WATER HEADER PRESSURE	S2.OP-AB.SW-0001(Q)	3.21	9	6	
LOSS OF SERVICE WATER HEADER PRESSURE	0300-000.00S-ABSW01-00	III.C	11		1, 4
Service Water Nuclear Area	205342	G-6	sh. 3	64	

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:**

Editorially Modified

**Question Source Comments:** SOQL1871. Modified layout of premise

**Question:** Actions for waste release in progress

During a complete loss of control air, S2.OP-AB.CA-0001(Q) "LOSS OF CONTROL AIR" the operator is directed to stop any liquid or gaseous radioactive releases in progress by closing 2WL51, Liquid Release Stop, and 2WG41, Gas Decay Tanks Vent Isolation.

Which one of the following correctly describes the reason for closing these valves?

- a. Ensure a positive closing signal while some air pressure is available
- b. Without air pressure, neither valve is capable of closing on interlock from their respective RMS channel
- c. This action terminates the open signal. Otherwise, these valves will re-open when air pressure is restored
- d. Ensures a release is not continued while degrading air pressure may be causing a change in the dilution medium flow rate

**Answer d**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 115    **RO Number:** 90    **SRO Number:** 88

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 3    **SRO Group:** 2  
065    Loss of Instrument Air

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air:

AK3.08 Actions contained in EOP for loss of instrument air    3.7    3.9

**Explanation:** d. – Correct. This step insures that, on a gradual depressurization, a release is not in progress when the dilution medium flowrate may be changing. a.&b. – These valves fail closed. c. – When these valves fail closed a closed limit switch terminates the open signal.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
LOSS OF CONTROL AIR	S2.OP-AB.CA-0001(Q)	3.23	4	5	
LOSS OF CONTROL AIR	0300-000.00S-ABCA01-01	III.D.23	12		2

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Significantly Modified (jkl)

**Question Source Comments:**    SOQL1045

**Question: CNMT fire response**

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- Power is at 100%
- OHA, FIRE PROT FIRE (A-7) alarms
- 2RP5 is checked and indicates the following:
  - Zone 59, Air and Water Deluge, Containment El. 100 Panel 335 is flashing
  - Zone 74, Smoke and Fire Detector, Containment El. 100 Panel 335 is lit

Which one of the following describes the status of the fire protection system?

- a. Fire protection water is being delivered via deluge valves
- b. A single manual valve in the Mechanical Penetration Area must be opened to initiate fire protection water flow via the open deluge valves
- c. The containment isolation valve must be opened from the control room to initiate fire protection water flow via the open deluge valves
- d. The Panel 335-related deluge valves located in the Mechanical Penetration Area must be manually opened to initiate fire protection water flow

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 116    **RO Number:** 91    **SRO Number:** 89

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

067    Plant Fire on Site

AA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site:

AA1.06 Fire alarm

3.5 3.7

**Explanation:** c. - Correct, The operator is procedurally directed "if at any time" RP-5 fire indication for both Zones 59 and 74 on are received, open 2FP147, Fire Protection Containment Isolation. a. - 2FP147 must be opened before flow into CNMT is established. b.&d. - The valve required to be opened is remotely operated from the RP-5 Panel.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-FIRPRO-00	V.B.5 & 7	67-68		8.c
OVERHEAD ANNUNCIATORS WINDOW A	S2.OP-AR.ZZ-0001(Q)	A-7, 3.2	17	24	

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Editorially Modified

**Question Source Comments:** B Group NRC exam (Q76)

**Question: CCW indications**

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- A control room evacuation has occurred due to habitability concerns
- All immediate actions have been completed for S2.OP-AB.CR-0001(Q)  
"CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION"
- CCW system was aligned with 21 and 23 Pumps running and 22 Pump in AUTO
- After leaving the control room but prior manning the Hot Shutdown Panel (HSD), CCW header pressure dropped to 65 psig and then recovered.
- No actions were taken to alter CCW Pump status when control was established at the Hot Shutdown Panel

Which one of the following describes the CCW Pump indication status the operator would observe when re-establishing control in the control room?

