Union Electric Callaway Plant PO Box 620 Fulton, MO 65251

February 9, 2001

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Stop P1-137 Washington, DC 20555-0001

ULNRC-04382



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Gentlemen:

DOCKET NUMBER 50-483 CALLAWAY PLANT UNIT 1 UNION ELECTRIC CO. FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-30 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2001-001-00 Missed step in test procedure results in an invalid Reactor Trip Breaker actuation due to the system being improperly removed from service

The enclosed licensee event report is submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (iv) to report an automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature during Solid State Protection System Testing.

Aterson For

Warren A. Witt Manager, Callaway Plant

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Enclosure



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cc: Mr. Ellis W. Merschoff Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-8064

> Senior Resident Inspector Callaway Resident Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8201 NRC Road Steedman, MO 65077

Mr. Jack N. Donohew (2 copies) Licensing Project Manager, Callaway Plant Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 7E1 Washington, DC 20555-2738

Manager, Electric Department Missouri Public Service Commission PO Box 360 Jefferson City, MO 65102

Mr. Thomas A. Baxter Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 2300 N. Street N.W. Washington, DC 20037

Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 700 Galleria Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY					APP	APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 6-30-2001											
(1-2001) COMMISSION					Estin Rep	Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send											
						comr	comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 E6), U.S. Nuclear										
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)					the I	Regulatory Commission, Washington, LC 2055-0001, or by internet e-mail to bis1(2017c.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104), Office of											
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Callaway Plant Unit 1						05000483				1 OF 3							
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At 09:28 on 01-12-01, with the Plant operating at full power, an unplanned actuation of the "A"																	
Reactor Trip Breaker occurred during testing of "A" Solid State Protection System (SSPS). The "A"																	
Reactor Trip Breaker Bypass Breaker had previously been closed as part of the testing procedure;																	
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Due to a missed step in the procedure, the INPUT ERROR INHIBIT switch for the "A" train SSPS had not been placed in the INHIBIT position. Placing the switch in the INHIBIT position generates an Intermediate Range Rodstop Block and blocks the source range detector. Immediately prior to this step is a caution statement that has a requirement to notify the Reactor Operator. The Technician read the statement, notified the Reactor Operator as required, and incorrectly initialed the following step as complete, but failed to reposition the switch. When the Technicians cycled the "A" logic switch, the "A" Reactor Trip Breaker opened and the Control Room received annunciator 56B, RCS < 50 degrees F sub-cool. The Control Room Supervisor suspended testing, notified I&C Supervision, notified Engineering and initiated an immediate review of the events. It was discovered that the INPUT ERROR INHIBIT switch had not been placed in the INHIBIT position. The switch was placed in INHIBIT and the test was completed.

NRC FORM 366 (1-2001)

NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)		
	05000400	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER	2 05 3		
Callaway Plant Unit 1	05000483	2001 - 001 - 00	2 OF 3		

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

At 09:28 on 01-12-01, with the Plant operating at full power, an unplanned actuation of the "A" Reactor Trip Breaker (SB52SB102BRTA) occurred during Actuation Logic Testing of "A" Solid State Protection System (SSPS), in accordance with ISF-SB-00A29 (FCTNAL-ANAL; SSPS TRAIN A FCTNAL TEST). The "A" Reactor Trip Breaker Bypass Breaker had previously been closed as part of the testing procedure; therefore the "A" Trip Breaker actuation had no effect on Plant operation.

The initial conditions were established per ISF-SB-00A29 and the testing began. Due to a missed step in the procedure, the INPUT ERROR INHIBIT switch for the "A" train SSPS had not been placed in the INHIBIT position. Placing the switch in the INHIBIT position generates an Intermediate Range Rodstop Block and blocks energizing the source range detector. Immediately prior to this step is a caution statement that explains the function of the switch and a requirement to notify the Reactor Operator prior to placing the switch in INHIBIT. The Technician read the statement, notified the Reactor Operator as required, and incorrectly initialed the following step as complete, but failed to reposition the switch. The test proceeded without incident until the Technicians began rotating logic "A" test switch. The Technicians did not receive proper indication when it was rotated to position 14. The procedure allows the Technicians to cycle the switch, to clean the contacts. When the Technicians cycled the switch, the "A" Reactor Trip Breaker opened and the Control Room received annunciator 56B, RCS < 50 degrees F sub-cool. The Control Room Supervisor suspended testing, notified I&C Supervision, notified Engineering and initiated an immediate review of the events. During the review it was discovered that the INPUT ERROR INHIBIT switch had not been placed in the INHIBIT position, contrary to the procedure. The switch was placed in INHIBIT and the test was completed.

At 12:40, the NRC Operations Center was notified of this event in compliance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (ii).

BASIS FOR REPORTABILITY:

This event was determined to be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (ii) / 10CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv) as an event that resulted in an automatic actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF).

CONDITION AT TIME OF EVENT:

MODE 1, Power Operations-100%

ROOT CAUSE:

The I&C technician had not placed the INPUT ERROR INHIBIT switch in INHIBIT even though he had signed the step off. The test procedure contained a caution that required action (notify the Reactor Operator) prior to performing the step (place switch in INHIBIT). Grouping both actions together and providing a single sign off contributed to the likelihood of error. This missed procedure step, by the I&C technician, left the INPUT ERROR INHIBIT switch in the NORMAL position. This allowed the test signal to actuate the "A" Reactor Trip Breaker.

NRC FORM 366AU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)		
	05000402	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER	3 05 3		
Callaway Plant Unit 1	0000483	2001 - 001 - 00	JOFJ		

NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The test procedure (ISF-SB-00A32) for "B" train has been revised to remove the notification from the caution and make it a separate step.

The test procedure (ISF-SB-00A29) for "A" train will be revised prior to the next use, to remove the notification from the caution and make it a separate step.

This event will be included in the Operating Experience for future Actuation Logic Testing of Solid State Protection System (SSPS) work.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The risk assessment (10CFR50.65(a)(4)) for performing this testing includes the possibility of a Reactor Trip. This event did not result in a Reactor Trip or plant transient. The missed procedure step did not result in any additional quantifiable risk to the health and safety of the public.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

A review of the previous three years determined that there have not been any similar events.

FOOTNOTES:

The system and component codes listed below are from IEEE Standard 805-1984 and IEEE Standard 803A-1984, respectively.

System JD

Component BRK