

February 14, 2001

LICENSEE: Florida Power and Light Company (FPL)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF JANUARY 4, 2001, MEETING WITH FPL TO DISCUSS STAFF QUESTIONS AND POTENTIAL REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAIs) FOR THE TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4, LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION

On January 4, 2001, representatives of FPL Company met with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff to discuss and/or provide clarification on several questions raised by the staff as part of its review of the application. The areas discussed were as follows:

- Section 2.3.4 Steam and Power Conversion Systems
- Section 2.3.1 Reactor Coolant Systems
- Section 2.3.2 Engineered Safety Features
- Section 2.4 Scoping and Screening Results - Structures
- Appendix B, Section 3.1.5 Galvanic Corrosion Susceptibility Inspection Program
- Appendix B, Section 3.2.2 Boraflex Surveillance Program
- Appendix B, Section 3.2.3 Boric Acid Wastage Surveillance Program.

The meeting was useful to clarify the intent of staff questions. Several of the questions were resolved, while the balance was formally sent to the applicant as RAIs. There were two bases for resolving staff questions: 1) the information was present in another section of the application; and 2) the question was that of omission based on applicability to the facility, to which the applicant confirmed the applicability of a certain questions. Attached is a list of attendees and documentation of the questions that were resolved.

/RA/

Stephen S. Koenick, Project Manager
License Renewal and Standardization Branch
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs

Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251

Attachments: As Stated

cc w/attachments: See next page

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NRC PUBLIC MEETING ATTENDANCE LIST
Clarify Contents of Application of License Renewal for Turkey Point
January 4, 2001

<u>Name</u>	<u>Organization</u>
Stephen Koenick	NRC/NRR/DRIP/RLSB
Paul Gunter	Nuclear Info & Resource Service
Dick Wessman	NRC/NRR/DE
Chang-Yang Li	NRC/NRR/DSSA/SPLB
Antonio G. Menocal	FPL
Stephen T. Hale	FPL
Raj Auluck	NRC/NRR/DRIP/RLSB
Carolyn Lauron	NRC/NRR/DE/EMCB
J. S. Guo	NRC/NRR/DSSA/SPLB
Muhammad Razzaque	NRC/NRR/DSSA/SPLB
Jim Davis	NRC/NRR/DE/EMLB

Requests for Additional Information that were resolved at the January 4, 2001, meeting

- In drawing Nos. 3-SAMP-02 and 4-SAMP-02 of the LRA, heat exchangers (SC-3-1432, -1433, -1434, SC-4-1432, -1433, -1434) are identified as within the scope of license renewal, but are not listed in Table 3.5-1 as being subject to an AMR. The heat exchangers are passive and long-lived. Justify the exclusion of these heat exchangers from an AMR.

This question was resolved because the information was appropriately contained in the license renewal application in Table 3.4-6, pages 3.4-39, 40.

- In drawing No. 4-AFW-01, part of the flow path from steam generator A in location G3 is identified as within the scope of license renewal, but not highlighted. It appears to the reviewer to be an error. Correct this error in the drawing, or explain why it is not highlighted.

In the application in drawing No. 4-AFW-01, the flow path is correctly identified as within scope based on the license renewal boundary flag. The highlight, which the applicant used as a technique to facilitate the review, was erroneously cut off prior to the boundary. In the meeting the applicant committed to expanding the highlight to the license renewal boundary whenever the drawing is revised. Therefore, based on the flow path being correctly identified with the boundary flag and the commitment to expand the line to the designated license renewal boundary flag, the question was resolved.

- Table 3.6-2 of the LRA only lists the blind flange of the fuel transfer tube as the component within the scope and subject to an AMR for license renewal. Why is it that the closure between the transfer tube and the sleeve that is welded to the containment liner are not listed as the components requiring an AMR?

This question was resolved since information was available in the application, specifically Section 2.4 page 2.4-12:

“Note that only the fuel transfer tube blind flanges are included with the Containment aging management review. The aging management review of the fuel transfer tubes, penetration sleeves, and gate valves is discussed in Subsection 3.6.2 as part of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling.”

- Section 2.4.1.1.1 of the LRA states that the piping and ventilation penetrations are the rigid welded type and are solidly anchored to the containment wall. Provide examples on some of these piping penetrations and ventilation penetrations and identify their boundaries within the scope of license renewal.