- a. The START backlight for only 21 and 23 Pumps will be lit.
- b. The START backlight for 21 and 23 Pumps will be lit. The START backlight for 22 Pump will be flashing and the audible group alarm will be sounding.
- c. No CCW Pump indications will be observable until the respective HSD Panel switches are returned to REMOTE, then the START backlight for only 21 and 23 Pumps will be lit.
- d. No CCW Pump indications will be observable until the respective HSD Panel switches are returned to REMOTE, then the START backlight for 21 and 23 Pumps will light, the START backlight for 22 Pump will flash and the audible group alarm will sound.

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    **B**                      **Cognitive Level**    **Comprehension**  
**Record Number:** 117    **RO Number:** 92    **SRO Number:** 90

**Area:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1  
068                      Control Room Evacuation

AA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation:

AA1.21 Transfer of controls from control room to shutdown panel or local control 3.9 4.1

**Explanation:** The AUTO start feature on low header pressure for CCW is blocked once the Control Switch on the HSD Panel is taken to LOCAL. Control room indications, and group alarm functions remain operable. b. – Correct. 22  
CCW pump auto started which activated the backlight flash & group alarm. a. – This would be the indication if the pressure dropped after taking LOCAL control. c. – Incorrectly assumes that taking LOCAL control removes CR indication. d. – Incorrectly assumes that taking LOCAL control removes CR indication and that the AUTO start signal is retained.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION	S2.OP-AB.CR-0001(Q)	Attach 6, 3.0; Attach 16, 6.0	1, 2-3	8	
CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION	0300-000.00S-ABCR01-00	III.D.16	17		1, 3.c
COMPONENT COOLING WATER	0300-000.00S-CCW000-02	V.A.1.d, f	33-34		8, 9

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** PTS RCP starting criteria

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- A LOCA has occurred
- A Core Cooling RED Path exists and 2-EOP-FRCC-1, "RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING" is being implemented.
- Steam Generator depressurization was ineffective in restoring core cooling.
- All RCPs are stopped
- TEN CETs indicate temperatures above 1200°F

In order to provide core cooling, which one of the following conditions must be established prior to starting an RCP?

- a. RVLIS Full Range level is greater than 39%.
- b. Seal injection flow for the selected RCP is greater than 6 gpm.
- c. Level in the S/G in the loop for the selected RCP is greater than 15% NR.
- d. The RCP Oil Lift Pump on selected pump is running for greater than 2 minutes.

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    **B**    **Cognitive Level**    **Memory**

**Record Number:** 118    **RO Number:** 93    **SRO Number:** 91

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1  
074    Inadequate Core Cooling

**EK3.** Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Inadequate Core Cooling:

**EK3.07** Starting up emergency feedwater and RCPs

4.0 4.4

**Explanation:** For the stated conditions the RCP is started without requiring "normal" RCP prerequisites. c. - Correct, RCPs should only be started in loops with S/G levels >15% ADVERSE to ensure heat removal by secondary. a. - RVLIS level is an evaluation criteria for exiting this procedure at Step 8, Core Cooling Check. During a LOCA, RVLIS or Pzr level requirements must be met to start RCP. b. - Normal RCP starting requirements are for >6 gpm seal injection flow. d. - The LO pump must be running to start the RCP. Normal requirements are for the Lift Oil pump to run for at least 2 minutes prior to RCP start. The run time is NOT specified in FRCC and a procedure CAUTION statement indicates the RCP must be started when directed.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING	2-EOP-FRCC-1	25	3	21	
EOP-FRCC-1, 2, and 3 ACCIDENT MITIGATION STRATEGY	0300-000.00S-FRCC00-01	II.C.6, III.B.25	22, 50		3.a,7

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Other Facility

**Question Modification Method:** Significantly Modified

**Question Source Comments:** Prairie Island exam bank

**Question:** RCS temperature reduction basis

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- R31, Letdown Line-Failed Fuel Process Rad Monitor, indication is rising
- S2.OP-AB.RC-0002(Q), "HIGH ACTIVITY IN REACTOR COOLANT" was entered  
High RCS activity is confirmed
- As directed by the CONTINUOUS ACTION SUMMARY, the CRS directs the Unit to be shutdown and RCS temperature reduced to 500°F.

