



James Scarola
Vice President
Harris Nuclear Plant

FEB 9 2001

SERIAL: HNP-01-023

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTENTION: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
DOCKET NO. 50-400/LICENSE NO. NPF-63
REQUEST FOR LICENSE AMENDMENT
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.9.2
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Dear Sir or Madam:

On December 13, 2000, Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) submitted a proposed license amendment for Technical Specification (TS) TS 3/4.9.2, "Refueling Operations - Instrumentation" and associated Bases. HNP is providing this administrative correction to the December 13, 2000 letter to clarify guidance in the Bases for TS 3/4.9.2.

This supplemental information does not affect the conclusions of either the 10 CFR 50.92 evaluation or the Environmental Considerations submitted as part of HNP's December 13, 2000 letter.

CP&L requests that the proposed amendment be issued such that implementation will occur within 60 days of issuance.

Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. E. A. McCartney at (919) 362-2661.

Sincerely,

P.O. Box 165
New Hill, NC 27562

T > 919.362.2502
F > 919.362.2095


ADD

J. Scarola, having been first duly sworn, did depose and say that the information contained herein is true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge and belief, and the sources of his information are employees, contractors, and agents of Carolina Power & Light Company.

Darlene S. Yarborough

Notary (Seal)

My commission expires: 2-21-2005



MSE/mse

Enclosures:

1. Technical Specification Bases Page

- c: Mr. J. B. Brady, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector
Mr. Mel Fry, Director, NC DEHNR
Mr. R. J. Laufer, NRC Project Manager
Mr. L. A. Reyes, NRC Regional Administrator

ENCLOSURE 1 TO SERIAL: HNP-01-023

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

BASES

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that: (1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the safety analyses and are specified in the cycle-specific COLR. The boron concentration limit specified in the COLR ensures that a core K_{eff} of ≤ 0.95 is maintained during fuel handling operations. The administrative controls over the required valves during refueling operations precludes the possibility of uncontrolled boron dilution of the filled portion of the RCS. This action prevents flow to the RCS of unborated water by closing flow paths from sources of unborated water.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core. Suitable monitors used in place of primary source range neutron flux monitors (N31 and N32) are recognized as alternate monitors. Alternate monitors may be used in place of the primary monitors provided the required indication is maintained and the alternate source range monitor is powered from a separate power supply than the redundant operable source range monitor. Additionally, the core position of the detectors for the two operable source range monitors and the loading/unloading pattern of the fuel ^{should} be such that detector capability is optimized.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME - DELETED

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

The requirements on containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE. Penetrations applicable to Technical Specification 3.9.4.b and 3.9.4.c may be opened provided the following administrative controls are in effect:

1. An individual or individuals shall be designated and available at all times, capable of isolating the breached penetration.
2. The breached penetrations shall not be obstructed unless capability for rapid removal of obstructions is provided (such as quick disconnects for hoses).
3. For the Personnel Air Lock, at least one door must be capable of being closed and secured.
4. Only penetrations that communicate between the Reactor Containment Building atmosphere and the Reactor Auxiliary Building Ventilation System atmosphere are permitted to be open under these administrative controls.

Containment penetrations that provide direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere must be isolated, or capable of isolation via administrative controls, on at least one side of containment. Isolation may be achieved by an OPERABLE automatic isolation valve, or by a manual isolation

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