This question was resolved since information was available in the application, specifically Section 2.3.2.3 page 2.3-15:

“Note that all containment penetrations and associated containment isolation valves and components that ensure containment integrity, regardless of where they are described, require an aging management review.”

- Section 2.4.1.2.2 of the LRA states that steel commodities are provided in each containment structure to allow access to the various elevations and areas inside the containment for inspection and maintenance. However, the section did not mention the individual structures in the steel commodities. Name the structures and their safety functions of the steel commodities within the containment internals that are subject to an AMR.

This question was resolved since information was available in the application, specifically Table 3.6-2, “Containments” has a line item for structural steel: beams, columns, elevators, stairs, platforms, and grating. These have the intended functions as follows: provide structural support to safety-related components, provide structural support to non-safety related components whose failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the required safety-related functions, and provide structural support and/or shelter to components required for fire protection, anticipated transients without scram (ATWS), and/or station blackout (SBO) events.

- Section 2.4.2.2 of the LRA did not provide detailed description on the cold chemistry laboratory. Provide information on: (1) the function of the laboratory, (2) general description of the enclosure structure, and (3) structural or functional support to what kind of safety-related functions.

This question was resolved since information was available in the application, specifically Section 2.4.2.2 page 2.4-14.

The Cold Chemistry Lab is a concrete building with a concrete roof. It is located southwest of the turbine building. The Cold Chemistry Lab does not perform any safety-related functions, or directly protect safety-related equipment. The Cold Chemistry Lab is shown in Figure 2.2-1. The Cold Chemistry Lab is in the scope of license renewal because: It is a non-safety related structure whose failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of required safety-related functions.

- Section 2.4.2.3 of the LRA did not identify whether the exterior walls and foundation of the control building have expansion joints, water-stops, or epoxy grout subject to an AMR. Provide information on structural sealant for the below grade construction joints of the exterior walls or foundation that are required to prevent ground water in-leakage or flooding. Explain how the structure can maintain the pressure boundary of the control room in the building.

This question was resolved since information was available in the application, specifically Section 3.6.2.3.2 page 3.6-38, with respect to ground water, and Table 3.6-5 for weather stripping and sealants/caulking.

“At Turkey Point, this is applicable to concrete structural components exposed to the groundwater, saltwater flow, or saltwater splash (Intake Cooling Water System discharge). The structures with concrete structural components located below groundwater elevation are the Intake Structure, Discharge Structure, and the floors and lower wall portions of the residual heat removal pump and heat exchanger rooms in the Auxiliary Building.”

- Section 2.4.2.5 of the LRA states that the diesel driven fire pump is protected from the external environment by a prefabricated enclosure. Provide information on the prefabricated enclosure regarding: (1) construction materials, (2) structural design features, and (3) the equivalent seismic category or safety classification when it was designed with the South Florida Building Code.

This question was resolved since information was available in the application, specifically Table 3.6-7 page 3.6-70, intended function 10 states, “Provide structural support and/or shelter to components required for fire protection, anticipated transients without scram (ATWS), and/or station blackout (SBO) events. NOTE: Although not credited in the analyses for these events, these components have been conservatively included in the scope of license.” Therefore, information present is sufficient to satisfy Appendix R related enclosures.

- In the non-Class 1 section of RCS piping for the plant, are there any flow restricting orifices, holes or penetrations which are relied upon to limit reactor coolant leakage or mass flow rate to less than the plant normal makeup system capacity? If there are, the staff requests the applicant to identify those components, and submit an aging management review (AMR) for those components in order to manage and maintain all of their intended functions, including the flow restriction function.

This was a question as to whether the applicant had any of the non-Class 1 components listed since they weren't discussed in the application. This question was resolved because there are no such non-Class 1 RCS components, which can be validated by the RCS boundary drawings. This was confirmed by the applicant during the January 4, 2001 meeting.

- The LRA stated that overpressure protection consists of three code safety valves and two power operated relief valves on each pressurizer. Table 3.2-1 of the LRA, however, did not identify the bodies of these valves as within the scope of license renewal requiring aging management. The staff believes that valve bodies should be in scope in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a) and 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1); and therefore, requests the applicant to submit AMP for these valve bodies. The staff has also noted that valve bodies were not identified to be within the scope of license renewal requiring AMR in the bounding generic report WCAP-14574.