Which one of the below identifies the bases for reducing Tave below this value?

- a. Ensures S/G pressures remain below the lift setpoint for the MS10s in the event of a SGTR
- b. Lowers the expected peak containment pressure in the event of a LOCA
- c. This lowers CVCS letdown temperature to increase the effectiveness of the demineralizers in removing activated corrosion products
- d. Reduces migration of radioactive nuclides through existing cracks or breaks in the clad by lowering clad tensile stresses

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 119    **RO Number:** 94    **SRO Number:** 92

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1  
076    High Reactor Coolant Activity

AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity:

AK3.06 Actions contained in EOP for high reactor coolant activity 3.2 3.8

**Explanation:** b. - Correct, Reducing Tave to less than 500°F prevents an activity release should a steam generator tube rupture occur, since the saturation pressure of the primary coolant is below the lift pressure of the atmospheric steam relief valves (MS10s). a. - Action will reduce heat input to CNMT reducing the peak pressure, but the CNMT is a pressure boundary in the event of a break. c. - CVCS letdown rates are increased in the procedure but activated corrosion product removal is via filtering rather than ion exchange and is unaffected by temperature. d. - Tensile stress on cladding may be reduced this does not necessarily reduce the migration of radioactive material through existing cladding flaws.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
Salem Unit 2 Technical Specification Bases		3/4.4.9	B 3/4 4-6	112	
HIGH ACTIVITY IN REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM	0300-000.00S-ABRC02-00	C.2	9		3

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Significantly Modified

**Question Source Comments:** Combination of SOQL1885 & SOQL0953. Changed layout of premise.

**Question:** SEC response during SI termination

The following conditions exist on Unit 2:

- An electronic failure and technician error caused an inadvertent SI
- The crew has transitioned to TRIP-3, SI Termination
- SI and Phase A are reset
- 2B and 2C SEC are reset
- 2A SEC failed to reset

Which one of the following correctly describes the expected response of the 4KV vital buses if a loss of off-site power occurs before 2A SEC can be de-energized?

- Blackout loading occurs on all buses
- Accident+Blackout loading occurs on all buses
- Blackout loading occurs on 2B and 2C buses. Accident+Blackout loading occurs on 2A Bus
- Blackout loading occurs on 2B and 2C buses. 2A bus is de-energized.

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 120    **RO Number:** 95    **SRO Number:** 93

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:**2    **SRO Group:**1

E02, SI Termination

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the SI Termination:

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency 3.9/3.9

**Explanation:** The SECs normally respond to loss of offsite power in MODE II. When 2A SEC failed to RESET, the operator would block and attempt to reset the SEC. If SI is NOT present when a block switch is taken to "Block", both trains of SI will be blocked to the respective SEC Cabinet as long as the switches are held in the "BLOCK" position. As soon as the switches are released (returned to center) "Block" clears and circuitry return to normal.  
c. – Correct. 2B and 2C SEC see a Blackout. 2A SEC sees a SI followed by a Blackout; a. – 2A is still actuated in the SI Mode; b. – 2B and 2C SEC's are reset, setup for the next actuation; d. – This would be the case if 2A SEC was de-energized prior to the loss of power.

**Reference Title**

**Facility Reference Number/Section/Page/L.O.**

SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION, 2-EOP-TRIP-3/Steps 1-3/1/24/NA

SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT CONTROL, 0300-000.00S-SEC000-01/IV.D.4, F.4/22,24,25/8,9,13

EOP-TRIP-3, SAFETY INJECTION TERMINATION, 0300-000.00S-TRP003-01/3.3.3/13/3,10.A.5

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** Evaluation of conditions for stopping SI Pumps

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- A LOCA has occurred
- The crew is performing actions of 2-EOP-LOCA-2 "POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION"
- After stopping ONE Charging pump the following parameters exist:
  - RCS pressure is 1025 psig stable
  - Pzr level is 28%
  - RCS temperature (CETs) are reading 480°F
  - Containment pressure is 4.4 psig

Which one of the following describes the action to be taken for these conditions?

- a. SI should be manually re-initiated.
- b. Re-start the Charging pump based on subcooling less than 38°F.
- c. Stopping of ONE SI Pump should be evaluated using NORMAL values for subcooling and Pzr level.
- d. Stopping of ONE SI Pump should be evaluated using ADVERSE values for subcooling and Pzr level.

**Answer d** Exam Level B Cognitive Level Application

Record Number: 121 RO Number: 96 SRO Number: 94

Tier: Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions RO Group: 2 SRO Group: 2

E03 LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization

2.4 Emergency Procedures / Plan

2.4.14 Knowledge of general guidelines for EOP flowchart use.

3.0 3.9

**Explanation:** Adverse CNMT conditions are 1) Containment pressure greater than 4 psig, or 2) Containment radiation greater than 1E5 R/hr. d. – Correct. With the Charging pump stopped, the next step is to evaluate stopping one of the running SI pumps. ADVERSE & NORMAL sets of numbers are provided. Since CNMT PRESS is ADVERSE, use ADVERSE values for both parameters. a. - SI actuation criteria, which directs operation of ECCS pumps as necessary (NOT SI re-actuation), is covered in the CAS based on subcooling of 0°F or Pzr level of 11% (19%). b. - 38°F is a NORMAL value used in the evaluation of stopping the first charging pump. Once that is satisfied, pump is NOT restarted unless the CAS values are exceeded. c. – Use of NORMAL values is incorrect and may result in stopping SI pump when conditions do not warrant.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION	2-EOP-LOCA-2	22	3	22	
EOP-TRIP-1, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION AND INTRODUCTION TO THE USE OF EOPs	0300-000.00S-TRP001-01	2.14	27		1.G
EOP-LOCA-2, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION	0300-000.00S-LOCA02-01	III.C.22	32		7

**Material Required for Examination** EOP-CFST-1, Table A and B

**Question Source:** Previous 2 NRC Exams

**Question Modification Method:** Significantly Modified

**Question Source Comments:** DGroup NRC 2/1999. Modified conditions such that correct answer changed.

**Question:** Eval of LOCA location

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- Unit is in MODE 4 cooling down on RHR
- RCS Temperature - 340°F
- RCS pressure - 300 psig lowering
- PZR level - 22% lowering
- CNMT pressure - 0.2 psig
- 2R16, Plant Vent Effluent Monitor is in ALERT
- R41B, Plant Vent Iodine Monitor radiation levels are trending higher
- S/G levels stable at - 42% (21); 40% (22); 43% (23); 40% (24)
- S/G pressures stable at - 100 psig (21), 95 psig (22), 100 psig (23), 98 psig (24)

Which one of the following events is taking place?

- a. POPS actuated and one PORV is stuck open.
- b. A LOCA has occurred in the area of the Regenerative Heat Exchanger
- c. A LOCA has occurred on the suction of the RHR pump.
- d. Letdown line pressure control valve 2CV18 has failed open.

**Answer c** Exam Level B Cognitive Level Comprehension

Record Number: 122 RO Number: 97 SRO Number: 95

Tier: Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions RO Group: 2 SRO Group: 1

E04 LOCA Outside Containment

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the LOCA Outside Containment:

EK1.3 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the LOCA Outside Containment. 3.5 3.9

**Explanation:** c. – Correct. During any LOCA, RCS pressure & inventory will fall. Rising indication on the Aux Bldg radiation monitors is indicative of the LOCA outside containment (RHR pump suction). a. - When POPS operation results in a PORV opening, RCS pressure will drop, but PZR level should rise due to voiding in the reactor vessel head. Initial conditions do NOT support POPS auto operation. b. – This leak is inside containment. d. - Failure of CV18 open results in increased diversion of RHR flow (RCS inventory) to letdown but the flow is contained and would not lead to rising Aux. Bldg. RMS indications.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT	2-EOP-LOCA-1	16	2	24	
EOP-LOCA-6 LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT	0300-000.00S-LOCA06-01	3.1	7		3
EOP-LOCA-01, LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT AND LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT ANALYSIS	0300-000.00S-LOCA01-01				9

**Material Required for Examination**

Question Source: NRC Exam Bank

Question Modification Method: Significantly Modified

Question Source Comments: Braidwood 1997 NRC exam

**Question:** Core cooling evaluation

Which one of the following is the reason that 2-EOP-FRHS-1 "RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK" directs transition to the procedure and step in effect if RCS pressure is less than all intact or ruptured S/G pressures?