Question can be resolved, information is in the application. The valves in question are captured by the line item in T3.2-1 listing valves ≥ 4 " as verified in drawings 3 RCS-02 and 4RCS-02.

- In Table 3.2-1, page 3.2-64 of the LRA, it is indicated that pressurizer instrument nozzles thermowells are within the scope of license renewal. However, it is not clear whether this includes the instrument nozzle itself, particularly, its welded portion. Both intergranular and transgranular type stress corrosion cracking has been detected in the instrument nozzles of other Westinghouse PWRs. The staff, therefore, requests that the applicant, if they have not already included it, submit AMP for the pressurizer instrument nozzles, including its welded portions.

This question was for clarification of two line items of the table, i.e., instrument nozzles and thermowells. As confirmed by the applicant during the January 4, 2001, meeting, the welded material is included in the nozzle; therefore based on the clarification and confirmation made in the meeting, this question was resolved.

- From the staff review of the LRA, it appears that the reactor vessel level indication system, including the probe itself, was considered by the applicant to be outside the scope of license renewal requiring no aging management. If this is so, then the staff requests the applicant to submit the basis of their exclusion; otherwise, to submit an AMR for the components.

This question was resolved, information is in the application. The RVLIS uses a CRDM penetration on page 2.3-9 in Section 2.3.1.5. In Table 3.2-1 includes CRDMs as pressure boundary.

- The staff noted that the LRA (Table 3.2-1) identified steam generator (SG) primary manways and its bolting to be in scope; however, only the boltings for mechanical closures in the secondary side of the SG were included within the scope of license renewal. The staff requests the applicant to justify why the secondary side manways were not in scope when these are also part of pressure boundary, or to submit an AMR for these components.

This question was to ensure the secondary side manways be included in scope. In T3.2-1, there is a line item for secondary closures. As confirmed by the licensee during the January 4, 2001, meeting, secondary closures include the secondary manways as well as other smaller closures. Based on information available in the application and confirmation by the applicant, this question was resolved.

- Tables 3.3-4 and 3.3-5 of the LRA did not identify sump screens and/or vortex breakers that may be used in pump suction lines to protect the pumps from debris and/or cavitation following a loss-of-coolant accident as within the scope of license renewal requiring aging management. The staff requests the applicant to verify whether the plant is equipped with such passive components; and if it is, then to submit an AMR for the components.

Question is whether facility has identified equipment. Sump screens are included in T3.6-2, page 3.6-54. The screens can be seen on drawings 3-RHR-01, 4-RHR-01. The facility does not have any vortex breakers as confirmed by the applicant during the January 4, 2001, meeting. Based on available information and confirmation by the applicant this question was resolved.

- Tables 3.3-4 and 3.3-5 of the LRA did not identify screens and/or vortex breakers that may be used in pump suction lines inside the tanks from which ECCS water is drawn in order to protect the pumps from debris and/or cavitation as within the scope of license renewal requiring aging management. If any of the tanks are equipped with such passive components, then the staff requests the applicant to identify those tanks; and to submit an AMR for the screens and/or vortex breakers.

Question is whether facility has identified equipment. The facility does not have any vortex breakers or screens used in pump suction lines inside tanks as confirmed by the applicant during the January 4, 2001, meeting. Based on available information and confirmation by the applicant this question was resolved.

- The LRA stated that two spray lateral headers located near the top of the containment structure spray water (supplied by the containment spray system) to limit containment pressure following a loss-of-coolant accident. These components, however, were not listed in Table 3.3-2 of the LRA. The staff, therefore, requests the applicant to verify whether these headers are within the scope of license renewal, and are subject to aging management requirements. If they are, then the applicant should identify the LRA section where they have been discussed; and if they are not, then the applicant should submit an AMR for the components.

The question addresses whether the headers which aren't specifically called out are included as part of the piping/fittings line item contained in T3.3-2. The table states piping/fittings downstream of MOV, 3/4-880A and -880B as confirmed by drawings 3-CS-01 and 4-CS-01, the headers are included in the pressure boundary and addressed by that line item. Based on available information in the application, this question was resolved.

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