- a. Feeding S/Gs under these conditions may halt natural circulation core cooling
- b. Core decay heat is being removed by means other than the secondary heat sink
- c. Under these conditions, initiating feed flow can cause a substantial reverse delta-P that may result in a S/G tube rupture
- d. RCS subcooling must be restored prior to the initiation of feed and bleed

**Answer b**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 123    **RO Number:** 98    **SRO Number:** 96

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

E05    Loss of Secondary Heat Sink

EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Secondary Heat Sink and the following:

EK2.2 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.    3.9    4.2

**Explanation:** b. - Correct, The S/Gs are no longer functioning as a heat sink. Core heat is being removed by break flow.  
a. -Control of feed is a concern for natural circulation flow. However, in this case, natural circ will not be affected by feeding. c. - A SGTR is not the concern in this situation. d. - There is no means of restoring subcooling until a heat sink is recovered.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK	2-EOP-FRHS-1	3	1	24	
EOP-FRHS-1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 HEAT SINK FUNCTIONAL RESTORATION	0300-000.00S-FRHS00-03	5.2.3	21-22		10

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** NRC Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Editorially Modified

**Question Source Comments:** Braidwood 6/1999 NRC exam.

**Question:** FR implementation

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- A break has occurred on 22 main steam line and 22MS167 cannot be closed
- The other S/Gs were initially overfed with current levels approximately 30% NR
- A reactor trip and SI have occurred
- Pressurizer pressure is 1300 psig and slowly lowering
- Pressurizer level is off-scale low
- 2-EOP-TRIP-1 Step 21, RCS Temperature Control, is being performed
- The RO reports the lowest loop Tcold is 260°F and slowly lowering

Which one of the following identifies the correct process of EOP implementation?

- Immediately transition to FRTS-1 "Response To Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions".
- Immediately transition to FRTS-2 "Response To Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions".
- Complete actions of TRIP-1 through Faulted S/G Evaluation, transition to LOSC-1 "Loss of Secondary and then immediately transition to FRTS-1 "Response To Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Cond
- Complete actions of TRIP-1 through Faulted S/G Evaluation, transition to LOSC-1 "Loss of Secondary and then immediately transition to FRTS-2 "Response To Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock Cor

**Answer** c **Exam Level** S **Cognitive Level** Comprehension

**Record Number:** 124 **RO Number:** **SRO Number:** 97

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions **RO Group:** 1 **SRO Group:** 1

E08 Pressurized Thermal Shock

EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurized Thermal Shock:

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations. 3.4 4.2

**Explanation:** This is a Thermal Shock RED Path c.- Correct. The CSFTs are NOT implemented until transition from TRIP-1 occur when Faulted S/G is determined in TRIP-1 and crew is directed to LOSC-1. a.&b. – Functional restorations a implemented until directed or after transition from TRIP-1. d. – Transition is to FRTS-1.

Reference Title/Facility Reference Number	SectionPage	Revision	L. O.
USE OF PROCEDURES, SC.OP-AP.ZZ-0102(Q), 5.3.12.C; E.2 2-EOP-CFST-1, 1.0, Figs. 4, 4A		19-20	7

USE AND CONTROL OF PROCEDURES	0300-000.00S-PROCED-02	III.E.14.c & e.2	28-29	3
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**Material Required for Examination:** 2-EOP-CSFST-1 Figs 4 & 4A

**Question Source:** New

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question: Natural circulation cooldown comparison**

Which one of the following correctly describes a major philosophical difference between EOP-TRIP-5 (TRIP-5), Natural Circulation Rapid Cooldown Without RVLIS, and EOP-TRIP-6 (TRIP-6), Natural Circulation Rapid Cooldown With RVLIS?

- a. In TRIP-5 steps are taken to prevent bubble formation in the reactor vessel head. In TRIP-6 steps are taken if a bubble forms in the reactor vessel head.
- b. In TRIP-5 the cooldown rate is limited to 50°F/hr. In TRIP-6 the cooldown rate is 100°F/hr.
- c. In TRIP-5 the cooldown and depressurization is performed in discrete steps. In TRIP-6 the cooldown is continuous and steps are taken if RVLIS indicates excessive reactor vessel head bubble formation.
- d. TRIP-6 permits use of a PZR PORV for depressurization while TRIP-5 does NOT. Reactor vessel head bubble formation cannot be accurately inferred from indicated pressurizer level while a PORV is open.

**Answer c**    **Exam Level**    B    **Cognitive Level**    Comprehension

**Record Number:** 125    **RO Number:** 99    **SRO Number:** 98

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions    **RO Group:** 1    **SRO Group:** 1

E10    Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS

EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS:

EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with Natural Circulation with Steam    3.4    3.6

**Explanation:** c. – Correct. In TRIP-5, the cooldown is terminated at plateaus and depressurization and corrective action for bubble formation is accomplished. In TRIP-6, the cooldown is continuous with corrective actions based on RVLIS indication; a – Reactor vessel head bubble formation is expected in both procedures; b. – In TRIP-6, the cooldown rate is 50°F/hr for only the first leg; d. – Aux. Spray is preferred but use of a PORV is permitted in both procedures.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
NATURAL CIRCULATION RAPID COOLDOWN WITHOUT RVLIS	2-EOP-TRIP-5	7, 10, 19, 26	1,2,3	21	
NATURAL CIRCULATION RAPID COOLDOWN WITH RVLIS	2-EOP-TRIP-6	7	1	21	
EOP-TRIP 4, 5, 6; NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN	0300-000.00S-TRP004-01	5.3.7, 5.3.8, 7.3.7	44, 46, 73		5, 6

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** New (jkl)

**Question Modification Method:**

**Question Source Comments:**

**Question:** Procedure transition when elec. power is restored

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- A LOCA has occurred
- While performing actions of 2-EOP-LOCA 1"LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT", 22 RHR pump motor seizes and power is lost to the 21 RHR pump
- The crew enters 2-EOP-LOCA-5, "LOSS OF EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION"
- A cooldown as been initiated as directed in 2-EOP-LOCA-5
- During the cooldown, the crew restores power to 21 RHR pump.

Based on current plant conditions, which one of the following represents the correct mitigation strategy?

- a. Return to 2-EOP-LOCA-1 and continue recovery actions with the step previously in effect
- b. Start the RHR pump to provide makeup flow to the RCS and continue recovery via 2-EOP-LOCA-5
- c. Continue with the cooldown and start the RHR pump when directed in 2-EOP-LOCA-5
- d. Immediately start the RHR pump and transition to 2-EOP-LOCA-3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation

**Answer a**    **Exam Level**    S                      **Cognitive Level**    Memory

**Record Number:** 126    **RO Number:**                      **SRO Number:** 99

**Tier:** Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions                      **RO Group:** 2    **SRO Group:** 2

E11                      Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation

2.4    Emergency Procedures / Plan

2.4.8    Knowledge of how the event-based emergency/abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with the symptom-based EOPs.                      3.0    3.7

**Explanation:** a. – Correct. Continuous action step states that if any train of emergency recirculation capability is restored then the crew should return to the procedure and step in effect. This is consistent with the organization of the EOPs.  
b. - The RHR pump should be started but that direction is provided in LOCA-1. c. - Continuation of the cooldown in LOCA-5 is not required. The purpose of the procedure is mitigation and recovery of recirculation capability.  
d. – A transfer to LOCA-3 is not initiated until RWST level is evaluated in LOCA-1.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
LOSS OF EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION	2-EOP-LOCA-5	5.1	1	22	
EOP-LOCA-5, LOSS OF EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION	0300-000.00S-LOCA05-01	2.1.1, 3.3.5.3	7, 15		1, 7.B

**Material Required for Examination**

**Question Source:** Facility Exam Bank

**Question Modification Method:** Significantly Modified

**Question Source Comments:** SOQL0117

**Question: AFW flow to multiple faulted S/Gs**

Given the following conditions for Unit 2:

- A steamline break occurred on the 22 S/G 25 minutes ago
- All MSIVs failed to close
- RCS pressure is 1050 psig
- RCS temperature (SPDS) average 370°F
- RCS Tcolds: 310°F (21), 280°F (22), 320°F (23), 320°F (24)
- CNMT pressure has stabilized at 8 psig
- S/G WR levels - 50% (21); 8% (22); 48% (23); 55% (24)

The operating crew is performing the Safeguards Reset Actions in accordance with 2-EOP-LOSC-2, "MULTIPLE STEAM GENERATOR DEPRESSURIZATION" when the STA reports a PURPLE Path for Thermal Shock Status Tree.

Which one of the following correctly describes the AFW flow strategy for both procedures?

- a. Maintain flow at 1.0E04 lb/hr to each S/G, to limit cooldown and prevent S/G tube dryout.
- b. Maintain total flow >22E04 lb/hr but only feed 21, 23, 24 S/G's, to maintain an adequate heat sink but limit cooldown
- c. Maintain flow to 21, 23, 24 SG at 1.0E04 lb/hr each, to limit cooldown and prevent SG tube dryout
- d. Maintain total flow at 22E04 lb/hr, feeding all S/Gs to maintain an adequate heat sink but limit cooldown

**Answer a** Exam Level B Cognitive Level Comprehension

Record Number: 127 RO Number: 100 SRO Number: 100

ier: Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions RO Group: 1 SRO Group: 1

E12 Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators

EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Uncontrolled Depressurization of all Steam Generators:

EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations. 3.5 3.7

**Explanation:**a. Correct, If all S/G are faulted or if any faulted S/G is necessary for RCS temperature control, feed flow is controlled at a minimum measurable value to minimize the effects of the RCS cooldown and prevent steam generator tube dryout. b. – Any SG <9% NR is required to be fed at 1E04; c. - If only one faulted S/G, the normal action is to isolate the faulted S/G and maintain 22E04 to the other S/Gs; d. – 22E04 is the minimum AFW flow value in most other procedures.

Reference Title	Facility Reference Number	Section	Page	Revision	L. O.
MULTIPLE STEAM GENERATOR DEPRESSURIZATION	2-EOP-LOSC-2	4	1	24	
EOP-FRTS-1 AND 2, RESPONSE TO PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK CONDITIONS	0300-000.00S-FRTS00-01	3.2.5	19		3.a
EOP-LOSC-2, MULTIPLE STEAM GENERATOR DEPRESSURIZATION	0300-000.00S-LOCS02-02	4	16		4

**Material Required for Examination**

Question Source: New (jkl)

Question Modification Method:

Question Source Comments:

ADAMS DOCUMENT COVER SHEET

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SALEM ADMIN QUESTIONS

SRO(I)

A3.1

PAGE 1 OF 2

CANDIDATE: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCKET: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

QUESTION:

A pipe break has occurred on the 78' elevation of the Mechanical Penetration Area. A Site Area Emergency has been declared. The Equipment Operator that will be sent into the area to isolate the leak has a current year TEDE of 1980 mrem. The evolution is projected to take 30 minutes, in a general area dose rate of 4.6 Rem/hr. The one time Emergency Dose extension is **NOT** authorized.

Can this NEO be used to perform the task without exceeding any administrative dose limit and what is the basis for your decision?

ANSWER:

Yes. ERO personnel are automatically extended to 4500 mR at an ALERT or higher. The NEO's dose is  $1980 + 30/60(4600) = 4280$  mR

RESPONSE:

*Added:*

*"and what is the basis for your decision?"*

SAT \_\_\_\_\_ UNSAT \_\_\_\_\_

K/A NUMBER: 2.3.4 3.1

REFERENCES: EPIP-202S

SRO

A3.2

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